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NAVAL STAFF MONOGRAPHS
(HISTORICAL).

FLEET ISSUE.

VOLUME XII

HOME WATERS—Part III.

From November 1914 to the end of
January 1915.

May 1925.

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NAVAL STAFF,

TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,

May 1925.

HOME WATERS, PART III.

November 1914 to the end of January 1915.

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HOME WATERS, PART III.

November 1914 to the end of January 1915.

Introduction.

This monograph continues the history of naval operations in Home Waters from the first German raid at Yarmouth to the action off the Dogger Bank. It thus covers the third period of the war, the period of German battle cruiser raids against the British coast.

The British movements connected with the German raids of November 3 and December 16 have already been described in some detail in C.B. 1585, Monograph No. 8 of this series; since that was compiled the German Official History of those raids has been published, the new material being so extensive as to necessitate the re-writing of the accounts. They will be found in Chapters I and VIII of this volume. The Monograph No. 8 has its own interest, in that it is an appreciation of the course of events as known from this side of the North Sea at the time, and affords an opportunity of comparing that appreciation with the actual facts.

Other monographs dealing in greater detail with certain aspects of the war in Home Waters during the specified period are :—

- (a) No. 7, C.B. 1585. The Patrol Flotillas at the commencement of the War.
- (b) No. 12, C.B. 1585. The Action of Dogger Bank, 24 January 1915; and its Addendum.
- (c) No. 18, C.B. 917*d*. The Dover Command, Vol. I.
- (d) No. 19, C.B. 917*e*. The 10th Cruiser Squadron during the Command of Admiral de Chair, 1914–1916.
- (e) C.B. 1553. History of British Minesweeping.
- (f) C.B. 1554. The Economic Blockade.

All times in this monograph are G.M.T., unless otherwise stated. The longitudes are reckoned from Greenwich.

Note on Sources.

The principal sources from which this monograph have been compiled are as follows :—

Confidential Sources.

- (a) *War Registry Telegrams for the Period.*—These are contained in H.S., Vols. 72–81 inclusive. The essential telegrams are reproduced in the Appendices to this monograph.

- (b) *M Branch Letter Books (Miscellaneous and Secret).*—These volumes contain Admiralty out letters.
- (c) *Secret Packs of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet.*—These are arranged in subjects and are bound in a large number of volumes with the general title of H.S.A. In this monograph they are quoted as "G.F.S.P."
- (d) *The Grand Fleet Narrative.*—This is a continuous diary of proceedings forwarded to the Admiralty by the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet. It is bound in monthly volumes. In this monograph it is quoted as "G.F.N."
- (e) *Papers of Commodore (T).*—These are the office papers of Commodore (T) bound in 13 volumes, with the general title of "Harwich Force Packs."
- (f) *Papers of Commodore (S).*—These are the office papers of Commodore (S) bound with the general title of "Commodore (S) War Records." The reports of Commodore (S) to the Chief of Staff under the title of "Eighth Submarine Flotilla Memoranda and Reports" are bound in the volumes H.S. 225 and 294.
- (g) *Grand Fleet Orders and Memoranda.*—These are bound in two series: (1) Grand Fleet Orders and Memoranda for General Distribution; (2) Grand Fleet Orders and Memoranda, Various. In this monograph they are quoted as "G.F.O. and M.," and "G.F.O. and M., Various," respectively.
- (h) *Signal, W/T and Deck Logs.*—These have been consulted whenever necessary. They are stored at Royal Naval Victualling Yard, Deptford, where they are registered and numbered.
- (i) *Admiralty Papers.*—The vast majority of these are still unbound. In this monograph they are quoted by their Branch Registry Number or by their Record Office title. All those which seemed to have connection with the subjects treated in this monograph have been scrutinised.
- (l) *Lockhart Leith's History of British Minefields.*—This document, compiled in the Admiralty from all available papers, is not yet in print and has not been registered or titled. Unfortunately, it gives no references to the original papers. It has been used as an authority when the sources on which it is based cannot readily be ascertained.

- (k) *Records of the Intelligence Division*.—The war records of the Intelligence Division are bound in several thousand volumes. They are quoted in this monograph by the general title of "I.D.H.S.," followed by the number of the volume concerned. The intercepted and decoded German wireless signals, which form the greater part of these records, have been a valuable source of information concerning contemporary German action and reports.

Published Sources.

- (a) *Der Krieg zur See, Nordsee, Bands II and III*.—This is the official German Naval History, based on the archives of the German Navy. It is the principal source of information from the German side. In this monograph it is quoted as "G.O.H." or "Nordsee."
- (b) *Naval Operations*, by Sir Julian Corbett.—This is the official history, based on Admiralty and Cabinet Archives and issued by the Committee of Imperial Defence. It has been utilised as a source for information not obtainable from the confidential papers listed above.
- (c) *Seaborne Trade*, by C. E. Fayle.—This also is an official history and is quoted as the authority for the effect of naval operations on seaborne trade.
- (d) Two other official histories, *The War in the Air*, by Sir Walter Raleigh, and *The Merchant Navy*, by Archibald Hurd, have occasionally been consulted.
- (e) *The World Crisis*, by Winston S. Churchill, gives copies of letters not otherwise available, and vivid pictures of certain parts of the war as seen from the First Lord's office. When used as a source it is mentioned in the footnotes.
- (f) The French Official History, *La Guerre des Croiseurs*, by P. Chack, Capitaine de Frégate, treats only of operations overseas up to December 8. It, therefore, contains very little matter bearing on the subject of this monograph, and that little is based upon the British Official Histories by Corbett and Fayle.
- (g) Personal narratives published by individuals have sometimes contained information not to be found in official sources. When used, such books are quoted in footnotes.
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HOME WATERS, PART III.

November 1914 to the end of January 1915.

CHAPTER I.

THE GERMAN RAID ON YARMOUTH, 3 NOVEMBER 1914.

1. **Preparations for Meeting Raids or Invasion.**—Among the anxieties of the Admiralty was the possibility of having to reckon with a raid or attempt at a landing by the enemy. This contingency had influenced the War Orders, in which was laid down the principle that, should a hostile expeditionary force be met at sea, the transports, and not the escort, were to be the first objects of attack. The expedition might, however, elude observation and reach our shores. Measures to deal with such an event would of necessity imply action by the War Office and other departments, as well as the Navy; and, as co-ordination of effort was essential, a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence had for some years had the matter under consideration. At a sitting of this sub-committee on 28 September 1914, it was suggested that detailed instructions should be given to local authorities for action in the event of a German landing, and accordingly the Admiralty ordered all Senior Naval Officers on the coasts of the United Kingdom to draw up, in co-operation with the local military and civil authorities, schemes for rendering useless the ports other than naval bases under their jurisdiction. Preparations were to be made for removing navigational marks, sinking vessels in the fairway and disabling the mechanical resources of the port, should the enemy be about to attempt a landing.¹

At the same time, the First Lord, in order to clarify and fix staff opinion, propounded a series of questions on the subject of invasion and referred them to Admiral Callaghan at the Nore, to whom two staff officers were temporarily attached to assist him in answering them. His reply reached the Admiralty on October 31. He considered that the Grand Fleet should not come south to take part in repelling an invasion; this should be rather the function of the Channel Fleet and the forces in the south, the Channel Fleet for this purpose being based on the Nore or in the Wallet off Harwich, when that could be rendered secure against torpedo attack. To deal with the transports themselves a flotilla of light draught vessels armed with guns should be concentrated at Yarmouth, near which port, should attack on

¹ Letter M. 02490, of 27 October 1914, in papers titled, *Case 622*, Vol. 1. (C6179)

London be the enemy's object, the landing would probably be attempted. As regards the method of gaining early intelligence of the enemy's forward move, which was the subject of one of the questions propounded to him, his opinion was that, beyond the reports of the usual agents—at any time an unreliable source of information—the Bight of Heligoland should be closely mined; outside these should be a wider zone of minefields watched by submarines, with destroyers patrolling further outside; any marked activity in sweeping would indicate the near approach of some proposed operation by the enemy.¹

His views arrived in time to be discussed with Admiral Jellicoe at a conference held at the Admiralty on November 2. As a result the 3rd Battle Squadron was ordered from the north to join Admiral Burney at Portland.² The ships of that squadron for some time had been acting as cruisers. On November 2, when the orders reached them, the *King Edward VII* class were cruising off the Shetlands, and the *Duncans* off the Hebrides, to intercept trade.

So far, the only means of dealing with a raid or an invasion rested with the patrol flotillas. These old torpedo craft had at first been concentrated by divisions in various ports, with the idea that as soon as news of the enemy's approach was received the nearest divisions should hurry to the threatened spot and attack the transports of the hostile force. After the discovery of the Tyne and Humber minefields at the end of August, the flotillas were deconcentrated and the boats carried out a continuous patrol of the coast, steaming up and down, singly, 20 miles apart, their function being to discover and deal with mine-carrying vessels, which the Admiralty at the time were persuaded were unarmed trawlers or craft masquerading as peaceful merchant ships.³ The patrol destroyers and torpedo boats could not keep the sea in rough weather, and the continuous work was so exhausting to crews and vessels that half of them had always to be in harbour. Those that were at sea patrolled the East Coast war channel, which was kept continuously swept for mines. All lights between Wick and Orford Ness had been extinguished since September 7 in the hope of baffling intending minelayers; and various light vessels had been removed, among them Smith's Knoll and Swarte Bank, which would render the approach to the coasts of Norfolk and Suffolk dangerous to a raiding force even in daylight.

2. The Enemy's Plans for a Raid.⁴—A raid was, in fact, at the moment in the enemy's mind. Nothing so formidable and impracticable as an attack by land forces on London seems ever

¹ M. 0079.

² Appendix B. 6.

³ See Monograph 7. C.B. 1585, *The Patrol Flotillas*.

⁴ The account from the German side is taken from the German Official History, *Der Krieg zur See. Nordsee* II, Chapter X.

to have been seriously contemplated ; but to a navy trained in the school of attack it was extremely irksome to have to submit to the idleness forced upon them by the intention of the Kaiser's Headquarters Staff to preserve the fleet intact. It might be expected also that the critical situation of the German army in Flanders would bring the fleet to its support ; but there was a lack of co-ordination among the various units of the German fighting machine and the Fleet Command were unaware that any special help was required. The Admiralstab¹ never mentioned it to the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, and replied to the army's request for assistance by despatching a few submarines to the coast of Flanders.

The chief idea in the minds of the Admiralstab at this time was to continue their mining policy. They had no sure information as to the disposal of our fleet. Indeed, their agents, perhaps from the excess of zeal to which agents are always prone, had reported men-of-war in almost every harbour in the British Isles, and there was no means of separating the grain from this copious mass of chaff. The Firth of Forth seemed the most promising field for operations. The attempt to mine it by the *Nautilus* and *Kolberg* on October 17 had been prematurely discovered and frustrated ; but the Admiralstab did not abandon hope of repeating the attempt without delay. The Fleet Command, however, feeling that surprise was essential to the success of such an operation and that surprise was no longer possible in the Firth of Forth, or indeed anywhere on the East Coast of England, determined that should a mining raid be attempted, it must be supported by powerful forces ; for they would not risk the loss of another light cruiser, which was the only vessel, except submarines, the Admiralstab proposed to use.

Hence arose the plan of operations. Our naval force in the Firth of Forth was no longer the objective ; the proposed operation seems to have been directed mainly against trading craft. Light cruisers, in close company with battle cruisers, were to mine an area off Lowestoft in order to destroy passing traffic and the fisheries, which in November are particularly active off the coasts of Norfolk and Suffolk.

The 1st and 3rd Squadrons of the High Sea Fleet, with a due proportion of cruisers and destroyers, were to come out in support, but no further than a rendezvous in 54 N, 4 E, about 60 miles NW from Terschelling ; to the west of this a screen of four submarines was to hold a line extending 30 miles SW $\frac{1}{4}$ S from 53.46 N, 4.27 E. For this, the first advance of the High Sea Fleet into the North Sea, the Kaiser's approval had to be obtained. On October 29 Admiral von Ingenohl telegraphed to the Imperial Headquarters an outline of his plan, doubting whether he would be allowed to carry it out ; and to his surprise

¹ This German word, meaning "Admiralty Staff," will be used to indicate the German Naval Staff.

approval came that evening. The weather was then unsuitable; a strong easterly gale was blowing. But there were reasons which seemed to admit of no delay:

At the British Admiralty there was a new First Sea Lord. Prince Louis of Battenberg, who was First Sea Lord when the war broke out, felt that, owing to his German parentage, he could not command all the confidence essential to the satisfaction of his important duties, and at the end of October he resigned. His successor, Lord Fisher, was well known in Germany to have had an active and ingenious mind; and the German Navy felt that they must get their blow in before Lord Fisher struck his.

Consequently, as soon as the weather moderated, a start was made. Further consideration of the problems presented by the scheme had forced the conclusion that, to avoid being sighted by our submarines working in Heligoland Bight and by the trawlers, which the Germans were convinced we were using for observation purposes, the mining force must leave the Jade under cover of darkness, and, therefore, could scarcely reach its objective till dawn. But if the mines were to effect their object in sinking merchant ships the fact of their being laid must be disguised and the best disguise appeared to be to give the appearance of another purpose to the expedition. It was therefore decided that during the minelaying by the light cruisers, the battle cruisers escorting them should bombard the coast defences.¹ Great moral effect on the British public was expected from this visible activity of the German Fleet so near the Thames.

3. The Situation at Yarmouth.—Yarmouth was the base for the six patrol destroyers *Violet*, *Vixen*, *Lively*, *Success*, *Earnest*, *Leopard*, whose beat extended from Cromer Knoll to Yarmouth itself. From Yarmouth the coast southward to Harwich was patrolled by six other destroyers based on Harwich. All twelve belonged to the 7th Flotilla, the Captain (D) of which, in the *Skirmisher*, was generally in the Humber.

At Harwich were the light cruisers *Arethusa* (Commodore Tyrwhitt), *Aurora*, *Fearless* (Captain (D) of the 1st Destroyer Flotilla), *Undaunted* (Captain (D) of the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla), and the destroyers of the 1st and 3rd Flotillas.

Between Harwich and Lowestoft stretched the area declared by us to be dangerous on account of the mines laid by the *Königin Luise*. The Germans presumably knew the position of her minefield and had therefore the advantage over us; and to make the area really dangerous to them as well as prohibited to our own ships we laid mines in October at the south-west and north-west edges of the square. These mines unfortunately proved no more effective than those of the Dover Straits field. Some of them came to the surface and were promptly sunk by

¹ This extension of the plan seems to have been made without the Kaiser's knowledge; it was not mentioned in the telegram of October 29 to headquarters.

the patrol destroyers under the orders of the Admiral of Patrols, who had not been informed that any British mines had been laid in that area.¹ They broke adrift on the slightest provocation, and after the gales at the end of October both the passage east of Harwich between the British and German fields and the branch of the swept channel running out from Yarmouth to Smith's Knoll were soon fouled by drifting mines. On November 1 four mines were sunk in the channel between Lowestoft and Yarmouth; one half-a-mile SE of Cross Sand Light Vessel off Yarmouth; and another in Lowestoft North Roads. Next day, another was sunk by a trawler three miles SE of Newarp Light Vessel off Yarmouth.² These were all drifting mines. As regards moored mines, the minesweeping gunboat *Halcyon* was superintending the sweeping of a channel from the Cross Sand Light Vessel to Smith's Knoll, where several mines had been seen; early on November 2 she was able to report the passage clear.³

Though the anchorage at Harwich was protected by forts on shore, Yarmouth was entirely undefended by land guns of any description. It had no examination service, and the entrance was so narrow that it could be easily blocked. So far there had seemed no special necessity for defending it; but it would soon attain more naval importance since it was to be the base of a new patrol flotilla of destroyers, the 10th, which was about to be formed. Moreover, the armed trawlers which were to act as auxiliaries to the patrol flotillas were increasing in number. The intention, at the beginning of November, was for the proposed 10th Flotilla, consisting of the *Forward* and 12 destroyers from the 7th Flotilla as nucleus, with 24 trawlers armed and fitted with the modified sweep, to be based on Harwich and Yarmouth. Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson was appointed Captain (D) of the 10th Flotilla on October 29; he was to act also as Senior Naval Officer of Yarmouth Base and to have his office ashore there. The trawlers, in divisions of 12 boats, were to sweep Smith's Knoll, the Broad Fourteens, or any other locality where submarines were to be expected. For communication with them Captain Nicholson was to use the wireless station at Lowestoft, and a telephone wire was about to be laid connecting his office at Yarmouth direct with that of the Senior Naval Officer, Lowestoft.⁴

4. Passage of the Raiding Force.—This, then, was the situation on the East Coast of England which the Germans intended to raid. The movement started on November 2. The first vessels to leave were the four submarines; they proceeded to their stations between the Texel and the battleships' rendezvous in 54° N, 4° E.

¹ Papers titled X. 3736/14.

² H.S. 72, pp. 103, 116, 206, 288.

³ H.S. 72, p. 254. Possibly the mines reported here were British mines. See H.S. 71, p. 701.

⁴ Papers titled X. 3024/14, X. 3766/14, and *War Office*, 10.4.15.

After a conference of admirals held on board the fleet flagship, the cruisers for the raid left at 4.30 p.m. under Rear-Admiral Hipper. The four battle cruisers, *Seydlitz* (Flag of Rear-Admiral Hipper), *Moltke*, *Blücher*, and *Von der Tann*, were screened three miles ahead by the light cruisers *Strassburg* and *Graudenz*, and followed by the light cruisers *Kolberg* and *Stralsund*, the last carrying mines. A destroyer flotilla was to have accompanied them. This had to be countermanded owing to the heavy seaway and doubtful weather, but scouting aircraft had carried out reconnaissances and had seen no signs of British forces. On November 2 we had no submarines in the Bight, though three boats were at Gorleston, ready to start as soon as the weather moderated—*E.10* to the Kattegat, to attack the German submarines operating off the Norwegian coast, *D.3* to watch off Terschelling, and *D.5* to observe the Western Ems. Thus the Bight was clear. Admiral Hipper steamed well to the northward before turning to the west, so as to give a wide berth to the Dutch coast and Terschelling, where we were known to be maintaining more or less continuously a destroyer patrol.

The battle squadrons, with the fleet flagship, followed an hour and a half later, taking almost the same course as the raiding party, which at midnight were approximately in 54.5 N, 4.15 E. Here Admiral Hipper altered course direct for Smith's Knoll, where it was intended the mines should be laid, under cover of a bombardment of certain coast works which the imaginative German spies had reported as in place at Great Yarmouth. So far all had gone well, but the squadron was now in danger of discovery.

5. Our Destroyer Patrols.—We, on our side, were contemplating a small raid in the enemy's territorial waters. The Germans had been observed by our watching submarines to be systematically sweeping off the Western Ems; and Commodore (T) obtained from the Admiralty permission to send two cruisers, each with a division of destroyers, to attack the minesweepers.¹ The cruisers he had selected, the *Undaunted* and *Aurora*, were ready with their destroyers at Harwich; but until the weather moderated it was useless to send them to raid the minesweepers. Meanwhile, he ordered them out on patrol, the *Aurora* with one division of destroyers to take the Broad Fourteens, while the *Undaunted*, with two divisions, operated between Terschelling and a rendezvous called Position Y, in 53° N, 3° 13' E.²

The *Undaunted*, Captain F. G. St. John, who had just relieved Captain Cecil Fox as Captain (D) of the 3rd Flotilla, left Harwich at 7.10 a.m., November 2, with the destroyers *Laurel*, *Legion*, *Lennox* and *Lysander*.³ Proceeding by the swept channel and

¹ B 2, 5.

² No copy of his orders is forthcoming; the latitude and longitude of Position Y is given in H.S. 75, p. 983.

³ *Laurel's* Signal Log, Deptford No. 17958.

Smith's Knoll he made for Terschelling, and during the dark hours of November 2-3 steamed across the route from Germany to Yarmouth. His course took him straight through the German rendezvous in 54 N, 4° E, at 7.30 p.m., before any of Hipper's squadron had reached it. Continuing northward for 30 miles Captain St. John turned west at 10 p.m., and south at 11 p.m. By this time Hipper was approaching the rendezvous, which he reached about midnight. Then, altering course direct for Smith's Knoll, the Germans increased speed, their course and that of the *Undaunted's* flotilla rapidly converging. It is impossible to ascertain the *Undaunted's* course exactly,¹ but she and her destroyers must have passed some 10 miles astern of the Germans at 3 a.m., November 3. Knowing nothing of the chance of a night attack that he had missed, Captain St. John continued his course southward, till at 6.30 a.m., about 25 miles to the westward of the Haaks, he altered course to reach Position Y about 8 a.m.

The *Aurora*, Captain C. J. Wintour, left Harwich at 5.45 a.m., November 2, with the three destroyers, *Lark*, *Lawford*, *Laverock*, to search for enemy submarines on the Broad Fourteens. Her route was by the passage between the British and German mine-fields, where many mines were drifting. At 8.15 a.m., the *Lark* sank two and, a couple of hours later, four more; the *Laverock* sank another at 2.30. Altogether, the little squadron sank 15 mines in the course of the day.² Early in the afternoon, the *Lawford* broke down with leaky condensers and had to be sent back to Harwich; her place was taken by the *Landrail*, which had been unable to leave with the rest of the division, and, proceeding up the swept channel, had been with the *Undaunted* till sent from Position Y to join her own division.

The *Aurora* and her division patrolled between the Maas and Haaks Light Vessels all night. The *Aurora* was to return to Harwich the following afternoon, while the three destroyers escorted the minelaying squadron to the eastern edge of the British mined area, where they were to lay a minefield during the night of November 3-4.

At dawn on November 3, when 20 miles south of the Haaks, Captain Wintour detached the destroyers to search for submarines, while he himself steered for Position Y, which he appointed as the rendezvous for 8 a.m. At 7.30 a.m., the *Lark* was 30 miles S68E from Position Y, steering for it at 24 knots.³

6. Admiral Hipper at Smith's Knoll.—By this time Admiral Hipper was approaching his objective. Having escaped detection by the *Undaunted* and her destroyers he continued his

¹ Her log gives no fixes. An entry in her Signal Log 14617 gives her D.R. position 5 p.m., November 2, as N71E, 47 miles from Y; this has been used as the starting point for plotting. See B 10.

² *Lark's* deck log; *Aurora* to Commodore (T), 8.42 p.m., November 2, in Signal Log 14617.

³ B 7, 8, 9, 15.

course for Smith's Knoll. Soon after 3 a.m. he met a fleet of fishing vessels. He could find no evidence to support his suspicion that they were acting as outposts for intelligence duties, and he passed on with a lively regret that he had no time or destroyers to sink them. And now the difficulties of navigation began to press. The shoals which fringe the Norfolk coast are in peace time well buoyed and lighted, but all these navigational marks had been removed. Moreover, on account of the weather and the course taken, the squadron had been unable to fix their position; in the unaccountable tides of the North Sea they might be well out of their reckoning. According to the flagship, they should reach Smith's Knoll at 5.30 a.m., and though her dead reckoning differed as much as 10 miles from that of certain other ships of the squadron, the *Stralsund*, rear ship, began to lay mines at that time. As the soundings did not agree with the assumed position, Captain Harder, of the *Stralsund*, laid his mines at greater intervals than in the plan, in order to have some reserve. This was wise; for suddenly, an hour later than he expected, he passed close by a buoy marked Smith's Knoll Watch, and knew that he had started his field 20 miles too soon.

A short time later the flagship found she was in 7 fathoms; guessing this to be Hearty Knoll, the Admiral altered course to SW, till the *Strassburg* sighted Cross Sand Light Vessel, and he was at last certain of his position, although the coast was still hidden in the mist. From there he intended to steer WSW for the Corton Light Vessel, stop in a favourable position, and begin the bombardment of the supposed Yarmouth defences. But at this moment he was diverted and thrown out of his course by sighting what he thought were enemy ships of some power. He turned to south in order to show them the broadside of his squadron, and thus remained too far from Yarmouth to effect any damage. Yet the vessels he had sighted were nothing more than the *Halcyon* and two of the patrol destroyers.

7. The "Halcyon" and "Lively" in Action.—The *Halcyon*, Commander G. N. Ballard, had come out from Yarmouth to look for floating mines in the Smith's Knoll channel. The visibility was low, about 6 miles, and a mist hung over the horizon. Out of this mist, at 7.8 a.m., when the *Halcyon* had reached the Cross Sand Light Vessel, suddenly appeared the leading German cruiser, steering direct towards her. Two minutes later the whole squadron came into view. Not sure whether these were friends or foes, Commander Ballard put his helm hard-a-port, and made the challenge. Any doubt that the ships sighted might be friends was quickly solved, for they replied to his challenge with salvos; and soon his wireless and his steering compass were carried away. The *Halcyon*, opposed to four German battle cruisers and four light cruisers, stood a poor chance of survival had it not been for the ready resource of Lieutenant H. T. Baillie-Grohman, who, in the patrol destroyer *Lively*, was coming out from Yarmouth

for the usual patrol of the swept channel. The other two boats, *Leopard* and *Success*, who shared with the *Lively* the turn of duty for the day, were following her, the *Leopard* a mile astern, and the *Success*, which was to take the southern-most station, further away still. Lieutenant Baillie-Grohman seems to have seen the enemy before the *Halcyon*, though she was $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles nearer to them, and at 7.5 he steered towards them, at 24 knots. When they opened fire he continued his course, and, circling round the *Halcyon*, put up a smoke screen, which effectually hid the gunboat, but drew the enemy's fire upon himself. Under cover of this screen, the first to be used in the war, the *Halcyon* ran for home. In a quarter of an hour the Germans turned away to the eastward, followed by the *Lively*, which, however, they soon outdistanced.¹

Lieutenant V. S. Butler, in the *Leopard*, was the senior of the two destroyer officers. Part of the duty of the patrol flotillas was to report the presence of the enemy. Accordingly, at 0720 he signalled by wireless to the *Violet*, the senior officer of his flotilla: "Two battle cruisers and two armoured cruisers open fire on *Lively* and myself."² This seems to have been made *en clair*, and was taken in by the Germans. Apart from this work of reporting, the *Leopard* kept inshore of the *Halcyon*, manœuvring to avoid the overs, which often came unpleasantly near.³

The *Success* had not left harbour till 7 a.m. She saw the flashes of gunfire through the mist, but was too far off to be of any use in the action.⁴ Both the *Lively* and *Leopard* had utilised this, the first opportunity of observing the firing of German armoured vessels since the war began.⁵ The outstanding feature was the small spread of the salvos, both from 11-in. and 6-in. guns; and it seemed remarkable that with such accuracy of calibration the Germans should have done so little harm. In fact, beyond the damage recorded, the *Halcyon*, though frequently straddled, was practically unhurt, her casualties being one seaman severely wounded. Both the *Lively* and *Leopard* were untouched.

The three resting destroyers of the patrol, *Violet*, *Earnest* and *Vixen*, in harbour at Lowestoft, raised steam directly the sound of the firing was heard. The *Violet* and *Earnest* went out, but the enemy had gone before they arrived on the spot; the *Vixen* was at four hours' notice and was, therefore, too late.⁶

¹ Papers titled X. 4075/1914. Lieutenant Baillie-Grohman received a letter of appreciation, M. 03461/14.

² B 12.

³ There was much W/T interference from the enemy, who seemed to be tuned to all our wave lengths. (Papers titled X. 3900/14).

⁴ The logs of the *Success* are lost; the signal and W/T logs of *Lively* for this period cannot be found.

⁵ Their observations were circulated to the fleet in Confidential Interim Order 213.

⁶ M. 04012/14.

The three submarines, *E.10*, *D.5*, *D.3*, at Yarmouth, at first were ordered out into the roads when the firing was heard; at 8.15, however, Captain Waistell, Captain (S) at Harwich, instructed them to proceed in execution of their previous orders in the hope that they might intercept the enemy near Terschelling. He also detailed three submarines to go from Harwich to Gorleston, and wait there ready for further orders. *D.5*, Lieutenant-Commander Godfrey Herbert, unfortunately struck a mine about 2 miles south of the South Cross Sand Buoy¹ and sank in less than a minute. Only Lieutenant-Commander Herbert and four others were saved by the steam drifter *Faithful*, Skipper James Collin, who, though he had seen the explosion and drew as much water as the submarine, gallantly came up to the rescue.² The position in which *D.5* sank was so far from the track of the Germans that the mine was probably a British one that had dragged or broken adrift. But the neighbourhood was clearly dangerous, and the submarines, which had been ordered to patrol 5 miles east of the Corton, were now recalled.³

As soon as they sighted the *Halcyon*, the two leading vessels, *Strassburg* and *Graudenz*, put on speed and opened fire on her at about 9,000 yards range; but Admiral Hipper, fearing submarines and minefields, recalled the two cruisers to their stations as look-outs at the head of his line, and ordered the *Seydlitz* only to fire. The order was misunderstood by the eager squadron, and the *Moltke* and *Blücher* joined in, with the result that the *Halcyon* disappeared in the explosion of the salvos, and observation of fire was impossible. The *Moltke* used her as target from 7.12 to 7.26; but the other battle cruisers ceased fire on her after three minutes and commenced bombarding the positions where spies had reported coast batteries, giving the maximum elevation to their guns. Owing to the mist and the long range, over 10 miles, no effect could be observed; and after a few minutes the battle cruisers engaged the *Halcyon* once more, the last shot of the day being fired at her by the *Von der Tann* at 7.31.

Since the first alteration of course on sighting the gunboat, the German squadron continued steaming more or less parallel to and 10 miles from the coast. By the plan, Admiral Hipper should have been several miles closer in; but he was already an hour late, and the courageous action of the *Halcyon* and *Lively* seems to have confirmed him in his desire to cut the operation short and get away. His movements were so hampered by minefields that his only line of retreat was by the way he had come; and at 7.31 he turned to eastward and retired, the *Stralsund* laying her last 28 mines astern of the squadron. There can be little doubt that the boldness of the *Halcyon* and *Lively* disturbed the German plan and saved the town of Yarmouth from such damage as a well-directed bombardment would have inflicted.

¹ The telegrams all say "Lightship," but Lieut.-Commander Herbert in his report, says "Buoy."

² He and his crew were awarded £97.

³ This paragraph is based on Commodore (S) War Records I, pp. 441-470.

As it was, the moral effect expected by the Germans to result from the bombardment had no opportunity of arising. No shell came nearer than the beach, and those that came so close were looked upon by us as overs from the action. It was not realised at the time that bombardment was the object of the enemy's raid, and though the existence of a minefield was not at first suspected, it was soon discovered when a fishing vessel was blown up at 8.30 a.m., about 3 miles west of Smith's Knoll Buoy.¹ The element of surprise on which the enemy reckoned in laying their field was, therefore, of very short duration.

8. Movements of Commodore Tyrwhitt's Forces.—Immediately the Germans opened fire, the *Halcyon* signalled by wireless to all ships that she was engaged by four enemy cruisers. This was taken in by both *Undaunted* and *Aurora* at 7.35 a.m. Commodore (T) at Harwich also intercepted the *Halcyon*'s message, and ordered the *Undaunted* and *Aurora* to Smith's Knoll with all despatch. This order the *Undaunted* took in at 7.40, when near Position Y. Captain St. John at once set course for Smith's Knoll, calling the *Aurora* and the *Lark*'s division to join him.

By 8 a.m., Commodore (T), who had ordered all the light cruisers and destroyers at Harwich to raise steam, heard from the *Halcyon* that the enemy squadron was moving away from the coast; he therefore ordered the *Undaunted* and *Aurora* to Terschelling in the hope of cutting it off. He intended to follow in the *Arethusa* with the ready destroyers, the *Fearless* and two divisions of the 1st Flotilla to follow him when they had raised steam.²

9. Orders Issued by the Admiralty.—The *Halcyon*'s signals were intercepted also by the Admiralty's reporting stations; but more than an hour elapsed before they reached the Chief of Staff's room. At first, simple warnings in the form of repetitions of the information were sent by the Admiralty to Dover, the Nore, Admiral Beatty at Cromarty, and the Vice-Admiral of the Channel Fleet. Commodore (S) was ordered to send all his available submarines to attack the cruisers off Gorleston, and the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, was to make the *King George V* ready for sea. By 9.30 a.m. the staff had decided on more definite action. All the Dover submarines were to go outside and be ready for emergencies. The *Queen*, from the Nore, was to proceed to the Tongue Lightship, and be joined there by the *Irresistible* and two destroyers from Dover; the *Venerable* and four submarines from the Nore Flotilla were added later to this force.³

¹ H.S. 72, p. 586. This was the *Fraternal*; two others, the *Copious* and the *Will and Maggie*, were blown up on the southern line of German mines during the day. (Papers titled *Board of Trade*, 6 November 1914. Reports of Loss of Fishing Vessels.)

² B 13 to 26, 28.

³ B 33 to 37, 39, 41 to 43.

The *Halcyon*, on arrival at Lowestoft, reported that the enemy's force consisted of four large four-funnelled armoured cruisers and four dreadnoughts, and had last been seen steaming south-eastward; this intelligence, which implied that the raiding force was more formidable than had been at first supposed by the Admiralty, reached Whitehall at 9.48 a.m. It seems to have been decoded and acted upon with remarkable rapidity; at 9.55 a.m., Admiralty Beatty was informed of it, and given discretion to proceed to the north of Heligoland to intercept the force on its return to Germany.¹

Though only eight enemy vessels had so far been reported it was obvious that there was activity in the North Sea. The Grand Fleet was at Lough Swilly, as far from German ports as the extent of the United Kingdom would permit. If the enemy was out, it was clear the Grand Fleet must be recalled; and at 10 a.m., orders went out for it to return to Scapa with all despatch and for the 3rd Battle Squadron to join it there. Admiral Jellicoe, who was on the way from London to Lough Swilly, was to follow his fleet in the *Iron Duke*. Twenty minutes later the Channel Fleet was ordered forward from Portland to Spithead, to be joined there by the *King George V*.² These orders were issued before it was known that the enemy, or at least a detachment of them, had again been sighted.

10. "Undaunted" Sights the Enemy at 9.50 a.m.—Receiving the Commodore's order to proceed to Terschelling in the hope of cutting off the enemy, the *Undaunted* turned 16 points to starboard with her destroyers.³ It was as well she turned there; in a quarter of an hour she would have reached and followed the mine-strewn track of the German squadron. Knowing the *Lark* and *Aurora* to be to the eastward of him, Captain St. John ordered the *Lark* to join the *Aurora* at Terschelling; but the *Aurora*, which does not seem to have understood that she was to go to Terschelling, continued her course for Smith's Knoll, calling the *Lark* to join her there. The *Lark* also continued her course for Smith's Knoll, where she joined the *Aurora* at 11, having crossed the mined track of the Germans.⁴

On turning the 16 points towards Terschelling, the *Undaunted* shaped a course very nearly that of the Germans, and her distance from them was just beyond the limit of visibility. Indeed, she was seen by them at 9 o'clock, though none of her vessels sighted the Germans. The courses were converging slightly, and at 9.05, Captain St. John suddenly saw the light cruisers of Hipper's squadron on his starboard quarter. He turned at once to north,

¹ B 30, 44.

² B 45, 46, 47.

³ Her deck log gives this turn at 8.43, her Signal Log, No. 14617, at 8.22; the latter is possibly a mistake for 8.42, as it is logged at 8.45 by *Laurel* (17958). See B 27.

⁴ B 31, 32, 38, 53.

and, calling his destroyers to put on their utmost speed, endeavoured to get out of sight. He thought, and, in fact, reported, that the enemy were chasing him, but it seems that before the German admiral could detach any ships to deal with him he had disappeared from view.

After steaming north for 20 minutes, Captain St. John steered west for a quarter of an hour; having by these movements shaken off pursuit and lost touch with the enemy, he turned back for Terschelling, being now a long way to the north of and astern of the enemy. Hipper also had turned some two points to northward to avoid the area off the Texel, in which the four mine-carrying torpedo boats had been sunk on October 17. The mines had been fully primed, and, as they would still be active, the area was reckoned by the Germans to be dangerous.

The *Undaunted* had sent out a signal to all ships that she had sighted the enemy, and later that she had resumed her course for Terschelling. Commodore Tyrwhitt ordered her to endeavour to lead the enemy south, without being cut off herself; but at this point the Admiralty, who were intercepting all the important signals, negatived the Terschelling patrol and suggested that the Commodore should concentrate his light cruisers, leaving the *Undaunted* to watch the enemy from a position well out of range. The *Undaunted's* movements had, however, taken her completely out of touch with the enemy, and the Commodore at noon, after ascertaining that this was the case, ordered her to join him and the *Aurora* at Position Y. Thus the enemy were left entirely unwatched.¹

11. **Situation at Noon.**—By noon, Hipper's squadron, whose speed had been reduced to 20 knots by defects in the *Kolberg* and the bad quality of the *Von der Tann's* coal, was 30 miles west of Terschelling, steaming ENE (magnetic). Von Ingenohl, with the squadrons from the High Sea Fleet, who, during the operation had been 100 miles from Yarmouth at the rendezvous in 54° N, 4° E, did not wait for Hipper to report his work completed, but started for home at 7.30 a.m., probably the time laid down in the plan for its conclusion. The sighting of the *Undaunted* by the raiding squadron, duly reported by Hipper, made no difference in the steady progress of the battleships homewards, since the fleet authorities were convinced that our heavy ships could not possibly reach Hipper's force, which therefore needed no support.

Their view was correct. The battle cruiser squadrons at Cromarty, the light cruisers at Scapa, the Grand Fleet at Lough Swilly, were still raising steam. So also was the Channel Fleet at Portland. The *Queen* and *Irresistible*, which, with destroyers and submarines, were to form a sort of defence against a raid in the Thames, had not yet reached their station off the Tongue Lightship.

¹ B 48 to 52, 54, 57, 61, 62, 63.

The only force which had any chance of obtaining touch with Admiral Hipper was the *Undaunted's* division. At noon this was some 15 miles north-west of him, steering on a course parallel to him, but at 16 knots.¹ Neither Admiral Hipper nor Captain St. John was aware of the other's proximity. This position of affairs continued till 12.37, when the *Undaunted* turned back for Position Y in obedience to the Commodore's orders.

The *Aurora* was near Smith's Knoll, where she had been waiting with the *Lark's* division for an hour and a half. Immediately on arrival there, she had reported to Captain St. John that she was waiting for orders. He, after some delay, told her to join him; but meanwhile, the Commodore had given the *Aurora* Position Y as a rendezvous with the *Arethusa*.²

The Commodore himself in the *Arethusa* was just rounding the north-west corner of the Southwold minefield. Having left Harwich at half-past eight with as many destroyers as he could muster, he steamed up the swept channel. Off Aldeburgh he was warned by patrol destroyers that there were mines adrift in the Channel; he kept a sharp look-out for these, and at 11.20, off the Corton Light Vessel, altered course to follow the Smith's Knoll Channel, which the previous evening had been reported swept and clear. He was thus on the point of steaming straight along the field laid by the *Stralsund* in her approach to Yarmouth. At 11.40, however, he heard from Lowestoft Naval Station that mines had been laid off Smith's Knoll that morning. He turned at once to east, away from Smith's Knoll, and skirted the northern boundary of the Southwold area. Here, too, he was in danger, for, as we have seen, the enemy had laid mines on their own line of retreat. These the *Arethusa* and her destroyers seemed to have crossed in perfect safety and ignorance. About noon the Commodore saw a mine explode a mile or so south of him, and although he did not know of the real danger he had just escaped, he ordered the *Fearless*, which had left Harwich with the rest of the destroyers at 10.30, to turn back and go out between the British and German minefields to join him at Position Y.³

12. Commodore Tyrwhitt's Sweep.—At the eastern limit of the Southwold mined area the Commodore turned northward for Position Y. Shortly before reaching it he was met by the *Undaunted* and *Aurora*, with their divisions, and by 3 p.m. he had concentrated his force of three light cruisers and 13 destroyers, and was ready to follow the Germans. The enemy, however, were five hours ahead of him and had not been seen since 10 a.m.

¹ The *Undaunted* signalled her noon position to her destroyers as 53.29 N, 3.40 E. This the destroyers obediently reproduce as their own position in their logs. The *Undaunted's* navigator, in her deck log, gives it as 53.29 N, 3.36 E observed, though observations were not possible. Probably the position was really a dead reckoning one, and not to be relied on within 10 miles.

² B 50, 55, 59, 65.

³ Based on *Arethusa's* signal logs. Also B 60, 64, 66.

The Commodore discussed the problem with Captain St. John, who agreed with his view that the German cruisers had gone straight home after mining Smith's Knoll; he asked the Admiralty for instructions, reporting a little later that he would sweep towards Terschelling till 5 p.m. and then turn back, unless they had other orders to give him. As it happened, his first request for instructions commenced with the words, "Doubtful whether enemy is returning to port"; the Admiralty, therefore, told him to remain at sea endeavouring to locate them and carrying out a destroyer attack after dark.¹ He accordingly continued steaming eastward till 11 p.m., when he was well beyond Terschelling. Here he turned back. No German wireless had been heard since 6 p.m., and in fact both Hipper's squadron and the High Sea Fleet had been in their own waters for some hours. The submarine screen had remained out till dusk, when they also turned for home. The Commodore had passed over the station of one of them at 7 p.m., but the boat was then well away. There was a thick fog all night, through which the flotilla steamed south-westward. Next morning, when the fog cleared, the Commodore again approached Terschelling; but nothing was to be found, and on the 5th he returned to Harwich by the passage between the British and German minefields, in order to re-fuel the flotilla before sending it out again on its normal anti-submarine patrol.

13. **The New Minefield.**—The Smith's Knoll Channel was too convenient to be allowed to remain closed without an effort to clear it, and minesweepers went out next morning from Lowestoft to sweep up the mines, an operation which, it was estimated, would take three days. Until this channel should be again available a temporary substitute was swept and buoyed from Haisborough Light to Jim Howe Bank. This was to be ready by November 6. It was soon found that the new minefield extended to 20 miles east of Smith's Knoll, and on the 5th one of the minesweeping trawlers, the *Mary*, blew up on the field. As a result of this accident the sweeping of Smith Knoll's Channel was suspended. Further accidents and the explosions of mines heard in rough weather brought the Admiralty to the conclusion that the district was quite unapproachable; and finally the Smith's Knoll Channel was definitely abandoned. On November 8 the northern limit of the prohibited Southwold area was extended to 52.54 N, and from 2° E to 3° E, and thus included the whole of Smith's Knoll Channel and the mines laid by the *Stralsund*. The area now prohibited as dangerous extended along the whole coast of Essex, Suffolk, and East Norfolk, except for the narrow war channel. This too, was so frequently fouled by drifting mines, both British and German, that all ships were warned to use the utmost vigilance when navigating it.²

¹ Possibly a negative was omitted. There is no record of the signal as made by *Arethusa*. See B 70, 71, 72, 74.

² H.S. 72, pp. 635, 680, 832, 835, 885, 902, 941, 997. H.S. 73, pp. 159, 250, 322.

The new minefield, however, made little difference to ships of the Grand Fleet, for Admiral Jellicoe, taking into consideration the frequent reports of drifting mines, had, on November 1, prohibited the vessels of his command from coming west of a line about 70 miles from the coast between St. Abbs and Dungeness. All navigation of the East Coast of England was to be by the Swept War Channel, and then only after ascertaining its safety from the naval centres concerned.¹

14. Return of the Grand Fleet to Scapa.—Admiral Jellicoe, when he learned that the Grand Fleet had been ordered to sea in daylight, pointed out that such procedure robbed the Grand Fleet of its only safeguard against submarine attack; his practice was to leave or enter port only in the dark or twilight hours, and he urged that this should be adhered to. The Admiralty fully agreed, but had been compelled to undertake the risk in what might have been a grave emergency.²

The receipt of the Commander-in-Chief's telegram at 3.25 p.m. seems to have decided the Admiralty that it was no longer desirable to have the heavy ships at sea. No intelligence had come in since the *Undaunted's* report of sighting four cruisers at 10 a.m., and considering by this time that the enemy had definitely retired, they ordered the battle cruisers back to Cromarty, and the Channel Fleet to Portland. The 3rd Battle Squadron was ordered to resume its course southward to join the Channel Fleet, and the three old battleships at the Tongue Lightship were sent back to Sheerness. The Commander-in-Chief was to use his discretion as to the further movements of the Grand Fleet in accordance with his previous orders.³

The battle cruisers had left Cromarty soon after 2 o'clock; the order for them to return reached them at 5, and they were safe in harbour again by 7.30 p.m. The Grand Fleet commenced leaving Lough Swilly at 3.45 p.m., only a few minutes before Admiral Jellicoe, who had rejoined, received the Admiralty's permission to use his discretion. He continued the movement, however, and after carrying out firing practices and tactical exercises north-west of the Hebrides went in to Scapa at dawn of November 9.

The circumstances which had compelled the fleet to retire to its remote anchorage at Lough Swilly still prevailed. Only three weeks had elapsed since Admiral Beatty had written to the First Lord: "We have no base where we can, with any degree of safety, lie for coaling, replenishing, refitting and repairing. . . . We have been running now hard since July 28; small defects are creeping up which we haven't time to take in hand. Forty-eight hours is our spell in harbour, with steam ready to

¹ H.F. 004. No. 292, of 1.11.14.

² Tels. 941 from and 168 to Commander-in-Chief. H.F., H.S., 72, pp. 561, 678.

³ B 73.

move at 4 hours' notice, coaling on an average of 1,400 tons a time; night defence stations. The men can stand it, but the machine can't, and we must have a place where we can stop for from four to five days every now and then to give the engineers a chance. Such a place does not exist. . . . We hate running away from our base, and the effect is appreciable. We are not enjoying ourselves. . . ." ¹

But efforts were being made to create a safe base for the fleet. Commander D. G. Munro, R.N., an energetic and practical officer, who, for the past 18 months had been supervising the fortification of Cromarty, ² had arrived at Scapa and personally taken charge of the work on the anti-submarine defences. The general scheme was the erection of wire obstructions across Hoxa Sound, Holm Sound, and Hoy Sound, and more solid obstructions in Switha Sound, and between Nevi Skerry and Roan Head, of the type devised by Commander Munro and already used at Cromarty. When the fleet returned to Scapa only the Hoxa Sound boom had been begun; the gear for it was being assembled, but, owing partly to the non-arrival of material and lighters, through the weather, very little was yet in place. ³

15. Loss of the "Yorck," November 4.—The fog of the night of November 3–4 was as thick in the Heligoland Bight as anywhere, and the High Sea Fleet was unable to go straight in through the minefields guarding the German ports. Most of the ships anchored in Schillig Roads on arrival, waiting for the fog to lift; however, the armoured cruiser *Yorck*, which had been part of the Scouting Group employed in screening the main body, developed urgent defects, which necessitated her going in at once. The narrow opening in the minefield was marked by a boom ship, for which in the dark she steered, only to find, when it came in sight at 200 yards range, that she was on the wrong side of it. In the strong current she could not recover her position and she was carried on to the minefield. Two mines struck her, the second causing her to capsize. The water here was shallow, and though many men were drowned in the dark, some climbed up on the wreck and others were saved by torpedo craft and ships' boats, which hurried up from all sides.

This minefield had been laid only a fortnight. The Fleet Command had protested, somewhat weakly it would appear, against such a constriction of their anchorage and exercising ground in Schillig Roads; but even after this disaster, no alteration was made in the policy of protecting the estuaries by extensive fields of contact mines, "the only effect of which," as the German historian comments, "was to limit the freedom of action of the German Fleet." ⁴

¹ Winston Churchill: *The World Crisis*, I, p. 389.

² *Ibid.*

³ G. 01431/14: C.S.D. Report, 10.11.14.

⁴ G.O.H., *Nordsee* II, p. 276.

CHAPTER II.

THE CLOSING OF THE NORTH SEA,
NOVEMBER 5.

16. **Review of Measures to Prevent Minelaying.**—While the German Staff had been planning their movement which culminated in the mining of Smith's Knoll, the Admiralty had also been in conference to decide satisfactory and feasible methods of preventing the very fact that had just taken place—the passage of minelayers and contraband. The two were closely connected in the mind of the staff, who had not yet divested themselves of the idea that Germany was using fishing craft and ordinary merchantmen, disguised perhaps as neutrals, for their minelaying projects. A series of orders had been issued, gradually increasing in stringency, with a view to minimising opportunities for minelaying by disguised merchantmen or trawlers. On September 5, all ships of the fleet were instructed to search every vessel they might encounter, since it was "evident" that the Germans were using vessels disguised as neutrals, or even British ships, for the purpose of laying mines in the North Sea; even neutral vessels might be sunk if they resisted, or if to send them in would endanger the efficiency of the watch for minelayers.¹ Foreign trawlers were to be searched in British ports for any circumstance, either in fittings or crew, which might confirm the suspicion that they had been laying mines.² Our own fishing craft were utilised in the preventive service; and since the false idea that the Germans were using unarmed vessels for minelayers was current and, indeed, remained current long after the German Government officially denied the allegation,³ the trawlers and yachts taken up and armed were considered sufficiently strong to assist the patrol flotillas in the search for these disguised vessels. The feeling that any ship encountered might be a minelayer was strongly present in the fleet and the Admiralty during September and October. The Commander-in-Chief urged the Admiralty to close the East Coast ports to trade and prohibit fishing there; but this seemed too extreme a measure. Moreover, the fishermen were proving an effective means of discovering minelayers and minefields, often, it is true, at the expense of their lives; to prohibit them from going to sea would cut off a valuable source of intelligence. So far, it was not the policy of the Admiralty to appear to be interfering in any way with the free movements of trading or fishing vessels,⁴ though the exclusion of the dangerous areas from the benefit of the State Insurance Scheme and

¹ This order is given in full in C.B. 917 I, *Home Waters* II, Appendix A 52.

² Adty. to Customs House, 6.9.14. See M Letter Book, Miscellaneous 273, p. 257.

³ "The German mines were laid exclusively by German warships." The official denial issued from Berlin, November 7. is given in full in M. 04617/4 and M. 15626/15.

⁴ M. 01788/14 and M. 16134/14.

the extinction of East Coast lights on September 7 had the practical effect of limiting innocent coasting traffic to the War Channel, where observation of it was more easy.

Neutral fishing craft, though they also, by blowing up, had occasionally revealed the presence of mines, were thought to be more dangerous than useful; and on September 27 a notice was issued prohibiting them from using British East Coast ports or from navigating the waters west of 1° E, north of 54.30 , or west of 2.30 E to the south of that latitude. The Commander-in-Chief was not satisfied with this; he thought, if Dutch fishing craft were allowed to fish on the Dogger Bank, the Germans would use that circumstance to cover their minelaying schemes, and he suggested on October 22 that the only effective means against them was to prohibit fishing altogether in the North Sea. The matter was still under consideration.¹

17. Review of Measures for Stopping Contraband.—Contraband carriers, on the other hand, were unlikely to be found near the coast, and the stoppage of them was a matter for the Grand Fleet cruisers and the 10th Cruiser Squadron. Methods of dealing with them were discussed, among other matters, at a conference between the Commander-in-Chief and the Admiralty Staff, held on board the *Iron Duke*, on September 17; no new decision was reached, but the power given to the Commander-in-Chief to remove to a British port any neutral vessel that interfered with military operations was confirmed. The procedure then in force was to be continued; that is, areas off our bases and the British coast were to be held by cruiser squadrons for the prevention of minelaying, the protection of trade, and the observation of the western side of the North Sea, while areas east of those permanently watched were to be swept at irregular intervals by the battle and light cruisers, supported by the battle fleet.

Admiral Beatty, Vice-Admiral of the cruisers of the Grand Fleet, was not satisfied with the position. He found that time did not permit the boarding of all the steamers encountered; moreover, the boarding itself was a hindrance to operations and, now that submarines were likely to be met, a danger to the cruisers themselves. He proposed, therefore, that the traffic should be regulated as much as possible from the shore. Ships in British ports could be inspected there, and if considered innocent, could be given some sort of safe conduct, the fleet being informed of their movements, and told that the ships concerned need not be boarded. He thought also that consuls abroad should advise vessels bound for Scandinavia to put in to Lerwick for the latest information; the lines trading regularly across the North Sea to British ports could in most cases be regarded as harmless and be left by our cruisers to be inspected in port. During the reconnaissance of Heligoland Bight, of September 10,

¹ Papers titled Foreign Office, 15.9.14.

he met many neutral trawlers, forming, as it were, a ring of 100 to 150 miles radius from Heligoland; various circumstances, small and indefinite in themselves, led him to think these were subsidised to act as German intelligence agents. The presence of these only emphasised the necessity of separating innocent from suspicious craft, and he put forward a proposal that traffic east and west across the North Sea should have clearly defined routes, avoiding its central area altogether.¹

His suggestion that shipping should have definite routes was already in force. On September 11, the Admiralty had sent a secret Memorandum on Navigation in the North Sea to all British and Allied shipping firms, and other authorities; in this the dangers of navigating the North Sea were pointed out, and vessels to and from Scandinavian ports were warned, in their own interests, to adopt a route between Kinnaird Head and Stavanger, or, if from ports on the west coast of the United Kingdom, through Pentland Firth in daylight, and thence direct to Stavanger.²

The loss of the three *Cressys* soon afterwards drew attention to the danger to ships of remaining stopped or at slow speed for boarding, as Admiral Beatty had pointed out; and the Admiralty at first prohibited armoured ships from stopping to examine merchant vessels or even patrolling off the coast of Scotland. The Commander-in-Chief, however, had so few unarmoured vessels, that unless he could use the older battleships and armoured cruisers to the eastward of 1° E, where they should be safe from submarine attack, he could not hope to stop contraband from getting through to Germany; his representation of this to the Admiralty procured their approval and indicated the importance of attaching small craft to the Grand Fleet to act as boarding vessels in place of the more important ships.³

The cruiser sweep at the end of September showed clearly that the method then in force of attempting to detect contraband by boarding vessels at sea had entirely failed. A large number of neutral vessels, or vessels flying neutral flags, were seen making eastward for the Kattegat. None of them flew the flags previously agreed upon to show that they had been boarded; and yet, in view of the operation in progress and the Admiralty prohibition against boarding by large cruisers, these vessels had to be allowed to pass without examination. Both Admiral Beatty and Admiral Jellicoe urged that the only method of securing control over contraband was to insist on all vessels calling at a British port for examination and for a secret signal, without which any vessel met should be turned back.⁴

¹ The Report of the Conference and Admiral Beatty's suggestions are in M. 0078/14.

² M. 03154/14.

³ G.F.S.P., XXXVI, pp. 463-466.

⁴ Papers titled X. 3895/14.

18. **The Conference at the Admiralty, 2 November 1914.**—The resignation of Prince Louis of Battenberg and his relief by Lord Fisher set up a new Board of Admiralty, and Admiral Jellicoe was called from Lough Swilly to meet it on November 2. He brought with him a memorandum of requirements, which the progress of the war had shown him to be necessary. Many of the items were matters of material. He asked to be given a number of armed trawlers, 12 destroyers from the patrol flotillas, 12 small armed steamers to save his cruisers from the dangers of boarding merchant vessels, eight other vessels to act as fleet minesweepers. Scapa, he thought, should be defended by a heavy boom and minefields to make it safe as a fleet base, and torpedo nets should be slung from rafts and barges to screen ships lying there. Scotland, north of the Caledonian Canal, ought to be a prohibited area under the Defence of the Realm Act, with himself as Competent Authority to administer the Act; aliens should be excluded from ports or public services and from all colliers and fleet auxiliaries. Observation posts with effective communications should be established on headlands and islands where submarines might pass. All these requests were granted and steps were taken immediately to expedite the necessary work.¹ But either at the Conference or as a result of it, the Admiralty now took a most important and far-reaching decision.

19. **Closing the North Sea, November 5.**—The Admiralty decided to adopt the Commander-in-Chief's suggestions for the limitation of traffic. They went even further, and declared the whole of the North Sea a military area. The official announcement was issued to the newspapers in time to appear on November 3; it read as follows:—

During the last week the Germans have scattered mines indiscriminately in the open sea on the main trade route from America to Liverpool, via the North of Ireland. Peaceful merchant ships have already been blown up, with loss of life, by this agency. The White Star liner *Olympic* escaped disaster by pure good luck. But for the warnings given by British cruisers, other British and neutral merchant and passenger vessels would have been destroyed. These mines cannot have been laid by any German ship of war. They have been laid by some merchant vessel flying a neutral flag, which has come along the trade route, as if for the purposes of peaceful commerce, and, while profiting to the full by the immunity enjoyed by neutral merchant ships, has wantonly and recklessly endangered the lives of all who travel on the sea, regardless of whether they are friend or foe, civilian or military in character.

¹ The Minute of the Proceedings of the Conference and the Commander-in-Chief's Memorandum cannot be found. The requirements are inferred from a minute of the First Lord in M. 03283/14. There are references to this memorandum in *The World Crisis*, by Winston Churchill, I, p. 392.

Minelaying under a neutral flag and reconnaissance conducted by trawlers, hospital ships, and neutral vessels are the ordinary features of German naval warfare.

In these circumstances, having regard to the great interests entrusted to the British Navy, to the safety of peaceful commerce of the high seas, and to the maintenance within the limits of International Law of trade between neutral countries, the Admiralty feel it necessary to adopt exceptional measures appropriate to the novel conditions under which this war is being waged. They therefore give notice that the whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all other vessels, will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines, which it has been necessary to lay, and from warships searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft. All merchant and fishing vessels of every description are hereby warned of the dangers they encounter by entering this area, except in strict accordance with Admiralty directions. Every effort will be made to convey this warning to neutral countries and to vessels on the sea, but from November 5 onwards the Admiralty announce that all ships passing a line drawn from the northern point of the Hebrides, through the Faroe Islands to Iceland, do so at their own peril.

Ships of all countries wishing to trade to and from Norway, the Baltic, Denmark, and Holland, are advised to come, if inward bound, by the English Channel and the Straits of Dover. There they will be given sailing directions, which will pass them safely, so far as Great Britain is concerned, up the East Coast of England to Farn Island, whence a safe route, if possible, will be given to Lindesnaes Lighthouse. From this point they should turn north or south, according to their destination, keeping as near the coast as possible. The converse applies to vessels outward bound. By strict adherence to these routes the commerce of all countries will be able to reach its destination in safety, so far as Great Britain is concerned, but any straying, even for a few miles, from the course thus indicated, may be followed by fatal consequences.

It will be seen that in claiming the whole of the North Sea as a military area in which they were at liberty to lay mines and to threaten grave danger from cruisers, the Admiralty felt that some justification must be given to neutral countries for a measure which so limited freedom of navigation. Unfortunately, the attempted justification was based upon misapprehensions. We now know that the Tory Island minefield referred to in the first paragraph of the announcement was not laid, as there stated, by

a merchant ship flying a neutral flag ; nor, as in the next paragraph, had Germany so far laid any mines under a neutral flag. In fact, the evidence on which these allegations were based, as has been shown in the previous volumes of this narrative, would not have borne careful examination, if such had been made ; and the statements are little more than generalisations from the multitudinous and unconfirmed rumours born in the excitement of war.¹

Next day, November 4, the passage of the Minches was also prohibited to merchant vessels,² which henceforth had to give the Hebrides a wide berth when on the west coast of Scotland.

20. Protests from Neutral Powers.—The Scandinavian Powers speedily protested against this limitation of the routes to their ports. Since the institution of the War Channel and the closing of the Dover Straits by the British minefield, the various lines trading from America to Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, had diverted their routes to the northabout passage as being safer. The masters of the ships viewed with dismay the prospect of having now to navigate from Dover to Farn Island within 3 miles of the unlighted, mined, and shoal-infested East Coast of England. Their objections were met by the grant of permission to a limited number of regular liners of each country to use the northabout passage, provided due notice were given of their movements and they made a practice of calling at Kirkwall each voyage.³

The Dutch were allowed to use the passage between the British and German minefields as before ; the Downs Boarding Flotilla could thus continue to supervise Dutch shipping.⁴

On the whole, the measure was received more favourably than might have been expected. By a fortunate accident the announcement that we intended to consider the North Sea a military zone happened to synchronise with the news that a secret minefield had been laid off Tory Island in the track of Atlantic shipping, and that Smith's Knoll Channel, until then considered safe, had also been mined. The revelation of these new and hidden dangers, for the Germans made no statement other than the general one at the beginning of the war that they intended to mine the approaches to British ports, may have helped the neutral powers to accept this drastic extension of belligerent rights.⁵ Certainly, the Admiralty announcement was

¹ The original papers containing the draft of this important announcement, which might give some indication of the reasons for its wording, cannot be found. M. 05193/14 contains an unsigned typewritten copy, which is the same kind of typing and on the same sort of paper as Memoranda of the First Lord.

² The original draft in Lord Fisher's handwriting is in M. 05193/14.

³ M. 03370/14, 03428/14, 03429/14, 03611/14, 03990/14, 20419/14, 20444/14.

⁴ M. 03370—14, 03378/14.

⁵ M. 04257/14.

merely a warning ; but it was expressed in such terms that no insurance office could venture to disregard it, and shipping is particularly sensitive to the dictates of the insurer.

By November 22 the protests and requests from the neutral powers had been dealt with and a definite conclusion reached. The eight most important Scandinavian companies trading to America had permission to use the northabout route, provided they called at Kirkwall for instructions on the eastbound voyage ; from Kirkwall they were to make direct for Bergen and follow the Norwegian coast to their destination. Westbound ships were to make 60° N, 3° E, and from there keep north of 60° N until well clear of the British Isles. All vessels, except those of the privileged lines, were to make the passage southabout.¹

21. Measures to Enforce the Closure of the North Sea.—At the moment when the Admiralty's announcement was despatched to the Press, the disposition of the Grand Fleet patrols was such that vessels attempting the northabout passage from the westward ran a fair chance of interception. The 10th Cruiser Squadron was patrolling north of the Shetlands. The *King Edward VII* class ships of the 3rd Battle Squadron were operating between the Shetlands and Faroes with armed merchant cruisers both sides of the Faroes ; the *Russell* class were west of Barra Islands. This disposition had two principal weak spots, the first north of the Faroes, where the Commander-in-Chief proposed to station any more armed liners he might be sent, and the second, Fair Island Channel and the Pentland Firth, which he considered submarines made too dangerous for large ships and bad weather rendered unsuitable for destroyers ; for the control of traffic in these two channels he proposed to use armed trawlers when they arrived.²

No sooner had the announcement appeared than Hipper's squadron raided Yarmouth. The 3rd Battle Squadron, which had been holding two of the patrol sections, was ordered to Portland, and the Grand Fleet to Scapa, taking with it the cruiser squadron off the Flannan Islands. Thus, on November 5, when all merchant vessels attempting the northabout passage were to be sent in, the only men-of-war at sea with the definite duty of arresting them were the armed merchant cruiser *Teutonic*, off the Faroe Islands, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron patrolling north of the Shetlands.

The Admiralty had sent the Commander-in-Chief no official intimation of their announcement and he was left to learn its terms from the daily papers. However, on the 6th, after the restrictions had nominally been in force for two days he was told that precise instructions would be sent him.³ Even by the end

¹ A 41 and Adty. Tel. 219 to V. A. Longhope, 22.11.14, sent 12.40 a.m.

² Papers titled X. 3895/14.

³ Adty. Tel. 193 to Commander-in-Chief, H.F., sent 3.10 p.m., 6.11.14 :—
" See press of November 3 for Memorandum. Precise instructions are under consideration."

of the month these instructions had not been sent, and the Commander-in-Chief had to ask whether or not he was to use force to prevent all neutral vessels entering the North Sea.¹ The Admiralty's answer, dated December 11, was: "In the case of neutral vessels which have not received permission to use the northabout route and who do not voluntarily call at Kirkwall, force should not be used to turn them back, but they should be brought into Kirkwall for examination, which should be made as exhaustive as possible. Discretion must be used, the object being to deter neutral vessels from using the northabout route, and in any case to induce such vessels voluntarily to call at Kirkwall for examination."²

The 10th Cruiser Squadron, which would be the main instrument in turning back vessels seeking to enter the North Sea from the westward, was beginning to succumb to the winter weather, and the Commander-in-Chief was forced to arrange for the refit of the old cruisers, three at a time. Their unsuitability for the arduous sea work was now obvious, and on November 20, the Admiralty ordered them all to pay off, intending to re-institute the Northern Patrol, with a squadron of 24 armed liners, as soon as these were ready. It was not till the end of 1914 that these vessels can be considered to be carrying out any organised patrol, and consequently, for two months after the Admiralty's announcement closing the North Sea, there was no real attempt possible to enforce the prohibition.³

CHAPTER III.

THE CHANNEL AND THE BELGIAN COAST, NOVEMBER 3-11.

22. **Admiral Hood returns to Dunkirk.**—One effect of the German raid on Yarmouth had been the recall of Admiral Hood to Dover. But as soon as it was clear that the German operation was a bombarding raid and not a landing of troops, Admiral Hood, at midnight, November 3-4, was ordered to go across again and support the Belgian flank. He sailed in the early hours of November 4, in the *Crusader*, with three other destroyers, only to find a dense fog, which made firing impossible. He utilised the lull to visit the Belgian Headquarters at Furnes, where he found that he might be expected to silence the guns on the coast before the Belgian army advanced. His force of small craft could scarcely accomplish this, and at his suggestion the old

¹ So far his instructions to the Grand Fleet were: Neutral ships are to be warned of the peril they incur, but at present no further steps are to be taken (G.F. Orders and Memoranda No. 311, dated 11.11.14).

² M. 04157/14.

³ See Monograph 19. *Tenth Cruiser Squadron*, Sections 17-19, 21, 24-26.

battleship *Revenge*, which was being prepared at Portsmouth for service afloat, was ordered to Dover, though he was warned not to use her, owing to submarine risks, unless indispensable. With his other vessels he was to continue his support of the Belgian left, saving the ships as much as possible.¹

A report had reached the Admiralty that 18 submarines had left Kiel through the Canal for the North Sea and the Belgian coast, on October 31, and that 18 smaller ones had followed by train; and the news was considered credible enough to be passed on to all the officers concerned for information.² The passage of submarines along the coast of Flanders was barred to some extent by the French minefields off Ostend; and on November 3, a fresh British minefield was laid across the Broad Fourteens to the eastward of Thornton Ridge. These mines were thus outside the limit of the area declared dangerous, which extended only as far as 3° E.³

23. Utilisation of French Destroyers.—The method of denying the passage of the Straits of Dover to submarines had been the subject of continual discussion. The French Admiralty put forward the view that the only effective means of preventing the operations of submarines and destroying them was to have perpetual sweeps night and day by light cruisers and destroyers in the Straits and the eastern part of the Channel. There was nothing novel to us in the idea; it was our own method of operations, and only lack of boats prevented its being carried out in the Channel, as well as at Dover. The Admiralty, therefore, took the opportunity to ask that the French flotillas should maintain a methodical and frequent patrol service in the area between the lines Boulogne-Dungeness and Havre-St. Catherine.⁴

There was reason for a special effort; another Army division, the VIIIth, was to cross to France during the nights of November 4 and 5, and in addition, four battalions of Territorial troops were to go over on the 4th. The transports were to leave at half-hour intervals, and were each to carry not more than 1,200 men. There would be eight ships on the night of the 4-5th, and double as many the second night.

The Admiralty felt unable to give any protection beyond the Extended Defence of Portsmouth, and therefore asked the French Admiral to use his spare destroyers in patrolling the route between the Nab and the French coast on the two nights. The request was made at 1.45 p.m., but did not reach Admiral Favereau till 6 o'clock, and he then felt it would be unwise to send destroyers

¹ H.S. 71, pp. 360, 478, 626; H.S. 72, pp. 675, 686; Appendix A 24, 25, 31.

² A 8.

³ 300 Service Mines between 51.35½ N, 3.1½ E, and 51.33 N, 3.12.40 E. (Lockhart Leith. History of Minefields, Appendix A 2.)

⁴ A 1, 13. There were a dozen destroyers at Cherbourg not detailed for any particular work (H.S. 72, p. 515).

that night, since a meeting in the dark of transports and destroyers would be more dangerous than useful. But he sent six boats to be off the Nab Lightship in daylight of November 5, so that the arrangements for escort could be communicated to them. With this escort the VIIIth Division crossed without mishap.¹

Further west, at Portland, was the Channel Fleet, which submarines might attempt to attack. The southern entrance to the harbour had a gap in it; but this, on November 3, was effectually blocked by the old battleship *Hood*, which was sunk there to form a solid obstruction. The force in harbour was increased shortly afterwards by the four *Duncans*; and all the battleships of the Channel Fleet were ordered to rig net defence, not waiting for net shelves, but lashing the nets to bolts in the ships' sides, and taking back those which had been allocated to the Sheerness defence boom, since this was not yet far enough advanced to want them.²

24. A German Signal Decoded.—So far, our knowledge of the enemy's intentions rested entirely on the reports of agents; but in the evening of November 5 a new source of information opened. A German code had been received in the Admiralty, but as yet nothing of importance had been decyphered. That night, however, the long distance wireless station of Norddeich sent out a signal which, in accordance with the usual routine, was intercepted and forwarded to the Admiralty. It proved to be in the code we had; and when decyphered was found to be orders to submarines to operate off the western entrance to the English Channel and from Ostend to Boulogne. The information was at once passed on to all senior officers concerned, including Admiral Favereau and the French Ministry of Marine.³

25. Orders to "U.29" and "U.12."—The German submarines which had been operating on the Belgian coast returned home on November 2, the personnel worn out with the strain and the boats themselves in need of repair. But the fire from Admiral Hood's ships had proved so galling to the German troops that the German Military General Staff pressed for further submarines to be despatched without delay to drive away our squadron. It was not then known to the Admiralstab that Admiral Hood had returned to Dover with all his destroyers, as a result of the bombardment of Yarmouth; and they sent off *U.12* (Forstmann) and *U.29* (Plange) at once on this mission. *U.29* left Schillig Roads at 11 a.m. on the 5th, and *U.12* left Heligoland at 9 p.m. on the 6th, with orders to sink any enemy ships off Nieuport operating on the Belgian left. Scarcely had they started when news came in from the Marine Division Headquarters in Bruges that our

¹ A 15, 22, 29, 36. H.S. 72, pp. 759, 761, 790, 990, 1051. H.S. 73, p. 73.

² H.S. 72, pp. 820, 936, 1014. G 01415/14.

³ A 44-47. H.S. 72, p. 1035. See also A 76.

ships were not firing and had apparently withdrawn. Accordingly, a wireless message was sent to *U.29* that, if nothing was seen on the Belgian coast, she was to go on through the Straits of Dover and cruise at the southern entrance to the Irish Channel and off Mount's Bay, where *U.20* had observed signalling at night which could only emanate from warships, and where, moreover, it was highly probable British cruisers would be guarding the important focal point of trade.¹ Most probably it was part of this order that we had intercepted and decoded.

26. The Western Patrols.—The forces in the west apparently threatened by the intercepted German order were the Anglo-French patrol, where Admiral Wemyss commanded the British half, and Cruiser Force E under Admiral Tottenham. Admiral Wemyss had just reported that the French Admiral wished his ships to operate independently on the southern half of the patrol line where he could maintain six ships. On the northern half, 42 miles long, Admiral Wemyss could maintain only three vessels, one of which was fully employed in dealing with the traffic concentrated on the English coast; he, therefore, asked for two more ships.²

Cruiser Force E (*Sutlej*, four *Juno's*, *Pelorus*, under Rear-Admiral Tottenham) was employed in patrolling four lines—off Tory Island, off the Fastnet, in St. George's Channel, and off the Scilly Islands. On November 2, the *Pelorus* was ordered to Gibraltar and there was some idea of sending the *Doris* also to the Mediterranean, though no orders to that effect had yet been sent. The withdrawal of the *Pelorus* necessitated the abandonment of one of the patrol lines; Admiral Tottenham thought the Scilly Isles patrol could best be dispensed with; but the Admiralty had already made arrangements in substitution for the cruiser on the St. George's Channel line. A Senior Naval Officer, Milford, had been appointed,³ and under him was placed a force of six Liverpool tugs supplied with rifles, the armed railway steamer *Scotia*, and the two armed yachts, *Aster* and *Greta*. These were to keep a continuous lookout for minelayers in the Bristol Channel.⁴

The tugs at Milford were only a temporary measure, till sufficient trawlers could be armed. The intention was to have in the Bristol Channel 20 of these armed trawlers, with a suitable number of armed yachts and minesweepers. A patrol of similar dimensions and constitution was to be stationed off Larne, to which place Commander Henry Berkely was appointed Senior Naval Officer; six tugs were given him, also as a temporary

¹ *Nordsee* II., p. 276, and Karte 11. This remark would seem to imply that even now, after three months of war, the Germans were unaware of the Anglo-French patrol kept by Admiral Wemyss.

² A 38.

³ Captain K. O. Gibbons, appointed November 2.

⁴ M. 03225/14. A 3, 5, 17.

measure, with four armed drifters and the yacht *Oriana*; the *Tara* was to co-operate with him.¹

The news that submarines intended to operate in his narrow area seemed to Admiral Wemyss to necessitate a radical change in the function of his force, a considerable part of which had been the stoppage of contraband. This he now abandoned, giving orders that no merchant vessels were to be boarded and that the patrol was in future to be considered rather as a precaution against suspicious or armed enemy vessels than as a lookout for contraband in neutral ships. These latter were not likely to escape, since if they were not bound for British or French channel ports they would be stopped in the Downs.²

27. Orders as to Passage of Transports.—The certainty that submarines—half a flotilla was thought to have been mentioned in the intercepted order—were about to pass down Channel, immediately affected the transport arrangements. The transports were forbidden to cross except at night, and were to be escorted by destroyers, “as far as possible.”³

There were only six old destroyers at Portsmouth, all fully employed on local defence; and, in consideration of this, store ships for Newhaven and all empty transports returning were allowed to go without escort. Although the VIIIth Division was across, there were movements of Territorial troops in prospect, which meant the passage of troop transports nearly every night in the near future. The Admiralty could supply no destroyers and wanted the French to carry out their suggestion of sweeps for submarines.⁴ Consequently, Admiral Meux, Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, was left to make the best arrangements he could. There was a French destroyer at Portsmouth acting as liaison, and through her he got into touch with the French Admiral. On the night of November 6–7, three transports went via the Needles Channel, two of the Portsmouth destroyers patrolling 30 miles on the line St. Catherines-Havre, and three French destroyers from 30 miles from Havre up to the anchorage. Thus only the middle section of 30 miles of transport route was left unpatrolled. On the following night, though some transports crossed, there was no escort at the French end, as all the French destroyers were engaged in a sweep. In addition to the transports going to France, three transports arrived from the Far East. They had been brought up from Gibraltar by the *Diana*, which, by Admiralty orders, left them in the longitude of the Start and went in to Devonport, while the three transports proceeded independently to Southampton, arriving in the dark hours of

¹ M. 03225/14, 03335/14.

² A 49.

³ A 46. The last words may have been intended to mean “when possible.”

⁴ H.S. 73, p. 73.

November 7-8.¹ On the night of November 8-9, when eight transports were to cross, and a submarine had been seen in the Straits of Dover, the French Admiral was asked by the Admiralty to send six destroyers to the Nab to cover them. Admiral Meux had arranged to use his own destroyers at the British end; but any possible misunderstanding at the rendezvous was avoided by the non-arrival of the French destroyers, which were still sweeping for a submarine seen that morning. This was presumably the supposed submarine sighted off Portland at 4.30 a.m.²

On the 9th more German orders addressed to a submarine in the Channel were intercepted; she was instructed to return and operate between Ostend and Boulogne.³ These orders were probably addressed to *U.29*, then passing through the Straits of Dover. From the Maas Light Vessel she had steered direct for the centre of the Straits, and had thus to cross two of the minefields laid by us to westward of the West Hinder Shoal across that very route.⁴ While she was passing submerged through the Dover area about noon on the 9th, she observed half-a-dozen destroyers on patrol, a four-funnelled cruiser in Dover Harbour, and a British submarine entering. Going on, *U.29* was off Portsmouth early on the 10th when, at 9.30 a.m., a vessel resembling a warship came so close that she had to dive suddenly. The boat crashed on the bottom; the air inlets began to leak and she lost trim. In addition, the after depth rudder chain broke. Feeling that he dare not, with his boat in this condition, attempt again to pass the Dover Strait submerged, her commanding officer decided to return round Ireland and Scotland, which he could do on the surface, and abandoning all ideas of attack on the western patrols he started for home westabout in the teeth of a heavy westerly gale.⁵

Both his presence before Portsmouth and his departure were unknown to us, and as nine transports were to cross on the night of the 11th at intervals of half-an-hour, the French Admiral was asked to escort each one by a destroyer. He did not receive the request till too late to act on it, for his destroyers were engaged in their sweeps; consequently, the transports on this and the two following nights crossed without any protection other than the bad weather which made it impossible for the Portsmouth destroyers to go further than the Nab.

The French Admiral, having made four grand destroyer sweeps for submarines during the past ten days without result,

¹ A 54. H.S. 73, p. 476. The transports were *Arcadia*, *Nile*, *Carnarvonshire*.

² A 53, 63-66. H.S. 73, pp. 471, 454.

³ A 71, 75.

⁴ Field laid October 3, 400 mines, 120 ft. apart, 20 ft. below L.W.O.S., between 51.29½ N, 2.30½ E and 51.31½ N, 2.18 E.

Field laid October 4, 400 mines, 120 ft. apart, 20 ft. below L.W.O.S., between 51.24 N, 2.15 E and 51.27½ N, 2.3.20 E.

⁵ G.O.H., *Nordsee II*, pp. 281, 282, and Karte 11.

now decided to proceed to Boulogne to organise a destroyer patrol and net defence there. We had asked that the French trawlers at Boulogne should be armed and used to carry on a continuous patrol in the area between the lines Dungeness-Boulogne and Beachy Head-Dieppe, which it was felt would add to the security of the transport route ; it may have been this patrol he intended to organise.¹

28. Withdrawal of the Dunkirk Flotilla.—Admiral Hood, on his return to the Belgian coast early on November 4, ordered the *Bustard* and *Excellent* to bombard Lombartzyde, on the German side of Nieuport. This little coast town had been cleared of the enemy, but not having been re-occupied by the Belgians, was now believed to be sheltering large forces of Germans. The *Bustard* fired 27 rounds and was then stopped by the shore observer, who reported, however, that her fire had done great execution among the massed Germans. The elevating gear of the *Excellent's* 9·2-in. gun broke down after the first round. Two days later the *Bustard* and *Humber* bombarded Westende, but ceased after nine rounds, as the shells were falling too near the Allied trenches.²

As regards submarines, two absolutely trustworthy witnesses saw two of them steaming SW on the surface off Zeebrugge Pier at 11 p.m., November 4, and two were seen off Zeebrugge by a seaplane the following morning. An agent reported that two more left Emden at 3 p.m. on the 6th. Moreover, a vessel of the Nore defence thought three torpedoes had been discharged at her on the 6th ; but the presence of a submarine was doubted, and active search by the patrol failed to locate it. Next day, the Commander-in-Chief, Nore, established a continuous submarine patrol extending between the Kentish Knock and North Foreland.³

The Germans ashore seemed to have transferred their most active operations to the neighbourhood of Ypres, and fighting on the Belgian coast had quieted down since the flooding of the country. On the 7th, therefore, Admiral Hood was recalled from Dunkirk to resume his regular duties as Admiral of the Dover Patrol ; he left the gun vessels under Commander Cherry, of the *Vestal*, who worked in conjunction with Colonel Bridges, the *liaison* officer ashore.⁴ Taking with him all the destroyers and leaving behind the *Vestal*, *Rinaldo*, *Humber*, *Bustard*, *Excellent*, three trawlers and an armed yacht, he returned to Dover.

There was thick weather off the Belgian coast and the vessels operating off Nieuport on the 8th had to close the shore. Immediately they opened fire, large guns on shore returned the fire so hotly that our ships began to withdraw. They found that in

¹ A 51. H.S. 74, p. 361.

² *Bustard* : Proceedings, C. 1056/14.

³ A 67. H.S. 73, pp. 201, 223, 285. "Dover Patrol Operations, Packs," Vol. XVII, pp. 57, 60. In none of these cases was a submarine present.

⁴ A 60.

addition to the guns they had a submarine to reckon with ; she was twice seen, both by the ships and a reconnoitring seaplane, but made no attack.¹ In the rapid tideway, the vessels could make only $1\frac{1}{2}$ knots. Though they were under fire for 25 minutes the enemy scored only one hit, a shell which struck the *Excellent* forward, but luckily did not burst. They succeeded in regaining Dunkirk without further damage.² In their absence a German aeroplane had dropped two bombs on Dunkirk ; this was the first occasion of what later became almost a daily event.

French destroyers were sent out from Dunkirk on the 9th to patrol between Nieuport and the Zuidecote Pass, and also near the Dyck, to look out for the submarine. Under cover of these, Commander Cherry proposed to try again. But the Admiralty, knowing from intercepted German signals that submarines were to operate between Ostend and Boulogne, decided to withdraw the whole force, keeping it organised as a flotilla at Sheerness, full up with stores and ammunition, ready for further service.³ The force left Dunkirk during the evening of the 10th.

29. Operations of the Harwich Flotillas, November 4-11.—While the operations on the Belgian coast were in progress, the Harwich flotillas had been patrolling the Broad Fourteens to keep submarines and surface ships from attacking the bombarding force. Commodore Tyrwhitt, at the conclusion of his chase of Hipper's squadron after the Yarmouth raid, returned to Harwich to re-fuel. The Admiralty had passed on to him a report from the Hague that a large number of submarines were about to leave Bremerhaven for Belgium, taking the route close to the Dutch coast. He had the *Fearless*, *Faulknor*, and seven destroyers out ; they left Harwich at 6.30 a.m., November 5, to relieve him on the Terschelling patrol, and he now ordered them to the Dutch coast, sweeping north from there at high speed after dawn, November 6, to meet the enemy. He considered it would be 24 hours before any of the hostile submarines could reach Belgium ; and, after re-fuelling, he intended to come out again, to meet and attack them himself.⁴ It was not, however, till early on the 7th that any destroyers got away from Harwich.⁵ These were seven of the " L " class, with the *Undaunted* and *Aurora*. None of these vessels sighted either U.12 or U.29. The division with the *Fearless* on the Dutch coast patrolled in fog till the forenoon of the 7th, when they turned back for home some hours before U.12 arrived. About noon on the 7th the *Undaunted's* division

¹ This was the only genuine submarine seen at that time. See Section 30.

² *Bustard* : Proceedings, C. 1056/14 ; H.S. 73, p. 521.

³ Dover Packs XVIII, p. 69. H.S. 73, pp. 581, 634. A 44, 71-73.

⁴ A 32, 33, 34.

⁵ Reason not known ; 19 boats were ready for sea at noon 6th. H.S. 73, p. 118.

and *U.12* were both approaching the North Hinder, but no encounter took place.¹ The division arrived back at Harwich on the 9th, the *Undaunted* herself going to Chatham to deal with defects. The Terschelling patrol was taken over by the Commodore himself in the *Arethusa*, with the *Faulknor* and eight destroyers.

In the afternoon of the 9th another German wireless message was decoded. It appeared to be an order for a torpedo flotilla to patrol near the Gabbard that night and the following night.²

The message, as interpreted, was passed to the Admiral of Patrols, who ordered the *Skirmisher* from the Humber to take the seven available destroyers of the 7th Flotilla to the Outer Gabbard on the 11th. One of the Nore seaplanes went out to scout on the 10th.³

Commodore Tyrwhitt took up a position off Terschelling to intercept the German force on its way to the Gabbard. It came on to blow very hard and the Admiralty left it to his discretion whether he should withdraw; but during the forenoon of the 10th the wind dropped sufficiently to enable the patrol to remain out. The *Aurora* and eight "L" class destroyers left early on the 11th to relieve the Commodore, but the wind increased to a gale again, and by Admiralty orders the patrol was discontinued and all the Harwich forces returned to Harbour.⁴

The *Skirmisher* and her destroyers patrolled between the Outer Gabbard and Shipwash in a heavy sea during the 11th, but saw nothing; nor did the seaplane from the Nore on the 10th, for the alarm had been false and no German flotillas were at sea. The only hostile vessel in the Hoofden was submarine *U.12*.⁵

30. Proceedings of "U.12."—*U.12* after leaving Heligoland⁶ passed Terschelling in the morning of the 7th, and, following the Dutch coast as far as Scheveningen, steered out from there to pass to westward of the North and West Hinder Shoals. The minefields we had laid in October stretched right across the passage of vessels making the Dover Strait from Terschelling; *U.12* had accordingly to cross one of these—that laid on October 3 to westward of the West Hinder Shoal. She crossed it on the surface without mishap about 10.30 a.m. on the 8th, and then steered for Nieuport to attack our bombarding squadron. When nearing Ostend, *U.12* obtained wireless touch with the German Naval Division ashore, and learned that no British ships were in sight;

¹ The small scale of Karte 11 in G.O.H. 11 makes it impossible to obtain accurate positions of the German submarines.

² A 72.

³ A 74.

⁴ A 78, 82. H.S. 73, pp. 656, 678, 729, 755.

⁵ It is now clear that the signal intercepted was merely a routine order for the patrol off Heligoland, a mistake in interception making Heligoland read Inner Gabbard. The original decode is in I.D.H.S.

⁶ The date is uncertain; the Norddeich telegram was intercepted by us at 9.35 p.m., November 5. However, Karte 11 gives 8 p.m. on the 6th as the time *U.12* left Heligoland.

but at 12.35 p.m., she saw between the sandbanks of West Deep some small vessels busily engaged in a duel with the shore guns, and she decided to attack. This was not easy to accomplish. The coast waters are shallow and full of currents; two trawlers were patrolling the eastern entrance and, in diving to pass them, *U.12* frequently touched the bottom. To check her position would mean exposing the boat; and, altogether, the navigational difficulties were so great that at 3.30 p.m. *U.12* abandoned the attempt and went to the bottom to wait for darkness. When she came again to the surface at 5 p.m., there was nothing to be seen. Our squadron had retired to Dunkirk. *U.12*, therefore, returned the way she had come and proceeded into Zeebrugge to report to the Admiral of the Naval Division ashore that it was useless to attempt to support the army by submarines in the West Deep. She was off Zeebrugge on the morning of the 9th and was taken in by a pilot vessel. She was the first German submarine to use that port.


Next day, our flotilla withdrew to Sheerness and Lieutenant-Commander Forstmann, in command of *U.12*, learning this from the Intelligence Staff ashore, had to choose some other object for attack. The weather was continuously bad, and a heavy sea from the west made the English Channel difficult of approach. He, therefore, decided to raid the Downs with the intention of torpedoing a warship or, failing that, a large transport. About 11 a.m. on the 11th he passed unnoticed through the patrols at the southern entrance to the Downs. There, ahead of him, in the midst of a stream of merchant vessels of all nations, he sighted a warship, and decided that this would be his quarry.

31. The Loss of the "Niger."—The vessel sighted by Lieutenant-Commander Forstmann was the gunboat *Niger*, which, with the *Harrier*, was employed in supervising merchant traffic, guarding detained vessels and taking charge of the tugs of the Downs Boarding Flotilla.

Ramsgate, in the Downs, was one of the three principal ports of naval control, and by far the most important, for more than ten times as many vessels came in to the Downs for examination as were sent in to Kirkwall and Falmouth combined.¹ There was no need here to employ a squadron, such as the 10th Cruiser Squadron in the North or Cruiser Force G on the Western Patrol; two gunboats and half-a-dozen tugs carried out the service of examination, for interception was unnecessary, since the presence of the destroyer patrol off Dover, the minefield in the Straits, and the configuration of the coast forced merchant traffic proceeding through the Straits of Dover to pass through the Downs.

On November 11, the *Harrier* was anchored in the northern half of the Examination Area and the *Niger* in the southern half, with steam on the engines and cables ready for slipping if

¹ See C.B. 1554. "The Economic Blockade, 1914-1919." Cap. XIX.



necessary. The Downs were open to the attack of German submarines, but the engines of neither gunboat were in a condition to stand continuous steaming, and the custom was for them to lie at anchor. The presence around them of merchant shipping, tugs and small craft was considered to lend a certain measure of protection; but on this day, these vessels, whilst concealing *U.12* from sight, did not prevent Lieutenant-Commander Forstmann from getting a shot at the *Niger*. Approaching as close as the current and depth of water would permit, at 12.3 p.m. he fired his bow torpedo at 2,000 yards range.¹

When the torpedo was still some 700 yards off it was sighted from the *Niger*. In the hope of avoiding it, Lieutenant-Commander A. T. Muir put the helm hard a starboard and went astern with the port engine, but before there was time for the engines to have much effect on the ship the torpedo struck her. The *Niger* sank in about 20 minutes, the crew being saved by the small craft around her.²

The news of the attack soon reached Dover; and even before the *Niger* sank, Admiral Hood's destroyers were searching for the submarine.³ They failed to find her, for *U.12* had made her escape and was on the way to Zeebrugge. There she remained weather-bound from the 14th to the 16th.

The incident, occurring so near Dover, made Admiral Hood anxious for his ships in the port, which was by no means submarine proof; he obtained the Admiralty's permission to send the *Brilliant* and *Sirius* to Sheerness.

It was some time before any other vessel could be allocated to take the place of the *Niger*, and meanwhile, the *Harrier* had to carry on alone. Admiral Hood took special pains to patrol the Downs with his auxiliary vessels and ordered the *Harrier*, as a further precaution against a repetition of the attack, to remain continuously under way during the daylight hours, although it was soon realised that this resulted in frequent breakdowns.

¹ *Nordsee* II, p. 281, and sketch, p. 283.

² Papers titled X. 2754/1914.

³ H.S. 74, pp. 58.

CHAPTER IV.

PREPARATIONS TO RESIST INVASION,
NOVEMBER, 1914.

32. **The New Base for the Channel Fleet.**—Though at the time of the German raid on Yarmouth the question of meeting an invasion on a large scale was under consideration at the Admiralty, so far no definite disposition of forces had been settled. The chief new decision then made was for the 3rd Battle Squadron to join the Channel Fleet; and in accordance with it the *Duncans* arrived at Portland on November 5 and the *King Edward VII* class early next morning. The *Vengeance* also, which was under orders for the East Indies, had been put under the Vice-Admiral Commanding the Channel Fleet (Admiral Burney); but no sooner had she arrived at Portland than she was again ordered abroad.¹

Portland Harbour was rendered more difficult of access to submarines by the sinking of the *Hood* in one of the two entrances; and in view of the enemy's presence in the Channel, Admiral Burney was instructed to fit net defence in all battleships under his orders as quickly as possible.² The War Plan had assigned Portland as the base of the Channel Fleet; it was now felt that this was too far from the East Coast to permit of that fleet's taking any active part in resisting invasion, and the Wallet, off Harwich, as suggested by Admiral Callaghan, was in process of being rendered secure from torpedo or submarine attack in preparation for its use by the Channel Fleet. On November 1, Rear-Admiral C. L. Napier, C.B., was appointed Senior Naval Officer, Gunfleet, to superintend the construction of the Wallet defence and take charge of the patrol there.³ Admiral Burney considered the Humber a better base for him than the Wallet; this seemed to him a very precarious place, in addition to which, at Spring tides, the fleet could not get in or out for four consecutive hours out of every twelve. The Admiralty, however, who were making a careful survey of the place, felt sure they would find a channel deep enough to be used at all states of the tide, and thought the Wallet better protected against submarine attack by shoals than most other anchorages; moreover, to put up an efficient submarine boom in the Humber would take several months,⁴ and time was of value, especially since the enemy might get to know that the Grand Fleet, through pressure of events abroad, had been temporarily deprived of some of its units.

¹ A 4, 18, 42.

² G 01415/14. Tel. 185 to V.A. Channel, 5.11.14. Sent 7.10 p.m.

³ His command extended as far as 1° 41' E between the parallels of the Naze and 51° 40' N. (M Letter Book, Miscellaneous 276, p. 139, and M. 03580/14.)

⁴ A 99, 114.

33. **Two Battle Cruisers Detached from the Grand Fleet, November 4.**—Early on November 4, there was received at the Admiralty a telegram from Valparaiso announcing that our South American Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Cradock, had been defeated by a German Squadron, under Admiral von Spee, off the coast of Chile. The position thus set up was serious, since between the victorious German Admiral and the all important trade routes from the River Plate there was no vessel able to engage his two armoured cruisers with any prospect of success ; and the various enterprises we were conducting on the shores of the Atlantic ran imminent danger of interruption.¹ Orders were immediately sent out which should have the effect of assembling at each of the points considered likely to be threatened a squadron sufficiently strong to withstand attack ; but, in addition to these defensive measures, the Admiralty decided to constitute a force fast enough to seek for and strong enough to annihilate the advancing enemy. The only body of cruisers large enough to spare ships for this purpose was in the Grand Fleet ; they ordered the *Invincible* and *Inflexible* from Cromarty with all despatch to Berehaven, as a first step. Admiral Moore was to shift his flag from the *Invincible* to the *New Zealand*, and remain with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron ; while the *Tiger*,² the new battle cruiser, doing her drills at Berehaven, was ordered to Scapa to join the Grand Fleet.³

The order, received only the day after German battle cruisers had bombarded Yarmouth, gave no reason for this detaching of two battle cruisers from Admiral Beatty's force, beyond that they were required for foreign service. Moreover, as received, the telegram was thought to have been mutilated in transmission, and the Commander-in-Chief was at a loss what to make of it ; but to save time he directed Admiral Beatty to proceed with all the necessary arrangements.⁴ It was not till midnight that the First Lord sent a personal telegram to the Commander-in-Chief explaining that, as Admiral Cradock's squadron had been defeated, it was essential to recover control of the South American trade route.⁵

Vice-Admiral Sturdee, Chief of the Admiralty War Staff, was to take command of the new force, being succeeded at the Admiralty by Rear-Admiral Henry F. Oliver, C.B., M.V.O., who, Director of Naval Intelligence at the outbreak of war, had taken over the duty of Naval Secretary to the First Lord when Admiral Hood became Rear-Admiral of the Dover Patrol.

¹ See Monograph 22. *Atlantic I*, Section 109.

² *Tiger* (Captain H. B. Pelly, M.V.O.), 28,500 tons. 30 knots (designed), 8-13.5 in., 12-6 in. guns.

³ A 20, 21, 23.

⁴ 951 from Commander-in-Chief. H.F. sent 4.11.14. 2110. The wording of the copy of the Adty. Tel. in "Grand Fleet In Telegrams" is identical with that sent.

⁵ A 30.

The *Invincible* was to be Admiral Sturdee's flagship. As she had not had her bottom coated since November 1913, it was decided that she should be docked and coated before going abroad, and accordingly, both she and the *Inflexible* were ordered to Plymouth, to fill up to the utmost capacity with stores and supplies, both for themselves and the rest of the South American Squadron. The two ships made the passage westabout, arriving at Plymouth on the 8th. Amongst other important preparations necessary was the testing of the *Invincible's* gun sights; the work to be done proved to take longer than was anticipated, but the Admiralty thought the situation did not admit of delay, and when the two ships sailed after dark on November 11, the *Invincible* carried civilian officials and workmen still engaged on her guns.¹

34. Battle Cruiser Sweep, November 6-9.—While the Dreadnought squadrons were still cruising between the Hebrides and Faroes before returning to Scapa, the Commander-in-Chief ordered a battle cruiser sweep across the North Sea. The *Lion*, *Princess Royal* and *Queen Mary* were to leave Cromarty after dark of November 6, for a rendezvous next morning in 58° 30' N, 0° E, where they should be joined by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, accompanied from Scapa by half the 4th Destroyer Flotilla. The combined force was to sweep southward during the 7th, at night crossing over to Norway to sweep northward during the 8th, keeping about 60 miles from the coast. During the 9th the sweep was to be southward again, about 60 miles east of the Shetlands and Orkneys; at dark the ships were to separate, the battle cruisers to take the 4th Flotilla to Cromarty, and the light cruisers to return to Scapa.²

The sweep started as arranged. The *Nottingham*, *Birmingham*, and *Lowestoft*, and the destroyers, left Scapa after dark; the three battle cruisers passed out through the gates in Cromarty Boom before 11 p.m., but the junction was not actually effected till 10 p.m. on the 7th, though the ships had been in wireless touch for some time. They were then half-way across to Norway. But here their orders were changed.

The Admiralty had in hand a plan for a seaplane raid on German air stations, and on the 7th asked the Commander-in-Chief if he could supply four battle cruisers in support to leave Cromarty during the night of the 13th. The sweep in progress was to conclude on the 10th, but now it seemed advisable to shorten it, and accordingly the Commander-in-Chief ordered Admiral Beatty to leave out the cruise up the Norwegian coast and return to his base by daylight of the 9th. At 7.30 a.m. on the 8th, therefore, Admiral Beatty, then some 30 miles SSW of Ekersund, turned back in the direction of Scapa; the light cruisers

¹ H.S. 72, pp. 903, 913, 995. H.S. 73, p. 646.

² G.F.N., November 6-7.

parted company at 4.30 p.m. and went on to Scapa, while the battle cruisers and destroyers entered Cromarty before dawn of the 9th. The whole of the 4th Flotilla was now at Invergordon with the battle cruisers. The sweep had passed without incident, except that at 9.42 p.m. on the 8th, the *Lion* sighted, and altered course to avoid, a supposed submarine.¹

35. Dispositions to Meet Possible Minelaying Raid, November 10, and the Cruise of "U.24."—On the 9th, an intercepted telegram was partially decyphered. It was only fragmentary, but it seemed to imply that two vessels with the call signs of the *Ariadne* and *Berlin* were leaving Wilhelmshaven that night, with no lights except navigation lights. The *Ariadne* was supposed to have been sunk on August 28; but the information, such as it was, was passed on to the Commander-in-Chief, who, considering that the movement might possibly be part of a mining raid directed against his bases, ordered the *Swift* to go out from Cromarty, with two divisions of destroyers, and patrol a line between 15 and 40 miles E by N from Kinnaird Head, in the hope of intercepting such a raid before it reached the Grand Fleet area.²

During the afternoon of the 10th, he moved the 10th Cruiser Squadron, which were on the line NW of the Shetlands, to cruise between the Shetlands and Orkneys. Such cruisers as he had available he sent to strengthen the *Swift's* patrol. He had very few, though one more had been recently added to his command. This was the *Sapphire*, which had joined the Grand Fleet just before it left Lough Swilly for Scapa.³ She was not modern enough to act with a cruiser squadron and he had attached her to the battle fleet. The light cruisers had just returned from their sweep with Admiral Beatty. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron and the *Sappho* had been patrolling in severe weather north-westward of the Hebrides to intercept trade since November 5, and were now due for relief to attend to the defects which had developed. In fact, the *Natal* and *Achilles* were on their way to relieve them; but, in view of the more urgent necessity of preventing a minelaying raid, the Commander-in-Chief ordered the two ships to turn back and patrol NNE of the *Swift's* line, attaching the *Falmouth* and *Blanche* to them for the night. At dawn, on the 11th, they were to proceed to their former station north-west of the Hebrides,⁴ which, however, would have to be unguarded in the interval between the departure of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron at 11 p.m. on the 9th and the arrival of the *Natal*.

¹ There was no submarine then in that position.

² A 70.

³ She was ordered away from Dover on October 27. H.S. 70, p. 804.

⁴ G.F. Out Telegrams.

The weather became worse. On the 11th, coaling and storing operations at Scapa became impracticable, and all the three seaplanes and tents at the base were wrecked by the gale.¹ The old *Edgars* of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were now scarcely seaworthy, and arrangements were made for them to be repaired, three at a time, in the Clyde, as the home yards were all full.

No enemy vessels were seen by the Kinnaird Head patrol. The *Swift* and destroyers returned to Invergordon on the 11th, and the *Natal* and *Achilles*, instead of proceeding to west of the Hebrides, were ordered to cover the eastern approaches to the Orkneys, with the *Falmouth* and *Blanche* further to the eastward; in view of the weather, the last two were given permission to take shelter if necessary. On the 13th, the *Natal* and *Achilles* returned to Scapa, and the *Liverpool* and *Lowestoft* relieved the *Falmouth* and *Blanche*, the latter going to Cromarty to dock.

Though no enemy vessels had been seen in the expected position, there was one which had sighted some of our ships. U.24 (Lieutenant-Commander Schneider) left Emden early on the 8th to examine the Hebrides and the Minch; and at dawn, on the 10th, battling against a heavy sea and wind, of force 8, she was east of the Pentland Firth. There, on two occasions, she saw a "Town" class cruiser zigzagging on patrol, but the weather prevented an attack. The ship seen was probably the *Falmouth*. The north-westerly gale of the 11th and following days effectually put a stop to any attempt to make a passage of the Pentland Firth, and U.24 ran before it towards Denmark. By the afternoon of the 13th, one of her engines was out of action, and in addition, the discomforts of the crew were so great that Lieutenant-Commander Schneider determined to continue his voyage homeward. He reached Heligoland on November 14, with a badly damaged boat.

His cruise inaugurated a new series of submarine operations of greater difficulty than any hitherto undertaken. The boats despatched to the Channel could rest their crews by lying on the sandy bottom; but in northerly waters no such relief was possible on account of the rocky nature of the sea floor, added to which the difficulties of navigation and the severity of the weather were even greater than in the south. On return home, he expressed the opinion that submarine expeditions to the Orkneys were unlikely to meet with success in the winter months.²

36. The "Princess Royal" Ordered Abroad, November 10.—Early in November, the armed merchant cruisers patrolling near the Faroes heard from a British trawler that she had seen four large steamers passing to northward of the islands. In reporting this to the Admiralty, the Commander-in-Chief asked for two more armed liners to strengthen that patrol. He did not state

¹ G.F.N.

² *Nordsee* III, pp. 3, 6, and Karte 1.

that three of the large steamers seen were steering east, and the Admiralty seem to have thought them connected in some way with a report that Germany intended to attack our cruisers watching New York. They considered it imperative to send a battle cruiser to protect the New York patrol, and ordered the Commander-in-Chief to send the *Princess Royal*.¹

So unexpected an order was received with surprise by Admiral Jellicoe. Two of his battle cruisers had just been sent off to South America, and now the *Princess Royal*, one of his two best, and armed with 13.5-in. guns, was to go to New York. The *Tiger*, which had been ordered to Scapa to take her place, had not carried out her gunnery practices and had only one dynamo in action; she could not possibly be relied upon to meet a German battle cruiser. He discredited the idea that Germany would send heavy cruisers into the Atlantic; and if they should send battle cruisers he was certain they would send not one, but all. The successive removals of ships from the Grand Fleet was opposed to his principles of strategy; "The German policy is concentration," he wrote, "and I most respectfully submit that if the policy of British dispersion is adopted, it may lead to disaster."²

He felt his views to be so sound that he expected a reversal of the Admiralty order, which, moreover, seemed to be based on a misunderstanding. Instead, there came merely a suggestion that he should have obeyed at once without question, and an enquiry whether the *Princess Royal* had sailed. She had not; and he still endeavoured to get the Admiralty to despatch the *New Zealand* instead of the *Princess Royal*, for it seemed to him she, with her 12-in. guns, could serve whatever purpose there might be as well as her more powerful consort.³ But the Admiralty made no alteration in their determination that the *Princess Royal* should go. She left Cromarty at 2.30 a.m., on the 12th.⁴

To some extent, the Admiralty in despatching the *Princess Royal* may have been influenced by a report from our Consul-General, New York, to the effect that the German Cruiser Squadron intended soon to strike in the North Atlantic.⁵ It is clear now that by "cruiser squadron" the informant, a German, meant von Spee's squadron⁶; but it does not seem to have been so

¹ G.F. Out Tels., November 7, and A 77.

² A 80, 85, 90.

³ A 87, 89, 92, 96, 98. The secret information referred to in A 96 "pointed to the possibility of the Germans endeavouring to slip one or two of their battle cruisers into the Atlantic to help the return to Germany of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and incidentally to release all their fast liners in New York." Winston Churchill: *The World Crisis* I, p. 444.

⁴ The Commander-in-Chief wrote a letter, 410/H.F. 0022, explaining his reasons for not at once despatching her in amplification of his telegrams. A copy of the letter is in H.S.A. 100.

⁵ A 16.

⁶ This was always spoken of as "Das Kreuzergeschwader."

interpreted, either at the Admiralty or in the fleet. Admiral Beatty, at any rate, considered it to mean a squadron of four battle cruisers, with the *Blücher* and six light cruisers. His own squadron—the *Lion*, *Queen Mary*, and *New Zealand* only, the *Tiger* being yet unfit to act with the rest—he assumed to be inferior to such a force, for though the *Lion* had 13·5-in. guns, the *Derfflinger*, now probably with the fleet, was credited with 14-in. guns; the battles which had so far taken place had, in his opinion, “emphasised most markedly that superiority will always annihilate inferiority without the inferior force being able to inflict compensating damage on the superior force”; and the situation seemed to him so grave that he asked whether his duty was still to sail instantly to engage the enemy if they should put to sea.

The Admiralty did not share his views as to the relative weakness of his squadron. They pointed out that “the inferiority of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron to the German Cruiser Squadron, even with the addition of the *Blücher*, is so slight that it should not make any difference in the Vice-Admiral’s duty to engage the latter if opportunity offers. The *Derfflinger* has not had much more time than the *Tiger* to get into good gunnery order, and it is on gunnery efficiency more than numbers that the result of an action depends.”¹

37. Change of Views regarding the Prevention of Invasion.—By the middle of November the whole of the British regular army was in France and the troops in England with which to withstand a hostile force, should it once have made a successful landing, consisted almost entirely of new recruits and soldiers only partially trained. Moreover, the War Office, which, in the first months of the war had looked upon invasion as so remote a possibility that they had pressed for the despatch of more divisions to France than the Cabinet were disposed to allow, were now becoming apprehensive. They argued that the lull on the fighting fronts would enable the Germans to spare as many as 25,000 good troops for the invasion of England. The Admiralty did not share this opinion; they considered that the difficulty of landing a large force, and the comparative ease with which British troops could be withdrawn from France to meet it, were sufficient to deter the enemy from the attempt²; but in the face of the alteration in War Office views the threat of an invasion could not be ignored or lightly dismissed.

In Admiralty schemes for opposing invasion considerable reliance had been placed upon the strong probability that the actual operation of landing would not be possible in the face of

¹ M. 03873/14.

² Winston Churchill: *The World Crisis* I, pp. 267, 376, 386, 450. The German historian says: “A knowledge of the relative naval strengths of Great Britain and Germany should have been enough to dispel any such idea (as an attempt at invasion).” G.O.H. III, p. 59.

the patrol flotillas and coastal submarines. As regards the capacity of the latter to oppose a landing, Commodore (S), in the light of the experience gained in actual war, was beginning to become doubtful. The conclusion he now reached was, that the submarines of the patrol flotillas could not be relied upon to inflict loss on enemy transports landing troops on an open beach unless our boats happened to be in the vicinity of the landing or had sufficient warning to enable them either to be on the spot when the transports arrived, or to attack them in daylight as they approached.¹ The Admiral of Patrols was equally doubtful as to the value of his patrol destroyers; they had reverted to their original organisation of divisions, each in a different port, and he considered that each division, as it arrived, would be destroyed by the enemy's covering force.²

But it had always been considered that the greatest risk an invasionary force would encounter would be during its passage across the North Sea; nevertheless, the actual course of the war had tended to shake that conviction. In the Commander-in-Chief's opinion the conditions in the North Sea which the War Orders had assumed were entirely changed by the activity of the enemy submarines. It was no longer possible to maintain watching cruisers near the German coast and, consequently, we could not learn in time of the departure of the raiding force. No more than the submarines could the Grand Fleet guarantee to stop the landing of a large force. He suggested that the nation should be so informed, and that a military force of 300,000 men should be raised for the special purpose of resisting an invasion. There would be time for this, since during the winter a landing on an open beach on the East Coast could be considered impracticable; what had to be reckoned with was a landing in some properly constituted port, and to prevent this he proposed the preparation of block ships and of arrangements for destroying jetties and flooding harbours with burning petrol; defensive minefields should be laid and old battleships stationed in the more likely ports to provide or assist the defences. These measures should render unnecessary any deconcentration of the Grand Fleet. He indicated that on November 20 there would be high tide shortly after dawn, which seemed the most favourable condition for an attempt at landing.³

These views the Commander-in-Chief put before the Admiralty, apparently in response to a Secret Memorandum brought to him by the First Sea Lord's Naval Secretary. No copy of the Secret Memorandum has been found, either in the Admiralty or in the records of the Grand Fleet; but there can be little doubt that it set forth in detail the Admiralty views as to the method of preventing and resisting an invasion covered by the High Sea Fleet.⁴

¹ Comm. (S), Memo. 059, of 1.11.14. A copy is in Comm. (S) War Records, Vol. I, pp. 661-671.

² See Monograph 7, C.B. 1585, *Patrol Flotillas*, Sections 42, 44, 46.

³ M. 05182/14 and Tel. 69 from Commander-in-Chief, 14.11.14.

⁴ M Letter Book 276, p. 749.

The chief feature to which the Commander-in-Chief objected was the definite attachment of the 3rd Battle Squadron to Admiral Burney's command in the Channel, instead of leaving it with the Grand Fleet. The areas declared dangerous from mines on the East Coast left only two exits for the Channel Fleet; Admiral Burney informed him that he would come out between the German and British minefield, preceded by minesweepers, and that he could not be clear of the mine danger till 24 hours after he had sailed. The Channel Fleet had no cruiser squadron to scout for it, and it was most probable that the enemy would mine the only two exits.

Such being the case, Admiral Jellicoe felt certain that there was little chance of a junction between the Channel and Grand Fleets; and, in fact, to leave the 3rd Battle Squadron in the south would be to deprive it of any chance of coming in to action in time. It was hardly to be doubted that any real attempt at invasion would be accompanied by the High Sea Fleet in force. This would be the opportunity for the Grand Fleet to bring the enemy to action; and in his anxiety to make sure of annihilating the hostile fleet, the Commander-in-Chief urged that the *King Edward* class should be returned to him, and that either the 1st or 3rd Flotilla should be attached to the Grand Fleet to redress its inferiority in destroyers; he suggested also that as soon as the conditions on the trade route permitted, some of the cruisers now engaged overseas should be added to the Grand Fleet.¹

38. Preparations for Disabling the Northumbrian Ports.—The critical date, November 20, was rapidly approaching, and the Northumbrian ports, which the Commander-in-Chief had represented as specially likely to be raided by the enemy, were still without special preparations. His suggestion was that Admiral de Courcy Hamilton and Captain Lionel Wells, retired officers of known energy, should be at once sent to make the necessary arrangements.² They were accordingly appointed on November 15, their orders being to arrange detailed schemes, in conjunction with the local authorities, for crippling the facilities of Sunderland and Newcastle. Their orders instructed them to prepare block ships and to conclude definite arrangements for blowing up piers, destroying cranes, and flooding the ports with oil³; and in less than a week their schemes were complete. Certain naval authorities, Sir Arthur Wilson and the Admiral of Patrols in particular, viewed these arrangements with some dismay; the exact moment for carrying them out must be decided by the authority on the spot, acting upon possibly incorrect intelligence, and the appearance of a small force intent only on bombardment, might result to us in self-inflicted damage incomparably greater than ever the enemy could hope to accomplish by the most

¹ M. 05182/14 and A 97, 108.

² Tel. 69 from Commander-in-Chief to Adty., 14.11.14.

³ M Letter Book 276, pp. 953–956, and 277, p. 858.

determined activity. Both these officers thought defensive minefields better, and their view was so far adopted, that a real observation minefield had been secretly laid off Blyth on the 13th,¹ and a fictitious one off Jarrow; compulsory pilotage to give the impression that minefields existed was instituted in the larger East Coast ports, to begin on November 27.²

At the same time a pigeon service was organised to be worked by fishing vessels, so that they might give warning of any raiding force observed; and Aberdeen W/T Station was made the Intelligence Centre for the Commander-in-Chief, all war signal stations being instructed to forward reports of the enemy to Aberdeen.³

A special effort was made to obtain a complete air patrol of the East Coast. Orders were issued for the Naval aeroplanes and seaplanes to be prepared for immediate use, so that when news of a raid was received they might go out and ascertain the strength of the raiding force. In addition, a special patrol by all aircraft available was ordered for November 19. The Cromarty area was to be patrolled from Fort George Air Station; the Firth of Forth, from Granton and Dundee. The coast, from Newcastle to Dover, was divided into sections, to be patrolled from the Newcastle, Killingholme (Humber), Yarmouth, Felixstowe, Eastchurch, Isle of Grain and Dover stations. In all cases the patrols were to be carried out to seaward, in order to obtain early information of the expected raiding force.⁴

All these measures were defensive. There remained the plan for attacking the invasionary force on its passage.

39. Anti-Invasion Orders of November 16.⁵—The cessation of bombarding operations on the Belgian coast put certain vessels at the disposal of the Admiralty for other work. These they intended to distribute along the East Coast as coast defence ships. The disposition of all the force available to resist a landing was settled on November 16. The *Excellent* was to lie at Clacton, the *Sirius* and *Brilliant* at Harwich, the three monitors in the Wash. The *Victorious*, *Majestic*, *Mars*, and *Jupiter*, stationed in the Humber, and the *Illustrious* in the Tyne, were to act as supports to the patrol flotillas there. Yarmouth and Whitby were to have divisions of destroyers, Hartlepool the *Rinaldo*, Sunderland one "C" class, and Blyth three "C" class submarines. These were the defensive force; the ships were not to go to sea to attack the invading force, but to meet it on its arrival.

¹ M Letter Book 276, p. 939.

² X. 4092/14. M. 05182/14. The ports mentioned were the Humber, Tyne, Firth of Forth, Moray Firth, and Scapa Flow.

³ M. 03586, 03494/14.

⁴ Memo. by D.A.D., dated 14.11.14, in "I.C.A. Correspondence," a volume registered by the C.I.D. Air History Section as 15/227/15.

⁵ M. 0082.

The function of attacking it at sea was given to the older battle squadrons, and the principle adopted was that indicated in the War Orders, namely, that the transports, and not the covering force or escort, were first to be dealt with. As soon as it should become known that a raiding force was at sea the Vice-Admiral, Channel Fleet, was to proceed without further orders from Sheerness, and, forcing his way through or past any covering force of whatever strength, was to attack the expedition, calling upon the *Duncans*, which would be at Dover, to join him. There was the possibility that the enemy's expedition might be found north of Flamborough Head. The Channel Fleet, in that case, could hardly expect to reach it in time; and, therefore, the *King Edward VII* class battleships, under Vice-Admiral Bradford, who had similar orders, were stationed, not with the Grand Fleet at Scapa, but in the Firth of Forth, with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and eight sea-going destroyers attached to them. The 1st and 3rd Flotillas were to elude the escort, if possible, and concentrate on the transports; but if the raid was north of Flamborough Head, Commodore (T) was not to go north of Haisborough without definite orders. The overseas submarines were to attack any force attempting to land between Dover and the Wash; if the landing occurred north of the Wash, they would be ordered to intercept the retreat of the High Sea Fleet or attack it at sea. The minelayers were to remain in readiness to lay mines in the Ems River approaches and off Heligoland, to catch the enemy on his return; and the cross-channel steamer *Paris* was taken up from the Brighton Railway Company to be equipped as a fast minelayer.¹

The decision to place the *King Edward VII* class with a complement of cruisers and destroyers at Rosyth had not been reached without difficulty, since it represented a marked divergence from the Commander-in-Chief's views on strategy and concentration. His proposals had all been directed towards substituting local measures and the action of minor forces for any dispersion of the main strength of the Grand Fleet; most of the local measures were adopted by the Admiralty, but they felt reluctantly compelled to take the *King Edwards* from him in order to have a force nearer than Scapa or Cromarty to the probable points of attack on the East Coast which, they pointed out, had been almost denuded of mobile defence in accordance with his own desire for concentration of all forces at Scapa.²

The Forth was now to be definitely a naval base. Certain restrictions of navigation in the Firth of Forth came into force on the 15th, and fishing at night was prohibited west of the line Fifeness-St. Abbs.³ The Admirals at Cromarty and Rosyth were both pressing for additional destroyers to aid in the defence

¹ M. 0082 and M. 03670/14.

² A 94 and numerous telegrams between A 100 and A 142.

³ M. 03505/14, 3539/14.

and patrol, but the Admiralty had as yet none to allot, though on the 17th they ordered eight of the Mediterranean destroyers home. They gave permission, however, for the guns and search-lights from the *Vulcan*, the depot ship for the submarines in the Forth, to be mounted at Leith and Granton; the latter place was now the base of the auxiliary patrol, since Methil had been found unsuitable.¹

By the 20th all the dispositions laid down in the Admiralty's anti-invasion orders were complete, except for the *Rinaldo*, which, having been delayed by a collision off Sheerness, did not reach Hartlepool till some days later. The movement of so many heavy vessels necessitated much destroyer escort; and the Harwich flotillas were drawn on for the work. The *Majestic* and *Jupiter* were each escorted by four destroyers from the Nore to the Humber; and when the Channel Fleet came round from Portland they were met in the morning of the 15th, at Dungeness, by 12 of Commodore (T's) destroyers, which escorted the fleet from there to Sheerness.

40. **A Sortie of the German Fleet Expected.**—During the 16th or 17th, the expectation of a raid was increased by reports of varying trustworthiness. Our minister at the Hague received an anonymous letter saying the German Fleet was to come out in the course of the week. The same statement was repeated by what was considered a trustworthy source in Denmark, with the addition that the sortie was for the object of enabling a force of fast cruisers to get into the Atlantic. This was passed to the Commander-in-Chief, who was inclined to doubt that if the Battle Fleet, which was reported to be at Wilhelmshaven, came out it would be for such a purpose, and he did not allow the reports to interfere with his arrangements for the control of contraband.

With the 3rd Cruiser Squadron away at Rosyth and the 10th Cruiser Squadron out of action, he found it impossible to patrol more than one area, and he therefore chose that most likely to be passed in daylight; but as darkness now lasted 15 hours, enemy vessels could, if they wished, pass in and out of the Atlantic with perfect ease.² Since the disturbance of his arrangements resulting from the anticipated minelaying raid of the 10th, he had been able to keep only half-a-dozen cruisers at sea, and these he had distributed on both sides of the Orkneys. On the 17th, for instance, he had to westward of the Orkneys the *Southampton* and *Birmingham* doing gunnery practices, and the *Nottingham*, with the *Tiger*, also practising gunnery. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was all at Scapa, as were also two of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. Apart from the *Drake*, off the Faroes, the only

¹ A 136. M. 03354, 03286, 03600/14.

² H.S. 75, p. 296. A 131, 133, 137.

Grand Fleet cruisers at sea were the *Devonshire* and *Argyll*, patrolling to cover the eastern approaches to the Pentland Firth. The weather had been uniformly bad, and the seaworthy part of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, *Gibraltar* and *Theseus*, had to shelter in Busta Voe till the 16th, before taking up their patrol area, now west of the Hebrides. Such armed merchant cruisers as were not coaling, or on their way to or from Liverpool for fuel, operated south-west of the Faroes with the *Drake*, in an attempt to keep the North Sea closed.¹

41. **A Submarine near Fair Island, November 18.**—Ever since the fleet returned to Scapa there were daily reports of the presence of submarines in the neighbourhood of the Orkneys and on the coasts of North Scotland. On November 5, the *Drake* saw what she thought was a periscope at 800 yards range as she passed Hoy Island, on the way out to her patrol station. That day 20 trawlers arrived at Scapa to assist in the anti-submarine patrol. Light rope nets of 12 ft. mesh, with sentry buoys to show by their movements when a submarine became entangled, were placed in Switha and Hoxa Sounds, and trawlers were set to watch them. On the 6th, two submarines were reported in Loch Eriboll, 11 miles east of Cape Wrath; some of the local defence vessels of Scapa were sent to search the loch, but found nothing. On the 8th and 9th, there were reports from the East Coast of Scotland which led to the assumption that one or more submarines were making their way north; and on the 10th, one was seen from the shore proceeding towards Holm Sound. On the 12th and 13th, reports came from the Hebrides that submarines had been seen in Loch Roag and Loch Resort; the Commander-in-Chief detached the *Rifleman* and *Larne* from the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla to investigate, learning on their return that they had found what was considered indisputable evidence of the use of the Western Hebrides by submarines. On the 15th, such credible reports from Noss Head and Duncansby Head were received that he sent a division of the 2nd Flotilla to hunt there. On the 16th, two submarines were seen passing the Skaw outwards; and next day one was seen near Stonehaven, and three in the Moray Firth.² Disquieting as these reports were, none of them was confirmed; and, indeed, they could not be, for the submarines and periscopes seen were all imaginary.

But on the 18th, a genuine submarine was seen and chased. In the channel between North Ronaldshay and Fair Island were the four minesweeping gunboats, *Skipjack*, *Leda*, *Gossamer* and *Circe*; on board the *Skipjack* was Commander Lionel Preston, in charge of the party. Just at noon, as the northern pair, *Skipjack* and *Circe*, were about to pass their sweeps, Commander Preston observed a small black object to northward of him, and the two gunboats chased it at their full speed. It proved to be the

¹ G.F.N.

² G.F.N., November 1914.

conning tower of a submarine, with a trawler more or less in company. The submarine made off through a somewhat heavy westerly sea, and was soon seen to be outdistancing the gunboats, although these were going the revolutions for 18 knots. The spray prevented Commander Preston from firing, as he did not feel it advisable to ease down to bring into play an old gun that was of no use outside 2,000 yards; but he called up destroyers and continued the chase, only to see after a chase of 45 minutes that the submarine, now well ahead, quietly dived. The trawler, on investigation, proved to be a harmless vessel from Aberdeen.¹

The submarine was *U.22*, which had set out on November 15 with the same instructions as *U.24* previously, to observe the supposed fleet bases. To these were added Loch Ewe, whose use by the fleet had been mentioned in private letters to a military officer taken prisoner on the Western front. *U.24* was told that no war vessels had been reported between Loch Ewe and the Fastnet, at which latter station the *Doris* was known to have stopped a steamer. By November 17, *U.22* was 60 miles east of the Pentland Skerries. There, in the forenoon, she twice sighted a cruiser of the *Liverpool* class, zigzagging at 12 knots; there was too much swell for her to make an attack. The ship she had sighted must have been either the *Devonshire* or *Argyll*, which at that time were covering the eastern approaches to the Pentland Firth.² Both classes of ship had four funnels and a similar silhouette. After her encounter with the *Skipjack*, *U.22* passed through to the west side of the Orkneys and proceeded for Loch Ewe.

42. Commodore (T) Reconnoitres Heligoland, November 18.— The information of anticipated German raids had so far been only of the nature supplied by agents, and too indefinite to have more effect than to keep the Admiralty on the alert. But on the 17th there was intercepted an actual German order from the Admiral of the 1st Scouting Group for a flotilla and a half of destroyers to be off Heligoland at daybreak, November 18. The exact significance of this was not apparent; but for safety's sake, since it might mean that the 1st Scouting Group, which included the battle cruisers, were coming out for a raid, two fast cruisers from Commodore Tyrwhitt's force were ordered to reconnoitre and report; while the Channel Fleet, the Harwich destroyers and submarines, and all the vessels under the Admiral of Patrols, were to keep steam ready to proceed.³

Only one vessel of the Harwich force was out on patrol at the time. After the withdrawal of the Terschelling patrol on account of the bad weather of the 11th, the destroyers took no further part in it; it was conducted by light cruisers only. The *Aurora* took it on the 14th⁴; and on the 17th, when the order

¹ M. 03942/14. *Skipjack's* Report.

² G.F.N.

³ A 135, 141.

⁴ H.S. 74, pp. 288, 420, 541.

to reconnoitre Heligoland came, the *Fearless* was patrolling between the minefields and the Dutch coast, but not on any fixed line, since the Admiralty, remembering what had happened to the *Cressys*, had instructed the Commodore to vary the position of the patrol.¹

The Commodore decided to go himself to Heligoland in the *Arethusa*, taking with him the *Undaunted*, which had now rejoined, after completing her defects at Chatham. He sent her on ahead, through the passage between the minefields, to rendezvous with him half-way between the North Hinder and Maas Light Vessels. After meeting, the two proceeded at high speed during the night so as to reach Heligoland by dawn. They patrolled to the northward of Heligoland for two hours, sighting nothing but the smoke of a vessel, apparently a destroyer. They seemed to have just missed the flotilla and a half of destroyers, which during the night of the 17th and 18th scouted westward from Heligoland, and at midnight were in 54° N, 5° E. The *Arethusa* and *Undaunted* were then near Ymuiden. The German destroyers came no further west,² but, turning back, were probably in harbour again when our cruisers came in sight of Heligoland.

At 8.30 a.m. on the 18th, when they were 12 miles from the island, there were wireless indications that their presence was discovered,³ and the Commodore, considering it useless to remain longer, withdrew to the westward and asked for instructions. He was told by the Admiralty to return to Harwich.⁴

43. Movements of Grand Fleet to Counter the German Raid.⁵—The Commander-in-Chief, on learning that it was possible the Germans were contemplating a raid, made dispositions to counter what he had last been informed was the enemy's policy, namely, a battle cruiser raid to cover the despatch of fast cruisers to the Atlantic. Admiral Beatty, with all the available cruisers and a division of the 4th Flotilla, was stationed east of the Shetlands, while the 2nd Battle Squadron cruised west of the Fair Island Channel. The 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons remained at Scapa at 2 or 4 hours' notice respectively; and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, which was under Admiralty orders to go to Rosyth with the *King Edwards*, kept guard east of the Orkneys till the battleships, which had been delayed on the Irish coast by the bad weather, arrived at Scapa. The closure of the North Sea was left, as before, to the *Drake*, *Mantua* and *Alsatian* near the Faroes, and to three of the old *Edgars* west of the Hebrides.

Learning, at 6.15 p.m. on the 18th, that nothing had been seen by our reconnoitring cruisers at Heligoland, the Commander-in-Chief moved the cruiser force to stations north and east of

¹ H.S. 74, p. 557.

² *Nordsee* III, Karte 2.

³ G.O.H. makes no mention of their visit.

⁴ H.S. 75, pp. 240, 319, 323, 383, 516, 532.

⁵ G.F.N. and G.F. In and Out Telegrams.

the Shetlands, the battle and light cruisers going to the northern area, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron to the eastward.

Nothing of the enemy had been seen by noon of the 19th, and Admiral Beatty, who wished to carry out torpedo practice in Scapa Flow, was instructed to come in there with the battle and light cruisers, his place north of the Shetlands being taken by the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. The 3rd Battle Squadron had left Scapa that morning before dawn for Rosyth, preceded by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. On the 20th, the 4th Battle Squadron relieved the 2nd on its station west of the Shetlands.

No incident had occurred during the patrol, except that the *Ajax*, at 9 a.m. on the 19th, saw a periscope in $60^{\circ} 10' N$, $6.30 W$. This must have been a mistake, since *U.22* did not go north of $59^{\circ} 31'$, and no other submarine was then west of the Orkneys.¹ The effect of the report of the *Ajax* was that the battleships were ordered to keep west of $6.30 W$. The 4th Battle Squadron was on its station only for a few hours; both squadrons were recalled and were at Scapa by daylight of the 21st. The Admiralty had concluded by this time that the raid had not yet taken place², and had determined to take the initiative themselves in the hope that to do so would dislocate the enemy's plans.

CHAPTER V.

A BRITISH RECONNAISSANCE AT HELIGOLAND AND A GERMAN ATTACK ON THE ORKNEYS, NOVEMBER 23 AND 24.

44. **The Plan and Object of the British Attack.**—For some time the Admiralty had been contemplating a repetition of the air raid of October 25, to be carried out by the seaplanes of the *Engadine* and *Riviera*, escorted by a detachment of the Harwich flotillas, with the *Duncans* from Dover in support. But on November 20, they became aware that a large force, practically the whole of the High Sea Fleet, was assembled in the harbours of Heligoland Bight for some offensive operation, and that five German submarines had been ordered to the Shetlands, in addition to those already operating in the Channel and on the Belgian coast. The disposition and state of preparedness of the High Sea Fleet suggested that it might readily be enticed out by an attack; and the absence of so many submarines would give the Grand Fleet an unusual measure of security if it came south in support. There seemed a good chance of provoking a considerable action in conditions favourable to ourselves.

¹ *Nordsee* III, Karte 2.

² The order they had intercepted seems now to be nothing more than one dealing with the routine of the Bight patrol. T.S.D.D.

The form of attack proposed was a seaplane raid on the Zeppelin sheds at Cuxhaven, which had been for some time in contemplation. The Commander-in-Chief, in view of the dependence of aircraft on weather conditions and the doubt that an air raid would bring out the enemy's main force, thought it injudicious to base the movements of the Grand Fleet upon such an attack; but the Admiralty, determined not to allow what they considered a good occasion for a sweep of the Grand Fleet to pass, gave orders for the proposed operation to proceed.¹

The plan, known as Plan X, was for the *Engadine* and *Riviera*, each carrying three seaplanes, to proceed to a point about 15 miles NNE of Heligoland, escorted by a force of Harwich destroyers and light cruisers, while the Grand Fleet in force came down within supporting distance, the cruisers and light cruisers to be 50 miles from Heligoland, the battle cruisers and battleships further behind them.

At first it was not intended to use any submarines in the operation; but, by the time the executive orders were issued, it had been decided that three submarines were to go close into Heligoland to intercept pursuing vessels and pick up the air pilots.²

There was not time for a letter to reach the Commander-in-Chief; the essentials of the plan were telegraphed to him, and on them he drafted his operation orders.³ He intended to take the whole fleet, including the flotillas from Scapa and Cromarty, and the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth. The battle squadrons were to proceed to a point 110 miles from Heligoland, the battle cruisers and light cruisers 40 miles nearer, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, with two light cruisers, to the close supporting position 40 miles from the island.

45. Departure of the Forces Employed.—The date for the air raid had been fixed at first for the morning of November 23; but since the repairs to the *Arethusa* would not be complete then, and the Commander-in-Chief asked for another day in order to have more ships ready, it was deferred to 5.30 a.m. on the 24th.⁴

The watch off Heligoland was continued between the 20th and 22nd by submarines *E.11* and *E.12*. The former got away from Yarmouth early on the 19th, and throughout the 20th was north-east of Heligoland; *E.12*, starting later, was delayed a whole day by fog, and did not reach her station off the western Ems till the 21st. Neither saw more than the usual destroyer and trawler patrols, reinforced in the suitable weather of the 20th by a Zeppelin air-ship, which circled round Heligoland the whole

¹ A 160, 165, 170, 171.

² A 161, 165, 167, 168, 177–191.

³ Operation Order 17, of 22.11.14. See Appendix G.

⁴ A 173, 175.

forenoon. *E.11* attacked one of the destroyers¹ that afternoon ; she missed, but caused great excitement among the flotilla, in the course of which she fouled some obstruction, which altered her trim so badly that she had to go to the bottom till nightfall before taking measures to free herself from it. This she eventually did by going astern full speed. Both submarines started for Haisborough Channel and Yarmouth in the evening of the 22nd.² They were thus on passage home when the fleet left for the new sweep.

The first vessels to start for the operation were the three submarines *D.2*, *E.5*, and *E.15*, which left Harwich at 7 a.m., November 22, in order to get out through the Haisborough Channel before dark. The weather was most unpromising, with a gale from the east ; and their experiences give some idea of the difficulties of manœuvring submarines on the East Coast in winter. By the time the leading boat reached Gorleston her companions were invisible and did not reply to her calls ; and she put into Yarmouth for instructions which, however, did not arrive till 3 p.m. They were to the effect that, as the weather forecast was favourable, the submarines were to proceed. By that time all three boats had arrived. They set out, but as it was now too late for navigating the unlighted Haisborough Channel, they anchored in the Would in seas which, breaking over their conning towers, caused *E.5* to plunge so badly that her hydroplane guards tore her hull and produced a bad leak. At daybreak the submarines proceeded in seas which so much reduced their speed that, realising that they could not arrive till several hours after the operation, in conformity with their orders for this contingency, they returned to harbour.³ Besides damaging *E.5*, the heavy sea had caused a serious loss to the submarine service ; Lieutenant-Commander Jameson, commanding *D.2*, had been washed overboard and drowned.⁴

The Grand Fleet was the next to leave. Though no submarines had been reported, as a precaution the Commander-in-Chief sent out the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla to search the Pentland Firth and the first part of the route towards the first rendezvous. They sighted nothing ; but they were themselves not unseen. *U.22* (Lieutenant-Commander Hoppe), after cruising on the 20th and 21st between Loch Ewe and Stornoway, both of which places she visited and found empty of any warships other than trawlers,⁵ was now reconnoitring Pentland Firth from the westward. At 3.10 p.m. on the 22nd, Lieutenant-Commander Hoppe

¹ The destroyer was *V.181*. Another destroyer, *T.99*, stated she had been attacked twice while proceeding from Heligoland to the Jade that morning. *Nordsee* III, p. 48.

² Comm. (S) War Records, Vol. I, pp. 479-485.

³ A 182, 192.

⁴ Comm. (S) War Records, Vol. I, pp. 486-494.

⁵ Loch Ewe had four yachts, nine trawlers and drifters, and five motor boats, based on Aultbea, but by the Commander-in-Chief's orders most of these were at Lough Swilly. (Positions and Movements, 21 November 1914.)

saw the 2nd Flotilla off the west coast of Stroma Island and watched them alter course to east. He tried to get near to have a view of Scapa Roads, but baffling currents drove him back, and as it was growing dark he turned westward to get into more open waters for the night. A little delay would have enabled him to count the ships of the Grand Fleet and solve the mystery of its main station.¹ The light cruisers leading the fleet passed the Pentland Skerries at 5 p.m.; the cruisers and battle squadrons half-an-hour later. Nothing was left behind at Scapa except the auxiliary vessels and the destroyers of the local patrol; even the *Achilles*, which, during heavy gun practice on the 20th had lost the muzzle of one of her 9.2-in. guns through the premature bursting of a lyddite shell, was with her own squadron, the 2nd, on the port beam of the battle cruisers.

The seaplane carriers, *Engadine* and *Riviera*, escorted by the *Arethusa*, *Aurora*, *Undaunted*, and eight "L" class destroyers, left Harwich at 5 a.m., November 23. Commodore Tyrwhitt was on board the *Arethusa*. He chose for his exit the corridor between the British and German mined areas, which he considered the only safe passage.

46. The Operation Abandoned.—By 8 o'clock the wind was dropping and all seemed to be going well. But a German wireless message, reported to the Admiralty, was understood to give the unwelcome information that a force of destroyers, light cruisers and armoured cruisers, was scouting to the north-westward of Heligoland, right in the path of the seaplane carriers as they made their way to the rendezvous on the far side of Heligoland, from which flying was to commence. At 8.45 p.m., therefore, the Admiralty sent orders for Commodore Tyrwhitt to abandon the operation, send back the *Engadine* and *Riviera*, with a destroyer escort, and fall back on his supports.² The Commodore was off Borkum Flat in 54° 28' N, 5° 43' E, at 10 p.m., when he received the Admiralty message; he turned back and accompanied the carriers for an hour and then, despatching them with the destroyers, headed himself with the three light cruisers and one destroyer, the *Lennox*, for the rendezvous where he should find the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.³

The Admiralty, in informing the Commander-in-Chief of the reasons for abandoning the seaplane attack, which both they and he had looked upon as subsidiary to the main object of bringing out the High Sea Fleet, gave him discretion as to ordering Commodore (T) to make a reconnaissance in the morning with adequate support, in the hopes that this would bring on a cruiser action. He, therefore, instructed the Commodore to meet the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at 54° 48' N, 7° E, 50' NW of Heligoland,

¹ *Nordsee* III, p. 14, and Karte 2.

² A 197.

³ *Arethusa* Signal Log 18133.

at dawn, of the 24th, and to reconnoitre to within 15 miles of the island, trying to draw the enemy on to the cruisers; these were to support him closely and to have the battle cruisers behind them.¹

Before reaching the rendezvous the Commodore, about 7 a.m. on the 24th, came across some strange vessels, which he took to be the enemy's destroyers, till after a quarter of an hour's chase northward, he found them to be our own light cruisers, those working with the battle cruisers.² He next came across the *Lion*, whereupon Admiral Beatty ordered him south again to meet the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, which was looking for him. He was in touch with Admiral Calthorpe at 8.10 a.m., by searchlight, and together they swept south-eastward, maintaining touch in the same way.

By 9.35 a.m. Heligoland Lighthouse was in sight, and at 10.15 the forts on the island opened fire, though none of our ships closed nearer than 15 miles. After cruising for an hour in the Bight and having sighted nothing except a submarine and some destroyers close to Heligoland, our force of 14 vessels³ withdrew at 11 a.m., both the Admiral and the Commodore being sure that they could not draw the enemy out.⁴ They saw nothing of the force reported to be scouting north-west of Heligoland. In fact, there was none. It appears, from the German history, that in the afternoon of November 20 the newly joined *Derfflinger* went for an exercise cruise with the other battle cruisers as far as 80 miles NNW of Heligoland, escorted by two light cruisers and a flotilla of destroyers. Fragments of decyphered orders concerning this cruise and the routine patrols gave rise to the idea that the patrol for the 23rd was as described in the Admiralty telegram. On November 20 we had no submarines in position to observe the battle cruiser's movements. *E.11* was east of Heligoland throughout the 20th, and *E.12*, which should then have been to the westward, did not reach the Bight till the squadron had gone back into port.

We had now two other submarines waiting in the Western Ems for any movement of the enemy. Commodore Keyes had suggested that he had two spare boats, and asked permission to send them to the Ems and go himself with four destroyers. The last part of his request the Admiralty refused, as the destroyers were wanted for other work, but they sanctioned the despatch of the two submarines. These were *D.4* and *D.6*. They left Yarmouth at daybreak of the 23rd, and were in position at the Western Ems throughout the 24th. Only the usual destroyer patrols were visible; *D.4* made an attack on one boat, but did

¹ A 198.

² See Appendix C.

³ *Shannon* (flag of R. A. Gough Calthorpe), *Natal*, *Cochrane*, *Achilles*, *Falmouth*, *Liverpool*, *Arethusa*, *Undaunted*, *Aurora*, *Lennox*, *Lynx*, *Midge*, *Owl*, *Hardy*.

⁴ Appendix C 15.

not succeed in hitting her. The submarines were to be there only 24 hours, and at nightfall of the 24th they left again for home.¹

47. **German Movements.**²—The morning of November 24 was one of great visibility, and our ships had been sighted by Heligoland Lighthouse some time before the patrols saw them. The German Fleet Command knew of the presence of our ships as early as 10 a.m. They were not unexpected, for the abandonment of the seaplane attack and the alteration of Commodore (T's) orders had entailed a good deal of wireless signalling, which was duly reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet by the *Blücher*, Senior Officer of the Outpost Forces. In addition to the usual patrols of the Bight, the German 3rd and 6th Torpedo Boat Destroyer Flotillas were at sea that night (November 23); it was a frequent procedure on dark nights for a destroyer force to be stationed north-west of Heligoland to attack any enemy forces which might be carrying out a sweep. Our wireless activity might mean something of the kind, but Admiral von Ingenohl refrained from sending out any support, as he felt sure that if the Grand Fleet was, in fact, making an appearance in Heligoland Bight, which, however, he thought unlikely, we should first have placed submarines in position to attack the German heavy ships as they came out of harbour. The 3rd and 6th Flotillas had orders to turn back when 85 miles from Heligoland; they seem to have turned before the arrival of our forces, which, therefore, were first reported by Heligoland Lighthouse. The patrols were at once withdrawn to the shelter of the guns of Heligoland, in order to avoid a repetition of the disaster of August 28. The High Sea Fleet was put at short notice for steam, and the submarines at Heligoland were ordered to proceed. There was only one boat not away on a cruise, *U.5*, which had gone out at 6.15 a.m., in accordance with the practice instituted on November 12, to the north of Heligoland, to lie in wait for our submarines. She was seen by our ships, but failed to get into position to attack any of them.

Though the High Sea Fleet did not move, the 16th Half-Flotilla was sent out to support the 15th Half-Flotilla, which was apparently keeping the patrol of November 24. The 16th Half-Flotilla kept touch with our forces till recalled at noon, but made no attempt to molest them. The only attack we had to endure was an ineffective bombing of the *Liverpool*, at 12.35 p.m., by an aeroplane. She was one of the two aircraft at Heligoland; they were both ordered out to reconnoitre when our ships appeared in the Bight. Neither machine had wireless. An airship was sent up at 10 a.m. from an aerodrome near Hamburg, but failed to sight our forces, though the whole of the Grand Fleet was then within 100 miles of Heligoland.

¹ A 181, 183; Comm. (S) War Records, Vol. I, pp. 502, 503.

² Taken from *Nordsee* III, pp. 23-26, and 47.

48. Return of the Fleet.—The battle squadrons, in the course of zigzagging on their rendezvous in 55.40 N, 5.20 E, were some 30 miles south of it at 10 a.m. when the Commander-in-Chief turned north again. The reports from Commodore (T), that only destroyers were in sight, and later that he was withdrawing since no movement could be observed, reached Admiral Jellicoe soon after 11 a.m., and he continued his course northward.

Meanwhile, the Admiralty had read a German signal to the effect that all the destroyer flotillas were to be ready for night operations that night. This they passed to Admiral Jellicoe,¹ who received it at 2.40 p.m. The cruisers joined up with the battle fleet about an hour later, and at dusk the Commander-in-Chief disposed his destroyers 10 miles astern to protect his rear. But no attack developed. It would seem that, when the aircraft returned to Heligoland and reported at 3 p.m., November 24, that our forces were retiring, the destroyer attack was countermanded, the Germans being unaware that the cruiser force they had seen was supported at no great distance by the whole of the Grand Fleet, which, at dusk, was still only 120 miles from Heligoland.

Commodore Tyrwhitt parted company before the battle cruisers rejoined the fleet; he returned direct to Harwich by the passage between the minefields, and was back in the afternoon of the 25th.

The weather on the 25th was so bad that the gunnery practices which Admiral Jellicoe intended the Grand Fleet to carry out had to be abandoned; the fleet returned to harbour, the battle cruisers to Cromarty, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, as before, to Rosyth. The battle squadrons arrived at Scapa before daybreak on the 27th, to find that, in their absence, Scapa Flow had been penetrated by a submarine.

49. Orders for a Submarine Search of the Shetlands.—As, on a previous occasion, the sweep by the Grand Fleet had synchronised with a submarine operation of some magnitude. The closure of the North Sea and the fixing of the line Farn Islands-Lindesnaes as the route for Scandinavian trade, combined with Lord Fisher's reputation for energy, suggested to the Admiralstab that we intended to move the Main Fleet to some base south of the Farn Islands, in preparation for a more vigorous policy. This view appeared to be confirmed by the fact that a steamer had sighted, on November 8, a fleet of 25 vessels, including dreadnoughts, in 57° N, 4° E. This was undoubtedly the force with Admiral Beatty in his sweep of November 6-9; but the report spoke of dreadnoughts, which might mean battleships, and seemed to imply that a powerful force was waiting somewhere south of the Farn Islands line to attack the German Fleet, of whose movements, it was assumed, we were kept informed.

¹ A 204.

Resolved to attack in their turn, the Admiralstab decided to despatch five submarines to make a ten days' search in the suspected area. Before the cruise began, however, so many reports came in that strong British forces were in the latitude of the Shetlands, that the operation orders were changed ; the boats were to remain only two days south of the given line and, if nothing were seen, were then to proceed on parallel lines as far as the latitude of Muckle Flugga. The lines of search were to be as follows :—

U.8 along the Norwegian coast.

U.9 between her and the middle of the North Sea.

U.17 the centre of the North Sea.

U.16 and U.18 to go to the east and west of the Shetlands respectively.

U.18 was thus the westernmost of the boats. If, on their return, they could bring reliable news of the position of the British Main Fleet, a fresh cruiser attack on the English coast was to be made.

The weather, which had been persistently bad, improved on the 17th, and the forecast for several days ahead was good. The submarines were, therefore, despatched that morning. No sooner had they started than the Admiralstab received reliable information that the Grand Fleet was west of the Shetlands, in the bay called "The Deeps." It was desirable to concentrate the boats in that area, and an order was sent out on the 19th, from Norddeich, "U.18, 16, 17, 9, 8, to proceed immediately to the Shetland Islands ; U.18 is to operate off northern half of west coast of Shetlands, U.16 off southern half of west coast, U.17 off Fair Island, U.9 off north half of east coast of Shetlands, U.8 off south half of east coast." This signal we succeeded in reading, except for the names of the boats.

The seizure of the Shetlands as a flying base by the Germans had been present in the minds of the Admiralty War Staff as a contingency to be guarded against ; and the discovery that a submarine operation was to be conducted around the islands drew attention to their defences. There were only two guns on the islands, two 12-pdr. belonging to the Shetlands Defence Force, a body of 250 men, half of whom manned the 33 look-out stations in the islands, and the other half guarded the temporary wireless station, which had been set up on Ander Hill in Bressay Island. At the outbreak of war, a cruiser, the *Forward*, and four destroyers, were allocated to the patrol of the islands ; but the *Forward* was now stationed in the Humber, and the destroyers had gone to Cromarty, the patrol of the islands being carried out by a dozen armed trawlers. Each of these had its own section of the coast to look after ; the patrols did not, as in the Orkneys, keep out to sea, but closely searched the Voes to prevent their use by submarines. It was recognised that the trawlers were in every way inferior to the new German submarines ; but it was

thought that they, in conjunction with the lookout stations, from which every part of every harbour could be seen, would suffice to keep off, or, at any rate, to harry any submarines which might attempt to establish themselves in the islands.¹

The signal, as decoded, was passed to the Commander-in-Chief in the morning of November 20.²

The *Edgar* was lying temporarily disabled at Busta Voe, in the Shetlands, which was used as the flying base of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, and the *Dryad* was on the way to her with repairing machinery. The *Gibraltar* was coaling in the Voe, and there were several colliers and store ships in the harbour. On learning that enemy vessels were coming to the Shetlands, the Commander-in-Chief ordered the Voe to be evacuated, which was effected by 7.30 p.m. on the 20th, the *Edgar* proceeding to Portsmouth to pay off, and the *Dryad* to Scapa. He also sent a division of the 2nd Flotilla to the Shetlands to hunt for the expected submarines till daylight of the 22nd, and stationed the *Oak* near Fair Island for the same purpose.³

50. Submarine Operations round the Shetlands.—Although we had read and acted upon the Norddeich signal, only one of the submarines, *U.8*, on the Norwegian coast, received it. *U.9*, the second boat from the east, carried out her original orders and kept well to the eastward of the middle of the North Sea. She turned back in latitude 61° N early on the 21st, and, through damage from the weather, had to put into Stavanger Fjord at night on the 22nd. Next morning, she was ordered out by a Norwegian torpedo boat, and left at once for home.

The other submarines all proceeded to the Shetlands, *U.18* and *U.16* as in their original orders, *U.8* in accordance with the Norddeich signal, and *U.17*, whose aerial had been carried away and who had found nothing in her proper area, by the initiative of her captain, Lieutenant-Commander Spindler, in command of the 2nd Submarine Half-Flotilla.

Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig, of *U.18*, who had the most westerly route in the sweep, had made the English coast at Whitby early on the 19th and prospected off Hartlepool, Sunderland and Shields all day without finding a warship to attack. He kept 20 to 30 miles from shore, passing through the area we had declared dangerous; he evidently thought he knew the position of the German minefield off the Tyne, and probably disregarded our warning not to go into the area, little suspecting that the Admiralstab had been misled by their own minelayers.⁴ Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig's good fortune saved him from destruction on one of the German mines so recklessly laid


¹ M. 03982, 04482/14.

² A 160.

³ G.F.N.

⁴ See Monograph 23, Home Waters, Vol. I, Plan VI.

at the end of August, and he went on to inspect the Moray Firth. He was there at dawn on the 21st, but saw nothing, and continued his cruise towards the Pentland Firth. Here, for the first time, he found definite signs of naval activity; a line of trawlers extended north from the Moray Firth and continued up the



coast of the Orkneys as far as he could see. They were evidently intended as a submarine screen, and Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig regarded their presence as a proof that the British Fleet was in Scapa Flow. His orders were to examine the Deeps; after sighting, at dusk, an old cruiser¹ too far off to

¹ Possibly the *Sapphire*, which at 2.30 p.m., 21st, was in 58.21 N, 2.14 W.

attack, he passed on with the intention of proceeding out into the Atlantic, where battleships and auxiliary vessels had been reported. But when 50 miles west of the Deeps, he found all the indications of a coming storm from the westward, and turned back to shelter under the lee of the Orkneys.

U.16, after cruising on the Farn Islands-Lindesnaes line, went on northward, keeping about 80 miles east of the Orkneys, though at the Shetlands she moved closer in. She passed Muckle Flugga Light at 9.25 p.m. on the 21st, and pushed on towards the Faroes, thinking this line a natural one for our patrols to hold. She also had to turn back on account of the weather; she had seen no war vessels, and in the hope of finding some, she began a systematic search of the coast at a distance of 8 miles. At daybreak on the 23rd, she went into Lerwick, following a steamer into the harbour in order to avoid mines. She stuck on a sandbank in front of the Queen's Hotel; but her enterprising captain, Lieutenant-Commander Hansen, got off by going astern full speed while still submerged. He also had seen no warships; he, therefore, determined to reconnoitre the west coast of the Orkneys and return through the Pentland Firth.

U.8, the only submarine which had taken in the Norddeich signal, went to her station 9 miles east of the Outer Skerries. She saw nothing but trawlers and one destroyer either there or off Fair Island.

U.17 had no better luck. She was off Muckle Flugga about midday of November 22 in a rising gale, which made the boat bump so much that Lieutenant-Commander Spindler felt he could not risk diving to attack even should an occasion be found. Moreover, one of his Diesel engines was giving trouble. He decided to give up his intention of reconnoitring the west coast, and began to cross over towards Norway.

51. The Patrols at the Fleet Bases.—The trawlers sighted by the German submarines were vessels of the Auxiliary Patrol, which had considerably expanded since its first inception as an auxiliary force to deal with minelayers on the East Coast. At the end of October, the Admiralty approved a scheme arising out of a suggestion by Captain V. H. Haggard, in charge of the submarines in the Firth of Forth, for stationing collections of armed trawlers or drifters at various strategic positions on the East Coast. They were to be in units of six boats, each boat armed with one or more guns and fitted with the modified sweep, when a sufficient supply of this gear could be prepared; one boat in each unit was to be the leader, commanded by a Lieutenant or a Sub-Lieutenant, R.N.R., and an armed yacht was to be attached to each unit. Scapa was allotted 4½ units, Cromarty and Rosyth 3 units each, Peterhead and St. Abb's Head¹ 4 units each, and Loch Ewe 2 units. Yarmouth was allotted 4 units, and Dover 2.

¹ The base of this patrol became, later, Granton.

This brought the total of patrol trawlers in service up to 160, exclusive of the minesweepers.¹

The Commander-in-Chief, however, at the conference of November 2, successfully urged the superior claims of Scapa on a greater number of trawlers than had been allotted, with the result that at the time of this submarine raid on the northern islands he had, in addition to 22 destroyers for local defence, an auxiliary force of 7 yachts, 70 trawlers and drifters, and 8 motor boats, exclusive of two incomplete units working in the Shetlands, the other bases having to go short in proportion.² His general scheme was to have 24 trawlers working between Noss Head and Fair Island up to 40 or 50 miles from shore, and 12 trawlers patrolling the west coast. The Shetlands patrol, with one-third of the boats resting, watched the entrances to Swarbacks Minn, and was responsible for the coasts and inlets of the Shetlands, and for an area 10 miles each side of the line joining Sumburgh Head and Fair Island.³

Cromarty, at this period, in addition to 12 unarmed minesweepers, had only 13 auxiliary patrol vessels, which operated in the immediate vicinity of the base. The line of patrol boats sighted by von Hennig extending northward from the Moray Firth must have been the Noss Head-Fair Island line of trawlers based on Scapa.

52. Destruction of "U.18," November 23.—Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig, passing close eastward of the Orkneys during the night of the 22nd, saw searchlights active in the direction of Kirkwall, and in that circumstance found confirmation of his opinion that the Grand Fleet was in Scapa Flow. As he proceeded southward he thought out plans for penetrating the Flow. The tide was most favourable. Under cover of darkness, *U.18* could proceed on the surface as far as the Pentland Skerries; there, at daybreak, she could dive and be carried with the current into the firth, so that she could arrive at the entrance with her batteries fully charged just as the tide turned. Assisted by Pentland Skerries Light, which had been specially lit for the departure of the fleet, *U.18* was off Swona Island at dawn; and though occasionally set back by eddies she was in Hoxa Sound at 11 a.m., and the whole Flow was visible in *U.18*'s periscope. It was with the greatest disappointment that Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig saw in it nothing but a few destroyers and trawlers. He had already passed many of these and had forborne to attack in the certainty of finding nobler prey. In front of him stretched the net boom between Hunda and Roan Head; he judged from its appearance that it was a shallow one, and he would have dived under it if there had been a single battle ship to be seen. But in the circumstances such an

¹ M. 02370/14. See *Home Waters* II, Section 14, for the former scheme

² Positions and Movements, 23 November 1914.

³ G.F.S.P., Vol. LXXI.

attempt would have been foolish, and Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig, at 11.20, turned round to emerge from the rocky corridor of Hoxa Sound into the open water, intending to attack a couple of destroyers, which were then coming out through the gate in the boom. When he put up his periscope to fire his torpedo, he found he must give all his attention to his own safety; it was evident he had been seen, and the whole patrol was on the alert ahead of him.

His presence had been discovered at 11 a.m. by the examination steamer *Tokio*, which sighted his periscope 300 yards SW of Hoxa Head, and gave the alarm; this started a general search by the destroyers and trawler patrols. Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig heard the noise of the propellers and kept under; nevertheless, he had to put up his periscope from time to time in order to find his way out of the rock-strewn channel with its swirling currents. Several times he did this with success; but at last, as *U.18* was rising, she was rammed by something, which put her on her beam ends and bent the periscope over at right angles. She had been caught about $1\frac{1}{4}$ miles SW of Hoxa Head by the trawler *Dorothy Grey*. The shock dislocated the depth rudder engine and the reserve steering gear; and Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig, unable to lie on the rocky bottom, for it was too jagged and deep, began a terrible journey towards the open sea, through the current, in an almost unmanageable boat, and with the whole of Scapa patrol ready for him should he break surface. Once he hit a rock 160 ft. below water; there was a sharp crack; the boat bent noticeably in the middle and shot up to the surface, to be caught and rammed by a trawler,¹ though not fatally. The mortal blow was reserved for the Orkney rocks to deliver; the blinded, plunging boat crashed on to the Pentland Skerries; there was "a violent shock in the forepart of the boat, a tearing noise to starboard, the sound of rending of plates, the crack of a burst welding, the crunching of a propeller amongst stones; then silence."² It was clear the boat was doomed. To save the lives of his crew, Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig blew his tanks and reached the surface, to find no vessels nearer than 2 or 3 miles. He hoisted the white flag to attract their attention and also to prevent them firing; the War Signal Station at Brough Ness saw the flag and reported it, whereupon two destroyers ran out to the spot. As they approached, the crew of *U.18* swam out to meet them, and Lieutenant-Commander von Hennig gave the order to sink his boat. Of the crew, 3 officers and 23 men were saved; one man was lost, the man who opened the Kingstons and went down with his ship.³

¹ The *Kaphreda* minesweeper claims to have rammed a submarine at this time. M. 04082/14.

² From Von Hennig's account in *Nordsee* III, pp. 19, 20.

³ The above details, taken from Lieut.-Commander von Hennig's account in the German History, agree with information obtained from survivors, given in M. 04176/14.

53. Two Submarines Attempt to Enter the Flow, November 24.

—The destruction of *U.18* did not terminate the endeavours to penetrate Scapa Flow. *U.22*, having failed on the 22nd to pass through the Pentland Firth from west to east, went round the Orkneys and attempted it from the eastward on the morning of the 24th. Once again, when she had reached the entrance to Scapa Flow, the tide was too strong for her; she had only one motor in action, and the stream carried her out south of the Pentland Skerries, past numbers of trawlers which, however, did not give chase. Having twice failed to get through the Pentland Firth, *U.22* now started to return home. She had been too late to meet the *Drake*, which arrived at Scapa with a broken-down engine before dawn of the 24th.

U.16, after leaving Lerwick, passed Fair Island and the west coast of the Orkneys, arriving at the western entrance of Pentland Firth at 1 p.m. on the 24th, just at the right time to be carried in by the easterly tide. Lieutenant-Commander Hansen proceeded on the surface, with the British flag flying, as far as Swona, where he could see into the Flow. Neither ships nor smoke were to be seen in the space marked on his chart as the anchorage, and only a few destroyers were visible to the eastward. Having noted this, he dived to avoid two trawlers that were approaching with nets out, and at dusk went on to the east coast of the Orkneys. Here minesweeping was in progress, in which both trawlers and gunboats were engaged. *U.16* was sighted by one pair of trawlers, which slipped their sweep and started to chase; when two other trawlers joined in, the first pair returned to inform the gunboats, the only armed vessels on the spot. At 1 p.m. on the 25th, the *Skipjack* sighted the submarine and opened fire; but *U.16* dived out of danger, and though four trawlers and four destroyers took up the chase, she evaded them and started for home.¹

U.8 also had an encounter with the patrols, this time with the *Dryad*, which was patrolling 40 miles to east of the Pentland Firth. *U.8* had continued her cruise down the east side of the Orkneys, and at 10 a.m. on the 24th was seen by the *Dryad* in 58.35 N, 1.45 W. The submarine dived at once, but not before the *Dryad* had opened fire; no attack was made by the submarine, and this, Lieutenant-Commander B. Prichard, in command of the *Dryad*, put down to the zigzag course on which he had approached.² At any rate, *U.8* was taken by surprise by the encounter, and as she had only 23 tons of oil fuel left she started for home.

54. The Return of the Submarines.—The submarine reconnaissance of the Shetlands and Orkneys happened to synchronise with our reconnaissance of Heligoland Bight; and the German

¹ Neither *Skipjack's* report, M. 04228/14, nor her deck log mentions the firing. It is recorded in *Nordsee* III, p. 22.

² *Dryad's* Report, M. 04688/14.

enterprise, a bold one for that early period of the war and inclement time of year, produced only the negative information that the fleet had not been found. There was, however, still a chance that the homeward-bound submarines might meet the homeward-bound fleet. But the Grand Fleet kept to the eastern half of the North Sea and on the 25th was between the Shetlands and Norway, while the submarines at the Orkneys made direct for the Bight. *U.9*, coming southward from Norway, steered out into the middle of the North Sea, and about noon on the 24th was in a position passed some 10 hours later by the Grand Fleet. But at that point *U.9* turned eastward for the coast of Denmark, reaching Heligoland on the 26th.

U.17 was forced by the southerly gale to hug the coasts of Norway and Denmark; she anchored on the 23rd in a fjord near Bergen, to carry out repairs, only to be ordered out by the Norwegian authorities. The submarine commander intended, as soon as he reached Lindesnaes, to carry on commerce warfare on the route to the Farn Islands. His boat had been fitted with a machine gun as an experiment, and he had not yet fired it; but a return of bad weather intervened, and the boat was again compelled to seek a temporary shelter. When she reached Heligoland, on the 28th, her machine gun was found not to have suffered from submergence.

U.22 steered direct from the Pentland Firth for the Ems, arriving on the 26th. *U.8* also arrived on the 26th; after her encounter with the *Dryad* she made straight for Horns Reef.

U.16 (Lieutenant-Commander Hansen) had the most trying experience of the boats that returned. After escaping from the minesweepers she steered for Heligoland; but her compass had broken down, and on the evening of the 27th, when Heligoland Light should have been in sight, she found she had been driven 135 miles to the north-eastward by the storm and current. The wind, of force 10, was contrary, and she had only 4 tons of oil fuel left. She bumped too badly to lie on the bottom, and she had to remain afloat at anchor for 7 days in a gale. Then the anchor cable parted; and with only 2 tons of fuel, and no provisions or drinking water, she put into Esbjerg, where she was allowed enough fuel and provisions to enable her to reach Germany. She arrived at Heligoland on December 8, having been given up for lost.

CHAPTER VI.

THE BOMBARDMENT OF ZEEBRUGGE AND THE
SUBMARINE ATTACK ON THE TRANSPORT ROUTE,
NOVEMBER 23-26.

55. **The Admiralty decide to Bombard Zeebrugge.**—By the middle of November it was definitely known that German submarines were using Zeebrugge as a base for operations in the English Channel and on the Belgian coast. Refugees from Belgium had seen a submarine in the harbour; and intercepted enemy signals placed the fact beyond a doubt. Moreover, agents reported that submarines, sent overland in sections, were being assembled there; and Commander Samson was ordered to make an air reconnaissance from Dunkirk, in favourable weather, and find out exactly what was going on.¹

The weather remained unsuitable for air work, but an enterprising reconnaissance was carried out by Lieutenant J. F. Hutchings in submarine C.34, which was off Zeebrugge at dusk of the 20th, and remained 24 hours on the lookout for enemy activity. At the evacuation the French had laid a semi-circle of mines round the head of the mole at Zeebrugge; Lieutenant Hutchings did not go close enough to run danger from these, but it would appear that he had not been warned of the line of mines laid ESE from Thornton Ridge buoy on November 3. In the sailing directions given him and in the course he actually followed, both inwards and outwards, his route was to the eastward of the buoy and presumably across the minefield, which, luckily, he passed both times soon after high water and on the surface. His visit produced no evidence of submarine activity; but in view of the experience he had gained, the Commodore suggested that should any operations be contemplated, C.34 should be stationed on the edge of the shoal water to watch for enemy submarines. On the 20th, also, a seaplane reconnoitred Zeebrugge; she saw no submarines either there or at Ostend, but noted that, though the Wielingen Lightship was in place, the Wandelaar had been removed.²

The news that enemy submarines were undoubtedly using Zeebrugge started many minds to work. Among them, Admiral Bayly, of the 1st Battle Squadron, put forward a scheme for blocking the port by sinking ships, but this the Admiralty did not then consider possible. The Germans had erected heavy guns; and the necessity of sweeping a way for the block ships through the minefield would delay them so much that they could not be relied upon to remain afloat long enough. Even were the block ships to be sunk in approximately the right positions

¹ A 122, 123, 157; H.S. 74, p. 188; Comm. (S) War Records I, p. 499.

² Comm. (S) War Records I, pp. 496-500; M. 0083.

they were not likely to achieve the desired result and make the port useless for submarines. To effect this the Admiralty felt it was necessary to destroy the locks or the mole, a massive stone structure capable of carrying 100-ton guns and of standing their recoil.¹

This was obviously a difficult operation requiring heavy bombardment ; and to avoid the necessity of having to consider a similar position at Dunkirk and Calais, should they fall into the hands of the enemy, the Admiralty asked the War Office to make plans for the necessary demolitions, in case of the evacuation of those ports.²

The *Revenge*, which was the only one of Admiral Hood's ships carrying heavy enough guns for the proposed bombardment, was not available, since she was now required again for the support of the Army.³ A further request for assistance had been received. On November 21, Admiral Hood, with his flag in the *Crusader*, proceeded with the *Revenge* and *Bustard* to Dunkirk, and was there joined by four French destroyers. He was accompanied by six of the Dover destroyers (*Crusader*, *Cossack*, *Flirt*, *Maori*, *Nubian*, *Zulu*), which so reduced the Dover Patrol that the new system of patrol which had just been arranged could not be brought into force, and the old method had to be continued with a much reduced number of boats.⁴

56. Bombardment of Zeebrugge, November 23.—For the actual bombardment of Zeebrugge, the Admiralty decided to use the four *Duncans*, which formed Admiral Stuart Nicholson's division of the 3rd Battle Squadron. These were at Dover as part of the anti-invasion dispositions. The anti-submarine defences of Dover were by no means complete ; the port was open through the western entrance, and Admiral Hood considered it unsuitable for battleships ; but the anti-invasion dispositions would be incomplete without the *Duncans* at Dover, and the Admiralty ordered such temporary measures to be taken, either by setting up nets or shielding vessels with colliers, as would serve to protect them from submarine attack while lying in the harbour.⁵ The *Duncans* had, therefore, been at Dover since the 15th. They were thus available for the bombardment, and two of them, Admiral Nicholson's flagship, the *Russell*, and the *Exmouth*, were detailed for the operation. To protect them during the operation eight destroyers were sent from Harwich (*Acheron*, *Archer*, *Attack*, *Ariel*, *Ferret*, *Forester*, *Druid*, *Defender*), and four pairs of the fastest minesweepers from Lowestoft were attached, in spite of the protests of the Senior Naval Officer, Lowestoft, that to take them away would prevent the proper sweeping of

¹ Papers titled X. 3931/14, X. 3932/14 ; C.B. 1524.

² M. 03778, 03863, 04447/14.

³ A 162, 163, 169 ; H.S. 75, p. 1,005.

⁴ A 172 ; H.S. 75, p. 1,006 ; H.S. 76, p. 208.

⁵ A 121.

the War Channel.¹ The fall of the shot was to be marked by the airships *Astra Torres* and *Parseval*, should the weather be favourable for air work.

The main object of the operation was to destroy Bruges Canal Lock, any submarines or other vessels lying in the harbour or canal, and certain military buildings ashore, including two gun batteries believed to have been recently established.² The battleships left Dover at 3.30 a.m. on the 23rd, screened by four destroyers, the remaining four protecting the minesweepers, which had gone on ahead. The approach to the initial bombarding position, via the western end of Thornton Ridge, was made during the forenoon of the 23rd from the North Hinder Light Vessel, the minesweepers having swept a track earlier in the morning. Between the Galloper and North Hinder Light Vessels the squadron passed several British mines drifting. At 12.30 p.m., the two battleships reached the south-west end of Thornton Ridge; here they reduced speed to 6 knots, with the minesweepers sweeping ahead. It was soon found, however, that even at 6 knots the minesweepers could not keep their position; in the shallow water the sweeps frequently parted, and the strong tide set the minesweepers so much off their course that they were of little use as protection. The apparent gravity of the situation was enhanced by the fact that a supposed German moored mine was sighted right in the track of the unprotected battleships; but just then one pair of sweepers managed to get ahead at the right moment, and the Rear-Admiral was able to enter Wielingen Channel to take up position for the bombardment.

Running down towards Zeebrugge on a SE by E course the ships opened fire at 2.35 p.m. with their fore turrets, firing first on the canal lock, the most important of the targets, at a range of 12,500 yards. The airships had been unable to leave Kingsnorth, and an attempt was made to spot the fall of the shot from destroyers stationed 3 to 4 miles on the port beams of the ships, which fired deliberate salvos. The method was new and did not prove very successful. After a quarter of an hour the Admiral altered course 4 points to port, thereby bringing the 6-in. guns and the after turrets to bear. As the range gradually decreased to less than 6,000 yards the fire was shifted on to various other targets; but when he was about two cables past the Wielingen Light Ship, the only pair of minesweepers had to slip their sweep, and as he was now without protection against mines, he turned 16 points at 3.30 p.m. and steamed back on his track. The wind was from the north-east, which caused considerable smoke interference; but firing was continued until 3.40 p.m., when the ships were out of range. The German batteries were silent throughout the operation, and no submarines

¹ There were 70 trawler minesweepers at Lowestoft. Telegrams are H.S. 75, pp. 955 and 1,009.

² The Admiralty orders are in M. 0083; Admiral Nicholson's orders are in X. 3932/14.

or other vessels were sighted. By this time the minesweepers had been sent back to Lowestoft; the remainder of the force now also returned to harbour, the battleships to Dover, and the destroyers to Harwich.

57. The Effect of the Bombardment.—The *Russell* fired altogether 76 rounds from her turret guns and 143 rounds of 6-in., all being lyddite, except 15 rounds of common 6-in. shell. Owing, apparently, to a misunderstanding, the *Exmouth*, which expended nearly the same number of rounds, fired a certain amount of shrapnel, of little use against buildings. Admiral Nicholson was not very sanguine as to the damage caused, though he considered that there was a fair chance that the lock had been damaged. Wild press reports of extensive destruction at Zeebrugge and submarines reduced to scrap iron, came from Dutch sources; but the more authoritative reports from our representatives in Holland differed as to the extent of the damage. As a matter of fact, the only serious damage caused was to the electric power station for the locks, and these had to be worked by hand for a time.¹ At the actual moment of bombardment there were no submarines at Zeebrugge, and the German guns did not open fire because the ships were out of their range; this the enemy were taking steps to remedy by the construction of fresh batteries. That the bombardment had achieved little effect in rendering the harbour useless for submarines is proved by the fact that the Admiral Commanding the German Naval Corps in Flanders made an immediate request for more submarines to be stationed at Zeebrugge as good prospects were opening up.²

58. New Scheme of Patrol of Dover Straits Instituted, November 27th.—Admiral Nicholson, on his return to Dover, found that Admiral Hood had also come back. The latter, on arrival at Dunkirk, on November 21, was called upon to make a reconnaissance in order to disclose the German batteries on the Flanders coast. Of their presence he soon found evidence, though his ships were not hit; and it was clear that, since his last operations on the coast, the Germans had mounted heavy guns. Moreover, the Rear-Admiral did not consider the risk to the *Revenge* from submarines justified; and when, on the 23rd, General Foch, commanding the French Army on the coast, announced that since the existence of German batteries capable of firing to seaward had been established, there was no further immediate use for the ships, Admiral Hood returned to Dover, leaving the *Revenge* to follow next night, as it was difficult for her to get out of Dunkirk Harbour in the neap tides then prevailing. The gun vessels were berthed in the basin at Dunkirk; four destroyers escorted the *Revenge* when she left, and the other

¹ *Nordsee* III, 42.

² *Nordsee* III, 42.

two destroyers accompanied Admiral Hood to Dover. On his way to Dover from Dunkirk, he passed a large number of floating mines, and did his best to destroy them. The weather for the past few days had doubtless set them adrift ; it had also carried away the boom defence of Dover.¹

During his visit to Dunkirk, Admiral Hood had been able to secure a more cordial co-operation with the French in the matter of the local defence of that port by French destroyers ; and as his own boats were back at Dover, and another bombardment in support of the Army was unlikely, in view of the presence of the German guns, it was now possible to put into operation the new scheme of the defence of the Straits.² The former system of occupying a fixed line with a cordon of destroyers had been successful in ensuring that merchant ships of all nationalities either passed through the Downs for examination by the Boarding Flotilla, or were searched on the patrol line ; and it would, doubtless, have prevented any armed merchantmen from entering the Channel, had the Germans attempted to send any. It had, however, been quite ineffectual in preventing enemy submarines from passing. The existence of the British mined area was now generally known to foreign shipping, and it was seldom that a vessel required to be diverted into the Downs ; consequently, that part of the work of the Dover Flotilla was practically at an end. The boats were suffering from overwork, the original War Orders having indicated that 20 were to be at sea nightly out of the 24 ; collisions at night, which were frequent, had reduced the available numbers and added to the strain on the remainder.³

The new system was to substitute for the cordon a series of occupied areas to cover the whole Dover command. The area to be patrolled was included between the Dungeness-Boulogne line and the southern limit of the minefield ($51^{\circ} 15' N$).⁴ This was divided into eight areas, each of which was to be patrolled night and day by a destroyer, the reserve division of four boats being kept ready for sea in Dover Harbour to hunt for any submarines sighted. In only two out of the eight areas was it necessary for the patrolling destroyers to pay special attention to diverting traffic, and they were thus free to concentrate attention on submarines. No alteration was made in the stations of our own submarines ; as before, one group patrolled between Folkestone and the Varne, and one off the South Goodwin Light Vessel, though by January 1915 this was altered and two or more submarines patrolled near the South Goodwin until well into the forenoon, all the other submarines remaining in harbour at Dover, unless information was received of an impending approach of the enemy, in which case one-half of the boats

¹ H.S. 76, pp. 77, 288, 392, 393, 401, 451, 529, 530, 591, 634, 824.

² H.S. 76, p. 288.

³ M. 03569/14. " Straits of Dover Patrol."

⁴ M. 0347/15. " Suggestions for Improvement of Dover Patrol."

proceeded to the South Goodwin, and the other half to the Folkestone-Varne line.¹ The French submarines to be kept ready were reduced in number to eight; in case of alarm, they were to take up the line from Grisnez to the Varne and from Calais halfway to the South Foreland; this was the only duty of the French in the Straits patrol. The light cruisers were to act as before, that is to proceed as circumstances required, to observe the movements of the enemy and to act as supports for the destroyers.²

The scheme was to come into force from noon on November 27³; but it was soon found almost impossible to carry it out. In the winter gales the old 30-knot destroyers could not keep the sea, and the work fell heavily on the Tribals, of which Admiral Hood had 12, though four were usually away re-fitting, and others on special duties, such as escort. But neither the old scheme of a cordon, nor the new scheme of a wide area patrolled in sections, availed to keep the Channel secure from submarines, which, indeed, seemed to find the Dover Patrol scarcely even an inconvenience.⁴

59. Cruise of "U.21" in the English Channel, November 21-27.—For nearly a fortnight since November 9, when the German order for the submarine in the Channel to return was read,⁵ nothing had transpired to shed light on the enemy's plans for attacking the transports of the Expeditionary Force. On the 15th, certainly, an order was read for some submarine at Zeebrugge to go in the direction of the Channel if the weather were favourable. A convoy of seven transports, bringing troops from India, with the *Bacchante* as escort, was then approaching the Channel for Southampton. In view of the order to the German submarine, they were at first instructed to scatter and to disguise as much as possible their appearance as transports, while the French Admiral was asked to patrol their route east of Ushant with his destroyers. There was a violent gale in progress; but, nevertheless, the Admiralty, after consideration, decided to neglect the military inconvenience which, it had been pointed out by the War Office, would result from landing the troops elsewhere than at Southampton, and ordered them to Devonport instead. All arrived safely, and no credible report of the presence of a submarine in the Channel was received.⁶ But, on the 19th, another order was read, implying that a submarine would be off some place, either Portland or Portsmouth, on the 20th; a little later it was amplified and seemed to mean that a submarine would certainly be operating on the 20th and 21st, with a trawler

¹ M. 05180/14. "Disposition of Patrols" (titled X. 3828/14).

² M. 03750, M. 03684/14.

³ It was not, however, instituted until December (M. 0347/15).

⁴ M. 0347/15.

⁵ A 75.

⁶ A 123-126.

in attendance, between Havre and Southampton. Accordingly, the French Admiral was asked to sweep the threatened area, and from that time forward to keep a strict lookout in the approaches to Havre, the Admiralty providing any escort considered necessary across the Channel. The French destroyers carried out a sweep and returned on the 21st, reporting that they had seen nothing. During the night of November 23-24, however, six transports were to leave for Havre, at intervals of half-an-hour; to provide sufficient escort was beyond the resources of Portsmouth, and in these special circumstances the French Admiral was asked to send some destroyers. He complied by sending three, which were ready at the Nab at dusk.¹ But the danger was at the other end of the transports' route.

U.21 (Lieutenant Hersing) left Germany on November 19 for Havre, with orders to remain off the port as long as possible, attacking warships or troop transports and steamers carrying war material, which it had been reported were about to arrive from Southampton and the Thames. Passing Dunkirk on the 21st, she reached the estuary of the Seine two days later. No warships were to be seen.

U.21 was waiting on the surface in the middle of the approach to Havre, some 6 miles NW of Cape de la Hève, when about 3.30 p.m., on the 23rd, a small steamer came in sight, obviously making for the port. When she was near enough Lieutenant Hersing fired a shot across her bows, and she stopped. He then went alongside, flying the German flag, hailed the master, and ordered him to leave the ship in 10 minutes and hand over all the ship's papers. This was done, and Hersing found the vessel was the *Malachite*, bound from Liverpool to Havre, with a cargo of general goods, not military stores, consigned to the Cunard Company. The master asked for the return of the log book and articles, but Hersing refused, saying he was sorry, but war was war. The crew had abandoned the ship, and he now, at 4.15 p.m., opened fire on her. She was still being fired at when darkness settled down, and her master and crew rowed away for Havre. Arriving at 8.30 p.m., the master hurried off to report the occurrence to the authorities, to whom it came as an unpleasant surprise.²

The Transport Officer at once stopped the departure of all transports and tried to order back to Southampton the only one that had sailed.³ He reported the matter to the Transport Department, and his telegram was passed on to the Chief of

¹ A 152, 156, 164, 188.

² The Master stated, however, that he learned later that the patrol boat had been watching the flashes, though she made no effort to investigate them. (Papers titled *Board of Trade*, 1 December 1914, *Malachite*.) This patrol boat was probably one of the French destroyers. Cape de la Hève stands 350 ft. high and has two batteries and a semaphore on it. (C.B. 1079 France, Coast Report, July 1914.)

³ She did not get the signal, but arrived safely at Havre at dawn.

the Admiralty Staff, who, thus, between 11 p.m. and midnight, first became aware that the expected submarine had been off Havre for 8 hours. He immediately warned all the Senior Officers in the Channel to be specially vigilant, but could take no further steps till the arrival of the French Naval Attaché, who was the accepted channel of communication with the French Admiral and Ministry of Marine. In the morning, however, he ordered six destroyers from Harwich to take the transports across, and, as soon as possible, asked the French Admiral to send destroyers to increase the escort and use the remainder of his boats to sweep ahead of the transports.¹

60. **Destroyer Sweeps in the Channel.**—The sweeps were already in progress. The *Branlebas*, one of the Cherbourg destroyers, had a torpedo fired at her, but it broke surface and she was able to avoid it²; at 2 a.m., on the 24th, the submarine was sighted near La Héve, and again at 7 a.m., by the *Tromblon*, another French destroyer. All the torpedo craft, both of the flotillas and of the *defense mobile*, took part in the search³; and it was hoped the submarine had been driven away.

The Harwich destroyers, with the *Hornet* as boat of the Senior Officer, arrived at the Nab just as the transports were leaving on the 24th; one had already gone with Torpedo Boat 9 and the *Conflict*, old torpedo craft of Portsmouth Extended Defence. The remaining transports were escorted to Havre by the *Hornet's* division. At 5 a.m. on the 25th, the *Hornet* made a signal *en clair* to Dieppe, informing the French naval authorities that five British transports escorted by destroyers would arrive off Havre at daylight. This signal was, perhaps, not taken in by *U.21*; at any rate she was not seen, and the transports all reached Havre safely. As no further orders had arrived, the *Hornet's* division then returned to Harwich,⁴ only to find that the Admiralty wished two of them to escort the two transports which were crossing on the night of the 25–26th, and the whole division, then on their way back to Harwich, to sweep for submarines or their tenders between Portsmouth and the Downs. The precipitate return of the *Hornet's* division had frustrated the first part of this programme, and the two transports were taken across by two boats from Portsmouth Extended Defence, while the *Hornet's* division was making its way back to Portsmouth.⁵

The division arrived the second time at the Nab at 7 a.m. on the 26th, having seen nothing west of Dover; they at once turned back to carry out the sweep ordered by the Admiralty. This also was without result. They reached Harwich at 4 p.m.

¹ H.S. 76, pp. 581, 603, 606, 607, 805; A 199, 200, 203.

² H.S. 76, pp. 790, 808.

³ *Nordsee* III, p. 43.

⁴ *Hornet* W/T Log 15545.

⁵ A 205, 208, and Portsmouth Records.

on the 26th. The one transport which crossed on the night of the 27th-28th was escorted by the Extended Defence. No French destroyers seem to have undertaken escort after the 23rd, though they searched the last half of the route on the 26th-27th; but, since on the 28th and 29th larger numbers of transports were due to leave and the weather was too bad for the ancient destroyers of Portsmouth, the Commander-in-Chief asked for the French to guard the transports' arrival. Two British destroyers came from Dover on the 28th to watch the approaches to Havre, and next day four other Dover destroyers acted as direct escort, while the French Admiral was again requested to safeguard the approaches to Havre. There were six French destroyers at Havre on the 28th, but whether they patrolled the entrance or not is not at present known. At any rate, all the passages were made in safety.¹

Besides the destroyers acting as direct escorts, 15 trawlers, fitted with gun and modified sweep, were sent from Yarmouth to Portsmouth to patrol the transport route to Havre against submarines, to sink drifting mines, and to board any suspicious small craft which might be assisting submarines. These trawlers were those allocated to the proposed 10th Flotilla, which was to have been based on Yarmouth.² Their departure brought that flotilla, as originally contemplated, to an end, for the 12 destroyers belonging to it had already been sent to Scapa. The formation of the flotilla therefore remained in abeyance, and the Captain (D) was appointed elsewhere. The trawlers left Yarmouth on the 26th, and the first of them arrived at Portsmouth in the afternoon of the 27th.³

So far, the impossibility of definitely allocating destroyers to Portsmouth for escort duties had forced on the Admiralty the unsatisfactory method of meeting the demand by requests to the French, which did not always achieve the anticipated results, or by taking boats from other stations and other duties. Earnest requests from the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, for more destroyers could only be met by replies that none were available.⁴ This situation was soon to change. The progress of events in the Mediterranean had rendered it no longer necessary to keep there the 5th Destroyer Flotilla, comprising 16 boats of the "G" or *Beagle*⁵ class; on the 17th, four of them were ordered home, where they were more urgently wanted, and others were to follow as soon as possible.⁶ The first four⁷ arrived at Plymouth on the 29th and were at once sent on to Portsmouth,

¹ H.S. 77, pp. 417, 508, 560, 673; A 231.

² See Section 3.

³ M. 02641/14, M. 04404/14; A 209; H.S. 76, p. 982; H.S. 77, p. 330.

⁴ See Papers titled A 1193/1914, where the weakness of the Portsmouth force of old boats is described in detail.

⁵ 1910. 27 knots. 1-4 in., 3-12 pdr., 2 t.

⁶ C.B. 917F, Monograph 21, Mediterranean, p. 285, and A 136.

⁷ *Beagle, Bulldog, Pincher, Rattlesnake.*

where the Commander-in-Chief was instructed to use them on the transport route and for a patrol of the Channel against submarines.¹

Meanwhile, *U.21* had found another victim. About 8 a.m. on the 26th, as the *Hornet's* division reached the Nab and turned to commence their sweep of the Channel, *U.21* hailed another steamer about 6 miles NW from Cape d'Antifer. The steamer was the *Primo*, bound with Newcastle coal for the Rouen depot of the Paris Gas Company. Calling the master to bring him the papers, Hersing remarked, as before, that he was sorry for the trouble caused, but this was war; and when the crew had abandoned ship he opened fire. An approaching steamer at once turned tail and ran for Fécamp; but some 2½ hours later the crew were picked up by a steamer and taken into Fécamp, where the master reported the matter to the British Vice-Consul. The *Primo* was still afloat, apparently little damaged by *U.21's* gun, when last seen by him.²

The Transport Officer at Havre did not know of the seizure of the *Primo* till 3.30 p.m., but as he then reported that French destroyers were searching for the submarine, it is possible the French Naval Authorities had earlier information. Eight British destroyers,³ with the *Miranda*, one of the new "M" class boats, as Senior Officer, had just been ordered to Dover from Harwich; they were to operate to the westward of the Dover Patrol, hunting submarines, sinking drifting mines and boarding suspicious small craft. They were to keep to the northward of 50° N, and it was now suggested to the French that a parallel sweep by French destroyers in the southern half of the Channel might be effective.⁴

The *Miranda's* division swept from Dover to the Needles on the 27th, and were sent back again next day by the Admiralty with orders to remain at Dover.⁵ They saw nothing, and were, in fact, too late, for *U.21* had passed through the Dover area during the night of November 27-28. Keeping close to the French coast she was chased by three destroyers, presumably French, and submerged; evading her pursuers by means of her hydrophone,⁶ she came to the surface near Middelkerke Buoy, in the hope of finding something to attack off Nieuport or Ostend. In this she was disappointed, and Hersing made for home, passing over the Thornton Ridge minefield. The tide was low, and he saw the mines sufficiently distinctly to note that they were of a new pattern, with a double lever on the cover. *U.21*

¹ A 232.

² Master's Deposition in Papers titled *Board of Trade*, 1 December 1914. She was still afloat and burning off Etaples at dusk on the 28th, but was not salvaged by the French. (H.S. 77, pp. 601, 985; H.S. 78, p. 609.)

³ *Miranda, Lance, Lennox, Landrail, Leonidas, Linnet, Louis, Laforey.*

⁴ A 213, 215, 216.

⁵ A 227, 234.

⁶ Unterwasserschallempfänger.

entered Emden on the 30th. Her operations in the Channel had been confined to the close vicinity of the French coast. She seems to have been left a fair amount of leisure by the French torpedo craft, while our destroyer sweeps and patrols had been carried out in the northern half of the Channel, which *U.21* had not entered.

Nevertheless, the comparative failure of her mission seemed to the Admiralstab to confirm the opinion that, with the methods hitherto adopted, it was not possible to stop the transport of troops across the Channel. The orders to submarines gave them permission to attack without warning only those vessels flying a war ensign. To board and search a ship in the Channel had proved in most cases impossible, owing either to the weather or to the proximity of hostile forces which she might call up by wireless. The staff therefore concluded that submarines could not hamper the transport of troops across the Channel until they were allowed to use their torpedoes on sight without restriction.¹

61. Submarine Reconnaissances of Heligoland and Zeebrugge, November 25–28.—While *U.21* was operating in the Channel our own submarines had been off the German ports. The fact that a German submarine was still using Zeebrugge, in spite of Admiral Nicholson's bombardment, suggested the idea of sending one of our own boats to stalk her, and on November 24, Lieutenant-Commander Hutchings went out again from Harwich in submarine *C.34*. As before, the course he took was to the eastward of Thornton Ridge, either over or very close to the minefield of November 3. He spent next day off Zeebrugge in a mist, which thickened so much that, in conjunction with a rising wind, it decided him to return to Harwich. On neither occasion had he seen a submarine, and he was convinced that had there been a meeting, he would have been too cramped by the shoals to manœuvre for firing a torpedo; he suggested two places off Ostend where, the water being more open, a stalking submarine would have a better chance of finding and attacking a hostile boat.²

There were also signs of activity round Heligoland, and two boats, *E.15* and *D.2*, went out to investigate it. *E.15* (Lieutenant-Commander T. S. Brodie) left Yarmouth at daylight, November 25, with *D.2*, now under Lieutenant-Commander C. G. W. Head, who had taken temporary command after the loss of Lieutenant-Commander Jameson. *E.15* was 5 miles from Heligoland at noon on the 26th, in thick weather, with a strong south-westerly wind, and she saw nothing that day. On the 27th and 28th, she was able to observe that several steamers were coming in and out of the northern entrance to Heligoland.

¹ *Nordsee* III, p. 44.

² A 202; Comm. (S) War Records I, 504–507.

Most of them flew neutral ensigns ; but two, of about 1,500 tons, steering south, were wearing the German merchant flag. This was the first time that flag had been seen by us in the Bight. Lieutenant-Commander Brodie closed to within 200 yards to attack ; but at the last moment, observing that the vessels were unarmed traders and that the weather was too bad for boat work, he forebore to fire his torpedoes, feeling sure that the crews would have little chance of rescue. But he followed the vessels up, hoping that a man-of-war escort would come out and give him a more worthy target. Nothing appeared. In the increasingly heavy sea he lost a seaman overboard, and that afternoon he started home, making only 2 knots against the gale.¹

Of *D.2* nothing more was ever heard or seen. The Admiralty assumed that she had been sunk in Heligoland Bight² ; but the Germans know nothing of the circumstances of her loss, and it is all too probable that she struck one of the drifting mines with which the North Sea was dotted.³ She was the first of the Harwich submarines to be lost without a trace, and in her commander the Service lost a brilliant officer.⁴

62. **The First Decoy Ship, S.S. "Victoria."**—The method employed by Hersing in dealing with the *Malachite* and *Primo* approximated closely to that enjoined in our Prize Regulations, for, though he had not searched the ships, he had taken steps to make certain of their nature and had given the crew time to board their boats before opening fire. Indeed, his proceedings, taking place as they did so near a fortified port, had been of a remarkably leisurely character. Since the sinking of the *Glitra*,⁵ suggestions had been made for using decoy ships, which should appear to be ordinary merchant vessels, but should carry concealed guns with which to attack a submarine approaching to board. At first these suggestions were not adopted, as it was felt in some quarters that such a policy, though in the first instance it might succeed in the destruction of a submarine, would certainly bring about serious reprisals on all trading vessels. The proposal remained in abeyance until it reached the First Lord. He strongly advocated the measure ; but no such vessel had so far been got ready.⁶ Now, however, the fact that Hersing had approached and remained on the surface, and had attacked his prizes with gunfire and not torpedoes, brought the Admiralty to a definite decision, and they ordered the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, to take up and fit a small steamer with concealed guns ; she was to preserve the appearance of an unarmed and

¹ Comm. (S) War Records I, 510–512.

² M. 04494/14.

³ Eighty-six drifting mines were seen between November 22 and 25, an abnormally large number (Bi-weekly Mining Statement, No. 9).

⁴ Comm. (S) War Records I, p. 516.

⁵ See Home Waters II, Section 65.

⁶ M. 03108/14.

harmless vessel and was to cruise on the Southampton-Havre route to entrap the submarine.¹

The vessel chosen by Admiral Meux was the London and South Western Railway steamer *Victoria*, 710 tons. She was commissioned at Portsmouth on November 28, by Lieutenant Douglas B. Bucham Brown, of the Gunnery School,² who brought with him 10 men to work the two 12-pdr. guns fitted in her. Most of her usual crew volunteered for the new service, and Lieutenant B. C. D'Arcy Maxwell, R.N.R. (Retd.), Marine Superintendent at Southampton, given the rank of Commander, R.N.V.R., accompanied the vessel to superintend her movements and lay her on routes where and when she might be expected to be in the course of her ordinary duty.

The *Victoria* left Southampton for her first trip in the evening of November 29, arriving at Havre the next morning. She spent a month going backwards and forwards, or cruising off Havre. She was not painted like a warship; her guns were concealed; and her officers and seamen did not wear Naval uniform. During December there was much bad weather; at such times she stayed in port, as submarines would be unlikely to be operating. At the end of the year, in a spell of particularly bad weather, she remained a few days in Fécamp Harbour, thinking no submarine would be out in such a storm. When it abated, she left at 8 a.m. on December 30 for Southampton, on what was to be her last trip. The experiment was deemed a failure, and she was paid off on 8 January 1915. Though she had seen no submarine on which to test her capabilities, it was now thought she was too small for her work. It was impossible in bad weather to uncover her guns, which were mounted forward, and were imperfectly concealed by dummy packing cases; and, further, not being a cargo boat or transport, she was thought to be not the type of vessel a submarine would molest. This might have been true at the time; but the reason for her failure to meet a submarine was really that there were none to meet. Only once during her commission was there a submarine near the Havre-Southampton line and that was when, in the storm, she was sheltering in Fécamp Harbour. But though she achieved nothing her career has an interest, for she was first of the "Q" boats.³

¹ A 221.

² Relieved December 13 by Lieutenant A. E. F. Palliser.

³ Portsmouth Records, 5/001/38, of 1 January, 1915.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FIRST HALF OF DECEMBER, 1914.

63. **The Position at the End of November.**—The first of the critical moments when invasion was considered possible now had passed ; but the dispositions which had been decided upon to meet the menace were still continued. The *Duncans* remained at Dover. They had been reconstituted as the 6th Battle Squadron, with Admiral Stuart Nicholson in command, and to them was added the *Revenge* temporarily, and the *Cornwallis*, which was approaching completion at Portsmouth.¹ The base of the squadron at Dover was anything but safe. The boom defence at the eastern entrance, after several times being carried away by the weather, was at the end of November so badly broken up that Admiral Hood decided to keep it, as soon as it could be repaired, only for fine weather. When it was not in place he arranged to patrol the entrance by a destroyer and two trawlers, endeavouring to mask the ships in port by colliers.² The Channel Fleet remained at Sheerness. The idea of basing it on the Walleet had been dropped, though preparations in that area were sufficiently advanced for navigation by merchant vessels to be prohibited.³ The West Swin was now considered a more suitable anchorage, and steps were being taken to make it ready. The squadron suffered a loss on November 26, when the *Bulwark*, lying at her buoy in Sheerness Harbour, was completely destroyed by internal explosions in her magazines and shell rooms. Only about a dozen men were saved, most of them badly injured ; and it was found impossible to obtain definite evidence of the cause of the explosion. On enquiry, it was found that in her sister ship, the *London*, the temperatures of the bulkheads of the ammunition passages rose to as much as 142 deg. in the conditions then obtaining. The conclusion arrived at by the Admiralty was that some loose cordite in contact with the bulkhead became ignited, raising the temperature sufficiently to detonate the shell which, in this squadron, it was customary to have ready in the ammunition passages. The explosions of these were considered sufficient to cause the explosion of the adjacent magazine and shell-rooms. To prevent a recurrence of this disaster, the Admiralty issued fresh orders for the stowage of cordite.⁴ The disappearance of the *Bulwark* left 11 ships in the 5th Battle Squadron, all now at Sheerness.

The smaller vessels of the anti-invasion scheme were still stationed at ports up the East Coast, some of which had been protected by real or fictitious minefields. The 3rd Battle

¹ M. 04035/14.

² H.S. 77, p. 995.

³ M. 04121/14 ; H.S. 78, pp. 134, 137.

⁴ Papers titled C 1062/1419, Loss of H.M.S. *Bulwark* ; and M. 045/1915

Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were based at Rosyth, the battle cruisers and light cruisers at Cromarty, and the Grand Fleet at Scapa. The attempt to give the fleet a period of rest on the Irish coast had proved a failure; the *Audacious* had been lost on a mine, and the bombardment of Yarmouth had shown that the main fleet could not be stationed so far away from the North Sea.

The loss of the *Audacious*, which was known to the Germans and had been published by them in the continental Press,¹ reduced the Grand Fleet by one of its best units; but the *Benbow* and *Emperor of India*, two new *Iron Dukes*, had commissioned, and were now at Berehaven doing drills preparatory to joining the Grand Fleet. The Battle Cruiser Fleet had been increased by the *Tiger*; but three of its units, the *Princess Royal*, the *Invincible*, and the *Inflexible*, were in the Atlantic as part of the dispositions to meet the German Cruiser Squadron; and there was as yet no indication of the time when they could be expected to rejoin Admiral Beatty.

The position of the Grand Fleet as regards cruisers, his weakness in which we have seen to be one of Admiral Jellicoe's great anxieties, was about to be somewhat improved. The *Warrior* and *Black Prince*, from the Mediterranean, reached Scapa on November 26, and were temporarily attached to the 6th Cruiser Squadron. They were not to remain in that squadron, for the 1st Cruiser Squadron was about to be constituted from the vessels of that class with the *Leviathan* as flagship; Rear-Admiral Moore had already shifted his flag to her from the *New Zealand*, on his appointment as Rear-Admiral Commanding, 1st Cruiser Squadron.²

The destruction or blockading of all enemy ships in the Indian Ocean had released those of our cruisers which had been engaged in hunting them. These were under orders for home; three of them were to join the 6th Cruiser Squadron, which would then be at last a real squadron, instead of a single ship.³ At the end of November the interception of contraband and the closing of the North Sea could only be performed by vessels of the Grand Fleet, for the 10th Cruiser Squadron was now paid off.⁴ But this strain on Admiral Jellicoe's light forces was soon to be relieved, since 12 merchant steamers had been armed and commissioned as boarding steamers, and most of these were either at or on their way to Scapa; they were to take over much of the interception of trade near the Orkneys.⁵ A new squadron of large armed liners to occupy the blockade lines between the Shetlands and Iceland was also being prepared, though so far

¹ H.S. 76, p. 97.

² A 220.

³ H.S. 77, p. 200a.

⁴ See Monograph 19, C.B. 917E, *The 10th Cruiser Squadron*.

⁵ M. 03398/14.

only two or three of the 24 ships taken up had yet arrived on their station. The position, therefore, as regards invasion and blockade might be considered as well in hand.

But the Commander-in-Chief was not satisfied with the conditions under which he might be compelled to fight a fleet action. A return had just reached him in which the High Sea Fleet was credited with a total of 88 destroyers, against which the Grand Fleet could count on only 32 boats from the 2nd and 4th Flotillas. There was no certainty that the Harwich flotillas would join him, partly because they might be held back to deal with an invasionary force, and partly on account of the difficulty of meeting at a rendezvous in North Sea conditions of light and visibility. With only 32 destroyers he could not hope to counter successfully an attack by the 88 German boats, and he felt he would be compelled, if attacked, to turn away, with the inevitable result of confusion and derangement of fire and the probable abandonment of a position of tactical advantage. Representing this to the Admiralty, who had just decided to attach the "M" class destroyers to the 3rd Flotilla instead of to the battle cruisers,¹ he urged that he should be strengthened in destroyers at the earliest possible moment.

After consideration, the Admiralty decided to send the 1st Flotilla north, not to Scapa, but to Rosyth, where they would be available both for a fleet action and for operations with the 3rd Battle Squadron to repel an invasion. In view of this reinforcement, the Commander-in-Chief was to detach eight of the river class destroyers he had for the defence of Scapa and send them to Portsmouth, where they would take over from the *Beagles* the work of escorting the army transports to France. The *Beagles*, with the "M" class boats, were to be formed into a new 10th Flotilla, to be based on Harwich; this flotilla would be under Commodore (T), and would have the *Aurora* as flotilla cruiser. All these transfers would take place on the arrival at Portsmouth of the eight boats from Scapa², and should result in giving the Commander-in-Chief greater freedom of manœuvre in a fleet action.

64. The Submarine Menace.—Since the outbreak of war, the attitude of the fleet and Admiralty towards submarines had entirely changed. No longer could even the Scottish islands be considered too distant for them to use as a theatre of sustained operations. The Grand Fleet base had been the objective of a persistent attack, and one submarine had almost succeeded in penetrating the boom defence. Luckily, the Grand Fleet was absent at the time; but a repetition of this form of offensive might give the enemy a chance of sinking important ships; and the fleet, in the then condition of the booms and obstructions, could hardly be thought to be adequately protected at its base.³

¹ M. 04104/14 of 30.11.14.

² M. 04356/14.

³ A 210.

Reports of the presence of submarines were so numerous and came from so many localities that the most obvious conclusion was that they were in the habit of replenishing in quiet bays from supply ships masquerading as trawlers or neutral traders. If ever a vessel was seen in the vicinity of a submarine she was at once suspected of being a supply ship. The hunt for the replenishing bases was part of the normal work of the auxiliary patrol, particularly of the motor boats; the railway companies in Scotland were called upon to report unusually large consignments of petrol to places in the Highlands; and the interest was kept up by the newly instituted coast-watch carried on by cyclists and boy scouts, who let nothing suspicious go unreported. In consequence, it was difficult to avoid a feeling that submarines were all round the fleet bases.¹

Equally disquieting was the appearance off the approaches to Havre of a submarine, which had remained for several days, scarcely hindered by the operations of the numerous destroyers despatched from Harwich and Cherbourg to hunt for it. It was clear that the Dover Patrol presented little obstacle to the passage of submarines; it was no longer safe to send transports across the Channel unescorted, and the *Beagle* class destroyers, which had been intended for the East Coast, had to be retained at Portsmouth to act as direct escorts to the transports. And with the increase of our army in France, it had to be recognised that the stream of transports would naturally increase in proportion. The Army could now no longer reckon upon the active co-operation of the Navy on its left wing. The Germans seemed to be secure in Flanders, and the heavy guns that they had mounted on the coast made a repetition of the bombarding operations more dangerous than ever. In addition, Zeebrugge was clearly a submarine base and, in future, would have to be regarded as a menace to the line of communication with the Army.

In order to baffle submarines should they again attempt to attack the cross-channel transport route, the Admiralty now decided to make considerable alterations in the lighting and buoyage of the coast between the Isle of Wight and Harwich. The alterations were to be in force by December 10; they were to be kept secret and were not promulgated to the mercantile marine, but pilotage stations were established at St. Helens, Isle of Wight, and Great Yarmouth, with, in addition, Dover for ships from French Channel ports, and the Sunk Light Vessel for ships crossing between the British and German mined areas. Every effort was made, by means of the Press and Notices to Mariners, to ensure that all vessels would be warned to call for pilots. Apart from navigational lights, the Admiralty arranged with the Home Office that all lights in houses and streets visible to seaward should also be extinguished or obscured, along the

¹ Papers titled X. 3994/1914.

coast from Ramsgate to Bognor. The co-operation of the French was secured, and all French lights east of Cape Barfleur were to be extinguished or altered after December 10, without further notice. By these means it was hoped that the navigation of the Channel and approaches to the Thames would be rendered too difficult for submarines.¹ In addition, the French decided to establish aeroplane stations on their Channel coasts to search for hostile craft.²

65. Defence of the Fleet Bases.—In view of the activity of submarines the incomplete condition of the anti-submarine defence in fleet bases was a subject of anxious consideration. As regards Scapa, the main base, the unfinished state of the defences was partly due to confusion of authority with regard to the preparation and laying out of the booms. Part of the material had been prepared in the Royal Yards, and was being laid by riggers; Commander Donald J. Munro, King's Harbour Master at Cromarty, was preparing another part of the materials; and a third part was in the hands of a contractor. The difficulties arising from this divided authority were ended when, on October 29, Commander Munro was appointed to supervise the anti-submarine defences of Scapa, Cromarty, and Loch Ewe.³ Towards the end of November, Captain S. T. Dean Pitt (retired), was appointed to have general charge of the boom defence of Scapa only. The eastern entrances, Holm Sound and Water Sound, were blocked by old merchant ships sunk in Kirk Sound, Skerry Sound, East Weddell Sound, and Water Sound; 14 ships were used, and the last was sunk on December 1.⁴ In Hoxa Sound the anti-submarine boom was in process of erection. It was this that had been seen by *U.18* before her destruction. It was now complete between South Ronaldsay and Nevi Skerry. The boom improvised by the fleet completed the obstruction between Nevi Skerry and Flotta; in this last was the gate for entry into the Flow. It was watched by 13 steam trawlers. The entry from the westward on each side of the Island of Cava was barred by an obstruction of booms and nets, which had been erected by the fleet; and a similar obstruction had been laid across the channel south of Flotta.

Batteries of Q.F. guns (12-pdr. to 4·7-in.), with searchlights, were established on Hoxa Head, Stanger Head, Switha Sound, Hoy Sound, and Kirk Sound⁵; and early in December, a battery

¹ A 230 and Papers titled *Trinity House*, 29.11.14.

² A 242.

³ Papers titled X. 6696/1915.

⁴ Papers titled X. 4076/1914 and G.F.N., December 1. It was apparently at one time intended to sink block ships in West Weddell Sound also, but this does not seem to have been carried out. See chart cutting dated 11 May 1915 in these papers.

⁵ See plan for details, which are based on papers titled X. 4076/14; Report by Major Montgomery (C.I.D., H.S. paper 15/15); G.F. Orders and Memos, various, 4.12.14.

of three 3-pdr. guns and a signal station were set up on Roan Head to command the submarine obstruction in Hoxa Sound. To supplement the gun batteries in Hoy Sound and Hoxa Sound, the *Hannibal* was anchored just east of Graemsay, and the *Magnificent* on the outer side of the Hoxa Sound boom. The patrols and mobile defence of the western entrance were in charge of the *Hannibal*, those of the southern entrance being in charge of the *Magnificent*. The navigational lights of the actual channels were extinguished. Those in the Pentland Firth were not lighted until 2 hours before sunrise, unless required for the movements of the fleet.¹

But as regards the secrecy of bases the situation was still unsatisfactory. There was little or no supervision of persons passing between the Orkneys and the main land. The steamer service enabled strangers to observe the land defences of the fleet, whose anchorage was shifted on October 25 from Scapa Bay in the north to Longhope and the sheltered waters on the west side of the Flow.² The examination anchorage for merchant ships was in Switha Sound, outside the Flow,³ but when ships came in for inspection or shelter, there was no restriction on captains landing and giving information to their consuls or owners. The guards and patrols were insufficient to prevent submarines from obtaining shelter or information, and the means of communication between headquarters and the lookouts on the island were so slow that great delays occurred in sending craft to any place where suspicious or hostile action was reported.⁴

At Cromarty, and in the Firth of Forth, the defences were better. Cromarty had an obstruction across the entrance, consisting of timber baulks and hawsers, from which hung old torpedo nets, supported by trawlers. In the Firth of Forth, two lines of obstructions were being prepared. By the end of November, the inner line at the Forth Bridge was in position and working well; the outer line at Oxcars was not in place, but the nets for it were being made; these nets were to be suspended from booms and hawsers.

Material for the anti-submarine defence of Swarbacks Minn, in the Shetlands, which was to be an advanced base for the cruisers of the fleet, was in process of manufacture, but none of it was yet in place, nor were the details settled. Loch Ewe was in even worse condition; the final scheme had not been determined, no defences were in place, nor was any material on the site. Commander Munro, who had come to Scapa to hurry on the work there, proceeded on relief by Captain Dean Pitt to Loch Ewe, to assume direct control of the defences. The situation there, at the end of November, was that as soon as mooring lighters

¹ Fleet Notices to Mariners, Nos. 58, 65, 72, 95, 100.

² Papers titled X. 4076/1914.

³ M. 03542/14, titled *Admiralty*, 11 November 1914.

⁴ Papers titled X. 7649/14.

became available, such material for the boom as had been assembled at the western end of the Caledonian Canal was to be sent to Loch Ewe and laid under the supervision of Commander Munro.¹

Besides the passive defences described above, the bases had patrols constantly guarding their approaches. The system at Scapa was to have :—

- (a) Destroyer patrols in the approaches to Hoxa Sound and east of the Pentland Skerries ;
- (b) Patrols of armed trawlers working across the western entrances from Stromness and Loch Eriboll, and on the east from Noss Head to Fair Island, looking out for submarines or minelayers ;
- (c) The trawler and fleet minesweepers sweeping continuously the eastern approach to the Pentlands, between 58.50 N and 58.29 N as far as 2° W ; and
- (d) A group of three or four cruisers as available, zigzagging about 80 miles eastward of entrance to the Pentland Firth, closing into 50 miles at night. The cruisers had orders not to board suspicious vessels, but to send them into Kirkwall for examination, turning them over to the armed trawlers.²

66. A Supposed Submarine in the Approaches to Scapa, December 3.—For a week the Orkneys had been free of submarines, or at least none had been reported ; but the immunity was of short duration. In the forenoon of December 3 the *Garry* (Commander Werden Wilson) was on guard in the Flow, just inside the islands which partially close Holm Sound. A gale was raging with such violence that communications between the ships of the fleet at anchor were impossible, even by such seaworthy craft as drifters³ ; but, about 10.30 a.m., a change of wind and the near approach of high water combined to produce conditions favourable to the entry of enemy submarines, and Commander Wilson weighed anchor and went out to be ready to meet them. Scarcely had he passed the main island before a large submarine was seen submerging. A quarter of an hour later it was seen again, and apparently fired a torpedo at him ; Commander Wilson also fired a torpedo, but without result. His guns, either from misfires or from the spray which was bursting in great clouds, were almost useless. A third time the enemy was seen ; and this time two shots were planted so near the conning tower that it was thought hits had been made. The submarine did not appear again. The report⁴ of Commander Wilson is

¹ See *C.S.D. Reports* in Admiralty Record Office. Since November 8, Captain Learmonth had borne the title Captain-in-Charge of Anti-Submarine Defences (short title C.S.D.).

² G.F. Orders and Memos, various, 1.12.14.

³ G.F.N.

⁴ M. 04509/14.

consistent and circumstantial; each time the object was sighted it had two periscopes and a conning tower; and it is hard to disbelieve that an actual submarine was present. But the German History makes no mention of the incident, and no submarine is stated to have been cruising near the Orkney Islands on December 3.

There was a battery commanding the area in which the *Garry* had been operating. On this occasion the spray and noise of the storm had prevented any intimation of the occurrence from reaching the battery; but it was manned only by the local Territorial Artillery, which, in Admiral Colville's opinion, had neither the experience nor training for them to take instant action or accept the responsibility of opening fire. When the Commander-in-Chief represented this, the Admiralty arranged to send a Marine detachment of one officer in command of the battery and 24 non-commissioned officers and privates to take over the more important numbers of the four guns.¹

67. Armed Boarding Steamer Patrol, Instituted December 6.—

By this time the armed boarding steamers asked for by the Commander-in-Chief on October 16, had begun to arrive at Scapa. He had intended to attach them, in groups of four, to the cruiser squadrons, and one group to the battle fleet. But to the Admiralty, the object of the steamers, when they were taken up, was to act in conjunction with the 10th Cruiser Squadron to avoid the necessity of stopping the cruisers to lower boats, and thus rendering them liable to submarine attack. The 10th Cruiser Squadron, that is, the old *Edgars*, were now paid off and were to be replaced by armed liners; and the Admiralty considered the boarding steamers to be no longer necessary. They therefore suggested that the Commander-in-Chief should send them south to be used for boarding work in places where they were urgently required.² Of the eight which had arrived at Scapa, four were found unsuitable for the heavy work in those stormy waters. These four were, therefore, sent to the Downs, to assist the Boarding Flotilla,³ but the Commander-in-Chief retained the other four.⁴ They were put in charge of the *Sappho*, and detailed for the patrol from the Hebrides north-westward, mainly for the object of stopping ships which might be carrying contraband destined for Germany. Their base was to be Loch Ewe, and they were under the general orders of Admiral de Chair, who had recently hoisted his flag in the *Alsatian*, in command of the new 10th Cruiser Squadron of armed merchant cruisers, which

¹ M. 05409/14.

² A 239.

³ *Louvain*, *City of Belfast*, *Peel Castle*, *Duchess of Devonshire*. The work of the Downs Boarding Flotilla was particularly heavy; on January 5, 81 vessels of Allied and Neutral nationalities were boarded by it. (Papers titled X. 4977/15.)

⁴ *Duke of Albany*, *King Orry*, *Amsterdam*, *Duke of Cornwall*. Particulars in G.F.S.P. xviii, p. 244.

were to control the entry into the North Sea, between Iceland and the Shetlands. The armed boarding steamers were instructed to zigzag at 12 knots by day; at night, they were permitted to steer a steady course at 8 knots, provided they altered course soon after dark, in order to throw off any submarines which might be following.¹ Any vessels met which required further examination were to be sent into Stornoway, except those which declared their intention of going to Kirkwall; armed guards were to be put on board the latter to ensure that they carried out their intention. The patrol north-west of the Hebrides had of late been maintained by the armed merchant cruisers with the fleet. There was a marked increase in commercial traffic; probably the undoubted presence of warships, which was made known by fishing vessels returning to port, had the effect of deterring neutral skippers from using the route against which they had been warned, and which had been made so inconvenient for them.²

68. The Mined Areas.—The Admiralty and the fleet were still under the impression that they had to fear minelaying by Germans in neutral merchant ships and trawlers, or vessels masquerading as neutral.³ To such an extent were they persuaded that the enemy had employed fishing vessels that drastic reductions were made in the areas in which fishing might be carried on. The whole of the West Coast of Scotland, as well as the Orkneys and Shetlands, were ruled out. In the North Sea, only the East Coast between Kinnaird Head and Cromer was open, and even here large patches were prohibited, either on account of the German minefields, or the fictitious defences of our own ports.⁴

It was, however, now fairly certain that the Tory Island minefield, on which the *Audacious* was lost, had not been laid by fishing vessels or steamers under neutral flags, as had at first been somewhat rashly concluded. The large Norddeutscher Lloyd liner *Berlin* put into Trondhjem, on November 16, with damaged engines, and it was at once discovered that she was an armed merchant cruiser; moreover, it was seen that she had mine-ports astern and was fitted for minelaying, though she had no mines on board. In preference to leaving port within the 24 hour limit, she chose to disarm and be interned. At first, her crew kept silence about her voyage; but before the end of the month it had transpired that she had laid mines off the

¹ *Orders for Armed Boarding Steamers*, 5/12/14, in G.F.O. Orders and Memos, Various.

² H.S. 78, p. 209.

³ Grand Fleet Memo., Information Concerning Mines, 15/1/15, Section 3. The Bi-Weekly Mining Statement, of 28/11/14, discusses a suspicious vessel off Coquet Island, flying the Danish flag, and two Dutch drifters acting suspiciously off Flamborough Head.

⁴ A 207, 235, 238, 240. A copy of the Admiralty Orders for Fishing Vessels, dated 1/11/14 is in H.S. 77, p. 176.

north-west coast of Ireland and in the White Sea, a report which was confirmed later with circumstantial details by a disgruntled member of her crew, who imparted the information to our Legation in Norway.¹

Tory Island minefield was as yet unexplored ; the Commander-in-Chief used the minesweepers to sweep the passage for the Grand Fleet when it proceeded from Lough Swilly to Scapa, and ordered the *Kaphreda* group of minesweeping trawlers to Scapa before they had time to sweep, in the intervals of bad weather, more than the line from Tory Island to Inishtrahull. This they found to be clear of mines. A group of drifters and trawlers from Loch Ewe and Belfast made several sweeps in the suspected area without finding any mines, but as they had only their fishing nets with them and were without naval officers, their report was not accepted as conclusive proof that the area was clear.² The minefield was an obstacle in the path of merchant shipping bound for Liverpool and Glasgow, now become our principal ports, and as soon as the Admiralty learned that the *Kaphreda* group had gone to Scapa, they ordered them back to complete the work of sweeping ; unfortunately, the trawler skippers' taste for liquor led to four courtsmartial, and it was not till November 25 that the group sailed again from Scapa.³ The minefield, therefore, was still practically untouched. Its extent was unknown, and no estimate of the number of mines laid could be formed.

There was no intention of clearing the East Coast minefields and no attempt was made to define them. The Admiralty looked upon them as a kind of barrier reef, with definite small passages of entry. The charts in the War-room of the Admiralty, on which the areas we had declared dangerous were ruled across with red bars, exerted a silent influence on the minds of the staff till they almost began to think the enemy thought them dangerous too ; whereas, it may be concluded that, in the offices of the Admiralstab the same charts bore only tiny black dots where the returning minelayers reported they had laid their mines. Our declarations that the areas were highly dangerous and that the mines had been scattered broadcast over the open sea—even our warning that we claimed the right of mining the whole North Sea—were regarded in Berlin as mere bluff ; the German staff credited us with more sense than to set spring guns in the fields we intended to shoot over. The British minefield east of Dover failed to gain much credence with them ; their submarines, craft so precious that they could take no unnecessary risk, manœuvred freely in the area with little restriction as to course, though it appears not always with impunity.

¹ H.S. 75, pp. 55, 313, 398, 829, 830, 1,039 ; H.S. 76, pp. 152, 237 ; H.S. 77, pp. 611, 976 ; H.S. 79, pp. 195, 753 ; and M. 0298/15.

² G.F.N., November 22.

³ H.S. 74, p. 636 ; H.S. 75, p. 113 ; H.S. 76, pp. 749, 876.

69. **The Submarine Base at Zeebrugge ; Disappearance of "U.11."**—Admiral Nicholson's bombardment of Zeebrugge did not achieve its object of rendering that port unsafe for submarines ; it merely stiffened the German resolve to use it as an advanced base for submarine operations on both sides of the Dover Strait. Learning on November 24 that there were 24 war vessels of importance, including battleships, in Dover Harbour, the Admiralstab concluded these would soon be used for renewed activities on the Belgian coast, and sent a submarine, *U.11*, to Zeebrugge, in readiness to attack them. She was the first boat of a new flotilla to be based there, the Senior Officer of which, Commander Otto Feldmann, arrived with his staff on November 30.

U.11 reached Zeebrugge on November 26. She went out on November 29 and 30, and again on December 2 and 3, lying in wait off the Wielingen Light Vessel for the expected bombarding squadron. For a few days after this a westerly gale prevented her from going to sea, and she proceeded to Bruges for some short repairs. A reconnoitring aeroplane saw her in the canal on the way to Bruges on the 6th.¹ By the time she had completed the repairs the weather had improved, and on the 8th she was off Dunkirk. Even there she found no vessel to attack. On that date the only ships at Dunkirk were the French guardship, a French torpedo vessel, and four French destroyers.² Had *U.11* gone on to Dover, she would have found the eastern boom absent ; the gales had broken it up. But only the vessels of the Dover Patrol were there. Seeing the unprotected state of the harbour, the First Lord, who passed through Dover on a visit to French Headquarters, suggested that the 6th Battle Squadron should be sent away till Dover was safe again ; and they were now at Portland.³

Defence against submarines by booms and obstructions was supervised by the Committee on Submarine Defences, with Captain Learmonth as its chairman ; this Committee had nothing to do with active attack on submarines, and feeling the need of a body to collect and examine the numerous suggestions on offensive tactics and weapons for defeating the submarine, the Admiralty, on December 8, re-constituted the Submarine Attack Committee which, established just before the outbreak of war, had not had time to put forward any proposals before its members were absorbed into service afloat. Captain L. Donaldson was the President of this Submarine Attack Committee, and Admiral Sir Percy Scott, who, on November 14, had been appointed to advise on anti-submarine devices, was to assist the Committee with his suggestions.⁴

¹ H.S. 79, p. 36.

² H.S. 78, p. 939.

³ H.S. 78, pp. 728, 746, 914.

⁴ M. 03466/14, 04128/14.

In the absence of the boom the guns commanding the eastern entrance to Dover were specially on the alert. In the morning of December 11 a suspicious object like a periscope was seen from the breakwater, and the guns opened fire. The object disappeared; nothing was found, though destroyers made a thorough search.¹ Whether or not it was a submarine has not been established; but it is certain that *U.11* disappeared about that time. She is known to have gone out from Zeebrugge on the 9th, to operate between Dunkirk and Calais, and she never returned. There was no suggestion when she left that she would reconnoitre Dover, and the most probable explanation of her end is that she struck a mine, either on one of our minefields or floating. The gales of winter were setting numbers of mines adrift. The Dover Patrol, on November 23, sank 28 floating mines off the Kentish coast; two days later, 23 were destroyed by ourselves and the French off Dunkirk, and 7 in the Dover Strait.² From German sources information was received that *U.11* had been mined off Zeebrugge, and this is still the Admiralty belief, though the German Official History does not definitely confirm it.³

The second submarine for Zeebrugge, *U.30*, was despatched from Germany on December 4, but the stormy weather obliged her to return to the Ems, where she remained. Two more, *U.5* and *U.12*, reached Zeebrugge on the 11th, having passed many floating mines; the two boats were eagerly welcomed, as information had come in that three old cruisers had been filled up with sand at Folkestone to block Zeebrugge at the end of the week.⁴

70. Proposed Operation to Counter a Raid.—Seeing that the moon and time of high water were favourable on December 8 for a raid on the Northumbrian coast, the Commander-in-Chief wished to arrange for powerful forces to be within intercepting distance of the enemy, should he attempt an operation of that kind. He felt the mining of his bases in advance would certainly be part of the German operations; it was a threat to be seriously considered, in view of the inadequacy of his sweeping resources. The trawlers were of so low a speed that they could not work far from the base; and a minefield, intended to trap the fleet, was not likely to be close in where it could be easily discovered. He had four minesweepers, but of these only three could be relied on, and that only in fine weather. All this meant either that he must accept a considerable risk, or submit to delay while the route of the fleet was being swept; and to obviate these he asked for the *Halcyon* and *Spanker* to be sent at once, to be followed

¹ H.S. 79, pp. 404, 422, 1,128.

² H.S. 76, pp. 678, 980, 996; H.S. 77, p. 417.

³ C.B. 1292 and C.B. 1292(b), *Losses of Submarines*, G.O.H. III, p. 46.

⁴ These sand-filled vessels, like those reported full of sand at Hamburg, were imaginative creations of the brains of spies. TSDD.

by eight fast merchant ships as minesweepers as soon as they could be got ready. The *Halcyon* and *Spanker* could not be spared from the East Coast, but the fast fleet sweepers were already in hand, and those that were ready were at once ordered to Scapa.¹ Commodore Tyrwhitt shared the Commander-in-Chief's opinion that the enemy would mine the fleet's exits as a preliminary to a raid. His only safe way out of Harwich was, he thought, between the British and German minefields; if this were mined, or Harwich Harbour blocked, he would be unable to play his part in the anti-raid dispositions, and he suggested an additional destroyer base should be made in Boston Deep. His proposal was not adopted, the Admiralty being obliged to accept the situation.²

Meanwhile, on December 6, the Commander-in-Chief issued his orders for the disposition of the fleet to meet the possible raid. The general idea was, that the battle cruisers, screened by the light cruisers, should be from 8 a.m. on the 8th to 8 a.m. on the 9th cruising about half-way between Northumberland and Denmark, while the 1st Battle Squadron, with the *Drake*, *Warrior*, and *Black Prince*, were to be within 60 miles to the northward of the battle cruisers, acting as support to them.³

The Admiralty, however, since there was no movement of the High Sea Fleet apparent, suggested that he should not send his ships south of the parallel of the Forth unless he had some special object, for the recent westerly gales would have set mines adrift and driven them into the area he proposed to work in. In view of this reply he cancelled the operation,⁴ and sent the 1st Battle Squadron to carry out gunnery practices to the westward of the Shetlands between December 9 and 12.

71. The Admiralty Planning another Air Raid.—The Admiralty were intent on repeating and bringing to a successful issue the frustrated air raid of November 23. New orders, marked Plan Y, were drafted on December 2, and the operation was to be carried out on December 10; but, being an air raid, it was, of course, dependent on the weather. As before, the immediate escort of the seaplane carriers was to come from the Harwich destroyer flotillas; a large number of submarines were to occupy strategic positions in the Bight, to be ready to attack any German ships emerging; while the Grand Fleet cruisers would come down to within supporting distance.⁵

The plan was not to interfere with the patrol kept by Commodore (T), who sent out a cruiser to Terschelling daily, as usual.⁶ The destroyer patrol had been completely given up. There had

¹ A 244, H.S. 78, pp. 572, 591.

² Harwich Force Packs, Vol. VII, pp. 6-18.

³ Operation Order No. 18; see Appendix G.

⁴ A 250, 251.

⁵ The orders are in Appendix H.

⁶ A 252. H.S. 79, pp. 803, 807.

been a transient alarm on November 28, when strong German wireless was heard at Harwich; it was too rough for destroyers, but the *Arethusa* and *Fearless* went out between the British and German minefields, returning next day by the Haisborough Channel. There was a similar alarm on December 2, and the *Arethusa* and *Aurora*, which had gone out for firing practice, proceeded to investigate, only to find that the signalling came from a Dutch ship.¹

December 10, the day for which the air raid had been planned, proved to be unsuitable; the weather was unpropitious, and the operation was postponed, partly for that reason and partly because the Harwich submarines and destroyers were required for another operation which was in contemplation.² Besides this, the French had just asked for another bombardment on the Belgian coast, and the assembling of the necessary ships from their anti-invasion stations on the East Coast involved their escort by Harwich destroyers. Commodore (T) was ordered to send four destroyers to Boston Deep for the monitors, and eight to the Humber to bring down two of the battleships from there.³

There was heavy weather again on the 12th, and the cruiser on the Terschelling Patrol, the *Aurora*, had to be recalled without relief. The necessity for keeping the Harwich forces concentrated for the proposed operation disappeared on the 13th, when it was definitely decided to postpone it, and the Admiralty now ordered Plan Y, the air raid, to be carried out as soon as the weather conditions were suitable.⁴ Before, however, a start could be made there were clear indications that the Germans, on their side, were about to make a raid themselves.

72. The Germans Planning another Coast Raid.⁵—Although the German submarines had made so many attempts to locate our battlefleet, since September they had failed to sight a single heavy ship, and Admiral Jellicoe's sweeps of the North Sea were quite unknown to the Admiralstab; in Berlin, it was believed that our main fleet, after August 28, had remained in protected harbours behind booms, and entirely beyond the reach of submarines. The reports of spies and of trading vessels agreed so little together that they threw no certain light on the actual disposition of our forces, and the only way to solve the problem seemed to be to risk another offensive. It was presumed that, after the Yarmouth raid, we should have brought some powerful ships down to the East Coast, a supposition that was confirmed when spies reported the arrival of the vessels distributed among

¹ H.S. 77, pp. 535, 612, 644, and H.S. 78, pp. 223, 242.

² A 258, 259, 264. No papers have been found to give a clue to the nature of the proposed operation.

³ A 257, 265, 268, 269.

⁴ A 272, 274.

⁵ *Nordsee* III, Chapter 2.

the East Coast ports to deal with invasion. Doubtless, the spies, as is their habit, exaggerated the value of these feeble craft.

Admiral Hipper suggested that a powerful raid on commerce in the Skagerrack would bring out whatever forces we might have stationed in the Forth, Cromarty, and the Humber. On the other hand, the Fleet Command thought a direct attack on the British coast would succeed better in bringing about an encounter; and on November 19, the Kaiser's consent was obtained to another battle cruiser operation, of the same kind as the bombardment and minelaying off Yarmouth. The scenes of the new adventure were to be Scarborough and Hartlepool; and on November 21, *U.27*, commanded by Wegener, who had shown that he could bring back useful reports, was despatched to reconnoitre the Yorkshire coast. He was on the spot during the 23rd and 24th, one of his principal objects being to come to some conclusion about the supposed minefields. It was quite uncertain whether the German mines laid at the end of August were still in position, or whether British mines had been laid. Some neutral skippers believed that we had placed a chain of minefields outside the War Channel, but this was disbelieved in Berlin, though it was considered possible that important landfalls had been mined. Other skippers put this story of minefields down to bluff, designed to render more easy the control of shipping, and some steamers were known to have safely made direct voyages from the Skagerrack to East Coast ports. Wegener, who succeeded in avoiding discovery, saw many vessels navigating as far as 12 miles from shore, and noticed that the coastal traffic went on at night without much difficulty, although no lights were burning. He examined the area repeatedly on various courses, coming finally to the conclusion that it was clear of mines. On his return, on November 26, he reported Whitby as a specially good landfall.¹

It was then decided that the bombardment should take place on November 29, in spite of articles in the British Press implying that some such operation was expected; but when news was received that heavy firing had been heard off Hartlepool, it was postponed. Too much delay was inadvisable, for it was realised that we had detached vessels to deal with von Spee; nothing definite was known as to the numbers or classes of ships sent, but it was obvious that the raid should be carried out while the Grand Fleet was still weakened from this cause. The idea of mining the fleet bases as part of the operation, foreshadowed by Admiral Jellicoe, was suggested by the Admiralstab. That Scapa was the base of the Grand Fleet was not known to the Germans; the Thames, the Forth, and Cromarty, were thought to be the best places to mine; but the suggestion was not adopted.

After the postponement, another reconnaissance by *U.27* was considered necessary, but unfavourable weather set in and it

¹ *Nordsee* III, p. 54.

was not till December 8 that Wegener got away. Two days later, a force of light cruisers and destroyers established the fact that we did no routine patrol work at night within 100 miles NNW of Heligoland. Wegener was to return or report by wireless before the 12th; but heavy weather delayed him, and his aerial having been damaged, he was unable to report till the 14th, on his arrival in the Bight. He had seen nothing to change his previous opinion, and the conditions seemed favourable. Admiral Hipper thereupon issued orders to begin the operation that night.

Some part of the orders consequent on the departure of the 1st Scouting Group reached our listening stations; they indicated that the group was going out for two days, which would give them time to reach our coast. Plan Y was postponed again; orders were at once sent out for the Grand Fleet to be ready for the Scouting Group on its arrival, and for our submarines to lie in wait on its line of retreat.¹

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SCARBOROUGH RAID, DECEMBER 16.

73. The German Plan of Operations.—With Rear-Admiral Hipper, when he left the Jade at 2 a.m. on December 15, were the 1st Scouting Group, consisting of four battle cruisers and the powerful armoured cruiser *Blücher*; four² of the five fast light cruisers which, since the loss on August 28 of the *Cöln* and *Mainz*, formed the 2nd Scouting Group; whilst two flotillas of the fastest destroyers screened him, the 1st Flotilla and the 9th, this last formed since the outbreak of war. Steering up to the 56th parallel to clear the Dogger Bank, the force was to turn to the westward after dark on the 15th for the run to the Yorkshire coast, arriving at dawn. Here the battle cruisers were to separate into two groups for the bombardment of Hartlepool and Scarborough respectively, while the *Kolberg* laid a minefield off the coast. To support the force, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Squadrons³ of the High Sea Fleet, the armoured cruisers of the 3rd Scouting Group, the light cruisers of the 4th Scouting Group, with the remaining destroyer flotillas were to be, at daylight on December 16, in a position 54° 40' N, 3° 0' E, on the eastern edge of the Dogger Bank, about 130 miles east of Scarborough. The inadequacy of support at such a distance was fully realised by Admiral von Ingenohl; but it was thought that any suggestion

¹ A 278-288.

² *Strassburg, Stralsund, Graudenz, Kolberg.*

³ Less the *König* in dock at Wilhelmshaven until 1.1.15 for damages to her stern.

of closer support, involving the possibility of a fleet action, would prejudice his chances of obtaining the Emperor's assent to the operation.¹

74. **British Dispositions to Meet the Raid.**—On the night of December 14–15, when the German signals connected with the despatch of Admiral Hipper's force began to come into the Admiralty, the greater part of the Grand Fleet was in harbour at Scapa Flow, a few cruisers being at sea engaged in maintaining the blockade. At Cromarty were Admiral Beatty's four battle cruisers, with part of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla; while the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were in the Firth of Forth.

Acting upon Admiralty instructions, the Commander-in-Chief ordered a concentration at 7.30 a.m. on the 16th of the 2nd Battle Squadron and the battle and light cruisers, in $54^{\circ} 10' N$, $3^{\circ} 0' E$, to intercept the German raiders on their return from the coast. Commodore Goodenough was two light cruisers short, for the *Liverpool* was away re-fitting and the *Lowestoft* on patrol. The *Blanche* was temporarily attached to him to remedy the deficiency, and in addition, the Commander-in-Chief ordered Admiral Pakenham to bring out the 3rd Cruiser Squadron from the Forth.

The two divisions of the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, from Cromarty, were to accompany the battle cruisers to the rendezvous. In reporting to the Admiralty his dispositions the Commander-in-Chief emphasised the fact that it was desirable the Harwich flotillas should join up with Admiral Warrender, since, owing to bad weather, the destroyers from Cromarty might not reach the rendezvous; for the Admiralty intelligence was that there would probably be three flotillas with the German force.²

The orders to Commodore Tyrwhitt went out from the Admiralty at 2 p.m. on the 15th. He was to concentrate the available light cruisers and two flotillas of destroyers off Yarmouth, at daylight on the 16th, ready to move to any point where the enemy might be reported, in order to get in touch with them and keep Admiral Warrender informed of their movements. Special reconnaissances were ordered for two of the latest "M" class destroyers; the *Minos* was to patrol from midnight, December 15–16, until 9 a.m. on the 16th, on a line running south from $53^{\circ} N$, $3^{\circ} 5' E$ (5 miles NE of the Southwold area), and the *Miranda*, between the same hours, near the North Hinder Light Vessel. The movements of Sir George Warrender's force were communicated to Commodore Tyrwhitt, and he was ordered, in the event of an engagement, to endeavour to effect a junction with the Grand Fleet detached force, in order to deal with the enemy's torpedo craft, using his light cruisers in case the

¹ *Nordsee* III, p. 51.

² A 283.

weather proved to be too bad for destroyers. At Harwich, in addition to the *Arethusa* and *Aurora*, and the two flotilla cruisers *Undaunted* and *Fearless*, there was the newly commissioned light cruiser *Galatea*, but being not yet fit for service she remained in harbour when the Harwich flotillas sailed at 2.15 a.m. on the 16th for Yarmouth.¹

At Harwich and Yarmouth, Commodore Keyes had 14 submarines standing by. Eight of them were to be spread on a line running SSE, from a position 30 miles NW of Terschelling to the 10-fathom line off the Dutch coast.

Commodore Keyes was reluctant to send so many submarines by night through the channel leading from Haisborough Light Vessel north of the Southwold mined area, and when the eight boats² left at 2.30 p.m., on the 15th, they proceeded via the passage between the British and German mined areas, to be in their waiting positions by daylight next day. The Commodore himself followed at 5 p.m. with the *Lurcher* and *Firedrake*, to scout to the eastward.³

Special vigilance on the morning of December 16 was ordered for the patrol flotillas, which were to be under way off their bases before daylight in positions suitable for rapid communication.⁴

All available destroyers and submarines at Dover were sent out to watch the Straits, between the South Goodwins and Outer Ruytingen, and the French were asked to have their patrols out also. The Admiralty, apparently, did not seriously anticipate an appearance of the enemy in the Dover area, for Admiral Hood was ordered to continue the support which his force was giving to the military operations on the Belgian coast.⁵

75. The Approach to the Rendezvous.—Admiral Warrender left Scapa at 5.30 a.m. on December 15 with the 2nd Battle Squadron⁶ and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, for the rendezvous in 54° 10' N, 3° E. In the Pentland Firth the heavy seas forced the ships to reduce speed and so seriously damaged the *Boadicea*⁷ that, with the *Blanche*, she was compelled to return to harbour. Half-an-hour later, Admiral Beatty brought the four battle cruisers out from Invergordon, the seven destroyers⁸ of the 4th Flotilla proceeding independently. Junction between the two forces was effected at 11.0 a.m., in 58° 20' N, 1.30' W, off the Moray Firth, and at 3.0 p.m., Admiral Pakenham's four cruisers from Rosyth were sighted, so that before dark the whole force was concentrated.

¹ A 288, 289, 293, 294.

² A 284. The submarines detailed were *E.2*, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, and *Archimede* (French). Their orders are in Comm. (S), War Records, Vol. I, p. 564.

³ A 281, 285.

⁴ A 290, 296.

⁵ A 291, 295, 297.

⁶ Less the *Thunderer* refitting at Devonport.

⁷ 2nd Battle Squadron, attached light cruiser.

⁸ *Lynx* (Commander R. Parry), *Ambuscade*, *Unity*, *Hardy*, *Shark* (Commander Loftus W. Jones), *Acasta*, *Spitfire*

Admiral Beatty had not received particulars of the situation before leaving Invergordon, and after effecting junction with Sir George Warrender, the latter informed him of the state of affairs, and that a raid on Harwich or the Humber was considered probable. Admiral Warrender further explained his plans. After reaching the rendezvous in $54^{\circ} 10' \text{ N}$, $3^{\circ} 0' \text{ E}$, at 7.30 a.m. on the 16th, he intended if there was no news to steer east (true) at 14 knots until 10.30 a.m., and then turn 16 points and steer west back to the original rendezvous, which would be reached at 1.30 p.m. If by then there was no report of the enemy he should turn north. In the expectation that the enemy's forces would first be encountered on their return from the English coast, Admiral Warrender stationed the cruiser squadrons astern of him whilst steering east; when he turned back to west they were to precede him and endeavour to draw on to the battleships any enemy that might be sighted. At Admiral Beatty's suggestion, the speed to be maintained after reaching the rendezvous was altered to 18 knots, on account of the submarine menace.¹ With only seven destroyers, Sir George Warrender was apprehensive of enemy destroyer attacks, and whilst pressing upon Sir David Beatty the duty of the cruisers to deal with them, he urged the Admiralty to order the Harwich flotillas to join him at the rendezvous. The signal came in to the Admiralty at 1.20 p.m., an hour after an urgent request to the same effect sent by the Commander-in-Chief, when he learnt that the *Boadicea* and *Blanche* had been compelled to return to harbour.² Nevertheless, when, three quarters of an hour later, the orders to Commodore Tyrwhitt went out, they were to the effect that he was to await news of the enemy off Yarmouth, 100 miles direct from Admiral Warrender's 7.30 a.m. rendezvous or 138 miles, via the swept channel.³

Before nightfall, the various squadrons took up their stations for the night. A course, $\text{S}17^{\circ}\text{E}$, at $14\frac{1}{2}$ knots, was ordered.⁴ The battle cruisers were placed 5 miles ahead of the *King George V*, with the light cruisers 5 miles on Admiral Beatty's starboard beam, and the armoured cruisers similarly disposed abeam to port. The destroyers were stationed 10 miles on the port beam of the *King George V*, and with the cruiser squadrons they were to close to visual distance of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at daylight.⁵

76. The Enemy Sight British Destroyers at 4 a.m.—Admiral Hipper, after clearing the Dogger Bank, turned to port at 5 p.m., and steered a course of $\text{W by S } \frac{1}{4} \text{ S}$, at 15 knots, for the Yorkshire coast, and all unconsciously for Admiral Warrender's force.

¹ Appendix D1, 2, 4.

² A 286, 287.

³ See preceding section.

⁴ D 9. *King George V's* Log No. 19648 gives average speed $14\frac{1}{2}$ knots.

⁵ D 8, 10.

About 12.15 a.m., on the 16th, he crossed the course of the British ships in 55.20 N, 1.50 E, about an hour ahead of the *Lion*. When Admiral Beatty reached this point, the light cruisers to the west of him can have been little more than 10 miles from the *Derfflinger*, rear ship of the German line. But the night was moonless and overcast, and neither Admiral was aware of the other's proximity. And yet on the German side a destroyer, S.33, was making repeated wireless calls, contrary to orders, and causing considerable anxiety.¹ She had lost touch with her squadron and, failing to get replies to her requests for position, about 2 a.m. she turned back for home and set a course for Sylt.

On our own side, the darkness had brought about a similar situation. The destroyers stationed 10 miles to the eastward of the battleships had also lost touch, but were continuing their course for the rendezvous. At 4 a.m., S.33 suddenly became aware of four boats in 55.1 N, 2.43 E.² The nearest was only 160 yards on the port bow. With great presence of mind the Commander of S.33 turned to starboard on to a parallel course, hoping to be mistaken for a British destroyer. In the darkness his ruse was completely successful, and 20 minutes later, having edged away out of sight, he sent out a wireless report of the encounter.³

77. Warrender's Destroyers Meet von Ingenohl's Screen, 5.20 a.m.—Unaware of the surveillance to which they had been subjected for the last 20 minutes, the British destroyers continued on their way. At 5.15 a.m., in 54° 47' N, 3° 0' E,⁴ the *Lynx* (Commander R. S. P. Parry), leading the two divisions in line ahead, S17E, at 14½ knots, sighted off the port bow a destroyer which, when challenged, replied with green and white lights.

The enemy boat was V.155, part of the High Sea Fleet screen. Admiral von Ingenohl had left harbour on the afternoon of the 15th, and after concentrating at 8 p.m., 20 miles north of Heligoland, had steered for the rendezvous in 54° 40' N, 3° 0' E, on the eastern edge of the Dogger Bank, and only 30 miles north of Admiral Warrender's rendezvous. The battle squadrons were steaming on a west-north-westerly course in line ahead at 7½ miles distance, with light cruisers disposed 6 miles abeam to starboard, two destroyer flotillas, the 5th and 7th, 8 miles to port, and two, the 2nd and 8th, astern. Spread 6 miles ahead of the battle fleet were the light cruiser *Hamburg* and the armoured cruisers *Roon* and *Prinz Heinrich*, with the destroyers of the 6th Flotilla.⁵

¹ None of the British ships heard these calls.

² This is the position of *Lynx* at 4 a.m., as estimated. The position given by S.33 in her signal (Appendix E 2) has been disregarded, as she admittedly did not know it.

³ Appendix E 2.

⁴ The positions given in the destroyers' reports vary widely, and no attention has been paid to them.

⁵ See *Nordsee* III, Karte 7.

V.155 had been detached by the *Roon* to investigate a steamer on the starboard bow, and at 5.15 a.m., when she met Commander Parry's destroyers, she was trying to rejoin her own flotilla. From the formation and number of the boats, of which she counted between 12 and 16,¹ and their reply to her recognition signal,² she took them for her own flotilla, and she turned and steered NNE at slow speed, making a recognition signal which she knew was unknown to us. There was no reply, and increasing to her utmost speed at 5.25 a.m., V.155 sent out the W/T signal, "10 enemy destroyers in sight."³ Her challenge had shown Commander Parry that she was hostile, and leading the British destroyers away in chase he switched on his fighting lights and opened fire at very close range,⁴ to which V.155 replied, altering course slightly to starboard to bring both her 15-pdr. guns to bear and calling up for help the Senior Officer of Torpedo Boat Destroyers in the *Rostock*.⁵

V.155 was soon forced round to port to a northerly course, though after a few minutes (0535) she altered four points to starboard once more, to throw out the range, as shells were falling close to her. She carried two 15-pdr. guns only, whereas the British destroyers were each armed with three 4-in.; but she gave a good account of herself. The *Lynx* was hit by two projectiles, her fore magazine and shell-room were flooded, and one of her oil tanks pierced. A few minutes later her helm jammed (0543), causing the boat to turn 16 points to port. The remainder of the flotilla followed her round, and at the turn the *Ambuscade*, second in the line⁶ was badly hit forward and had to haul out of the line. The turn allowed V.155 to escape; she altered course to the eastward and disappeared, apparently unscathed.

At 5.15 a.m., on V.155's first report of the enemy, the *Hamburg*, the nearest of the light cruisers, at once proceeded at full speed to her assistance, with the attached destroyers V.158 and V.160. At 5.53 a.m. she sighted a darkened vessel ahead, and receiving no reply to her challenge, she switched on her searchlight and discovered a British destroyer, upon which she opened fire at 800 yards, followed by V.160. The destroyer was the *Hardy*, which had apparently fallen somewhat astern of the *Lynx* and *Unity*, when the latter resumed the original course, S17E, after

¹ She only reported 10, however.

² *Nordsee* III, p. 65, says the British destroyers challenged with "AFJJ."

³ E 3.

⁴ *Lynx*, Report of Proceedings, M. 05091/14, gives range "500 yards(?)," which is approximately the range shown in *Nordsee* III, Karte 7, but *Nordsee* III, p. 65, gives the range about 2,000 yards. All times in Commander Parry's report are about 15 minutes slow.

⁵ E 4. The position there given by V.155 was too far to the north, westward.

⁶ *Nordsee* III, p. 66, says the third boat in the line was the one damaged during the turn, but from the British reports the *Ambuscade* seems to have been hit at the turn.

the unintentional 16 point turn,¹ whilst the *Shark's* division continued to follow the *Hardy* SSW. The *Shark* and *Hardy* opened fire at once, and the latter, upon whom the *Hamburg* concentrated her fire, was repeatedly hit, the range closing to as little as 400 yards ; she had 17 casualties, her foremost 4-in. gun was put out of action, her voice pipe communications to the after guns were cut, and the steering gear disabled. Steering from the engine room, Lieutenant-Commander L. G. E. Crabbe hauled out of line to port² and was once more engaged by the *Hamburg*. The two vessels passed quickly on opposite courses, but not before the *Hardy* managed to fire a torpedo. This did not take effect, for the *Hamburg* had already altered course to port in anticipation ; and she disappeared, carrying the marks of the *Hardy's* fire and with a number of men wounded.

The *Lynx* and *Unity* were now drawing every moment further to the southward of the remainder of the flotilla, for Commander Loftus Jones had led his division round to port and was now standing by the *Hardy*, whilst Commander Parry was taking the *Unity* S17E, on the original course for the night.³ At 5.55 a.m., the *Ambuscade*, away to the northward, had signalled to the *Lynx* that she needed help. The signal was taken in and repeated by the *Unity*, and Commander Parry ordered the latter to go to the assistance of the *Ambuscade*.⁴ At that moment, however, a cruiser loomed up astern, between the *Unity* and *Ambuscade*. This was the *Roon*, which, with the 11th Half-Flotilla, formed the centre ship of Admiral von Ingenohl's advanced screen.

78. The High Sea Fleet Retires, 5.40 a.m.—Admiral von Ingenohl had received, at 4.24 a.m., the report of S.33, that she had sighted four enemy destroyers in 54° 55' N, 2° 15' E. The signal gave no details of the enemy's course ; and there was some doubt whether S.33 had signalled her position correctly, for it was not clear why one of Admiral Hipper's destroyers should be so

¹ *Nordsee* III, p. 67, says the *Hamburg* proceeded to V.155's assistance on the first report at 5.15 a.m., and sighted the *Hardy* a quarter of an hour later. But the appendix of signals gives 0525 as the time of receipt of V.155's first signal, and Karte 7 shows the *Hamburg* engaging the *Hardy* at 0553.

² Her report (M. 05091/14) states that she turned to starboard, but the greater weight of evidence is that she turned to port.

³ The *Lynx's* Report of Proceedings states : "Defect to my steering gear was speedily remedied, and flotilla resumed original course and speed," viz., S17E, 14½ knots. Corbett, "Naval Operations, Vol. II, Plan 2," shows the *Lynx* and *Unity* steering SSW, but this is not considered correct. The *Lynx's* statement that the "flotilla" resumed original course is considered to apply to *Unity* alone of the remaining destroyers, for the *Ambuscade* had turned out of line damaged, and the evidence is that the *Lynx* and *Unity* had lost touch with the *Hardy* and the *Shark's* division soon after the damage to *Lynx's* steering gear. In the plan the *Lynx* and *Unity* are shown as proceeding S17E at 18 knots, instead of 14½ knots, since *Lynx's* Log No. L664, seems to indicate 18 knots as their speed.

⁴ D 12, 14, 16.

far in the rear. It still wanted two hours to dawn, and the conditions were favourable for destroyer attacks; but for the time von Ingenohl held on. An hour later the reports of *V.155* began to come in.

The High Sea Fleet had just reached the rendezvous in $54^{\circ} 40' \text{ N}$, $3^{\circ} 0' \text{ E}$, while Admiral Warrender, with the battle cruisers some 4 miles on his port bow, was in $54^{\circ} 32' \text{ N}$, $2^{\circ} 44' \text{ E}$. The *Prinz Heinrich*, port wing cruiser of von Ingenohl's advanced screen, was actually less than 10 miles distant from the 2nd Battle Squadron at the moment.

Here at last were the conditions for which the Germans had been striving since the outbreak of war. A few miles away on the port bow of the High Sea Fleet, isolated, and several hours' steaming from home, was the most powerful homogeneous battle squadron of the Grand Fleet, the destruction of which would at one blow have completed the process of attrition and placed the British and German fleets on a precisely even footing as regards numerical strength. But the German Commander-in-Chief did not stay to penetrate what he apparently believed to be the destroyer screen of the Grand Fleet. Simultaneously, with the report of *V.155* that enemy destroyers were chasing her, he sent out an order to turn 16 points to port to a south-easterly course at high speed.¹ The signal for the turn was delayed for 10 minutes by interference from the British destroyers, but the manœuvre was carried out about 5.42 a.m., the gun flashes of the destroyer engagement being visible off the starboard bow as the ships turned. For 40 minutes von Ingenohl steamed on an almost parallel course to Admiral Warrender, and at daylight he stationed the fleet, disposed his five flotillas of destroyers to protect him from submarine attack, and altering course 3 points to port, rapidly drew away from the British detached squadron.²

79. The "Lynx" Encounters the "Roon."—At the time of the turn the advanced cruiser screen of the High Sea Fleet was some 5 miles to the westward of the scene of the destroyer engagement. Thus the *Roon*, about half-an-hour after the turn, sighted the *Lynx* and *Unity* on the port bow steering $S17E$.³

¹ E 5.

² E 17, 20, and *Nordsee* III, Karte 8. Admiral Ingenohl's decision is discussed and severely criticised in *Nordsee* III, pp. 72-74.

³ The plans in *Nordsee* III give no geographical position for the *Roon* prior to 0700, and the position of the encounter, as shown in Plan IV, is based on the assumption that the *Lynx* and *Unity* steered $S17E$ at 18 knots, after the repair to the former's steering gear. *Nordsee* III, Karte 7, shows the screening position of the *Roon* while making for the R.V. to have been 6 miles ahead of the leading battleship of the H.S. Fleet, and she has been shown as being in her correct position at the time of the turn (0542). *Nordsee* III, p. 70, says the *Roon* followed the turn to the SE, and presumably she steered to assume a screening position astern of the Fleet. In Plan 11 she is shown some distance astern of this screening position.

There was some uncertainty on board the *Roon* as to the nationality of the two destroyers; they appeared to be approaching from the direction of the main body of the High Sea Fleet, and they gave no reply to the *Roon's* recognition signals.¹ The courses crossed, but before switching on her searchlights and opening fire the *Roon* turned away to the southward to avoid possible torpedoes. Her destroyers withheld their fire to avoid spoiling her aim, and by the time that the *Roon* was able safely to turn towards the *Lynx* and *Unity*, the latter were so far off that it was useless to proceed in chase; and the *Roon* steered eastward to resume her screening position astern of the High Sea Fleet.

When day broke, the *Lynx* and *Unity* discovered themselves to be alone with no vessels in sight, and at 6.23 a.m., being short of oil, Commander Parry shaped course NNW to return to port for repairs.²

He had not held this course for many minutes, however, before a cruiser was sighted 5 miles off to the ESE. This was the *Roon* once more, steering for her screening position astern of the High Sea Fleet, which had just turned to ESE½E.³ She appeared to be steering NW, and Commander Parry correctly appreciated that she was his late antagonist. He altered course to the westward and, increasing to full speed for 20 minutes, ran out of sight.⁴

80. **Beatty goes after the "Roon."**—By 6.20 a.m. the *Hardy* had effected repairs and was able to proceed. Steering from the engine-room, she took station astern of the division, which then proceeded SSW at 25 knots. Five minutes later, Commander Loftus Jones altered course to S15°E, parallel to the pre-arranged course of the battle squadron. There was no indication of Admiral Warrender's ships, which, at the time, were 25 miles away to the southward; but at 6.50 a.m., smoke was sighted 3 miles off to the south-eastward, and 9 minutes later it was seen that it came from five destroyers steering E by S.⁵

Commander Loftus Jones at once increased to full speed and proceeded eastwards with his four boats to close, and at 7.8 a.m. he tried a few ranging shots at about 4,000 yards, which fell short.⁶ Two minutes later he sighted, behind the smoke of the enemy's destroyers, a large cruiser, correctly identified as the

¹ *Lynx*, Report of Proceedings, says she replied with four white and five green lights (as *V.155* had done), which "appeared to satisfy the enemy and he disappeared to the eastward."

² D 20.

³ E 17.

⁴ *Lynx*, Report of Proceedings.

⁵ *Shark's* Report of Proceedings, M. 05091/14, says the enemy were steering NE, but *Nordsee* III, Karte 7, shows them steering E by S.

⁶ *Nordsee* III, p. 71, says the correct range was 6,600 yards.

Roos, and altering course 4 points away, he kept her on his bow, 4 miles off. The enemy vessels made no attempt to drive off the destroyers, but proceeded on their E by S course.

Immediately on sighting the *Roos*, Commander Loftus Jones drafted a report to Admiral Beatty.¹ Owing probably to enemy jamming, it was not sent off till 0725, and it was received by the *King George V* a few minutes later. This was not by any means the first news of the destroyers received by Admiral Warrender's force, for at 0540, the *Lynx*'s signal reached the *Lion*, reporting that she was chasing hostile destroyers to the north-westward.² A series of intercepted signals showed that German cruisers had been sighted and that both the *Ambuscade* and *Hardy* were damaged; but the situation remained obscure, for no single one of the reports gave any position.³ At 0600 the *Lion* observed the flashes of gunfire to the north-eastward,⁴ but, until daylight, nothing could be done to support our destroyers, and in view of the undesirability of betraying to the enemy the presence of our heavy ships, Admiral Warrender refrained from making any signals to the destroyers or reporting the enemy to the Commander-in-Chief.⁵ It was not until an hour later (0834) that the Vice-Admiral learned, through an intercepted signal, that the anxiously awaited destroyers from Harwich were far away to the southward of him.⁶

Continuing on his way southward, Admiral Warrender reached the rendezvous in 54° 10', 3° 0' E, shortly after 7 a.m. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron began to close the *Lion* at daylight, and by 0710, Commodore Goodenough was in visual touch with the battleships.⁷ At 0817, Admiral Warrender turned to the eastward and proceeded to zigzag on a mean course of 90 deg., while the battle cruisers made for their screening position 5 miles astern of the battle squadron. This was the situation when, at 0734, Admiral Warrender heard from the *Shark* that she was in touch with the *Roos*, 14 miles N by E true, from the position of the battle squadron.⁸

¹ D 27.

² D 11. The signal was not passed to the *King George V* by the guardship *Monarch* until 0614.

³ D 12-25.

⁴ Her Log No. 19727.

⁵ V.A., 2nd B.S., to C.-in-C., H.F., 327/W.10, 19 December 1914 (H.S. 295, p. 62), c.f. A 279. On 30 December 1914, a memo. was issued to Flag Officers by the C.-in-C. (M. 051/15), in which it was stated that, under all circumstances, on sighting any enemy vessels in the vicinity of the coast of the United Kingdom, it was very necessary that the coast patrols should be warned immediately, and that the Adty. and C.-in-C. should be informed.

⁶ D 54a.

⁷ D 26.

⁸ The 0705 position given by the *Shark* (54° 22' N, 3° 20' E) was 15 miles too far S (true), as shown on the plan.

Admiral Beatty, with the light cruisers hastening to take up their screening position 5 miles north of him,¹ was just coming up on the starboard quarter of the battleships, then making a leg to the east, and Admiral Warrender signalled to ask if he had received the *Shark's* report.² The *Lion* crossed his wake without replying,³ and Sir George Warrender saw her alter course, not to starboard to follow the *Roon*, but to port for her screening position astern of the battleships. "Are you going after *Roon*?" he flashed by searchlight, and was told by Admiral Beatty, "Have heard nothing of *Roon*." Admiral Warrender at once gave him the facts and, almost simultaneously, the *New Zealand* passed on the important signal in question, which she had received more than half-an-hour previously.⁴ Altering course for the reported position, Admiral Beatty spread his light cruisers to look out to the northward for the *Roon* and swept eastward at high speed in chase, leaving the slow 3rd Cruiser Squadron to screen to the southward of the battleships.⁵ "Shall follow you and retire north at 1430," Admiral Warrender signalled to him as he swept past to port. "Do not go too far east, inform me of your movements occasionally."⁶

Commander Loftus Jones, meanwhile, had been keeping the *Roon* in sight as she steered eastward at about 20 knots to rejoin the High Sea Fleet. About 0740, a patch of mist forced him to close her, and 10 minutes later, when the mist cleared, he sighted ahead of him to the eastward three light cruisers, which gave no reply to his challenge. One of these was his original antagonist, the *Roon*, and the other two were the *Stuttgart*,⁷ screening to north-westward of the High Sea Fleet, and the *Hamburg*,⁸ which was steering to regain her position in the screen. The *Stuttgart* and *Roon* turned, and, calling up the *München* to the eastward to join them, they chased the *Shark's* division west. By 0815, the injured *Hardy* was unable any longer to maintain 30 knots, and speed was reduced to 26 knots.⁹ But by now the British destroyers were almost out of sight from the German cruisers, and at 0820, the latter abandoned the pursuit and steered for their stations once more.¹⁰

Shortly before the German cruisers abandoned the chase of the *Shark's* division of destroyers, the *Stuttgart* and the *Rostock*,

¹ D 29.

² D 33. The signal referred to, 0705, is there attributed to the *Lynx*, but the meaning is clear.

³ Apparently she did not receive the signal.

⁴ Cf. D 49.

⁵ D 38, 40-45.

⁶ D 52.

⁷ Cf. E 21.

⁸ Apparently the third cruiser was the *Hamburg*, of whose position at the time *Nordsee* III is uncertain.

⁹ Logs of *Shark* (No. S.1410) and *Hardy* (No. H.447).

¹⁰ *Nordsee* III, p. 71, and Karte 8.

which was screening to northward of the High Sea Fleet, reported submarines, and the nearest ships of the 2nd Squadron also opened fire on a supposed submarine.¹ These erroneous reports seem finally to have confirmed Admiral von Ingenohl in his decision to return to harbour.²

81. Warrender Learns of the Bombardment of Scarborough, 0855.—When the German cruisers turned and chased him, Commander Loftus Jones reported to Admiral Beatty, giving a position some 10 miles SSE of his correct one.³ The signal was not sent until 0825, and was received by Admiral Beatty 10 minutes later. Before any alteration of course had been made by the battle cruisers on his report, signals began to be received in the main W/T offices of *King George V* and *Lion*, which created a fresh situation.

At 0841, the *King George V* intercepted on "S" wave, a signal from the *Patrol*, of the 9th Destroyer Flotilla, to the *Jupiter* in the Humber, that she was heavily engaged with two enemy battle cruisers, followed by the report that she was badly injured.⁴ Four minutes later, the *Lion* heard Scarborough calling urgently to the Admiralty that the town was being shelled.⁵ By 0855, Admiral Warrender too, had the latter information from the Admiralty.⁶ The time of the bombardment, 8.20 a.m., was erroneously given in the signal as 1820, but Sir George Warrender saw in this an evident error and took the correct time to be 6.20 a.m.⁷ Signalling to the battle cruisers and light cruisers to rejoin him, he altered course to the NNW and steered for the Humber.⁸ Turning to port, Admiral Beatty abandoned the chase of the *Roon* for the more important objective, and took Commodore Goodenough away with him on a WNW course for Scarborough.⁹

Gradually the situation became clearer. At 0900, the Admiralty reported that the shelling of Scarborough was being carried out by dreadnought battleships, and altering course 4 points to port, Admiral Warrender signalled to the *Lion* that he was steering for Scarborough.¹⁰ Simultaneously, he learnt that the destroyers from Harwich were on their way to join him, for at 0921, orders were intercepted from Commodore Tyrwhitt

¹ E 23, 24.

² *Nordsee* III, pp. 72-74.

³ D 49.

⁴ D 64, 68.

⁵ D 51.

⁶ D 61.

⁷ V.A., 2nd B.S., Report of Proceedings, M. 04953/14. Report on Operations in the North Sea on December 16. (H.S. 295.)

⁸ D 65. The course, NNW, did not lead to the Humber, but signal D 71 indicates that it was Admiral Warrender's intention to make the Humber.

⁹ D 70, 74.

¹⁰ D 75, 81.

to the *Undaunted* and *Fearless* to take their flotillas, via the swept channel, to Haisborough Light, and thence to join the battle squadron.¹

Commander Loftus Jones was in visual touch now, and as he ran down from the northward to take station on the *Southampton*, he signalled to the *Lion*, "Am being chased by light cruisers."² "Engage them," Admiral Beatty ordered the Commodore by searchlight, whilst the *New Zealand*, by his orders, gave the *Shark* the positions and courses of the heavy ships.³

Scarcely had Admiral Beatty flashed to the *Southampton* the orders to disengage the destroyers from the pursuing light cruisers than the *Lion* intercepted a signal from Sheerness to the *Aurora*, originating at the Tyne, that the enemy dreadnoughts with three cruisers were now off Hartlepool.⁴ Admiral Warrender got the signal too, and assuming that the enemy were working up the coast, he altered course to starboard and steered north-west. Admiral Beatty had come to the same conclusion, namely, that the enemy were working up the coast.⁵ In view of the uncertainty as to what he would shortly encounter he could not risk being without his scouting light cruisers, and recalling the Commodore, he ordered him to take station ahead.⁶ But the signal was unnecessary, for Commodore Goodenough, from his position to the northward of the *Lion*, could see that the *Shark's* pursuers had already abandoned the chase,⁷ and he had not altered his course.

82. Admiral Hipper detaches his Light Forces.—The enemy ships reported first off Scarborough and then off Hartlepool were two different groups of Admiral Hipper's force.

Shortly after he passed the Dogger Bank, at 4 a.m., the weather conditions, which had been favourable, began to alter for the worse. The light easterly breeze backed to the north-west and rapidly increased in strength. B.29 had been detached with condenser trouble an hour and a half previously, and the rising wind and sea now made it appear doubtful whether the remaining destroyers would be able to hold on. Just then, however, the report of S.33 came in. It would be light in two hours, and to send the destroyers on a daylight run home across the North Sea in heavy weather, with an enemy force reported between them and their base, was too dangerous; and Admiral

¹ Admiral Warrender states in his report that, at 0930, he informed Commodore (T), as well as the Admiralty, of his position, but the evidence is that the signal (D 94) was made to the Admiralty only.

² D 84. This was quite incorrect, cf. D 98.

³ D 67, 85, 89.

⁴ D 95.

⁵ D 106.

⁶ D 97.

⁷ Possibly, too, he had the information in D 98 before he received the order to engage the enemy light cruisers.

Hipper decided to keep them. At 6 a.m. the *Strassburg*, screening ahead with the 9th Flotilla, reported that she could not face the heavy sea off the coast, and that she had already turned back with the destroyers.¹ She was apparently off Middlesbrough, but the weather was misty, and she had sighted neither the coast nor lights.

Admiral Hipper decided to take the risk of carrying out the bombardment without light forces to screen him, and, keeping the *Kolberg* with her mines, he signalled to the *Stralsund* to take the *Strassburg*, *Graudenz*, and the destroyers to the 6 a.m. rendezvous of the High Sea Fleet.² The strict W/T silence, which veiled the movements of both British and German forces during the night, had prevented Admiral Hipper from learning that the High Sea Fleet had turned back an hour ago and was now steering full speed for home; nor could he, for his part, inform the Commander-in-Chief of the detaching of his light forces for their 100 mile unsupported run.

The signal to the *Stralsund* had barely gone out when the bright flames of the Middlesbrough blast furnaces showed Admiral Hipper that he had arrived at his objective (0640). In accordance with the arrangements, the *Von der Tann*, *Derfflinger*, and *Kolberg* turned to port and steered for Scarborough, while Admiral Hipper took the *Seydlitz*, *Moltke* and *Blücher* north towards Hartlepool.

83. The Patrol Flotillas encounter the Raiders.—The mist severely hampered navigation, although several brightly lit up localities enabled the ships to get their bearings.³ Keeping as close to the coast as possible in order to avoid mines, Admiral Hipper sighted Hartlepool at 7.14 a.m., and at 7.45 a.m. the Port War Signal Station challenged him,⁴ followed a few minutes later by the lighthouse signal station at the harbour entrance. The morning was misty, and it was not yet fully light. Admiral Hipper's ships were thought to be flying the Union Jack and the White Ensign, and their nationality was at first in doubt ashore.⁵

The first recognition of the battle cruisers as an enemy force seems to have been made by the destroyers patrolling off Hartlepool.⁶ About 0755, these destroyers, then about 6 miles north-east of Hartlepool, sighted ships in shore of them, approaching from the east at high speed, and closed to examine them. The *Seydlitz* and *Moltke* opened fire at once on the two leading boats, at ranges between 8,000 and 5,000 yards, the *Moltke* using her

¹ E 14.

² E 16.

³ An officer from *U.27*, who had gained considerable knowledge of the coast during submarine cruises, was on board the *Seydlitz*.

⁴ G.H.Q.G.B. (I) Report on Coast Bombardments, November 1914–December 1918, says the P.W.S.S. sighted them at 8 a.m.

⁵ G.H.Q.G.B. (I).

⁶ *Doon* (S.O.), *Waveney*, *Test*, *Moy*. They left harbour at 0600 on 16th.

11-in. guns with full charges in addition to her 6-in. secondary armament, while the *Blücher* joined in against the third and fourth destroyers.

The *Waveney*, *Test* and *Moy* turned away to port and escaped without casualties and with little injury.¹ Lieutenant-Commander H. M. Fraser, in the *Doon*, had drawn somewhat ahead of the remainder of his division, and steering towards the enemy he tried to fire a torpedo. The range, 5,000 yards, was too great, however, and turning away under a hail of projectiles, he escaped with some damage from splinters and with 11 casualties.²

84. The Bombardment of Hartlepool.—In the heavy sea that was running the destroyers would inevitably have been sunk had the battle cruisers chased them.³ Admiral Hipper's operation orders stated that the sinking of ships was to take precedence of coast bombardment; but, assuming that on his way home he would certainly meet forces more valuable than destroyers, he turned at once to the bombardment of Hartlepool.⁴ The engagement with the destroyers had lasted only some 7 minutes, and about 0803, the battle cruisers took up their pre-arranged positions some 2 miles from the shore and opened fire; the *Seydlitz* and *Moltke* running north past the town until 0823, and then turning 16 points and running back on the opposite course, while the *Blücher* described a circle in Tees Bay.

The targets engaged were as follows: *Seydlitz*—Cemetery Battery⁵ and Wire Works; *Moltke*—Lighthouse and Heugh Batteries, Town Moor Coastguard Station; *Blücher*—Engineering Works north of the harbour, Middleton Dock, Central Docks establishments, and Gas Works.⁶ Indirect fire was used at times. The *Seydlitz* and *Moltke* fired their secondary and light guns only (5.9-in. and 22-pdr.), keeping their heavy guns loaded with reduced charges for use against submarines.

The Lighthouse Battery (one 6-in. gun) and Heugh Battery (two 6-in. guns) at once replied, the opening range being 4,180 yards.⁷ The *Blücher* was hit four times,⁸ one shell, bursting

¹ The *Waveney* was not hit at all.

² *Nordsee* III, p. 78, says: "One of the destroyers (*Doon*), with magnificent indifference to the heavy fire, turned to fight a running action, finally disappearing, apparently badly damaged, in the midst of heavy explosions." The *Seydlitz* fired about 100-6-in., *Moltke* 38-11-in., and 54-6-in., in the destroyer engagement; the *Blücher's* expenditure is not given. The German account says three torpedoes were seen and avoided, but none of the British destroyers fired a torpedo, the range being too great. The destroyers' reports are in H.S. 295.

³ M. 04794/14. Report of attack on vessels of 9th Patrol Flotilla by a squadron of the enemy on 16 December 1914.

⁴ *Nordsee* III, p. 79.


⁵ No guns were mounted in this battery.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Report by O.C., Tees and Hartlepool Defences (C.I.D.H.S. 249/1). The times given in this report have been accepted in preference to those in *Nordsee* III.

⁸ Apparently by the Lighthouse gun.

just below the forebridge, placed two of her 22-pdr. guns out of action, nine of their crew being killed and two badly wounded; another destroyed the sighting hood and rangefinder of her 8-in. turrets; whilst a third damaged some searchlights and the W/T aerial. All the shells fired at the *Seydlitz* and *Moltke* at first fell 100 to 200 yards short, but when the two battle cruisers turned on an opposite course, 20 minutes after opening fire, Heugh Battery obtained three hits in rapid succession on the *Seydlitz*, holing her forward on the water line, but without doing other serious damage. The *Moltke* was hit once, and, in order to render spotting easier, she began to use her heavy guns. Owing to the mist and the extreme range, South Gare Battery, at the mouth of the Tees, was unable to come into action.



The first warning of attack was given to the ships in harbour by the gunfire of the destroyer action. Inside the harbour were the light cruisers *Patrol* and *Forward*, of the 9th Flotilla, and submarine *C.9*, of the 6th Submarine Flotilla. The coast patrols had been warned to be specially alert on the morning of the 16th, and weather permitting, all vessels were to be out of harbour

before daylight.¹ In the early hours of the morning, however, there was a heavy swell on Hartlepool bar, and as the tide was falling rapidly,² Captain A. C. Bruce, of the *Patrol*, who was Senior Officer, had decided about 6 a.m., not to send the ships out.³ But directly the sound of firing was heard the three vessels slipped their hawsers and proceeded. As the *Patrol* cleared the entrance she came under a heavy fire, was struck three times, grounded on the bar, and with difficulty reached the Tees.⁴ C.9 had to dive to avoid the enemy's fire, grounded, and could not get clear in time to attack; and by the time the *Forward* got to sea the enemy had disappeared. At 8.32 a.m., the bombardment ceased, and Admiral Hipper withdrew to rendezvous, with Admiral Tapken's three ships, some 50 miles east of Whitby.

Eighty-six civilians were killed and 424 wounded, and a great deal of damage was done ashore. Little military damage was done. The guns of the shore batteries were uninjured, though their crews had a few casualties, as had also the New Army troops manning the coastal trenches.⁵ Two fishing vessels were sunk by the gunfire, without loss of life.⁶

85. The Bombardment of Scarborough and Whitby.—The southern group, under Admiral Tapken, experienced some difficulty in locating Scarborough owing to the extinction of all lights, though they were helped by a brightly lighted railway train running along the coast parallel to their course. At 8.6 a.m., the force reached a point about 3,000 yards east of Scarborough, and, running southward past the town, opened fire at under 1,000 yards range on the Castle Hill and sea front.⁷ The *Von der Tann* took as the targets of her medium guns the waterworks, using indirect firing, whilst with her light guns she fired at the railway station. The *Derfflinger* bombarded the coastguard station, close to the Grand Hotel, and the Signal Station. The enemy met with no opposition; Scarborough was an undefended

¹ A 290.

² High water, Hartlepool, December 16, 0215; low water, 0840.

³ The weather on the previous evening had been so bad that the patrolling destroyers (*Doon's* division) were sent into harbour and did not go out until 6 a.m. on the 16th, and Admiral Ballard had ordered Captain Bruce to keep the cruisers in harbour, with steam up, and not to go out unless required or specially ordered. (M. 042/15, "Report in connection with submarine stationed at Hartlepool not being sent on patrol on 16 December 1914.")

⁴ This fire was not specially directed at the *Patrol*. She was sighted by the spotting officers of the *Seydlitz* and *Moltke*, but owing to the smoke and mist, neither the conning tower nor the guns could see her, and the fire control at that date was not adapted for opening fire on her in such circumstances. (*Nordsee* III, p. 81.)

⁵ The total military casualties were 9 killed and 12 wounded.

⁶ *Wayside Flower* and *Constance*.

⁷ Report of O.C., Scarborough, C.R.N.C. 40951 (G).

town and no guns were mounted.¹ At 0816, the *Von der Tann* and *Derfflinger* turned 16 points and ran past the town on the opposite course, finally ceasing fire at 0835, having expended 333 5·9-in. and 443 22-pdr. high explosive shell.² The military casualties ashore were one killed and one wounded. Eighteen civilians were killed and 99 wounded. A good deal of damage to property was caused all over the town, 200 buildings being struck by shells, in addition to a number slightly damaged.

Proceeding at 23 knots, the *Von der Tann* and *Derfflinger* were off Whitby shortly after 0900, and at 0905 they began the bombardment of the town and the War Signal Station, the latter of which they wrecked, at a range of about 1 mile.³ The smelting works could not be distinguished. At 0913 Admiral Tapken ceased fire and turned east to join Admiral Hipper. His two ships had fired 188 rounds at Whitby, but the total casualties were only 5. Considerable damage was done to private houses.

The *Kolberg*, meanwhile, had run on past Scarborough when Admiral Tapken turned north for Whitby, and began to lay her mines at 0814 between Scarborough and Filey, about a mile off shore. Owing to the heavy sea that was running she did not lay them exactly on the pre-arranged line, but slightly to the westward,⁴ the greater part of the field running NE and SW across the swept channel, up to some 7 miles from the shore. At 0841, she completed the operation and steered north to rejoin Admiral Hipper.⁵ The junction of the three groups took place at 9.30 a.m., and Admiral Hipper signalled to the Commander-in-Chief that the operation was completed and that he was steering for home at 23 knots.⁶

86. Admiralty Intelligence and Dispositions.—The first news of the enemy was received at the Admiralty at 0748 on the 16th, when a portion of the *Shark's* signal was intercepted, reporting the *Roon* in sight.⁷ The position was missed, and the situation remained vague. At 0818, a signal was intercepted from the *Waveney* reporting "Enemy in sight," and at 0828, the *Test* signalled that she was in action with two dreadnoughts.⁸ Simultaneously, Scarborough called the Admiralty and reported

¹ *Nordsee* III, Karte 1, shows the following guns at Scarborough:—4-6-in. Q.F., 5-6-in. B.L., 2 Q.F. "anti-boom breaker" guns. There is a note on the plan, apparently referring to these batteries, "Ub-Batt." (? gun-drill batteries). *Nordsee* III makes no mention of them as targets of the *Von der Tann* and *Derfflinger*.

² *Nordsee* III, p. 84.

³ Report of O.C., Whitby, C.R.N.C. 40951 (G.)

⁴ Position of first mine, 54° 15.2' N, 0° 18.2' W. True direction, 1220 (2,600 yards), 32° (3,900 yards), 21° (1,100 yards), 55° (5,400 yards). Number of mines laid, 100. Depth, 2 metres at L.W.O.S.

⁵ E 29.

⁶ E 30.

⁷ D 27.

⁸ D 46, 50, 56.

that it was being shelled.¹ Telegraphic communication with the town broke down immediately afterwards. Ten minutes later, Hartlepool also called the Admiralty to report three cruisers firing off the place, and Captain Bruce, of the *Patrol*, was heard ordering the *Test* to attack the enemy with torpedo.² It was evident that the expected German attack on the coast had commenced.

Information was at once sent to Admiral Warrender that Scarborough was being shelled, and Commodore Tyrwhitt was ordered to get into touch with the enemy.³ Admiral Bradford in the Forth was warned of the raids, and since Admiral Warrender's signal that the detached force was steering for Scarborough⁴ had not yet come in, the 3rd Battle Squadron was directed towards the Humber, for which the Admiralty had heard by intercepted signal that the *King George V* was steering.⁵ These orders to the 3rd Battle Squadron were superseded, however, by a signal from the Commander-in-Chief ordering Admiral Bradford to proceed to 55° 50' N, 1° 10' W (30 miles east of Berwick) with all available cruisers and destroyers from the Firth of Forth, in order to intercept the enemy if they came north.⁶ With the same object the Admiralty also ordered the Grand Fleet to sea; the fleet had been at one hour's notice for steam since 4 a.m., and Admiral Jellicoe reported that he would be leaving harbour between noon and 1 p.m.⁷

87. Admiral Warrender steers for the Gap between the Mine-fields.—Admiral Warrender's force, meanwhile steering a westerly course, was rapidly approaching the English coast, the battle-ships with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron at 18 knots, and the battle cruisers, with the light cruisers spread to the northward, at 24 knots. Admiral Beatty kept his battle cruisers concentrated, this being the invariable rule in any but the clearest weather, though the Admiralty considered that in the special circumstances the front covered was too narrow and that the battle cruisers should have been spread to a small extent.⁸ On account of the slow speed of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, Sir George Warrender kept Admiral Pakenham's cruisers with the 2nd Battle Squadron.

Ahead of the British forces, and distant little more than two hours' steaming, there stretched from north to south along the entire English coast a dangerous area which, by standing orders, was not to be crossed.

¹ D 51.

² D 62, 63.

³ D 61, 73.

⁴ D 94.

⁵ D 69, 71, 104.

⁶ D 88, 92, 101.

⁷ D 97, 130.

⁸ M. 0473/15. Operations in the North Sea on 16 December 1914. (Reply of C.-in-C. to A.L., M. 04953/14), and Adty. reply, M. 0473/15 (M Letter Book 280, p. 910).

In December 1914 the method of promulgating information with regard to German minelaying had not been elaborated, and no periodical mine charts were issued, the only special charts in existence being those showing the swept War Channel up the east coast of England. Admiral Beatty had not been able to obtain these before leaving Cromarty, and on meeting Sir George Warrender had asked him for information how to approach the English coast south of the 55th parallel.¹ The reports of mines sighted had led Admiral Jellicoe to the conclusion that the entire East Coast was dangerous, and on November 1 he had issued an order that no ships of the Grand Fleet were to navigate in an area bounded on the east by a line drawn approximately 149° from 56° N, 0° E, without first obtaining the latest information from Naval centres.²

Sir George Warrender now warned Admiral Beatty that in order to locate the enemy Commodore Goodenough would have to take his light cruisers across the area prohibited by the Commander-in-Chief, though he took the precaution of asking the Admiralty for approval of this procedure.³ The Admiralty by now had heard that the raiders had retired, and rightly appreciated that they were returning to Heligoland. There was no need for Admiral Warrender to take his ships across the minefields, and they so informed him.⁴

Meanwhile, the Commander-in-Chief had come to the conclusion that the enemy would emerge via the gap between their own minefields off the Tyne and Humber, and he pointed this out to Admiral Warrender,⁵ who thereupon altered course for the gap (1025), and spread the 3rd Cruiser Squadron on a line SSW from him (1048), intending to steam up and down outside the area prohibited by the Commander-in-Chief.⁶ He signalled to Admiral Beatty, who was making for the north-west corner of the Dogger Bank, to steer for the gap, keeping south of the shoal, a bad bit of ground with a least depth of 7 fathoms and

¹ D 5, 6.

² H.F. 004, of 1 August 1914, No. 292, 1.11.14.

³ D 92, 99. In his signals and in his despatch, Admiral Warrender used the word minefields, and the Admiralty apparently interpreted this to mean the areas off the Tyne and Humber declared dangerous by them on August 28. Admiral Warrender, however, apparently referred to the area prohibited by the Commander-in-Chief, for the course to Scarborough from the position he was in, when he asked permission to cross the "minefield," passes clear of the areas declared dangerous by the Admiralty.

⁴ D 107, 115, 122.

⁵ D 114. The signal speaks of a gap extending only as far west as 20' E. The existence of such a gap does not seem ever to have been brought to notice previously, though from Admiral Jellicoe's reference to it in his despatch (M. 04953/14), it might be thought to have been a matter of common knowledge. The despatch says: "I anticipated the enemy would come out through the gap which existed in the minefield between latitudes 54° 40' N and 54° 20' N, as far west as longitude 0° 20' E."

⁶ Cf. D 140, 141.

with several wrecks scattered over it. Admiral Beatty, however, had altered course at 1000 to clear the south-west patch and he was now committed to the route to the northward. He therefore held on until 1100, intending to round the shoal and block the gap with his light cruisers to the northward; he suggested to Admiral Warrender that Admiral Pakenham should block the exit to the southward, whilst Admiral Bradford kept watch by the Farne Islands.¹ To this suggestion Admiral Warrender made no reply, however, for it had crossed instructions sent by him almost simultaneously, to obey the Admiralty orders and keep outside the minefields.²

Admiral Warrender had heard at 10 o'clock that the Harwich flotillas were off the Would Light Vessel steering N26°W, at 25 knots, and had ordered them to join him on the southern edge of the gap at full speed.³ The rendezvous, 54° 20' N, 1° 30' E, was 90 miles from Commodore Tyrwhitt's 9.45 a.m. position, and had it been possible to maintain his speed of 25 knots, the Harwich force would have joined the 2nd Battle Squadron about 1345. The weather, however, during the forenoon had been rapidly growing worse, the destroyers had to be sent into Yarmouth, and the speed of the light cruisers was reduced to 16 knots. At 1320, Commodore Tyrwhitt reported that he could not reach the rendezvous until 3 p.m., and as he would then be too late to be of use, Admiral Warrender ordered him back to his base.⁴

88. Encounter with Hipper's Light Forces, 11.25 a.m.—At this date the various vessels composing a force, when making reports, etc., did not use any system of reference positions based on the flagship's reckoning, as was usual in the later stages of the war. The result was that, soon after 10.30 a.m., when Admiral Beatty drew out of sight of the 2nd Battle Squadron, there was considerable uncertainty as to their relative positions, since the reckonings of the *King George V* and *Lion* showed a difference of at least 5 miles.⁵

During the afternoon the weather on the Dogger Bank had been unusually fine, calm and clear; but about 11.30 a.m. a breeze sprang up, accompanied by drizzling rain, and by noon it was blowing hard from the westward, with driving rain squalls which sometimes reduced the visibility to less than a mile. At 1109 Sir David Beatty reduced the speed of his squadron to 18 knots, doubtless in order to allow the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron to

¹ D 106, 123, 125, 126.

² D 127.

³ D 112, 121.

⁴ D 169, 178, 185.

⁵ At 1110, the *Lion* reported to *King George V* her position, course, and speed (B 129), giving her position an hour's steaming farther west than she actually was. The signal does not seem to have been questioned at the time, but, in his Memo. to Flag Officers, 30 December 1914 (M, 051/15), Admiral Jellicoe pointed out that it was very undesirable when in proximity to the enemy, that anticipated positions should be given in advance.

reach its screening position 5 miles ahead of him.¹ The distance apart of the ships of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron had already been reduced to 4 miles at 1045 on account of the lessening visibility.² Shortly after 1100, the *Nottingham* lost touch with the *Birmingham* and altered course to port to close. She sighted the *Birmingham* suddenly at 1115, and reported her as an enemy.³ The mistake was quickly discovered and corrected (1128), but almost at that very moment (1125) the *Southampton*, port wing ship of the screen, 5 miles east of the *Lion*, steaming at 24 knots into a heavy head sea, sighted an enemy light cruiser with several destroyers steering towards her, approximately 3 miles distant ahead.

The enemy vessels were the *Stralsund* and 2nd Half-Flotilla, leading the *Strassburg* and 9th Flotilla eastwards, whilst the *Graudenzen*, with the 1st Half-Flotilla, was coming up some 7 or 8 miles on the *Stralsund*'s starboard quarter.

The German light forces had experienced a very trying time since Admiral Hipper detached them at 6.40 a.m. The light cruisers and destroyers rolled so heavily that some of the latter lost their masts and the ready ammunition on the forecastles of the light cruisers broke loose from its lashings. There was 2 ft. of water on the main decks, and the torpedo tubes had to be unloaded and could not be made ready for action again. The conditions, however, improved as the vessels drew further to the eastward. From the W/T signalling that was heard it appeared that enemy forces were approaching, and Captain Harder, of the *Stralsund*, the Senior Officer of the force, decided that the three groups should proceed independently at their utmost speed. By 9 a.m., however, they were all in visual communication with one another, though the *Graudenzen* soon dropped astern again as her destroyers frequently broached to in the heavy seas, and finally had to turn into the wind and connect up their bow rudders to improve their steering.

The *Southampton* seems to have sighted the *Stralsund* first. The heavy spray coming over the *Southampton*'s forecastle rendered it impossible to fire to windward, and Commodore Goodenough turned to starboard to engage, reporting the enemy to Admiral Beatty and calling to the light cruisers to close.⁴ The *Stralsund*, directly she sighted the *Southampton*, put her helm hard aport, and both ships opened fire. As the *Stralsund* turned Commodore Goodenough followed her round. The *Birmingham* was now joining up from her lookout station, and Captain Harder, on sighting a second light cruiser, ordered the destroyers to cover his escape with a smoke screen. He soon recognised our ships

¹ D 134, 135.

² *Southampton* (S), and M. 04718/15: "Operations of 16 December 1914."

³ D 135a, 137, 138.

⁴ D 139, 139a, and *Southampton*'s Report.

as "Town" class; but for some reason he reported them as armoured cruisers, repeating the error at 1138.¹ The *Strassburg* and *Graudenz* had conformed to the *Stralsund*'s turn to starboard and were running to the southward, steering at first on a parallel course, on the disengaged side of the *Stralsund*. They were as yet too far off to be sighted by Commodore Goodenough. The German vessels had a slight advantage in speed over the *Southampton*, and they made use of it to work round on to a south-easterly course, to which Commodore Goodenough conformed.² The *Strassburg* and *Graudenz* gradually closed the *Stralsund*, till at 1145, they were sighted by the *Southampton*, but Commodore Goodenough did not report them.³ The range by now had opened to some 10,000 yards; the weather conditions rendered shooting from light cruisers difficult, and the fire on both sides was ineffective. The destroyers of the 2nd Half-Flotilla had followed the *Stralsund* round to starboard, but though they sighted the *Southampton* when little more than 2,500 yards off, and opened fire on her with their guns, they had turned too far away to fire their torpedoes.⁴

The *Nottingham* and *Falmouth* had intercepted Commodore Goodenough's report to Admiral Beatty that he was engaging a cruiser and some destroyers, and the *Falmouth*, further, had received the Commodore's order to close.⁵ As the two ships ran down to the south-westward to join the *Southampton*, the *Nottingham* came in sight of the *Lion*. Commodore Goodenough had reported one enemy light cruiser only,⁶ and as the *Birmingham* was supporting him, there seemed to Admiral Beatty to be no need for the other light cruisers to quit their screening positions where they were urgently needed to look out for the enemy's heavier ships, of which the vessels sighted were believed to be part of a screen. He accordingly ordered the *Nottingham* to be re-called to her lookout station ahead of him.⁷

¹ *Nordsee* III, p. 89. These two signals are not given in the original appendix.

² D 145.

³ *Southampton*'s signal log, No. 12732, gives time of sighting as 1145. The exact time is uncertain, as the times in the signal log are stated by Commodore Goodenough, in his report, to be unreliable, and his report does not give the time. Admiral Jellicoe, in his despatch, written December 23 (M. 04953/14), says the Commodore sighted them at 1140, but did not report them; but his Memo., H.F. 0022, 23 December 1914, to the Commodore, 1st L.C.S., accepts the time of sighting 1145, given in *Southampton* (S).

⁴ *Nordsee* III, p. 90.

⁵ D 139, 139a, 143. Commodore Goodenough, in his report, says, a signal to the L.C.S. to turn 16 points to follow the enemy was also made, but not logged. It has not been traced in any ship's log.

⁶ D 139, 143.

⁷ D 144, 154. But Admiral Beatty's report says, the signal was made to the *Nottingham* and *Falmouth*.

Unfortunately, the signal, as made by searchlight, was addressed, not to the *Nottingham* alone, but to the light cruisers.¹ It was seen by the *Birmingham* 2 miles astern of the *Southampton*, and was passed to the Commodore by both her and the *Nottingham*; and Commodore Goodenough, knowing that the enemy were heading straight for the 2nd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, broke off the engagement and turned 16 points to resume his screening position (1155).² As he hurried off he sighted and reported what he took to be another enemy cruiser to the southward.³ This was the *Stralsund*, which had run some 2,000 yards ahead of the *Strassburg* and *Graudenzen*, and had apparently been lost sight of by Commodore Goodenough. Seeing the *Southampton* turn, Captain Harder thought she intended to continue the engagement on opposite courses, and he turned 16 points himself to support the *Strassburg* and *Graudenzen*.

Commodore Goodenough's signal reporting another cruiser did not get through till 1210; by this time the *Southampton* was coming in sight of the *Lion*, which had made an alteration of course to the southward for 10 minutes to avoid some trawlers.⁴ "What have you done with the enemy light cruisers?" asked Admiral Beatty, seeing the *Southampton* steering towards him; and "Engage the enemy," he ordered. "There is no enemy in sight now," replied the Commodore. "They disappeared south when I received your signal to resume station."⁵

While the mistake was still being cleared up by an interchange of signals another report of the enemy came in. The German light cruisers, running south-eastward, encountered Admiral Warrender's force, as Commodore Goodenough had anticipated. The visibility was so bad that the Vice-Admiral had just ordered the 3rd Cruiser Squadron to close and follow

¹ Apparently the identity of the *Nottingham* was uncertain.

² The following passages occur in the Memo. to Flag Officers, issued by the C-in-C. on 30 December 1914 (M. 051/15): "Should the officer commanding a squadron, or the captain of a single vessel, receive an order from a senior officer which, it is evident, may have been given in ignorance of the conditions of the moment, and which, if obeyed, would cause touch with the enemy to be lost, such officers must exercise great discretion as to representing the real facts before obeying the order. It must be realised that a signal made under such conditions is in the nature of an instruction. . . . The senior officer on the spot, when actual contact with the enemy has been gained, must assume general control of the operation of all naval forces in the vicinity, in order to ensure co-operation between the various units."

³ D 148. The signal says "cruisers," but Commodore Goodenough's Report says, "a cruiser apparently of the *Prinz Adalbert* class." *Nordsee* III, says she was the *Graudenzen*, but from examination of the evidence, it seems more likely that she was the *Stralsund*, and that Commodore Goodenough had temporarily lost sight of her. German light cruisers had already twice previously in action been mistaken for armoured cruisers, on August 18 and 22.

⁴ Cf. D. 146, 155, 163.

⁵ D 152, 154.

him (1209).¹ Two minutes later, in the lift of a rain squall, he sighted, away to the northward, the smoke of a number of vessels and soon made out some cruisers and destroyers about 5 miles off, steering east at high speed. Admiral Warrender turned up towards them and increased to full speed, ordering Admiral Pakenham to get ahead and attack the enemy's destroyers.² This, however, the ships of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron had not the speed to effect, and by 1240 the enemy had disappeared, steering east in another rain squall.³

On sighting the enemy light cruisers, Admiral Warrender reported them to Sir David Beatty. He gave no bearing or course of the enemy, though this could approximately be inferred from his own signalled course. Admiral Beatty received these signals at 1225, as he was on the point of altering course to port for the centre of the gap; there was no indication what the enemy cruisers were, and in order to ensure being to the eastward of the enemy's battle cruisers he turned 16 points (1230). Had he held on he would have sighted Admiral Hipper ahead of him in half-an-hour's time. Ten minutes later he heard from Admiral Warrender that no battle cruisers had yet been sighted, followed at 1257 by the information that the 2nd Battle Squadron had resumed their original station.⁴

Admiral Beatty's appreciation of the situation at this juncture is best told in his own words to Admiral Warrender⁵ :—

"The various reports we had received of enemy battle cruisers off Hartlepool at 9 a.m., made it practically certain that they must still be west of us. The enemy light cruiser sighted by you, which I assumed to be the same as that engaged by *Southampton*, made it probable that our battleships would be reported south of the Dogger Bank, and that the enemy battle cruisers would then attempt to break away north of it. In any case, with visibility varying as it was from only 1 to 5 miles between 11.30 and 1.30, and with this new information at his disposal, the probability of catching him became remote. Therefore, at 1.15 p.m., I turned to the north with L.C.S. still spread to the westward and reported to you accordingly (my 1315").

¹ D. 151.

² D 157, 160, 163a. At the moment of sighting the 2nd B.S., the *Stralsund*, which was somewhat ahead of the *Strassburg* and *Graudenz*, was in the act of turning 16 points to resume the engagement with the *Southampton*. She stated (*Nordsee* III, p. 92), that she continued her turn through 32 points, and flashed to the 2nd B.S. the recognition signal KF, which had been made to her three times already by the British light cruisers. To this she ascribes her escape. It is clear, however, from Admiral Warrender's signals and his despatch, that the enemy were immediately recognised as such.

³ The German destroyers did not attack, because they considered that only a massed attack could succeed in the circumstances, and that any attempt on the part of the various groups to concentrate would have betrayed the fact that they were hostile and caused them to be sunk. Further, there had been no opportunity since daybreak to unload their torpedoes and adjust them for day firing range. This experience hastened the adoption of a device by which the range could be adjusted without unloading the torpedo. (*Nordsee* III, p. 93.)

⁴ D 156, 157, 166, 171.

⁵ V.-A., *Lion*, Report (M. 04953/14).

The situation was by no means clear to Admiral Hipper, and as he approached the scene of the engagement, he ordered the *Stralsund* and *Graudenz* to report definitely the composition of the enemy's forces. The *Stralsund* reported correctly what she had seen, namely, two light cruisers (the *Southampton* and *Birmingham*), and six ships, which she had been able, despite the mist, to recognise as the 2nd Battle Squadron. Captain Pullen, of the *Graudenz*, however, taking it for granted without justification that Admiral Hipper knew him to be following immediately astern of the *Stralsund*,¹ cast his signal in such a form as to confirm Admiral Hipper's apprehensions that he was confronted with two separate battle squadrons.²

Admiral Hipper's suspense was short-lived. Simultaneously with the *Stralsund*'s report of the composition of the enemy, the wireless office of the *Seydlitz* heard her giving the information, "Enemy is out of sight." Putting his helm hard over to starboard, Admiral Hipper turned 8 points to secure his own safety. He was just 12 miles from Admiral Beatty at the time. As he hurried northwards he asked the light cruisers as a final precaution: "Are you in danger?" The reply was a laconic "No," and holding on to the northward until well clear, Admiral Hipper gradually wore round to an easterly course for the run home.³

He was sighted by the trawler *Octavia*, at 1430, in 55° N, 1° 54' E, and by the *Imperial Queen* an hour later, but did not stop to sink them. One trawler was, however, sunk by the light cruisers. This was the *Manx Queen*, sunk by V.28 about 1330, after her crew had been taken off.⁴

89. Hipper's Escape.—At 11.30 a.m., when the *Stralsund* was encountered, Admiral Hipper, with the battle cruisers, was 50 miles to the westward of his light forces and about the same distance east of Whitby. He had just learnt that the High Sea Fleet was 100 miles to the eastward of him, steering at full speed for their base,⁵ intelligence which surprised him, for he had taken it for granted that, knowing the light forces had been detached,⁶ Admiral von Ingenohl would have waited to bring them safely in.⁷ It was too late, however, to recall the light cruisers, and

¹ Cf. E 33.

² E 43, 44.

³ E 46.

⁴ The Prize Court Proceedings (titled *Misc. Offices*, 31 December 1914), state that the *Manx Queen* was sunk by U.28 in 54° 12' N, 3.2 E. No time is given. It is thought that U.28 is a misprint for V.28, leader of the 9th Flotilla, attached to the *Strassburg*; the light cruisers crossed the longitude of 3° E in 54.35 N about 1330. The Return of Merchant Shipping (Losses), Adty., August 1919, gives "torpedo boat" as cause of loss. *Nordsee* III makes no mention of this incident.

⁵ E 31.

⁶ E 25.

⁷ *Nordsee* III, p. 100.

Transfer
to force
120 to
follow
around
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2.5.19

Admiral Hipper could only hope that the misty weather would enable them to evade the British forces.

His worst fears were realised when, at 1139, the *Stralsund* called him, giving her position 50 miles to the eastward and reporting that she was being chased in a south-westerly direction. Sending his crews to action stations, Admiral Hipper steered at 23 knots to support. He could, however, form no picture of the situation, on account of the many mistakes made by the light cruisers in the composition, coding, and transmission of their signals. Thus one of the first signals received reported the British main body chasing the *Stralsund* to SW by S,¹ and 12 minutes later the two hostile light cruisers were reported 5 miles south of the position of the main body, which latter was now said to be steering SE, 5 miles to the eastward of the light cruisers. In contradiction, the *Graudenz* gave the enemy's course as west, and this was confirmed a minute later by the *Stralsund*.² The confusion reached its climax 5 minutes later (1213), when the *Stralsund* sighted Admiral Warrender and signalled five enemy battleships 25 miles to the southward of the main body already reported.³ To Admiral Hipper it now appeared that he was confronted with two separate enemy squadrons. He had already altered course, first to SE and then SE by E, and he now (1217) turned to E by S, and signalled his course to the light cruisers. Though he had every expectation of being outnumbered, he held on at high speed in support.

90. **The Admiralty receive Intelligence of the Enemy.**—At 1215, Admiral Hipper had reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet his position 54° 38' N, 1° 7' E, steering E by S at 23 knots.⁴ The signal was intercepted and decyphered by the Admiralty, and was sent out to all ships at 1325.⁵ Admiral Beatty received it at 1343, half-an-hour after he had turned north with his light cruisers spread to the westward, having correctly appreciated that the German battle cruisers would attempt to escape our battleships by steering to the northward. The Admiralty signal indicated that the enemy were apparently about to pass right over the Dogger Bank patch. To Admiral Beatty this seemed improbable, and the only chance left of bringing them to action was to proceed eastward at full speed, and

¹ E 34.

² E 35-37.

³ E 39. Although the *Stralsund* had reported the "enemy's main body" to the eastward of her at 1139, she had not sighted the 1st B.C.S.; but her signal gave a correct statement of the situation. It is not clear from *Nordsee III* whether the *Stralsund's* signal was based on the belief that heavy forces were behind our light cruisers, or whether it was a mistake in drafting or coding. Before recognising the *Southampton* as a light cruiser the *Stralsund* successively took her for a trawler and a battleship.

⁴ E 40.

⁵ D 187.

intercept them eastward of the Dogger Bank. Accordingly, at 1385, he altered course to the eastward and increased speed to 22 knots.

The course which the enemy were reported to be steering, had they continued on it, would have brought them in sight of Admiral Warrender, who had turned north at 1324, on reaching the southern edge of the gap in the dangerous area. As there was no sign of the enemy, Sir George Warrender came to the conclusion that they had passed him in the mist at 1215,¹ and he continued his way north. Half-an-hour later (1410) his smoke² was sighted by the *Kolberg*, which had dropped far astern of the German battle cruisers. The high speed steaming in the heavy head seas had damaged her severely,³ her compass and rangefinder platforms were destroyed, some of her gunports stove in and the guns crews injured, and in case of attack she could not have manned her guns. Her speed was reduced to 12 knots, and it was not until Admiral Hipper turned east that she was able to increase speed and catch up.

At 1223, while reporting the 2nd Battle Squadron in sight, the *Stralsund* had called to Admiral Hipper for the position of the High Sea Fleet.⁴ The *Friedrich der Grosse* answered the call herself; the signal was duly intercepted by the Admiralty, and the intelligence it contained was sent out to Admiral Warrender's forces, with a warning not to go too far east.⁵

About 1300 further intelligence of Admiral Hipper came into the Admiralty, giving his position, course, and speed at 1245, when he turned north on hearing from the *Stralsund* that his light forces were safe.⁶ The information was not sent out from the Admiralty until nearly two hours later (1450), and it was by now impossible for Admiral Beatty to meet the German battle cruisers before dark. At 1545, Sir George Warrender ordered the battle cruiser squadron to relinquish the chase and rejoin him in the morning. Reducing to 18 knots, Admiral Beatty turned north, and both portions of the British forces steered on that course during the night.

The Grand Fleet had begun to leave Scapa at 1215, and when clear of the Pentlands, set a course at 16 knots for a rendezvous in 57° N, 2° 30' E, at 9 a.m. on the 17th. At 1430 the Commander-in-Chief ordered Admiral Bradford to steer to intercept Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers if they should come north,⁷ but eventually, the 3rd Battle Squadron, with Admiral Warrender's

¹ D 193.

² Or possibly that of the 3rd C.S. stationed N15W of the 2nd B.S. *Nordsee* III, p. 103, speaks of 4 columns of smoke.

³ She had to spend some time in dock.

⁴ E 41.

⁵ D 184.

⁶ D 198; E 47, 49.

⁷ D 196.

force and Commodore Tyrwhitt's four light cruisers, joined the Commander-in-Chief at the rendezvous between 8 and 9 a.m. on the 17th.

The destroyers from Harwich went in to Yarmouth in the early afternoon of the 17th, after being detached on account of the weather, and at 1520 the Admiralty telegraphed to Admiral Warrender that he might direct Commodore Tyrwhitt to take them to Heligoland to attack the German ships on their return. Admiral Jellicoe had learnt at 1418, that the High Sea Fleet was out, and he wished to have Commodore Tyrwhitt with him at daylight, and he signalled to Admiral Warrender that it was too late to send the destroyers to Heligoland. But the Vice-Admiral had already decided against the plan, as there was a strong north-west wind and a nasty sea.¹ Commodore Tyrwhitt was on his way home, in accordance with his instructions from Admiral Warrender at 1354, when he intercepted a signal from the Commander-in-Chief, ordering the Vice-Admiral to keep all the ships out; he turned to north-east and steered towards the position in which he believed the 2nd Battle Squadron to be, and eventually received orders to join up at the 9 a.m. rendezvous.²

91. **Movements of our Submarines.**—The last hope of intercepting the enemy now centred in Commodore Keyes. At 1034, the Commodore in the *Lurcher*, with the *Firedrake* and the eight submarines detailed for the operation, was on his station in the Terschelling line, when he intercepted part of a very faint warning from the *Monarch* to the *Ambuscade*, that the enemy was off Scarborough.³ Knowing nothing of the dispositions of our own fleet or of the enemy, and being out of W/T sending range, he despatched the *Firedrake* at full speed to ask for instructions; meanwhile, he steamed up and down the line to collect his submarines, so as to be ready to obey any orders he might get. The weather on the passage out had been dirty and rainy, with the result that the submarines had lost touch with one another and were out of station; by 5 p.m., he had been able to collect only four boats, *E.10*, *E.11*, *E.15*, and *Archimede*.

Meanwhile, at 1535, he received orders from the Admiralty, timed 1410, to proceed to Heligoland to intercept the High Sea Fleet, which it was believed would return to the Bight after dawn on 17th, passing west of Heligoland on a southerly course to make the Weser Light.⁴

The Admiralty times were 12 hours too late, for the High Sea Fleet, after separating 80 miles NW of Heligoland at 1 p.m., was now proceeding into the Bight, the 1st and 2nd Squadrons to the Elbe, via the north of Heligoland, while Admiral von Ingenohl led the 3rd Squadron to Schillig Roads. There were two

¹ D 184, 199, 204, 214.

² Comm. (T) Report (in M. 04593/14).

³ Comm. (S) War Records, p. 569.

⁴ D 192.

imaginary submarine alarms in the latter group, at 2.50 p.m. and 5.30 p.m., respectively, but by 9 p.m. the entire High Sea Fleet was safely in harbour.¹ This, however, was not suspected by us at the time, and in pursuance of the Admiralty orders, Commodore Keyes sent off the four submarines he had found to stations ranging from 5 miles north-west to south of Heligoland; *E.11* was to be off the entrance to the Weser.

Nightfall found Commodore Keyes searching with cruiser arc lamp and W/T for his missing submarines, while the weather steadily grew worse, and he waited impatiently for information of the movements of our own forces or further news of the enemy. He seriously considered the possibility of taking the *Lurcher* and *Firedrake* to the northward of Heligoland to attack the High Sea Fleet on its way in, but in the belief that our destroyer flotillas would surely be endeavouring to deliver a night attack on the enemy, he reluctantly decided that to collect his missing submarines for operations next day must be his first consideration. The orders under which they were acting were, that they were to leave their stations off Terschelling at 4 p.m. on the 16th if no enemy were sighted; and the Commodore now steered for the North Hinder Light, to intercept them there on their return.

He was just approaching the light when another message reached him; the Admiralty believed Heligoland and Amrum lights would be lit when the ships were going in, and that the *Lurcher* and *Firedrake* might get a chance to attack about 2 a.m. on the 17th.² The message had gone out from the Admiralty at 2012, more than 5 hours ago, but instead of being sent by the usual route, via the submarine depot ship *Adamant* and the *Firedrake*, it was despatched through Ipswich W/T station; and when it reached the Commodore, at 1.18 a.m. on the 17th, he was 200 miles from the Bight and could not possibly get there in time.³

The four submarines were in position, however. At 1.30 a.m., Lieutenant-Commander Nasmith, of *E.11*, sighted Heligoland on the starboard beam, and, altering course, he picked up the channel 5 miles to the westward of the island and proceeded slowly towards the Weser Light Vessel. He saw nothing of Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers, which took the eastern channel and felt their way into the Jade with great difficulty in the dark about 6 a.m. Twenty minutes later *E.11* was off the Weser Light

¹ *Nordsee* III, p. 107.

² D 216.

³ The message was made from Ipswich at 2040. It was received by the "S" tune guardship *Woolwich*, who was informed that Commodore Keyes was at sea in the *Lurcher*, and was directed to inform Ipswich to this effect at once. Instead of doing so, the *Woolwich* attempted to transmit the message on "D" tune, and at 2238, having failed to get into touch, she informed the Admiralty. The message was then apparently sent from the Admiralty to Felixstowe at 0023 on 17th, and was despatched from there at 0105, and received 10 minutes later by the *Lurcher*. (Comm. (S) War Records, p. 577.)

Vessel, having passed between the minefields on which *D.2* had been lost a few weeks previously. At 7.20 a.m. the German destroyers were sighted, as they came out to cover the passage of the 1st Squadron from the Elbe to the Jade, and at 8 o'clock the leading ships of the battle squadrons came in sight. They were zigzagging, and Lieutenant-Commander Nasmith had to turn with them before he could get a shot. At 0810, he fired his starboard tube at the leading ship, the *Posen*, at 400 yards. The submarine was rolling heavily, and the torpedo ran too deep and passed under the battleship. He then attacked the third ship in the line, but she altered course suddenly straight towards him and he had to make a rapid dive. He reached 70 ft. before the battleship passed over him, but the boat had lost trim, and in rising to repeat the attack she broke surface and was sighted. The battle squadron separated in all directions and dashed at full speed for the estuary, and though Lieutenant-Commander Nasmith made every effort to cut off the last ship, she steered round him and reached harbour in safety.¹

None of the other submarines sighted the enemy, and they all returned to Harwich in the course of the next three days, after experiencing very bad weather, which developed on the 18th. The French submarine *Archimede* escaped the worst of it by leaving her station on the 17th, when severe weather threatened; even so, her Commander (Lieutenant de Vaisseau E. Deville) was considerably impressed by the weather and conditions of winter service in the Bight, and after effecting temporary repairs of the defects she had developed, she returned to Cherbourg for a long refit.²

92. The Scarborough Minefield.—The Admiralty, remembering that minelaying had accompanied the bombardment of Yarmouth, had early warned the Senior Officers of Minesweepers at Grimsby and South Shields to pay particular attention to the swept channel where the enemy vessels had been³; but it was not till 7.20 a.m. of the day following the Scarborough raid that any evidence of minelaying was obtained. In the early hours of December 17 a boat pulled in to Scarborough, and from it disembarked part of the crew of S.S. *Princess Olga*, which they stated had been mined at 7.20 the previous evening, 5 miles ESE of the port. This was the first the port authorities learned of the matter, and the news was telegraphed to the Admiralty and the local Naval authorities at once. It reached the Admiralty at 7.45 a.m., 12 hours after the occurrence. The *Princess Olga* was, however, not the first vessel to have found the minefield. She had been preceded an hour earlier by the collier *Elterwater*,

¹ Comm. (S) War Records, pp. 573–5.

² *Ibid.*, p. 582.

³ A.M.S. to Captain Massey Dawson and Commander Dalgety, 16.12.14, 4.45 p.m. (H.S. 80, p. 487.)

which, sinking in 3 minutes, had lost five of her crew ; the survivors were picked up by a steamer bound for the Tyne, and landed there next day. An hour after the mining of *Princess Olga*, a third steamer, the Norwegian S.S. *Vaaren*, struck a mine and sank in 3 minutes, with the loss of 13 out of her crew of 17, the survivors being taken to Grimsby by a trawler which had picked them up. None of the three explosions were reported from the shore, though they all occurred within a few miles of Scarborough, and it was only from the survivors that anything was learned of the losses.¹

The Admiralty, as soon as they knew that the *Princess Olga* had been mined, sent out a general warning by W/T, in code, to all H.M. Ships at 11 a.m. and noon, as follows : " Mines appear to have been laid yesterday off Scarborough, about 7 miles from land. It is probable mines have also been laid off Whitby and Hartlepool." At 1.30 p.m. they ordered all East Coast Senior Naval Officers to warn and stop traffic between Flamborough and Newcastle until a channel could be swept. The swept War Channel terminated in 54° 8' 30 N, 0° 3' E off Flamborough Head. Orders were now sent out for a pair of fleet sweepers to sweep a further channel from there to 54° 41' 20 N, 0° 58' 30 W, off Hartlepool, operating only when the water was above half-tide² ; to the sweepers were attached three armed drifters and two motor boats, and when the weather was favourable, eight drifters with nets were to assist in the work. The fleet sweepers *Skipjack*, *Jason* and *Gossamer*, which were on passage from Lowestoft to join the Grand Fleet, were to make only one sweep, and were to continue their passage north as soon as they reached Hartlepool.³

It was most undesirable to hold up traffic on the East Coast for long, and at 6.15 p.m. on the 18th the Admiralty gave the East Coast Senior Naval Officers permission to allow ships to pass during daylight, provided they kept within 2 miles of the coast between Flamborough Head and Newcastle.⁴

Sweeping began next day, the first vessels to begin work being the three gunboats. They were at the last buoy of the War Channel off Flamborough Head at daybreak ; there they passed their sweeps and, keeping 6 miles from shore, soon brought two mines to the surface. The tide was falling, and as half-tide was approaching they proceeded for Scarborough. At 9 a.m.

¹ *Elterwater* mined, 6.10 p.m., 16.12.14. News reached Admiralty 10 a.m., 17th, through submarine C.13, spoken by S.S. *City*, which had *Elterwater's* survivors on board.

Princess Olga mined 7.20 p.m. News reached Admiralty 7.45 a.m., through report of seamen landed.

Vaaren mined 8.30 p.m., 16th. News reached Admiralty 5.30 p.m., 17th, from Hull, where trawler brought survivors.

² To S.O., Sweeping Vessels, 6.10 p.m., 17.12.14.

³ H.S. 80, pp. 964, 983 ; H.S. 81, p. 106.

⁴ H.S. 80, p. 117.

they sighted a trawler unit, which had left Grimsby at dawn and was now at work with sweeps out. The *Skipjack* closed to communicate and the other two gunboats went on in to Scarborough.

Almost immediately after the *Skipjack's* arrival the trawlers got amongst thickly laid mines, and within the space of 5 minutes at least 18 mines were brought to the surface or exploded in the sweeps. This experience was exceptional, and was probably never repeated during the war. The detonations shook every vessel from stem to stern. A *melée* of trawlers, mostly with their sweeps parted, mingled with drifting mines, swung down on the tide, firing on the mines. Two trawlers had struck mines, and one other was in danger of sinking through a leak.¹ In some cases, so great had been the concussion that undamaged vessels believed they had been struck. One of the mined trawlers slowly sank with headway, her mast, nearly submerged, moving through the water like the periscope of a submarine; the other, down by the head, was badly on fire, while her consort steamed alongside her to render assistance. This large flotilla of sweepers was now in the middle of a thickly mined position, with low water approaching; they were, therefore, ordered to anchor. Once anchored, the safety of the vessels was assured until they swung to the flood tide and could await high water, the tidal rise being greater than the draught of the trawlers. Difficulties were encountered in sinking the mines which, in some cases, drifted very close to vessels at anchor; but the light draught paddle sweeper *Brighton Queen*, which had now closed, proved useful in dealing with the situation. In this sudden and dramatic emergency the trawler reserve men gave a great exhibition of their splendid courage and their readiness to obey orders promptly. When the ships had anchored the weather became hazy; a destroyer joined the flotilla, passing safely over the minefield at low water before she could be diverted. Three heavy draught merchant ships, disregarding gun signals and code communication, also passed to the northward.²

As soon as the tide was high enough the three gunboats continued their voyage to Scapa, and Commander R. H. Walters, in charge of the minesweepers, re-commenced work. The information that the *Orianda* had been sunk only $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Scarborough Castle, and that a number of mines were found 1 or 2 miles off shore, showed the Admiralty that it was unsafe for traffic to proceed until the channel was properly swept; they accordingly stopped it once more between Flamborough Head and the Tees.³

¹ *Orianda* sank in 10 minutes; *Passing* and *Star of Britain* damaged.

² This paragraph is a quotation from C.B. 1553, *History of British Minesweeping in the War*. The writer, Commander L. G. Preston, was in the *Skipjack* at the time. The Reports of Proceedings of the Minesweepers, titled Cap. W. 86/14 and Cap. W. 79/14 cannot be found.

³ To all ships in code, via Cleethorpes W/T, 6.5 p.m., 19.12.14.

On the 20th, however, two of H.M. vessels were to come to grief on the minefield. The armed trawler *Garmo*, on passage from Sheerness for Scapa, struck a mine, turned right over and sank, drowning an officer and five men. Shortly before this, H.M. Yacht *Valiant*,¹ on passage for Cromarty, had her rudder and both her propellers blown off; she did not sink and was towed in to Scarborough by two trawlers, which came up to salve her in spite of the danger of mines.

Commander Walters was instructed to confine his operations to clearing away mines within 2 miles of the shore.² Reinforced by four paddle steamers as shallow draught sweepers, and the eight drifters from Lowestoft using their nets, he swept a channel close inshore from Flamborough Head to Scarborough and considered the passage safe beyond that, since there was no evidence that the Germans had laid any mines north of that town. By the morning of the 23rd there were 48 ships in the Humber awaiting permission to sail northward, and though on the 22nd, at 4 a.m., a Norwegian steamer, S.S. *Boston*, had been blown up off Scarborough, merchant vessels were allowed on the 24th to proceed within the 10-fathom line and as close to the shore as possible.³ Next day three merchant vessels suffered, the *Gem*, *Gallier*, and the Norwegian S.S. *Eli*; one of Commander Walters' flotilla, the minesweeping trawler *Night Hawk*, which, in the fog, had drifted out of the channel, was blown up with the loss of six lives.⁴

Two more victims, the Dutch S.S. *Leersum* and the British *Linaria*, were mined on December 26, with the loss of two lives.⁵

Until the new channel was buoyed, destroyers from the patrol flotillas kept guard at each end of the Scarborough minefield to prevent commercial traffic from passing through at night or by unauthorised routes. By the 26th, drifters marking the channel were in position, and ships drawing 24 ft. and under were allowed to proceed in daylight.⁶ The marking vessels were apt to drift in bad weather; but the buoyage of the channel was begun on December 30 and finished on January 5, thus extending the Swept Channel to Hartlepool. Meanwhile, the Danish S.S. *M. C. Holm*, was sunk on January 2. Her owners claimed for her cargo of cotton, on the grounds that she had intended to proceed to Copenhagen via the north of Scotland, but was diverted to the East Coast route by our patrols. The Admiralty

¹ The yacht had been lent by Lord Pirrie, of Harland and Wolff. Her commanding officer was Admiral C. J. Barlow, D.S.O., retired, who was now serving as Captain, R.N.R.

² A.M.S. to Commander Walters, 25.12.14.

³ To A.O.P., etc., 2.25 a.m., 24.12.14.

⁴ Papers titled Cap. W. 69/1914; Report of mining of *Night Hawk*.

⁵ Depositions from *Eli* and *Leersum* in papers titled *Board of Trade*, 29.12.14.

⁶ To all ships, Midnight, December 26-27.

replied that the firm should address their claim for compensation to the German Government.¹

In addition to sweeping the buoyed channel the minesweepers turned their attention to clearing the field. Two more trawlers were mined during the operations, which were not completed till April 1915. Out of the 100 mines laid, 69 were accounted for, 53 being swept up before the end of 1914. The losses of merchant ships in this field were heavy.²

CHAPTER IX.

THE AIR RAID OF DECEMBER 25.

93. Disposition of the Fleet Altered to Meet Future Raids.—

Though the success with which the enemy had escaped, now for the second time, after a bombardment of the British coast was not due to any special error in the strategical disposition of the fleet, the Admiralty determined on an alteration. It seemed likely that the enemy would soon make another raid, probably to the southward. To be in a better position to meet this, they decided to move the battle cruiser force from Cromarty to Rosyth, with four of the fastest light cruisers; and to save time they arranged that the order to sail and the fixing of the rendezvous where the battle cruisers should intercept the enemy would be issued by the Admiralty direct to Admiral Beatty, instead of through the Commander-in-Chief. The Grand Fleet would also be ordered to sea, in which case the Commander-in-Chief was to take complete charge of the operations. The *Indomitable*, a battle cruiser of the *Invincible* class, which had been refitting at Queenstown after her return from the Mediterranean, was ordered to join Admiral Beatty at Rosyth. The battle cruisers left Cromarty on the 21st, and arrived at Rosyth, their new, and, as it happened, final base, that same evening.

As before, the Admiralty intended to retain control of the forces under Commodore (T) till he could join either the battle cruisers or the Grand Fleet. There was also a possibility that the enemy might attempt to rush the Dover Straits for a raid on Ireland and the western squadrons; to prevent this the force in the south would be concentrated to bar the Straits.³

This Southern Force was now under Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, who, on December 17, had been ordered to exchange commands with Admiral Burney. Admiral Bayly hoisted his flag on board

¹ Papers titled *Foreign Office*, 28.5.15. *M. C. Holm*.

² C.B. 1553. *History of British Minesweeping*.

³ A 318, 322.

the *Lord Nelson* at Sheerness, as Vice-Admiral Commanding the Channel Fleet, on December 20.¹

The Broad Fourteens Patrol, the main object of which was to obtain early information of raids to the southward, had been interfered with by the bad weather and the recent operations; but on the 20th, the *Fearless* went out as far as the Haaks Light Vessel. She saw nothing except some drifting mines, and was back at Harwich in the afternoon of the 21st. Meanwhile, the Admiralty, through their intercepting stations, obtained indications, on December 21, that something was afoot, even that the High Sea Fleet would be coming out, and they warned the Commander-in-Chief and the Rosyth force that they might be wanted for sea the following night. In order to obtain more precise information, eight of Commodore (T's) destroyers proceeded for a rendezvous near Terschelling, from which, when orders were given, they were to go on to the northward of Heligoland to watch during the night of December 22-23. From dawn of the 23rd till daylight on the 24th the watch was to be taken over by two submarines, which were to go on in advance.² By the afternoon of the 22nd, however, the Admiralty concluded that no special movement of the High Sea Fleet was likely, and they endeavoured to recall the destroyers and submarines. The destroyers obeyed the signal, but the submarines were already on the way to Heligoland and beyond recall. One of them, *E.2*, returned at dusk of the 24th, having observed the Bight patrols and attempted to attack a submarine. The other, *E.7*, stayed a day longer, and on the 25th was near the Weser Lightship.³

94. Armed Boarding Steamers Absorbed into the Defence against Mines.—On learning that there was no movement of the High Sea Fleet immediately in prospect, the Commander-in-Chief obtained the Admiralty's permission to take the whole fleet to sea, including the battle cruisers and the 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth, for drills and exercises. By midnight, December 24-25, the whole of the Grand Fleet was at sea, including the cruiser squadrons and flotillas. The 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons carried out target practice at ranges between 17,000 and 15,000 yards.⁴

This movement did not interfere with the routine of closing the North Sea, which was being carried out by the 10th Cruiser Squadron, of which 12 ships were now on patrol. The North Sea entrance was watched by this squadron in four patrol areas; one of these was that west of the Hebrides, in which they relieved the armed boarding steamers, freeing them for other work.

¹ Tel. 538 to C.-in-C., H.F., 17.12.14; Deck Log, *Lord Nelson*. Admiral Burney had expressed the view that it was impossible to carry out his orders. (M. 0082.)

² A 325-328.

³ A 332-334, and Comm. (S) War Records, H.S.A. 269, pp. 595-8.

⁴ H.S.A. 221, Memo., H.F., W. 44, 6.1.15.

These craft, since December 20, were placed permanently on guard to the eastward of the Pentland Firth. Their orders were that they were to patrol between 30 and 60 miles from the Pentland Skerries; unlike the rest of the fleet, which had strict orders not to board merchant vessels in waters where submarines might be expected, the squadron was definitely to board all ships met. They were to give warning of all hostile vessels and were to be keenly on the alert for minelaying at night, more especially on the 50-fathom line, where it was most likely to occur. To westward of the boarding steamers were the fleet sweepers and trawler minesweepers at work by day, and from the Pentland Skerries in to Hoxa Sound the patrols of the destroyers of Scapa defence. To seaward of the boarding steamers the Commander-in-Chief stationed two of his cruisers; the boarding steamers were as yet not fully trained to cruiser work, and he felt that some outpost was necessary. The Admiralty looked upon this use of cruisers as dangerous and unnecessary and ordered it to cease; it was submarines of which they were most afraid, and to have cruisers patrolling continuously the same lines suggested a repetition of the loss of the *Cressys*. On one occasion, the *Cochrane*, on the way out for this patrol, opened fire on a periscope which appeared three times quite close to her near the Pentland Skerries. Although the submarine was imaginary, the report of the occurrence strengthened the Admiralty's view that the Commander-in-Chief was risking his cruisers unnecessarily.¹ But, by representing the untrained state of the boarding steamers, Admiral Jellicoe obtained permission to send out one or two of the less valuable cruisers at night till the necessity for them was no longer apparent.

It is clear that the main object of the armed boarding steamer patrol was to guard the fleet from the danger of having to cross a minefield, which might be interposed by the Germans between the fleet's base and their own manœuvring area as part of the enemy plan for their next operation. Some trawlers returning to harbour on the 17th reported seeing a German destroyer laying mines in 55° 15' N, 1° 20' E.² This was incorrect, but taken in conjunction with the reports of mines which had dragged their moorings or broken adrift from the Tyne and Humber minefields, Admiral Jellicoe was led to the conclusion that the Germans on the 16th laid mines north and south of the positions of the vessels engaged in the bombardment of the Yorkshire coast in order to catch ships coming to intercept the enemy off the gap between the Tyne and Humber minefields, to catch our vessels making the coast, and across the line of retreat of the German squadron.⁴ Besides protecting, in this manner, their own

¹ M. 04875/14.

² G.F. Orders and Memos., Various, December 20 and 29; A 343, 345, 350, 353, 355.

³ H.S. 80, p. 762.

⁴ M. 051/15.

operations, it seemed highly probable that the enemy, in the event of a general action, would endeavour to mine the approaches to the fleet's bases in order to catch vessels returning; he urged upon the Admiralty that, as soon as an action was imminent, all the local defence vessels, including the battleships in the Tyne and Humber, should patrol the areas of approach up to 60 miles from their ports, to find and deal with minelayers. The suggestion conflicted with the Admiralty's views that these heavy ships were stationed in the ports to prevent a landing, and it was not adopted.¹

The policy of defending our own harbours by mines was pushed forward; but the work was greatly handicapped by the lack of 500-lb. mines and other essential material. By the end of 1914, 2,164 British and 360 French mines had been laid across the southern part of the North Sea; observation minefields had been laid at Blyth, the Tyne, Sunderland, at Broughton Ferry, in the River Tay; and an E.C. minefield was in position at Scapa, between Groo Taing and the Grinds.²

95. Sweeping Commenced in the Tory Island Minefield.—The bad weather of the first half of December had prevented any sweeping operations off the north coast of Ireland. The *Kaphreda* and her group of eight minesweepers arrived at Larne at the end of November, but they were unable to begin work till the gale abated on December 19. That day they exploded five mines, 16 miles NNE of Tory Island.

Unknown to them, a vessel had been lost within a few miles of them some hours before they arrived. The *Tritonia*, a Manchester steamer bound for Newfoundland, struck a mine and sank at 10.40 a.m., December 19, about 25 miles north of Tory Island. The master and half of the crew in one boat drifted towards Oversay, and were picked up off Oversay Light next morning by one of the armed trawlers under Senior Naval Officer, Larne.³ This trawler had no W/T, and the cable was temporarily broken down; but an armed yacht went out, making wireless signals to Malin Head War Signal Station, to warn the Admiralty of the presence of the mines on which the *Tritonia* had been lost, and to enquire for the rest of the crew. The message reached the Admiralty at 5.49 p.m., December 20—that is, 31 hours after the sinking of the *Tritonia*—and was the first news of her loss.⁴ They immediately sent out a warning for all men-of-war to avoid the locality, following it with orders that no Atlantic commercial shipping was to pass round the north of Ireland till

¹ A 329 and G.F.O. and M., Various, 2.1.15.

² Lockhart Leith: History of British Minefields, Chapter II.

³ He now had two Auxiliary Patrol Units of one yacht and six trawlers each, though one of the units was still incomplete.

⁴ H.S. 81, p. 379.

further orders.¹ The other boat of the *Tritonia* reached Inishtrahull.²

The *Kaphreda* group continued sweeping the minefield. They destroyed four mines on the 21st, and three on the 22nd. In sweeping this field, as in all the minesweeping in the early days of the war, the lack of a good cutter for the mooring ropes of the mines was felt. Mines were towed about from place to place without exploding, only to be dropped unsuspected when the sweeps were slipped. Trials were being made with other kinds of cutting sweeps, and meanwhile, all minesweepers were instructed to complete their sweeps, when possible, in shallow water, so that any mines caught would appear on the surface.³ The officer in charge of the operations⁴ at Tory Island, considered the mines had been laid later than December 6; this was an incorrect assumption, for they were part of the *Berlin's* minefield on which the *Audacious* had been lost. The field, owing to its large and unknown extent and its distance from land, was troublesome to deal with, and it was not till August 1915 that the Commanding Officer of the Minesweepers⁵ was satisfied that it was clear of mines.⁶

96. **German Aeroplane Raids, December 21–25.**—Although mining of our waters was an important part of the strategy of the enemy, they intended to carry on other forms of minor attack, including raids by aircraft. The German Navy's means of air offence was limited to Zeppelins, since they had no seaplane carriers; but the Army had aeroplanes, and probably wished to make some reply to our bold attacks on the sheds at Friedrichshaven and Düsseldorf. The *Revenge* had been acting on the flank of the Army while the enemy were bombarding Scarborough⁷; and as the Germans knew that Dover was the base for the ships which co-operated with the Army, they decided to try a bombardment of that port. On December 21, at 1 p.m., two explosions, like those of heavy shell, were seen on the water about 400 yards west of Admiralty Pier. They seem to have been taken first for shell from long range guns; but after a few hours it was established that they were two bombs dropped from some aircraft flying at a great height. Three days later, another aeroplane dropped bombs on the outskirts of Dover,

¹ To all ships in W/T code, 7.55 p.m., December 20; to S.N.O., Halifax, C.-in-C., H.F., and S.N.O.'s, west coast of Ireland, in Code, 12.20 a.m., December 21.

² Depositions of Master of *Tritonia* titled *Board of Trade*, 29.12.14, S.N.O.'s report, titled X. 3731/14.

³ M. 054/15.

⁴ Lieutenant Sir J. H. Domville, Bart.

⁵ Then Lieutenant G. Unsworth, R.N.R.

⁶ Papers titled Admiralty, 18.8.15, *Clearing of Tory Island Minefield*.

⁷ For details of the *Revenge's* firing, see Monograph 18, *Dover*, C.B. 936a, pp. 15, 16.

luckily causing no loss of life.¹ These were the first bombs dropped from the air on British soil.

What seemed intended for a more formidable attack occurred on Christmas Day, when shortly after noon a German aeroplane was sighted from Sheerness. It made no attack on the Naval port, but continued westward towards London. Three aeroplanes speedily got up from Eastchurch and the Isle of Grain and gave chase; the fastest of these overtook the raider at Erith, headed him back and engaged him with machine gun fire over Tilbury. Both aeroplanes came under fire from all the anti-aircraft batteries within sight. So far the German had dropped no bombs; but crossing to the south side of the river, he unloaded two bombs on Cliffe, doing no damage, and making away out to sea, was soon lost in the fog. The pursuer came down at Eastchurch; it was useless to continue further as his machine gun had jammed. He claims to have hit the German three times; his own machine had one hole, made probably by a fragment of one of the 339 anti-aircraft shell expended.²

97. **Plan for an Air Raid on Cuxhaven.**—The Admiralty also intended to make an air-raid, but in their case on an unquestionably military objective, the Zeppelin sheds at Cuxhaven. The raid had been in train when the knowledge that enemy cruisers were out had led to a postponement. On the 18th, they ordered the Commodores to seize the first favourable opportunity; and Commodore Keyes, who, in collaboration with Commodore Tyrwhitt, had the choice of the date, arranged for the plan to be put into execution on the 23rd. But again it was postponed on account of the anticipated emergence of the High Sea Fleet, and it was not till it was clear that the enemy were not moving that the date of the operation was finally fixed as December 25.³

The plan,⁴ drafted on December 2, laid down that the three carriers, *Engadine*, *Riviera*, *Empress*, each carrying three seaplanes provided with three 20-lb. bombs, and escorted by Commodore Tyrwhitt, with three light cruisers and eight destroyers, approaching from the north-westward, were to be at Rendezvous II,⁵ 16 miles to the NNE of Heligoland, about an hour before it would be light enough for flying. As soon as the machines were away, the Commodore's force was to proceed first westward to Rendezvous III, thence south-westward to Rendezvous IV, from which point they were to steer southward on a wide front to meet the returning seaplanes, which, besides

¹ H.S. 81, pp. 543, 568, 584, 605, 1020, 1077; M. 04897/14. These raids are not mentioned in *Nordsee* III.

² M. 04981/14, and War Office document called "Aeroplane and Seaplane Raids, 1914-1916"; the copy in the Air Branch of the C.I.D., Historical Section, is registered as A.H. 207/73/1.

³ A 280, 313, 321, 323, 336.

⁴ Appendix H.

⁵ See Plan at p. 136.

bombing the Cuxhaven air sheds, were to gather as much useful information as possible. While picking up the seaplanes, Commodore Tyrwhitt would be reinforced by the *Fearless* and eight destroyers of the 1st Flotilla; and the whole operation was to be covered by 10 submarines, stationed between him and the German coast.

The orders for the submarines were based on the assumption that the minefields in the Bight extended in a more or less straight line from the 10-fathom line outside Norderney to Heligoland, at various points on which line mines had been reported by our submarines. Accordingly, it was considered safe to station two boats at Rendezvous A, 5 miles south of the releasing point for the seaplanes, with orders to proceed, when the seaplanes had started, direct to Rendezvous D, the picking up place. This route, as will be seen from the plan, took them very near to, or even through a new minefield. Two other submarines were stationed at Rendezvous C, 10 miles NE of the picking up position, from whence they were to make for Rendezvous C1 and C2, a few miles S and SE of that position. This last rendezvous, though clear of the supposed line of mines, was very near the old minefield. The other submarines were placed at Positions T, U, V, W, X, and Y, along the 10-fathom line between Norderney and the Western Ems buoy. Admiral Jellicoe further arranged to have the whole Grand Fleet to come into the North Sea and to move south to the 56th parallel in case the attack should bring out heavy forces.¹

The Germans were on the alert; but it was not an air attack they were expecting. Since early in December, rumours of a British naval offensive had been circulating in the Admiralstab, and strangely enough, they were of the same kind as those which were reaching our own Admiralty. The reports to Berlin stated that 200 steamers were being prepared as blockships, and that some had been transformed to resemble warships. The 200 blockships may have grown out of the 12 for Scapa; and the imitation warships were those merchant vessels being fitted at Belfast with a wooden superstructure to give them the silhouettes of Dreadnoughts, the employment of which had so far not been defined. No scheme for the blocking of the German rivers was at that time even considered in the Admiralty, and the enemy were crediting us with too much initiative; nevertheless, the Admiralstab received such definite reports that they strengthened the outposts and issued detailed orders in anticipation of such an event. On the 22nd, they laid a fresh minefield, $13\frac{1}{2}$ miles long, on the meridian of $7^{\circ} 35'$, extending as far north as 54.22 ,² and

¹ The general idea and Admiralty Operation Orders are in M. 05178/14; the orders issued by Commodore (S) are in M. 05033/14; the orders for seaplanes are in M. 05027/14; the C-in-C's orders for the battlefleet and flotillas are in G.F.S.P., Vol. LXIII. Admiral Beatty's orders for the cruiser forces have not been found.

² 516 mines, set to a depth of $19\frac{1}{2}$ ft.; laid by *Nautilus* and *Pelikan*, a.m., December 22. *Nordsee* III, p. 125.

sent two destroyer flotillas to scout as far as Horn Reefs. Reliable information that we were about to make an attack was received in the evening of the 24th. This set the defence in motion; submarines were sent to lie off Borkum and Amrum Bank from 2 a.m. on the 25th; the airships *L.6* and *L.5* went out to northward and westward, respectively; all outpost craft and the fleet generally were placed at increased readiness for action; and at 4.45 a.m. the 12th Half-Flotilla went out to search the Bight for submarines. They returned at 7 a.m., having seen nothing.

98. **The British Air Raid of December 25 : Movements of Seaplane Carriers and their Escort in Heligoland Bight.**—Meanwhile, Commodore Tyrwhitt, in the *Arethusa*, with the *Undaunted*, two "M" class and four "L" class destroyers, left Harwich at 5 a.m., December 24, escorting the three seaplane carriers.¹ The weather at Harwich was perfect for flying, with high visibility; it was very cold and there were light airs from the eastward, but the sea was calm, and conditions seemed particularly favourable for seaplane work. By 4.30 a.m. on Christmas Day, the force was 35 miles NW of Heligoland, and here they passed four vessels showing trawlers' lights. Shortly afterwards, low Telefunken was heard, emanating apparently from the vessels just passed. It was immediately evident that the alarm had been given, for in the next half-hour no less than 17 messages with the call sign "urgent" were sent, apparently from Heligoland. These signals originated from *U.6*, which was the submarine despatched to Amrum Bank, and was then cruising some 30 miles north of Heligoland; she had seen a bright white light, which she believed to be shown by a submarine to direct the approach of our forces. At sunrise, she saw the whole expedition, and noted that three of the vessels were undoubtedly aircraft carriers.

The seaplanes had been launched, and seven of them were already away. Two had failed to start, and had to be hoisted in again. The time was now 7.20 a.m., and the ships turned to the westward, the turn baffling *U.6*, which was preparing to attack one of the destroyers.

It was soon seen that the seaplane carrier *Empress* could not keep up; but there was no time to lose if the Commodore's force was to be in time to pick up the seaplanes at the appointed rendezvous, and speed was not slackened. Consequently, by the time the Commodore reached Rendezvous IV and turned south, the *Empress* had become separated from her escort, and was a target for a systematic attack by two German seaplanes and the airship *L.6*. Thirteen bombs were dropped on her, one falling within 20 ft. of her, and another within 40 ft. The Zeppelin also opened fire with a Maxim. No ship of the escorts was

¹ *Aurora* was attending to defects at Chatham from December 19 to January 6.

specially detached to assist her ; but the force opened fire with anti-aircraft guns, maxims and rifles, and the *Undaunted*, at 11,000 yards, fired shrapnel from her 6-in. guns.

In spite of the persistence of the attack, she escaped without injury or casualties. Lieutenant F. W. Bowhill, in command of the *Empress*, reports¹: " My method of defence was to watch (the Zeppelin) carefully as she manœuvred into position directly overhead. I then went hard over. I could see her rudders put over to follow me, I put my helm over the other way. . . . I think it put her off her aim ; otherwise, I fail to see how she could have missed us." He had no anti-aircraft guns, but he kept up a steady fire with his rifles, and got off eight rounds from his after 12-pdrs., with the result, as he thought, that he drove her off. She certainly retired ; but it was because she was losing buoyancy and had got rid of all her bombs. The continuous firing to which she had been subjected resulted in three bullet holes in her outer covering.²

The course laid down by Commodore Tyrwhitt would take him unconsciously several miles north of the new minefield, and his margin of safety was increased by the fact that he had released the seaplanes some 5 miles north of the spot appointed. He thus escaped the new mine danger, and the rendezvous for picking up the seaplanes was so far to the westward of the earlier minefield that there again he was safe. He reached it at 9.30 a.m., and altered course to south towards Norderney Gat, shortly afterwards effecting junction with the *Fearless* and her flotilla, and the whole then swept south on a front of 6 miles. Here he was sighted by the airship *L.5*, which came up and dropped bombs, seaplanes from Borkum joining in. Once more the force escaped damage. The air attacks to which he had been subjected convinced the Commodore that, given ordinary sea room, our ships had nothing to fear from either seaplanes or Zeppelins, an opinion apparently shared by his ship's companies who, with much merriment, looked upon their attacks chiefly as fine opportunities for letting fly with any weapon that chanced to be handy. It was observed that the airships could not tack, but had to wear, and consequently, a well judged 8-point turn of the ship attacked threw the pursuer out of action for a considerable period, provided that following ships were not in line ahead.³

In the course of 45 minutes, two only of our seaplanes had been recovered ; one other had been found by the *Lurcher*, which, with the *Firedrake*, was cruising to the southward in support of the submarines. It was clear that the four remaining seaplanes could no longer be in the air, for they had been away 4½ hours, and the best supplied had fuel for only 4 hours. There seemed no hope, after the extended search of the approach in

¹ M. 05027/14.

² *Nordsee* III, p. 130.

³ Comm. (T) to Adty. and C.-in-C., 27.12.14. Copy in H.S.A. 145, pp. 381-385.

Norderney Gat, that the missing aircraft were in those waters, and Commodore Tyrwhitt reluctantly shaped course for home at 11 o'clock.¹

99. **Operations of the Seaplanes.**²—The seaplanes had been attacking under considerable disadvantages. The exact position of the objective, the airship sheds near Cuxhaven, was not known; they were believed to be at Capelle, a village some 5 miles south of Cuxhaven. When, however, the seaplanes reached the land they found it covered by patches of thick mist, compelling them to fly low, with the consequent increased danger from the anti-aircraft organisation.

Machine No. 119, Flight-Commander Ross, cruised over the sand dunes, at a height of only 150 ft., but saw nothing resembling a shed. His pressure pump broke down, and as he could not get a high speed, he soon steered westward, avoiding the Schillig Roads as too dangerous. Off Wangeroog, he observed a submarine, on which he dropped a bomb, but it failed to explode. Alighting on the sea, he set to work to repair his pressure pump, taxi-ing away from a trawler, which appeared to mean attacking him, and when his pump was again in order, he flew away. He was picked up by the *Lurcher*. No. 811, Flight-Lieutenant Edmonds, flying at 250 ft., also failed to find the sheds; in Schillig Roads he saw two light cruisers, and dropped his bombs on one of them with no appreciable effect.³ He had been vigorously fired upon and his machine was hit in six places; and, continuing northward, he was picked up by Commodore Tyrwhitt. No. 136, Flight-Commander Kilner, found his engine miss-firing in the fog, and had to abandon his search for the sheds. Flying over Schillig Roads his machine was hit several times; and though he dropped no bombs, he was able to make a valuable reconnaissance of the disposition of the fleet and patrols. In this he was greatly assisted by his observer, Lieutenant Erskine Childers, R.N.V.R., who was intimately acquainted with the Frisian coast, on which he had written a well-known book, "The Riddle of the Sands." This was the third machine picked up by the squadron.

Machine No. 120, Flight-Lieutenant Miley, also found nothing worth attacking. His petrol was running very low as he was making his way northward from Norderney, when he saw below him a submarine emerging, and seeing that it bore the British marking of a red band on the conning tower, he came down to find out where the picking up squadron was, and to ask for a tow, for he had only 5 or 10 minutes petrol left. The submarine was *E.11* (Lieutenant-Commander Nasmith), whose station was 6 miles north of Norderney. Nasmith had seen, in his periscope,

¹ Comm. (T's) Report, M. 04982/14.

² Their reports are in M. 05027/14.

³ This was the *Graudenz*. One bomb dropped 200 yards from her and exploded on the water. *Nordsee* III, p. 130.

the approach of the seaplane, and rose to meet it. Embarking Flight-Lieutenant Miley, and taking the craft in tow, he started for the rendezvous. His progress was not to be undisturbed, for before he had covered much of the 13 miles to the picking up rendezvous, an airship hove in sight, obviously making for the strange pair of warships. Almost immediately, two more British seaplanes alighted with the same report, that they had not enough petrol to take them to the rendezvous. These were Nos. 814 and 815.

No. 814 (Flight Sub-Lieutenant Blackburn) had found no airship sheds, but had dropped two bombs on a battery at Wilhelmshaven, which was annoying him with a heavy fire. As he was still hotly bombarded, he released his third bomb over the middle of Wilhelmshaven town. No. 815 (Flight-Commander Oliver) had dropped his three bombs on some red sheds on the island of Langeoog, thinking they were probably for aircraft. The two seaplanes had seen *E.11* in company with No. 120, and had alighted for assistance.

Lieutenant-Commander Nasmith was now confronted with the task of saving four airmen and salving or destroying three seaplanes in the face of opposition from the airship, which was manœuvring to get into position above him. To add to the anxieties of the situation, he had seen a submarine closing from the eastward, at full speed on the surface ; it was not recognised as British, and as it dived when near, it was considered hostile. He cast off No. 120, ran alongside No. 815, and hailed the pilot and mechanic of No. 814, which had been damaged by the enemy's fire, and was standing on its head with its tail in the air, to jump overboard and swim to *E.11*. By the time the last airman was on board, the airship was nearly overhead and the enemy submarine should have been near enough to fire ; at this point Nasmith dived to 40 ft., and immediately felt the explosion of two bombs above him. Before diving, he had riddled the floats of No. 120 with bullets, and she was bound to sink.

The submarine he had seen was, in fact, one of our own, *D.6* (Lieutenant-Commander Halahan), who, in the prevailing haze, had been unable to fix his position, and was about 10 miles to the eastward of Rendezvous U, his appointed station ; seeing the planes descend, he had come up to assist. He had dived when the airship passed over him, and it did not occur to him that approaching as he was, end on, *E.11* would fail to recognise him. As soon as the airship's bombs had exploded, he came to the surface alongside No. 815, intending to salve the pilot. On rising, he found the airship within a hundred yards at a height of not more than 50 ft., and she at once opened fire on him with a maxim gun. Staying on the surface long enough to make certain that the seaplane was abandoned, he dived again. The tide was carrying him towards the supposed position of the minefield, and he did not again approach ; but before leaving he saw the seaplane sink.

Six out of the seven aircraft were now accounted for; the seventh, No. 135 (Flight-Commander Hewlett), had disappeared. A seaplane, thought to be No. 135, had been seen on the water a few miles west of Heligoland, and Hewlett was at first given up for lost. It appeared later that, owing to engine trouble, he had been forced to descend after a flight of $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours; he was picked up by a Dutch trawler and landed in Holland, returning safely to England.¹

The airship sheds, for which the seaplanes had all been looking, were not at Capelle, but at Nordholz, about 6 miles to the south-westward of Cuxhaven. One of the planes had circled over it, but its pilot did not recognise the sheds, and being under fire from the batteries defending them, dropped two bombs among some trees and disappeared. The defending gunners thought the bombs were aimed at the gasometer.² It is difficult, from the British reports, to identify this pilot; most probably it was Blackburn, in No. 814, though he states he dropped his two bombs at Wilhelmshaven, 20 miles further on. The mist, and the speed at which aircraft operations are carried on, may account for the discrepancy.

100. Movements of British Submarines.³—Besides the two submarines, which had assisted in the rescue of the pilots of the seaplanes, there were nine British submarines on the German coast on Christmas Day, one of these, *E.7*, being there more or less by accident. Her commanding officer, instead of returning at nightfall of the 24th, understood, incorrectly, that he had the option of remaining an extra day. As he had seen nothing on the north side of Heligoland, on Christmas Eve, he proceeded westward and reconnoitred the mouths of the Jade and Weser during Christmas Day. Coming up to the surface at 8.50 a.m., he found a Zeppelin directly above him; he dived immediately, and as the airship showed herself in his periscope from time to time, he remained submerged all day. At dusk he proceeded for home. He had not been warned of the probable position of the minefield, but, as it happened, the sea was phosphorescent, and when 5 miles west of Heligoland, he dived to 60 ft., and thus passed through, rather than over the mines.

E.6, stationed 2 miles east of Rendezvous A, while these seaplanes were hoisted out saw smoke to the southeast, and interposed herself between it and the squadron, only to find the smoke retiring. After waiting about for any seaplanes which might have failed to get away, she proceeded for home. No record of her track is available, but if she crossed the new minefield she did so in safety. A hostile submarine attacked her unsuccessfully about 20 miles west of Heligoland.

¹ M. 010040/15.

² *Nordsee* III, p. 129.

³ The Report of Commodore (S) is in M. 05033/14.

E.15, stationed 2 miles west of Rendezvous A, proceeded on the south flank of the squadron when it turned to west, after releasing the seaplanes, and she, too, unknowingly crossed the new minefield. At 11.30 a.m., while at Rendezvous C, she saw two explosions about 14 miles WNW of Heligoland. Possibly these were mines. *E.12* and *13*, at Rendezvous C, had no special adventures. *E.10*, at Rendezvous Y, attacked three hostile submarines without success, and was about to fire a third torpedo at a destroyer, when she recognised it as the *Lurcher*, flying the pendant of Commodore (S).

S.1, the first boat of a new class and making her maiden voyage, reached her station, Rendezvous X, but, in diving, lost her foremost detachable keel in a collision with a submerged object. Finding she could not dive, she returned forthwith. *D.8*, at Rendezvous V, passed a large patch of oil and bubbles, the report of which, when she returned, caused some anxiety. *D.7*, stationed at Rendezvous W, did not return at the appointed time, and at first it was feared she had been run down by *S.1*. She was, however, quite safe; she had been delayed 16 hours by a Zeppelin, which hunted her persistently.

Thus the whole force returned without loss, in spite of the danger from the minefields, among which it had unconsciously been manœuvring. The Admiralty expressed their appreciation of the work carried out by all concerned in what they characterised as a novel and dangerous enterprise.¹

101. Movements of the German Defence Force.—The position at which Commodore Tyrwhitt's force was assembled to guard the release of the seaplanes was only 20 miles from Heligoland, which gave the alarm a few minutes before 7.30 a.m. Five minutes later the outpost vessel, which was some miles south of the island, saw five seaplanes approaching, but she had no wireless, and it was nearly an hour before her report reached the Fleet Command. Even then it was the first definite information they received of the air attack.

All the fleet was already in a state of instant readiness; the 1st Destroyer Flotilla was under orders to sail, to reconnoitre a supposed minefield, reported to be 50 miles NW of Heligoland; and, at the moment of the raid, the *Von der Tann* and *Moltke*, in Schillig Roads, were being relieved by the *Derfflinger* and *Seydlitz*, so that all four battle cruisers were actually under way and in company. But, in view of the danger from British submarines off the mouths of the rivers, and thinking our aircraft were merely the forerunners of a more formidable force, the Fleet Command held back all these vessels, and even withdrew the outposts. Offensive measures were limited to aircraft and submarines. Seaplanes went out from Heligoland, List, and Borkum, and made the attacks mentioned, the ineffectiveness of which seems to have been concealed from the Official Historian, for he claims

¹ M. 05129/14.

that "the day was a memorable one for German naval airmen; the junior officers and their crews displayed conspicuous skill and daring." The order for the ready submarines to go out was not issued by the Fleet Command till 10.10 a.m., but it had been anticipated by the German Commodore (S), who despatched three of them to various points. The two which were already out had been watching the operation; *U.6* had seen the seaplanes released. *U.20*, at Norderney Gat, saw them picked up. Two other submarines saw the force at its last rendezvous, but in all these cases the rapid movements of Commodore Tyrwhitt foiled attack. No attempt was made to follow him, although a flotilla of destroyers was waiting with steam up; and our whole force returned safely to Harwich, in spite of the slowness of the *Empress*, which reduced the speed to $16\frac{1}{2}$ knots.¹

The events of the day showed the Germans the value of occupying a flanking position, from which the retreat of any raiding force might be cut off. Admiral von Ingenohl's anxiety lest he should sustain losses inflicted by British submarines prevented him from sanctioning the use of surface vessels, either off Terschelling or Horn Reefs; but it was decided that, when an enemy attack was expected, as many submarines as possible should be stationed at daybreak off Borkum, under the direct orders of the officer in command of the half-flotilla.² At the time, however, no surface ships were sent out, either to follow and attack the raiding force, or to ascertain what were its supports.

102. Movements of the Grand Fleet.—During the air raid, the Grand Fleet was cruising midway between Jutland and the Forth, several times sighting what were believed to be submarines.³ The fleet remained out all day; but the weather was increasingly bad, and at 8.10 a.m. on the 26th, the destroyers had to be sent home, leaving the battleships without a submarine screen. Two hours later the Commander-in-Chief abandoned the sweep and, sending the battle and light cruisers to Rosyth with the 3rd Battle Squadron, proceeded with the cruisers and dreadnought ships for Scapa. Beyond the three supposed submarines sighted, nothing had been seen, except some smoke, believed to be that of very fast vessels shadowing the fleet. But no submarines or fast vessels were out on those days, and the dangers were imaginary.

Yet the Grand Fleet returned to harbour with serious losses. In accordance with the practice adopted, in view of the submarine menace, the fleet was to enter Scapa before daybreak, with all lights darkened. As the 2nd Battle Squadron, which was leading the battle fleet, altered course to northward, to enter the Flow by the Hoxa Sound at 10 knots, a following wind, of force 8, caused the funnel smoke to obscure objects ahead to a serious

¹ *Undaunted Deck Log*, No. 19951.

² *Nordsee* III, p. 158.

³ M. 05061/14.

extent, and the ships began to lose touch with one another. In the sub-division *Orion*, *Thunderer*, *Monarch*, *Conqueror*, a further complication was introduced by the *Thunderer* falling back to take station astern of the line. The *Monarch* and *Conqueror* put on speed to regain touch, but each failed to keep her next ahead in sight. Shortly before she reached the boom, the *Monarch* found one of the patrol trawlers under her starboard bow, and starboarded her helm, only to find another trawler on the port bow. She then put her helm hard a-port and stopped, with the result that she was heading for Hoxa Point; discovering this she put her engines astern, and was thus lying athwart the channel. The *Conqueror*, coming up in the darkness, was also diverted from her course by the trawlers. She saw the green lights of the *Monarch*; but, taking them for those of a vessel coming out, continued her course till, suddenly, she realised they were those of her consort, backing right across her bows. The *Conqueror* stopped and reversed her engines; the *Monarch* put hers to full speed ahead. But it was too late; the *Conqueror's* bows tore off five plates of the *Monarch's* stern, sustaining herself extensive damage, which flooded 12 compartments on the starboard side.

Both ships were safely got into Scapa Flow. Though the Court of Enquiry found that the Captain of the *Monarch* had not given adequate warning to his next astern, the Admiralty, at the Commander-in-Chief's request, took no further action. As regards the patrol trawlers which, not on this occasion only, had proved a danger to navigation, the Commander-in-Chief issued a drastic order that ships were, in future, not to alter course to clear them, and that the trawlers would be held alone to blame should they be rammed by vessels entering.¹

The 1st Battle Squadron entered safely; but the Commander-in-Chief, who was leading the 4th Battle Squadron, realising, from messages intercepted, that something was wrong, did not at once go in. Standing to the westward, through Pentland Firth, he waited in the furious gale till 10 a.m., an hour and a half after daylight, before entering. This was one of the rare occasions when any important part of the Grand Fleet passed in or out of harbour, except in darkness.

Of the two damaged ships, the *Monarch* was soon made seaworthy. She left Scapa for Plymouth on December 29, but had to put into Queenstown on account of the weather. As soon as it moderated she was escorted by destroyers to Plymouth. The *Conqueror*, after preliminary patching, went to Cromarty to be made seaworthy, and then proceeded to Liverpool for her full repairs.

103. The Grand Fleet at the End of 1914.—As compared with the fleet at the outbreak of war², the main differences were in

¹ Court of Enquiry Papers titled X. 159/1915.

² See Monograph 23, *Home Waters I*, C.B. 917H, Appendix A.

the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons. The 2nd Squadron had lost the *Audacious*, and, being temporarily without the services of the *Monarch* and *Conqueror*, consisted of only five effective ships. On the other hand, the 4th Battle Squadron had been increased by four units, the two ex-foreign dreadnoughts, *Agin-court* and *Erin*, and the two newest battleships we had, *Benbow* and *Emperor of India*. On balance, therefore, the battle fleet had been increased.

In battle cruisers also, substantial increments had been made, for the *Tiger* was now in fighting form, and the *Indomitable*, *Invincible*, and *Inflexible* had been added to the force in Home Waters. The two last, with the *Princess Royal*, were at the moment on foreign service ; but they were under orders for home, and their date of rejoining could be only a few days distant.

The most marked increase was in cruisers. Whereas, in August, the Commander-in-Chief had only nine cruisers and six light cruisers, in addition to the single ships attached to his battle squadrons, he now disposed of six full squadrons of four ships each. Of this total cruiser force, four ships were away under repair, due shortly to rejoin. Only two of the cruiser squadrons, the 2nd and 3rd, remained constituted as at the outbreak of war. The 1st Cruiser Squadron had come home from the Mediterranean and now consisted of *Leviathan* (flag of Rear-Admiral Moore), *Warrior*, *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*. The 6th Cruiser Squadron, merely a skeleton in August, comprised now the *Drake* (flag of Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant, C.B.), *Donegal*, *Cumberland*, from the Cameroons, and *Hampshire*, on the way home from the East. There were now eight light cruisers in the Grand Fleet. The *Southampton*, *Birmingham*, *Nottingham*, and *Lowestoft* formed the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Goodenough ; and the *Falmouth* (flag), *Gloucester*, *Yarmouth*, and *Liverpool* had been constituted on December 28 as the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Trevelyan D. W. Napier, M.V.O. In place of the old *Edgars*, a score or more of armed liners were enforcing the blockade and relieving the Commander-in-Chief of the necessity of using his own cruisers for the purpose.

The defence and patrol force for Scapa had enormously increased, not only in destroyers, and by the utilisation of the armed boarding steamers, originally intended for another purpose, but also in auxiliary patrol vessels, to the number of 83 out of the 100 allotted. Moreover, Scapa, a naked harbour in August, was now, to some extent, protected by booms and land defences.

No encounter between the main forces of ourselves and the enemy had yet taken place, and there had been no opportunity of comparing their material with ours. Admiral Jellicoe was beginning to find weaknesses in his fleet. The secondary armament of the *Iron Duke* was placed so low that the gun ports were carried away in the prevailing rough weather, and fittings had to be improvised to keep out the water. There was a marked

failure of condenser tubes, particularly in the battleships. The boilers of the light cruisers were showing defects, which, in the case of the *Liverpool*, reduced her speed on one occasion to 17 knots; and the Commander-in-Chief had to reckon with the probability of having one or two light cruisers under repair at a time.¹ The incessant sea work and the storms of the north were telling on the destroyers, particularly the 2nd Flotilla, whose officers were losing confidence in their boats through frequent failures in the steering gear.²

Against these possibly unexpected weaknesses could be set the unforeseen advantage we derived from our ability to interpret the German wireless signals. It seemed unlikely, until the Germans should change their code, that any important move of the High Sea Fleet out into the North Sea could take place without some intercepted signal giving us light on what was about to occur. The result was, that it was no longer necessary for the Grand Fleet either to carry on the continual sweeps of the North Sea, as prescribed in the War Plans, or to be constantly in a state of complete readiness. It was now possible for rest and training to be looked upon as matters of essential routine. On the whole, the Grand Fleet was less harassed, more secure, and stronger than when war broke out.

CHAPTER X.

LOSS OF THE "FORMIDABLE," AND INSTITUTION OF THE DOVER BARRAGE.

104. **Renewal of German Submarine Activity in the Channel, December 27.**—The middle of December found operations in progress, not only in the North Sea and on the English coast, but also a renewal of activity by British ships on the Belgian coast. On December 15 and 16 the *Revenge* carried out bombardments in connection with the French operations east of Nieuport,³ and the two German submarines in Zeebrugge, *U.12* and *U.5*, were sent out on the 17th and 18th, respectively, to attack Admiral Hood's ships, as soon as the weather, which had been thick, had somewhat improved. *U.5* (Lieutenant-Commander Lemmer), failed to return, and it was thought she had struck a British mine. The loss was successfully concealed from us. This was the second submarine loss in the Zeebrugge flotilla, for *U.11* had been lost a week previously. *U.12* continued to go out daily, returning to Zeebrugge every evening.

¹ Jellicoe: *The Grand Fleet*, pp. 174, 175, 188.

² Tel. 539, C.-in-C. to Adty., 31.12.14.

³ See Monograph No. 18, "Dover, Vol. I."

During her regular patrols on December 28 and 30 she discovered the Thornton Bank minefield, which had been laid on November 3. No less than 50 of the mines broke adrift in the New Year's gale, and were washed up on shore. On December 24, Norddeich announced to all ships that a German minefield, 4 miles wide, had been laid north-west of Nieuport Bank, and on the same day we intercepted a signal to a German submarine, warning her of the mines.¹

The XXVIIIth Infantry Division began crossing from Southampton to Havre on the night of 19th-20th, with the *Beagle* class destroyers from Portsmouth as escorts. The state of the tide prevented the transports from entering Havre until some hours after daybreak, and as a precaution against submarines, Admiral Favereau was asked to have all his available torpedo craft outside Havre during the night 19th-20th and two following nights, whilst Admiral Meux sent some of his trawlers across to patrol. The system of lights and buoys in the Channel had been altered between November 18 and December 10, for the confusion of submarines, but during the last few weeks the German submarines not employed on the defence of the Bight had been busy in the north and on the Belgian coast. However, their activities in the Channel were now once more on the point of recommencing.

On December 22 Lieutenant-Commander Schneider left the Ems in *U.24*, for Zeebrugge, reconnoitring for mines and patrols on the way, preparatory to the despatch of another submarine half-flotilla. It was not until he had sailed that the news of the loss of *U.5* reached the commanding officer of the submarine flotillas; he attempted in vain to recall *U.24* by wireless, but the boat reached Zeebrugge safely on December 24, though she narrowly escaped being bombed from the air whilst embarking stores at Bruges next day. On December 27, Lieutenant-Commander Schneider set out to operate off Plymouth, where enemy vessels were expected.² He spent the night of December 28-29 sheltering from the weather on the bottom, between Dover and Folkestone, 2 miles from the coast. At midnight, 29th-30th, off St. Catherine's Point, he sighted two large darkened ships, steaming fast, but could not get a shot at them.

The vessels sighted by *U.24* were two of the 6th Battle Squadron, steaming at 13 knots for Sheerness. During their stay at Portland, the *Albemarle*, *Exmouth*, and *Duncan* had carried out firing practices, and on December 26 the Admiralty ordered them to change places with the 5th Battle Squadron at Sheerness, in order that the latter also might do some firing.

¹ I.D.H.S., A 851. This minefield is not mentioned in *Nordsee* III, or in O.U. 6020, "Statement of German Minefields." There is evidence, however, that there were mines in West Deep, off Nieuport, see Papers titled X. 6117/15 and X. 8415/15, and "Dover, Vol. I." A French torpedo boat, No. 319, was sunk by a mine $1\frac{1}{4}$ ' N of the Bell Buoy in West Deep, on January 19. (H.S. 86, pp. 889, 935.)

² Probably the troop transports which were arriving from the East.

On December 17 Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly had taken over the command of the Channel Fleet from Admiral Burney, who now succeeded to Sir Lewis Bayly's command of the 1st Battle Squadron. It appeared to Admiral Bayly most necessary that the 5th Battle Squadron, which had been lying in harbour for some time, should be taken to sea for exercises and to fire their guns.¹ He suggested a bombardment of Borkum or Sylt, but apart from the fact that this would cause the expenditure of a considerable amount of ammunition without affording adequate return in training, there were no destroyers available in southern waters to protect the ships during such an operation; for the 1st Flotilla was proceeding north shortly to join the Grand Fleet, and the "M" class boats were not yet all available. Thus the only flotilla, other than the patrols, in southern waters, was the 3rd, and this had to stand by for the escort of the XXVIIth Division. The Admiralty, therefore, ordered the exercises to be carried out from Portland.² Admiral Bayly arranged that the 6th Battle Squadron should arrive at Sheerness at 1 p.m. on December 30, the 5th Battle Squadron, in which he flew his flag on board the *Lord Nelson*, leaving Sheerness at 10 a.m. that day and carrying out exercises in the Channel, prior to arriving at Portland at daylight on January 2.³

These movements necessitated the allotting of destroyer escorts. Escorts were not, as a rule, provided for ships on passage west of Dover, though vessels passing through the Straits were escorted, except at night, and all important troop movements were covered by destroyers. Admiral Hood was instructed by the Admiralty to send four destroyers to escort the 6th Battle Squadron from Folkestone to the Nore, and Commodore Tyrwhitt was told that six of his boats were to escort the 5th Battle Squadron as far as Folkestone.⁴ Admiral Bayly had been cautioned by the Admiralty to beware of submarine attack while on passage, and he replied that the ships would carry out the movements at 15 knots. No destroyer protection was arranged by the Admiralty for the 5th Battle Squadron during its practice. The 6th Battle Squadron had just carried out their firings from Portland without such protection, except in the case of one ship, the *Duncan*, for which Portland provided a T.B. patrol⁵; and, indeed, since December 10, when a submarine was fired on at the entrance to Dover harbour, no enemy submarine had been sighted in the Channel.⁶

¹ Admiral Burney had attempted to carry out firing from Sheerness, but, owing to the short period of time during which the ships could enter or leave harbour, and to other difficulties, it had not been possible to carry it out.

² M. 0087/14, Composition and Orders of Channel Fleet, and M. 0088/14, Operations of 5th Battle Squadron.


³ A 347.

⁴ A 348, 349.

⁵ H.S. 70, p. 1,061.

⁶ Daily Return of Movements of German and French Ships in Home Waters.

105. **Channel Patrols, December 1914.**¹—The new system of occupation of patrol areas by the 6th Flotilla and submarines at Dover had been in force since early in December. The Straits were divided into eight areas; and endeavours were made to keep one destroyer in each area, night and day. It was often impossible to occupy all eight areas, owing to the frequent demands made by the Admiralty on the Dover Flotilla for escort duty. Admiral Hood's practice, when he had not boats enough for more than four stations, was to give up the area system and revert



to the cordon which it had superseded. When a submarine was reported the patrols did not leave their areas, but all available resting destroyers left harbour for the spot indicated, and using that as a centre, searched radially from it, working their modified sweeps. The trawlers of the Dover Patrol worked always between Dover Harbour and the South Goodwin, to guard the southern entrance to the Downs.²

The constant patrolling in the wintry weather caused many breakdowns among the destroyers; on the night of December 28-29, when *U.24* was in the Straits, eight out of the 24 Dover

¹ M. 05100/14. Disposition of Patrols (Titled X. 3828/14).

² Letter 245/033, from R.A., Dover Patrol, 8.12.14, in Papers titled *Admiralty*, 28 November 1914.

destroyers were under repair. It happened to be a moment when none of them had been detached on escort or other non-patrol duties, and the areas were all occupied. The *Tartar*, which was keeping watch in Area 2, in a strong gale and very heavy sea, opened fire at 10.20 p.m., December 28, on some object, thought to be a submarine. The position was S75E, $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Dover.¹ At that time *U.24* was certainly not far away; but she was on the bottom, only 2 miles from Dover, sheltering from the weather; and the object seen was not a submarine.

There were other patrols besides that kept by Admiral Hood's force. The French maintained four submarines from Boulogne on the line Cape Griz Nez to Varne, and four from Calais on a line Calais to the centre of the Straits. The French torpedo boats on the coast between Calais and Dunkirk were used for operations on the Belgian coast. Some of Admiral Favereau's 18 destroyers at Cherbourg made periodical sweeps in the eastern half of the Channel, between the line St. Catherine's Point-La Hogue and the Straits of Dover, and made occasional sweeps to the westward if required. The French might also be called upon to assist in the escort of transports, which, since December 8, had sailed singly, each escorted by a destroyer. This duty was usually carried out by the *Beagle* class destroyers, of which, by December 15, there were 10 at Portsmouth; and normally, the French responsibility in this respect was limited to guarding the approaches to Havre.² The arrangement was that the French torpedo boats should come out from Havre to bring the transports in and protect any unable to enter owing to the state of the tide; but they did not perform their duty very readily.³ The French submarines at Cherbourg usually limited their activities to the immediate vicinity of that place in order to avoid mistakes. Three French submarines were attached to the extended defence of Portsmouth, under the orders of Admiral Meux. There were now three units of trawlers at Portsmouth, each vessel armed with a gun and fitted with the modified sweep, the leaders having W/T. The drifters, however, 20 in number, were without guns, as all available guns were required for arming sea-going auxiliary patrol yachts and trawlers.⁴ Cruiser Force G, and the cruisers and light cruisers of the French 2nd Light Squadron patrolled as usual between the Lizard and the French coast, each on their own side, supported by three of Admiral Favereau's large cruisers 50 miles to the eastward of the patrol line.

¹ *Tartar's* Deck Log.

² *By day*—1 armed examination vessel, 1 t.b. under way, 1 t.b. at buoy at entrance. *By night*—1 armed examination vessel, 2 t.b.s under way.

³ C.-in-C., Portsmouth, to Admiralty, 320, 12.12.14, and M. 0129/15.

⁴ Tel., Admiralty to C.-in-C., Portsmouth, 2021, 17.12.14.

106. **Sinking of the "Formidable," January 1915.**¹—The 5th Battle Squadron passed the *Duncans* on their way into Sheerness about noon on the 30th, and at 8 a.m. on December 31 the squadron, steering a steady course down Channel at 8 knots, was 13 miles south of Portland Bill.² The *Lord Nelson* had just rejoined after parting company at 4 a.m. to secure her fore-castle hatch covers and torpedo nets, and Admiral Bayly now increased speed to 12 knots and commenced exercising manœuvres.³ After sighting the *Duncans*, Lieutenant-Commander Schneider had gone on to the Start, where he charged his batteries during the night, holding his boat at slow speed against the strong southerly wind and sea. At 9.50 a.m. on the 31st he was about 25 miles SSW of Portland, when he sighted smoke to the north-westward, and steering towards it, discovered the 5th Battle Squadron.⁴ For nearly four hours, whilst the squadron exercised alter course manœuvres, Lieutenant-Commander Schneider tried to get into position to attack without success, and, finally, at 1.30 p.m., when his batteries were nearly exhausted and the 5th Battle Squadron steering east appeared to be going into Portsmouth, he gave up the attempt and began to recharge his batteries. *U.24* remained unseen by our ships.

After turning 16 points at 1.30 p.m., the 5th Battle Squadron steered up Channel throughout the afternoon, Admiral Bayly intending to carry out various exercises and manœuvres next day, before entering Portland Harbour at daylight on January 2. At 5.50 p.m., the *Prince of Wales* reported by signal that a steamer flying the Norwegian flag had been behaving suspiciously for the last two hours; the *Diamond* was ordered to examine her, but she does not seem to have been boarded. At 7 p.m., Admiral Bayly altered course 16 points, and steamed back parallel to and $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the southward of his daylight track, "carrying out to the letter the ordinary precautions,"⁵ which directed that, when in waters where submarine attack was possible, ships cruising at less than 14 knots speed should make an alteration of course just after dark, in case they might have been sighted in daylight and followed.⁶ The ships were steaming at 10 knots, in line ahead, 2 cables apart, with the *Topaze* and *Diamond* 1 mile astern of the squadron. The night was cloudy but clear, the visibility at times being as much as 2 miles. A fresh breeze

¹ The various reports, etc., dealing with this are in H.S., Vol. 142.

² See Plan VII.

³ Signal Log of *Lord Nelson*, No. 41135.


⁴ *Nordsee* III, Karte 15, shows *U.24*'s position at 0950 on 31st 30 miles SSE of Start Point, but the text, p. 145, says she sighted the 5th Battle Squadron to the NW of her, and her position has been so plotted on Plan VII.

⁵ M. 0372/15, V.-A., Channel Fleet. Statement of his action as regards the conduct of the Channel Fleet on the occasion when *Formidable* was lost.

⁶ G.F. Orders, Section 267, and Channel Fleet Orders, Section 177.

was blowing from the southward, raising a choppy sea, favourable to submarine operations.

Whilst lying on the surface recharging her batteries, *U.24* had drifted some miles up Channel. At 10.30 p.m. on the 31st Lieutenant-Commander Schneider once more got under way and set a course for Start Point, intending to be off Plymouth before daylight.¹ At 1.8 a.m. on January 1 he sighted three ships without lights, bearing 80 deg. to starboard, and soon recognised them as large warships.² They were the three leading ships of



the 5th Battle Squadron, and at 1.58 a.m., *U.24* was just able to get off a torpedo at the third ship, the *Queen*, at 750 yards. The firing angle was acute; the torpedo missed, and was not observed by any of the ships. The remaining five battleships now came in sight, all unconscious of the proximity of an enemy submarine; crossing their wake, Lieutenant-Commander Schneider came up on the starboard side of the rear ship, the *Formidable* (Captain Arthur N. Loxley), and at 2.25 a.m. fired two torpedoes at her at 6 seconds interval, one, at least, of which took effect abreast the foremost funnel.

¹ *Nordsee* III, p. 146. Her course shown on Plan VII does not lead to the Start, but the evidence is that she thought herself further west than she actually was.

² The time is given as 2.55 a.m. (S.M.T.) in *Nordsee* III, p. 146, and 1.55 a.m. (S.M.T.) in Karte 15. Presumably, 12.55 a.m. (G.M.T.) is meant, but times have been adjusted from the time of torpedoing of *Formidable*, given by her O.O.W. as 2.25 a.m., and by *U.24* as 2.12 a.m. (G.M.T.). Presumably the fourth ship was astern of station, for from Karte 15, it appears that the three leading ships were out of sight when the five rear ships came into view.

The *Formidable* hauled out of line to port and was brought up into the wind. The ship listed 10 deg. to starboard and steam went almost immediately, owing probably to the damage to her boilers and steampipes caused by the explosion. Wind and sea were now increasing rapidly,¹ the ship was in darkness and listing, in spite of the attempts to get her on an even keel; but the launch and sailing pinnace were got out by hand, and the sea boats and some target rafts were launched. Owing to the difficulty of remaining alongside the ship in the heavy sea, the launch drifted away without her full complement of men, but by picking up men in the water, both launch and sailing pinnace eventually had about as many men on board as they could safely carry in such weather. The *Formidable* had landed one of her cutters on the outbreak of war,² but the other two were lowered, one of them capsizing. Over 500 officers and men remained on board after the boats left the ship, and were employed in getting down the timber stowed on the booms, and in passing up from below mess tables and other wooden articles. It was recognised on board that the explosion was due to a torpedo, and that a submarine was present³; but the ship could not steam, and all the stokers had been ordered up from below.

The explosion on board the *Formidable* had been seen by the *Topaze*,⁴ and Commander W. J. B. Law (in Command), steamed up, and, seeing boats in the water, began the work of rescue. He had just picked up 43 men, who were in the barge, when a brightly lighted liner came in sight, and by Captain Loxley's orders, the *Topaze* closed her and requested urgent assistance; but although his signals were acknowledged and understood, the vessel continued her course, nor did she pay any attention to the *Formidable's* unmistakable distress signals. The *Diamond* was standing off in obedience to a warning from the *Topaze*, to beware of submarines.

U.24, meanwhile, again approached the *Formidable*, and about 3.10 a.m. Lieutenant-Commander Schneider fired a third torpedo. Exploding nearly amidships, on the port side, it brought the *Formidable* on to almost an even keel, but caused her to settle slightly by the bows. The *Topaze* was just approaching after trying to stop the liner, and Captain Loxley hailed her and ordered her to leave the sinking ship on account of the submarine. The latter was almost simultaneously reported close to the *Topaze*, but owing to the men struggling in the water and to the position of the *Diamond*, Commander Law was unable to open fire, and *U.24* escaped submerged.

¹ 2.30 a.m. Wind, 4-5; sea, 3-3 a.m. Wind, 5-6; sea, 4-4 a.m. Wind, 6-7; sea, 6. (N.L. 3426/15: Loss of *Formidable*. Admiral Bayly's Report).

² *Lord Nelson's* Signal Log No. 41134.

³ *Topaze*, Report. (N.L. 3426/15).

⁴ The signalman of the watch reported it as a gun fired by the *Formidable*, but *U.24* was not fired at. If she was sighted at all (which is doubtful), it was not until either shortly before or after the *Formidable* was torpedoed for the second time.

The *Diamond* now joined the *Topaze* in the work of rescue. The wind and sea had increased so much that the two light cruisers were almost unmanageable. Some of the *Formidable's* boats had capsized, whilst the others had drifted away from the ship. The *Topaze* succeeded in stopping a small steamer, which, however, made off after standing by for a short while.

About 4.39 a.m. the *Formidable* sank by the bows,¹ and the *Diamond* steamed to leeward of the wreck to pick up the men struggling in the water. In the rough sea the wood which floated off the battleship's deck was of little help to the men, but, by means of life lines, the *Diamond* picked up 37 officers and men. Her cutter, which she had lowered, was carried away by the wind and was not found until 6.15 a.m. It had to be abandoned, though the crew were saved.

The *Formidable's* launch, though holed, and without boilers and short of oars, was kept afloat, the 2 warrant officers and 71 men in her being rescued about noon, by fine seamanship, by Captain W. Pillar, of the Brixham sailing trawler *Provident*.² The sailing pinnace reached Lyme Regis after 22 hours' struggle in the heavy sea, 6 out of the 55 petty officers and men in her being found dead from exposure, whilst three others died shortly after landing. Captain Loxley and the majority of the officers and over 500 men went down with the ship.³

Owing to the rapid loss of steam and stopping of the dynamos, the *Formidable* was unable to send out any wireless report that she had been torpedoed. At 2.30 a.m., the *London*, her next ahead, reported that the *Formidable* had hauled out of line, but it was not until 3 a.m. that the *Lord Nelson* received a report from the *Topaze* that the ship had been torpedoed.⁴

At the time, the remainder of the squadron had just turned 16 points, in accordance with the courses ordered for the night. Ordering the ships to raise steam for full speed, Admiral Bayly turned 4 points to port and steered to the north-eastward for two hours to get clear of the *Formidable*, whose distress signals could now be seen; and at 5 a.m. he set a course for Portland, where he arrived at 10 a.m., abandoning the projected exercises.

By Admiral Bayly's orders the *Topaze* and *Diamond* stood by the scene of the disaster until daylight, but in the⁵ rough cold sea no men could hope to survive for long. So bad was the weather, that the tugs and torpedo boats sent out from Portland had to return, and Admiral Bayly sent back the four destroyers despatched to the scene of the wreck by the Commander-in-Chief,

¹ *Diamond's* Report. H.S. 142, p. 20.

² H.S. 142, p. 121.

³ The two W.O.'s in the launch were the only officers saved by boats, such of the others as were saved being rescued out of the water.

⁴ *Lord Nelson's* Signal Log No. 41135.

⁵ Signal log, of *Lord Nelson*, No. 41135.

Portsmouth.¹ Eleven destroyers of the 1st Flotilla went out from Harwich during the afternoon by Admiralty orders, to sweep the Channel from Dover to Plymouth, on the English side, but they, too, had to put back for shelter until early on January 2, when they left again to carry out the sweep. The *Acheron* and 1st Division swept between the lines Dover-Calais and Brighton-Cape Antifer; the *Hornet* and 4th Division west of this, as far as the Cherbourg-Anvil Point line; and the *Ferret* and 5th Division continued the sweep to the line Plymouth-Ushant. Admiral Favereau sent out destroyers that day on his side of the channel, with orders to pay particular attention to the transport route. To avoid confusion with the French, our boats in all cases kept north of 50° N.²

Nothing more was seen of *U.24*, which arrived at Zeebrugge on January 3, with a damaged periscope and only two torpedoes remaining. The Admiralstab had learnt of her exploit within 24 hours of the event, and at 9 a.m. on the 2nd, Reuter, at Amsterdam, had it in a telegram from Berlin.

Although, admittedly, there had been some lack of precision in the Admiralty orders issued to Sir Lewis Bayly for the movements of the Channel squadrons, the Board severely blamed him for faulty and careless conduct, which resulted in the disaster³; and on January 16, they ordered him to hand over the command of the Channel Fleet to Admiral Bethell, whose place, in command of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, Admiral Bayly now took.

There seems to have been some suspicion at the Admiralty that intelligence of the intended movements of the 5th Battle Squadron had reached the Germans through an unguarded signal, for on January 9, they enquired of the *Fearless* whether any *en clair* signals had been intercepted during the past fortnight from the *Lord Nelson* to the French authorities.⁴ Admiral Bayly had duly notified Admiral Favereau of his intended movements, but the signal had been sent in code. However, the fact that the 5th Battle Squadron was leaving at 10 a.m. on December 30, for Portland, was generally known in the Channel Fleet two days previously, for on the 28th a number of visual

¹ Admiral Bayly did not ask Portsmouth for destroyers until 5.32 a.m., though the incident occurred within that area. Admiral Meux heard of the torpedoing of the *Formidable* through intercepted telegrams, and was ordered by the Admiralty to send out destroyers. One of the four destroyers, the *Savage*, went on and picked up five bodies. Admiral Bayly asked Devonport and Portland to send out destroyers. At Devonport there were only the Examination Service vessels and eight T.B.s, and at Portland there were six T.B.s. Two of the latter were sent out, but had to be recalled on account of the weather. Portland also diverted the destroyer *Matchless* by W/T and sent a tug. Devonport sent two boarding steamers.

² A 357-360, 365, 366, 368, 370. H.S. 83, pp. 164, 173, 242.

³ See Papers in H.S. 142.

⁴ H.S. 142, p. 94.

signals to that effect was made in plain language by the *Lord Nelson*¹; it became known on shore through the medium of postmen and stewards of the Fleet; but *U.24* left Zeebrugge four days earlier than this, and the intelligence did not apparently reach the Germans in time to be of use, if at all.

107. Admiralty Measures.—Steps were immediately taken by the Admiralty to watch the submarine base at Zeebrugge. Two of Admiral Hood's submarines, *C.31* and *C.34*, were placed under Commodore Keyes' orders to carry out this watch.² *C.31* (Lieutenant George Pilkington) proceeded from Harwich on the 4th, but failed to return. Commodore Keyes went across on the night of January 9–10, with the *Lurcher* and *Firedrake*, to search for her, but he found no traces of her, and it is concluded that she struck one of the mines of the German field off the port. On the Commodore's suggestion, the detachment of the Royal Naval Air Service at Dunkirk was instructed to keep a good lookout for any salvage operations, but nothing that could be reasonably assumed to be such was noticed. Her loss had the effect of suspending the proposed watch off Zeebrugge, and *C.34* did not sail.³

It was realised at the Admiralty that, in future, destroyer escort must be provided for all large ships cruising in narrow waters,⁴ and, in order that adequate protection might be arranged, they issued orders that no large ship was to be sent to sea without their permission.⁵

The last large ship to cruise in the Channel without escort was the *Commonwealth*, coming down westabout from Rosyth to refit at Chatham. She reported her progress regularly, and at 6 p.m. on January 1 the Admiralty learnt from an intercepted signal to Admiral Wemyss that she would pass up Channel that night. No destroyers were ordered to meet her, and the only warning she had of submarines seems to have been one sent at 11 a.m. that day by Admiral Bayly. At 7 a.m. on the 2nd the *Commonwealth* was off the Start, the scene of the disaster 24 hours previously. She was not due at the Tongue Light Vessel until 8 a.m. next day, and she accordingly turned and steered W for 4½ hours. At 11.30 a.m. she once more turned up Channel, but not until she reached the Varne Lightship did destroyers meet her.⁶ On the other hand, the strictest precautions were taken to ensure the safety of other large ships in the Channel. The *Majestic*, on passage from Dover to Portland, was ordered in to Portsmouth; the *Monarch*, coming down from

¹ Signal Log No. 41134.

² A 375.

³ Comm. (S) War Records, Vol. II, pp. 48–9.

⁴ H.S. 142, p. 109.

⁵ H.S. 83, p. 641.

⁶ M. 0167/15, "H.M.S. *Commonwealth*, Letter of Proceedings," and H.S. 82, pp. 449, 476; H.S. 83, pp. 77, 105, 204, 238, 294, 336–338, 360.

Scapa westabout, to refit at Devonport, put into Queenstown; and the *Cornwallis* was ordered to remain in harbour at Killary Bay. Special orders were sent to the *Minotaur* on the way home from the Mediterranean.¹ Two destroyers took the *Venerable* from Portland to Portsmouth on the night of January 6-7, and she was not allowed to go on to Chatham until the night of January 8-9, as a submarine was said to have been seen 8 miles N of Whitstable. An entire division brought the damaged *Monarch* from Queenstown to Plymouth. Submarines were reported to be in that neighbourhood also, and the *Queen Elizabeth* was sent out to Gibraltar to do her gunnery before joining the fleet, in order to be safer during her practices. For the time being, the 5th Battle Squadron was ordered to remain in harbour.²

108. **The Admiralty urge the Capture of Zeebrugge.**—The reappearance of enemy submarines in the Channel brought once more urgently to the fore the necessity of clearing the Belgian coast and capturing Zeebrugge, which, it was recognised, the Germans were steadily developing into an important submarine base. The Admiralty strongly urged that an advance along the coast to Ostend should be made in conjunction with the landing of a large force at Zeebrugge under cover of warships.³

This fitted exactly with Sir John French's own views, who held that an attack along the Belgian coast, in conjunction with the Navy, was the proper rôle of our armies in France. He had been studying the problem for some weeks, and at a conference with General Joffre, at Chantilly, on December 27, he had urged this view. The French Commander-in-Chief agreed in principle, but at the moment he was planning to strike further south before the German 1914 class, called up in October, were ready; and to do so he required Sir John French to relieve the French troops to the northward of the British line. To enable him to do this, General French proposed to the King of the Belgians that the British and Belgian forces should be amalgamated. The standard of efficiency of the Belgians, particularly of the leaders and the staff, was lower than that of the British; and to counteract this to some effect Sir John French wished to embody Belgian brigades in his own army corps. After consultation with his government, the King of the Belgians refused to fall in with the plan. "Had my proposed plans been acceptable to the Belgians," wrote Sir John French, on January 3, "I think it would have been possible for me to have organised a sufficient force with which, in conjunction with the Fleet, to have effected the capture of Ostend and Zeebrugge."⁴ Pending the arrival of considerable reinforcements—General French asked for at least 50 battalions, guns and ammunition—the operation had to be

¹ A 361, 364, 369, 371.

² H.S. 84, p. 69.

³ A 374.

⁴ Memo. dated 3.1.15. (C.I.D., G-1.)

postponed in deference to General Joffre's desire that British troops should take over the French line north of La Bassée, as far as the sea.

109. **Further Reports of Submarines in the Channel, January 1915.**—The reappearance of an enemy submarine in the Channel and the sinking of the *Formidable* was the signal for a crop of submarine reports. A periscope was said to have been seen off Teignmouth at noon on January 3, and the *Hornet's* division of destroyers, which had gone in to Portland during the afternoon on conclusion of their sweep in the Channel, left at 4 a.m. on the 4th to search for the submarine.¹ Two were reported to have come to the surface astern of the destroyers as they passed Teignmouth to search Tor Bay, and the *Hornet* reported that she was attacked about 10.30 a.m., 2 miles south-east of Berry Head.² From Exmouth came a report that two submarines had been seen at 8.15 a.m. on the previous day. The *Ferret's* division, after taking the *Monarch* into Plymouth, joined the *Hornet* in a systematic search for the supposed submarines; the *Acheron's* division was working in the Dover area. No sign of the enemy submarines was seen on the 5th, and on the 6th the *Hornet's* and *Acheron's* divisions returned to Harwich, the *Ferret's* following next day. No sooner had the destroyers left than the imaginary submarines began once more to appear, and on the 10th and 11th no less than eight were reported from various watering places between Portsmouth and the Lizard. Mysterious signalling was reported to take place from the shore to submarines, and representatives were called up to the Admiralty from the naval ports to discuss the question.

Both the submarines and the signalling from shore existed only in the imagination of those people (mainly civilians) who made the reports in all good faith. No submarines whatever were working in the Channel at the time. The Germans still possessed some 25 submarines only, approximately the number with which they had entered the war, the new construction having done no more than balance their losses. Half the boats were in dockyard hands at any average moment.³ Three boats had been detached to the Baltic, and a certain number were apparently employed on the defence of the Bight. There was an average of three boats working in the North Sea daily during January, but the Zeebrugge flotilla had not been increased, and there were here *U.12* and *U.24* only.

On January 6, *U.12* tried the experiment of taking to sea a seaplane lashed to her upper deck forward, in order to increase the radius of action of the aircraft reconnoitring on the Flanders coast, but it was found that this procedure was possible only

¹ H.S. 83, pp. 531, 610, 639.

² H.S. 83, pp. 696, 718.

³ *Nordsee* III, p. 189.

in the most exceptional weather, a conclusion which, it might be thought, the Germans could have reached without actual experiment.

Agents at this time reported to the Germans that 38,000 Canadian troops left London on January 10 for Boulogne. The intelligence, though untrue, was believed to be reliable, and Lieutenant-Commander Forstmann took *U.12* out that day to attack the transports. He found a strong trawler patrol in the Straits, but no transports, and on the following day heavy weather drove him home.

Meanwhile, the German agents were sending in alarming reports of serious naval and military operations about to be undertaken by the Allies on the Belgian coast. Possibly they had got wind of General French's plans to capture Ostend and Zeebrugge. On January 14, *U.24* and *U.12*, still the only two submarines at Zeebrugge, were sent out. *U.12* went no further than the *Wandelaar* Light Vessel, but *U.24* went on to Calais and Boulogne. Nothing was sighted except hospital ships, and on the 17th, *U.24* returned to Zeebrugge. She left for Emden on the 28th.

110. The Dover Barrage Instituted.—The patrol encountered by *U.12* was apparently the drifter patrol that had been established towards the end of December. Whilst at Dunkirk for the bombardment of December 15 and 16, Admiral Hood had become gravely concerned with the accumulation of naval parties at the base. There were armed motor boats, horse boats, drifters, monitors, gunboats, and trawlers with modified sweep, as well as an observation of fire party, armoured trains, flying officers, medical officers, and a large number of officers and men whose function the Admiral could not discover.¹

Admiral Hood was too occupied with the most important of his functions, the patrol of the Straits, to be able to control all these parties, and he suggested that Commander Fullerton, of the *Severn*, the Senior Officer on the Active List, should be given the acting rank of Captain and placed in command at Dunkirk. But the objection to this was that it would lead to the monitor

¹ M. 039/14, "Accumulation of Naval Parties at Dunkirk" (titled X. 3758/1914). The complete list was as follows:—

- 4 armed motor boats (2-3-pdr., 2 M.G.'s), with supply boats. Under R.A. (Tempy. Captain, R.N.V.R.) Eyres.
- 3 horse-boats (1-4.7 Q.F.). Under Comdr. Halahan.
- 9 armed drifters (1-3-pdr., 2 M.G.s). Under Captain Dick and Captain Carver (Retd.).
- 2 monitors (2-6-in.). Under Commander Fullerton.
- 2 gunboats (*Excellent*, 1-9.2-in., *Bustard*, 1-6-in.) out of action.
- 4 trawlers, with modified sweep, under Lieutenant-Commander Mackenzie Grieve. Armoured trains under Com. (Act.) Littlejohns (Retd.). Observation of Fire Party under Comdr. Altham, Flying Officers, R.N.V.R. Officers, Medical Officers, etc.

being kept at the base, instead of being sent where required ; and for the time being no change was made.

The drifters were, however, withdrawn on December 22. They had been "hustled down from the North Sea without bedding, without lamps, without proper fittings on deck."¹ They arrived at Dunkirk on December 15, and had spent the last week in fitting out for sea.² They drew too much water to be used on the north French and Belgian canals, like Captain Eyres' motor boats and the horse boats ; and Admiral Hood was at a loss to know how to employ them. Eleven more armed drifters had arrived at Dover on December 18, but although the Admiral had asked the Admiralty what was to be done with them, he received no reply.³ By Admiralty order, the entire 20 were now used to patrol the Straits.⁴

The patrol did not long remain in being. On January 13 12 of the drifters were sent to Sheerness for anti-submarine work in the Thames Estuary, and the remaining eight went to Portsmouth.⁵ A new method of preventing the passage of enemy submarines through the Straits was being tried, consisting of a barrage of indicator nets. The first trials were carried out by Admiral Hood two days later, and within a month 30 drifters were riding to their nets across the Straits.⁶

¹ R.A.D.P. Daily Report, 13 January 1915.

² (M. 0347/15, see H.S. 174, p. 23.)

³ H.S. 80, p. 833. They were apparently intended to be used with the nine on the Belgian coast. Cf. M. no number, 29.12.14, "Small Craft for Employment on Belgian Canals."

⁴ H.S. 81, p. 645. The telegram says that the drifters were to work to westward of the Dover Patrol, the western limit of which was a line, Dungeness-Boulogne. U.12 encountered the drifter patrol between the Outer Ruytingen and West Dyck, but, as far as can be ascertained, there was no drifter patrol in the Straits other than the boats from Dover, about which, however, no other information is forthcoming.

⁵ H.S. 83, pp. 194, 239, 327.

⁶ See Monograph No. 18, *Dover*, Vol. I, Part IV.

CHAPTER XI.

THE FIRST MINING OF THE BIGHT AND THE FIRST ZEPPELIN RAID.

111. **British Mining Policy.**—The German battle cruiser raid on Scarborough, accompanied by the laying of a minefield within 3 miles of the coast of Great Britain, raised the questions both of defensive and offensive minefields. The shortage of mines, from which, at the outbreak of war we had suffered, was now to some extent remedied; 5,000 were ready, increasing at the rate of 2,000 a month; the only matter to decide was the positions in which they were to be laid.

The Commander-in-Chief, though at first inclined to advocate a policy of offensive mining, was now in favour of using the mines defensively. In September he had proposed mining one side of Heligoland Bight, leaving the other free for the entry of our submarines; but further consideration led him to the conclusion that minefields in German waters, as they must be left unobserved, would not be worth the risk of laying and the material expended. It was on this conclusion of his that the Admiralty decided to lay their first minefields across the entrance to Dover Strait rather than in German waters.¹ Again, in November, when submarines were reported frequently in the north, he proposed mining the Scottish lochs, reported to be used as shelters by submarines and their tenders; but the Admiralty were not convinced that mining was the most effective way of dealing with submarines, and preferred leaving the armed patrols unrestricted.²

Even after the Scarborough raid, the Commander-in-Chief did not propose retaliating by laying mines in German waters. He asked instead for a definite scheme, whereby minelayers loaded and ready for sea should be kept standing by to lay minefields at strategic centres as soon as it was known the enemy were at sea. He wanted also fast minelayers and destroyers carrying mines to accompany the Grand Fleet, and others to mine the gaps behind the enemy when he appeared on our own coasts.

Admiralty opinion was opposed to all these suggestions. We had neither ready, nor in view, any vessels capable of working with the fleet under battle conditions, and, if we had, mines laid in the heat of an action would be so uncertain in position and so difficult to notify to the fleet in time that they would be as likely to damage our own ships as the enemy; consequently, the Commander-in-Chief's desire to use mines tactically in a fleet action could not be fulfilled.³

¹ See Home Waters II, Appendix A.70, 123.

² M. 03905/14.

³ M. 05120/14.

As regards mining Heligoland Bight, Admiralty opinion was veering round. Part of the anti-invasion measures of November consisted in a scheme for lines of mines to be laid east and west of the Ems to catch the enemy returning home, but no orders were issued on the subject, nor was any definite approval given to the plan.¹ The policy of not restricting our own movements in German waters continued in force to the end of the year.

As a result of the observations of his submarines, Commodore Keyes came to the conclusion that the Amrum approach to the Elbe had not been mined by the Germans. He was, nevertheless, opposed to the idea of our laying a minefield there, partly because he thought the German minesweepers were so active that little result could be expected from a minefield in that locality unless it were laid during the dark hours of the night prior to the enemy's return, but mostly because he did not want those waters fouled for his submarines, since he hoped to be able to place several there before the High Sea Fleet returned next time.²

With the New Year, however, the Admiralty decided against the Commodore, and began to consider the details of an offensive operation in the Bight.

112. The First British Minefield Laid in Heligoland Bight, 8 January 1915.—It seemed probable to the Germans that we had laid mines in Heligoland Bight as part of our air raid on Christmas Day, and orders were given for a more extended programme of mine sweeping than had so far been attempted. The minesweepers could not get to work at once; but on January 3 they systematically searched the area north of Heligoland, while the 2nd Scouting Group, with a destroyer flotilla, patrolled from 40 to 100 miles west of Amrum Bank. They returned to the Jade at 10 a.m., January 4. Certain German wireless signals in connection with this sweep were intercepted and decyphered by us; and the Admiralty ordered Commodore (S) to send two submarines out, with a destroyer as wireless link, to wait orders for proceeding into the Bight. A few hours later they cancelled the order and recalled the submarines, as they understood the scouting group and destroyers had returned to harbour.³

Minelaying had been no part of the programme of the Christmas Day air raid, and though the enemy had laid minefields off five of our principal ports, so far our replies had been of a defensive character. But the Admiralty now determined on some measure of offensive mining on the enemy's own coast. The orders for the operation, known as O.Q., were issued by the Chief of the Staff on January 5.⁴ Four minelayers, to be detailed by the

¹ M. 05170/14.

² Comm. (S) War Records I, pp. 583, 586.

³ *Nordsee* III, 160. A 379, 380, 381, 386, 388.

⁴ See Appendix J.

Captain-in-Charge of Minelayers,¹ were to proceed from Sheerness, through the gap between the British and German minefields, accompanied by the *Aurora* and *Undaunted* from Harwich. As this part of the voyage had to be made in daylight, a division² of Harwich destroyers was attached to act as a submarine screen till nightfall, when they were to return to Harwich. The minelayers and cruisers were to make for Horn Reefs Light Vessel, by which they were to fix their position accurately; using this as a departure, the minelayers were to continue along to the position of Amrum Bank Light Vessel, and lay lines of mines there during the night east and west across the route out of Heligoland Bight, while the cruisers waited in support at a position about 30 miles to the westward of them. Should support not be required, the cruisers were to proceed to a position about 100 miles to the westward and await the return of the minelayers there. Owing to the secrecy which must be maintained if the operation were to have any chance of success, the orders were to be communicated only to the Commanding officers of the ships concerned until they were well at sea.³

That the contemplated operation was a hazardous one was well understood. The four minelayers selected to carry it out—*Naiad* (Captain Mervyn H. Cobbe), *Apollo* (Commander W. R. G. Petre), *Iphigenia* (Commander E. R. Morant), *Latona* (Commander T. H. M. Maurice)—were old vessels launched in 1890, their maximum speed was 15 knots, and their armament of four 4.7-in. guns was practically useless against the modern guns carried by German destroyers.⁴

The start, as intended, took place at 8.45 a.m. on January 7, when the four minelayers left Sheerness in moderately clear weather, under the escort of eight "L" and "M" class destroyers. Outside the port there was fog, so thick that the whole squadron had to anchor off the West Oaze Buoy. They proceeded again at 11.45 a.m. in the direction of Harwich, to meet the *Aurora* and *Undaunted*, which, also delayed by the fog, could not leave port till 1.15 p.m. Just about this time, the *Llewellyn*, anchored at West Oaze Buoy, en route from Chatham to Harwich, saw what she reported as the track of a torpedo. All the available vessels of the Nore Defence went out to search for the submarine, and the minesweepers swept the channel; they found nothing.⁵ By 4 p.m. the light cruisers had picked up the minelaying squadron and the destroyers had parted company for Harwich. Learning of the delay caused by the fog, the Admiralty at first ordered the operation to be carried out a day later; but on a representation from the Commodore that it was actually in progress, they

¹ Captain Mervyn H. Cobbe, R.N.

² Increased at Comm. (T's) suggestion to two divisions.

³ M. 010055/15. Orders for Operation O.Q.

⁴ Lockhart Leith: History of British Minefields.

⁵ H.S. 84, p. 283.

laid, the Admiralty informed Captain Cobbe that they highly appreciated the service rendered by him and the officers and men of the minelayers, as the risk involved was very considerable and was well known to all the officers and men concerned.¹

Soon after their departure from Sheerness a submarine had been reported off the port. The report was followed by others, in particular, one from the *Duncan*, at Sheerness, that she had seen three submarines proceeding up the Thames. Accordingly, Admiral Sir George Callaghan, who, on January 4, succeeded Sir Richard Poore as Commander-in-Chief, the Nore, was ordered to make a hunt on a large scale with all his available craft; the passages were to be blocked by drift nets, and small craft were to sweep with chains or wires. Nothing was found, and, in fact, no submarine was in the Thames at the time; but, in view of the very definite reports, the minelayers had to be escorted back from Harwich to Sheerness by eight of the Harwich destroyers.²

This was the first and last time that the old slow minelayers of this class were used to mine the enemy's waters. On January 10, three fast steamers, the *Princess Margaret*, *Princess Irene*, and *Biarritz*, were taken up to be fitted as minelayers; and later, other fast vessels of the same capabilities were added to the number.

Though the visit of the minelayers to the Bight had not been observed by the German patrols, the minefield soon revealed itself by the mines breaking adrift. Floating mines were seen off Amrum Bank by fishing vessels on the night of the 9th; and a Norwegian steamer, S.S. *Castor*, was sunk on the field next morning. The Germans sent out a warning to merchant ships and endeavoured to stop those approaching the danger areas. Patrols were performed by barrage-breakers,³ one of which struck a mine on the 14th.

We had foreseen that the minefield would soon be revealed and that sweeping would begin. Accordingly, on the 11th, a plan, called O.R., was drafted, which had as its object a raid on the minesweeping flotilla. Commodore Tyrwhitt's force was called upon to provide two squadrons, each to consist of a light cruiser and eight destroyers. The destroyers were to go to each end of Amrum Bank and sweep north and south respectively between it and the coast of Schleswig, while the light cruisers remained in support on the seaward side of the minefield, whose position was accurately given in the orders. The raid on the minesweepers was to be made on the 13th at high water, 8.15 a.m., when the danger from mines would be least; but if the weather were such that destroyers could not escape from light cruisers,

¹ M. 0323/15: Report on Operation O.Q.

² A 405, 410, 411, 412, 415; H.S. 84, pp. 498, 516, 636, 743, 764.

³ *Sperrbrecher* in the original German. These were steamers whose draught had been increased by sand or cement ballast (*Nordsee* III, 166); they combined the functions of minesweepers and mine-bumpers.

it was to be deferred.¹ When the time came, however, the weather prevented a start and the operation was cancelled.²

The minefield lay right across the only remaining channel into Heligoland Bight which had been officially notified as a route for merchant vessels; and the Germans considered it as intended principally to put a stop to their reviving overseas trade. The Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet had often objected to the use by merchant vessels of this passage into the Bight; he would rather have had merchant traffic limited to the Ems and Skagerrack; but as the Admiralstab were anxious to restore the trade of the German North Sea ports, his objections had been overruled.

113. A Second German Minefield off the Humber, 14 January 1915.—The revelation of our minefield off Amrum Bank not only blocked neutral traffic with German ports, but also upset the plans for an operation just about to begin. The success of the Scarborough raid naturally produced a desire to repeat that form of offensive, and plans for mining the approaches to the Humber, Forth and Cromarty were considered. The Humber scheme took precedence, since definite reports had come in of six heavy fighting ships based there. The new minefield was to be to seaward of that laid on August 24, and the mines were to be set to 16 ft. below low water springs, so that the loss of a fishing boat should not prematurely expose their position. The date fixed for the operation was January 12 and 13, when the whole High Sea Fleet, except the *Oldenburg* and *Kronprinz*, under repair, would be available.

The plan for the operation was much the same as that of our raids into the Bight. The light cruisers with mines were to go to about 40 miles from the Humber, the battle cruisers supporting from 30 miles further eastward, while the battle squadrons came far enough out for a junction of the whole fleet to be effected at daylight. Three submarines were to take up positions about half-way between Norfolk and the Texel.

A submarine, *U.28*, had noted during the Scarborough raid that trawlers patrolled immediately west of the peace position of Swarte Bank Lightship, and it was considered necessary to send out *U.22* on January 3 to make a reconnaissance. She sighted no patrol vessels or floating mines, and the trawlers she met east of the Outer Dowsing seemed to be merely ordinary fishing boats. She was back in the Ems by the 6th.

The discovery of our new minefield off the Amrum Bank put a temporary stop to the operation, for Admiral von Ingenohl would not start unless the passage NE of Heligoland were clear for his return, and he decided to postpone the mining expedition

¹ M. 010056/15 : Orders for Operation O.R.

² H.S. 85, p. 238 ; A 420, 422.

until the minefield had been accurately located. He ordered the field to be swept up ; but owing to the stormy weather it was not until the 12th that work was begun on it.

Next day, although minesweeping had only just begun and the heavier ships had no hope of moving for some days, *U.22*, *U.31*, and *U.32* were despatched to their watching positions on the meridian of 3° E. The weather was most winterly, with a westerly gale of force 9, accompanied by hail and snow. *U.32*, the southernmost of the three boats, was compelled to return on the 17th, and next day *U.19* was sent out to occupy her station, which was about 50 miles east of Lowestoft. Meanwhile, mine-sweeping had been actively in progress on the Amrum Bank minefield with the accompaniment, so familiar to us, of mines exploding and hurling splinters 200 ft. into the air ; the concussion was sometimes so great as to cause leaks in the minesweepers. The approaches to the Jade and Ems also were anxiously swept for mines and the routes outwards were searched by the barrage-breakers

But, apart from the difficulty of dealing with mines, a report had come in which threatened to stop the operation altogether. A telegram from New York, on the 14th, stated that the expected British blocking expedition was to take place during the week ; this report was confirmed in the minds of the German staff by a notification in plain language from the British Admiralty that all Atlantic shipping was to proceed round the south of Ireland until further notice. This prohibition had been in force since December 21, immediately after the loss of the *Tritonia*, but the telegrams then embodying it were in code, and the diversion of shipping had been done quietly by Senior Naval Officers and H.M. ships.¹ In the middle of January, however, it was repeated by wireless *en clair* and immediately roused the suspicions of the Germans, to whom our warnings to merchant ships were thought to be intended to conceal some military design. They considered as true, as indeed it was, that at Belfast we were disguising merchant ships as Dreadnoughts by giving them a wooden super-structure ; and the reports concerning the blocking expedition gave Belfast and Liverpool as the ports of concentration of the block ships. Consequently, the Admiralty's announcement that the north of Ireland route was closed to mercantile traffic seemed good evidence that the blocking squadron would soon be leaving Belfast and Liverpool.

The expedition was wholly imaginary. The Admiralty's strategy was based rather on a hope that the High Sea Fleet would come out into the open than on any desire to keep it blocked in port. The Amrum Bank minefield had been devised specially to stop neutral traffic and to catch submarines returning, and not primarily to prevent the emergence of the High Sea Fleet, which was not known to use that exit. But the fact that

¹ See Section 95.

we had now commenced offensive mining in the Heligoland Bight and had blocked the Northern Channel lent colour to the German idea that we would continue the policy and block the western exits from the Bight by blockships. It was now, therefore, decided that the mining expedition should be carried out entirely by light forces, the battle fleet and battle cruisers being kept back to deal with the expected blocking expedition.

Captain Harder, *Stralsund*, was put in command of the operation, and at 4 p.m. on the 14th he proceeded by the western exit with the *Strassburg*, on board of which were 120 mines; they were accompanied by the 9th Flotilla, divided into groups of three or four boats. A few hours later the Weser Intelligence Centre reported that a British agent had given information of a German squadron leaving harbour on a westerly course.¹ Although it was thought that this report was more likely to refer to the sailing of the fleet projected for January 12, it seemed probable that the intelligence would put the British on the alert. To Admiral von Ingenohl it showed the danger to which the unsupported light cruisers were exposed; but he took no further measures to give them support.

By 11 p.m., the *Stralsund*, *Strassburg*, and destroyers were crossing the meridian of 4° on a more or less direct course for the Humber. The weather was beginning to defeat the destroyers; seas washed over them, preventing both observation and signalling; boats, ventilators, and weather screens were carried away, bridges driven in, gun sights bent, and ammunition washed overboard. In some boats the fires in the forward boiler-rooms were put out; and *V.25* and *V.26* collided in the dark, though not much damage was done. The officer in command of the flotilla decided that the weather was too much for him, since it was impossible to reduce speed below 20 knots if the operation were to be carried out with any prospect of success. He decided, therefore, to turn back in accordance with orders which had been given him to meet this contingency. The *Stralsund* and *Strassburg* went on alone. The sea subsided gradually. As they approached the English coast they sighted numerous trawlers. By this time, any trawlers sighted during an operation were looked upon, both by ourselves and the Germans, as probably reconnaissance vessels. In this case, the two German cruisers listened for any report of their presence, but nothing suspicious was intercepted. At 4 a.m., January 15, they were still 50 miles short of the Humber. Captain Harder decided that, although he was 10 miles short of the spot where, according to the plan, the mines should be laid, he would begin his operation at once while he was still unobserved. He turned sharply to port, which was the signal to the *Strassburg* to begin her operations. The mines were laid on a line 30 miles long between

¹ No such intelligence reached the Admiralty from any agent at this time.

53.55 N, 1.35 E, and 53.45 N, 2.13 E, the distance apart of the mines being from 330 yards to 480 yards. The last mine was dropped at 5 a.m., and the ships, turning to eastward, proceeded at 24 knots for home, with a following wind and sea.¹

The position of the minefield was not well chosen, from a military point of view, since there was no swept channel which led to it. Men-of-war from the Humber had to use either the Haisborough Channel or proceed up the coast to the Farn Islands. Sweeping was in progress in the Smith's Knoll Channel, which had been fouled during the Yarmouth raid of November 3; finally, by January 21, that also was buoyed and declared safe for H.M. ships.² But none of these channels led to the new minefield, which was near Indefatigable Banks and was later known by that name. Moreover, since December 24, the parallelogram from 1° E to 2° E between 54.15 N and 55.20 N had been considered dangerous.³ This barred approach to the new minefield from the north. There was thus little likelihood of H.M. ships being caught by the field. It remained for a fishing vessel to discover it.

The trawler *Windsor*, of Grimsby, was fishing successfully about 55 miles east of Spurn Light Vessel when, hauling in her trawl at 3 a.m. on January 22, her crew saw that they had brought up a mine, wedged between the chains of the trawl. The master decided to get his crew into their one boat and endeavour to get assistance from the other trawlers fishing near. Failing to attract attention, he returned towards the *Windsor* to deal with the danger; but just before he reached her the mine exploded, sinking the trawler and nearly wrecking the boat. The men drifted about for a whole day till picked up by another trawler, which brought them in to the Humber on the 23rd.⁴

The mine which had destroyed the *Windsor* was undoubtedly one of those laid by the *Strassburg*, and the incident might have revealed the position of the new minefield. But, as it happened, a returning trawler had reported the previous day that she had seen a moored mine 3 ft. below the surface in 53.33 N, 1.44 E, which is 20 miles to south-westward of the line of mines; and on the strength of her report the area 6 miles round this last spot was announced to the fleet as a dangerous one.⁵ No addition to this announcement was made after the *Windsor's* accident⁶; and the true position of the minefield, or even the

¹ *Nordsee* III, pp. 167-171. In the German statement of mines laid (O.U. 6020A) the field is stated to extend 46,300 metres in the direction 117° from 53.55 N, 1.33 E.

² To all ships and S.N.O.s, 1.25 a.m., 21.1.15, "Channel from Cross Sand Light Vessel to Smith's Knoll Light Vessel buoy, 2 miles wide, is now safe."

³ A 340.

⁴ M. 16209/15: Deposition of Master of *Windsor*.

⁵ H.S. 87, pp. 187, 244.

⁶ The section of the Grand Fleet Orders called *Information Concerning Mines* gives, on January 30, a list of 329 reports of mines sighted to date, but does not include that which blew up the *Windsor*.

fact that it existed, remained for a long time unsuspected. The original Humber minefield had not yet been explored and the new minefield was sufficiently near the old one to become confused with it when minesweeping began. The actual line of mines was not located till the end of June.¹

114. Reorganisation of Grand Fleet Cruiser Squadrons, January 12.²—The return home of the cruisers which had been employed on foreign stations, permitted the formation of new squadrons; and a general reorganisation of the cruiser force took place. The 1st Cruiser Squadron, which, at the outbreak of war, had been in the Mediterranean, was reconstituted to consist of the four sister ships, *Defence*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Warrior*, *Black Prince*, and placed under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Robert K. Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O., who was to be relieved as Rear-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron by Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, lately Director of the Operations Division of the Admiralty War Staff. Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, who, in the *Leviathan*, was commanding the former 1st Cruiser Squadron, was made Rear-Admiral Commanding the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, to consist of the *New Zealand*, *Indomitable*, and *Invincible*. The *Leviathan* was transferred to the 6th Cruiser Squadron. A new 7th Cruiser Squadron was formed, its command being given to Rear-Admiral Arthur W. Waymouth. The organisation thus arrived at was as follows:—

1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.—Vice-Admiral Beatty; *Lion* (flag), *Tiger*, *Queen Mary*, *Princess Royal*.³

2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron.—Rear-Admiral Moore; *Invincible*,⁴ *New Zealand* (flag temporarily), *Indomitable*, and *Inflexible*, when available.

1st Cruiser Squadron.—Rear-Admiral Arbuthnot; *Defence* (flag),⁵ *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Warrior*,⁵ *Black Prince*.

2nd Cruiser Squadron.—Rear-Admiral the Hon. S. A. Gough-Calthorpe; *Shannon* (flag), *Achilles*, *Cochrane*,⁵ *Natal*.

3rd Cruiser Squadron.—Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham; *Antrim* (flag),⁵ *Argyll*, *Devonshire*, *Roxburgh*.

6th Cruiser Squadron.—Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant; *Drake* (flag), *Leviathan*, *Cumberland*,⁵ *Berwick*.⁶

¹ C.B. 1553, Preston: History of Minesweeping, p. 20. Captain Preston wrongly assumes that the mines were not laid till April 14.

² M. 0299 of 12 January 1915.

³ She had rejoined from North America on January 2.

⁴ Repairs at Gibraltar.

⁵ Refitting.

⁶ Still on North American Station.

7th Cruiser Squadron.—Rear-Admiral Waymouth ; *Minotaur* (flag),¹ *Donegal*, *Hampshire*, *Lancaster*.²

1st Light Cruiser Squadron.—Commodore Goodenough ; *Southampton* (pendant), *Birmingham*, *Nottingham*, *Lowestoft*.³

2nd Light Cruiser Squadron.—Rear-Admiral Napier ; *Falmouth* (flag), *Gloucester*, *Yarmouth*, *Liverpool*.¹

The intention was for the 1st Cruiser Squadron to leave the Grand Fleet and be attached to the Channel Fleet ; but this transference was deferred until a 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron could be formed.³

115. Plans for an Air Raid on Emden and the Raid on the Bight Patrol, January 19.—After the experience gained in the air raid at Cuxhaven on Christmas Day, the Commodores lost little time in preparing to make another similar attack. The plan for it, called Z.I., was ready by January 12. As the Amrum Bank approach was mined, the proposed raid was not to be on Cuxhaven airsheds, but on those at Emden. The three seaplane carriers, each escorted by a division of Harwich destroyers, the whole accompanied by the *Arethusa*, *Aurora* and *Undaunted*, to which was attached a division of the fastest destroyers, were to release their seaplanes at dawn in 53.42 N, 6.6 E, outside the Western Ems, and pick them up at a position about 20 miles to the westward. On the occasion of the Christmas Day air raid it had proved difficult to keep the carriers together under the one escort ; in the light of this experience, it was now arranged for each carrier to keep its escort of a division of destroyers, the boats circling round the carrier during the operation of releasing and picking up the seaplanes ; moreover, each carrier was to return independently with its own destroyer escort as soon as she had secured her complement of seaplanes. The three light cruisers, with the fast division of destroyers, would cruise to eastward to cover the rear.⁴

The *Lurcher* and *Firedrake*, each with two submarines, were to be 10 miles to eastward of the rendezvous for the release of the seaplanes and would sweep to westward, well in rear of Commodore (T.s) light cruisers. As before, a number of submarines were to take up positions along the German coast, well clear of our own ships, to attack any German vessels coming out and to help in picking up and, if necessary, destroying any seaplanes which might be unable to reach the squadron.⁵

The weather at the time was not favourable for air raids, and on the 14th the proposed operation was postponed, the two Commodores being called to the Admiralty to consider something

¹ Refitting.

² Still on North American Station.

³ A 490.

⁴ Comm. (T.s) orders of 13.1.15, in H.S.A. 270, pp. 26–30.

⁵ Comm. (S.s) orders of 12.1.15, H.S.A. 270, pp. 23, 24.

else.¹ What was then devised was an operation of a different kind, a destroyer raid on the German outer patrol, which was reported to be holding the line between Borkum and Horn Reefs. The scheme, called Plan J, arranged that a force with Commodore Tyrwhitt, consisting of the flotilla cruisers and all available destroyers, should strike the Borkum-Horn Reefs line in 54° N, near the Borkum end and sweep along it towards Horn Reefs.² It was thought that, as the only known entrance into the Bight was at the Borkum end, any boats met to northward of it would have no bolt-hole through which to escape. To avoid too much scattering of our force any one enemy boat was to be chased by only two destroyers, which were to go no further than 7° E. Battle cruisers would be in support in 55° N, 5.30 E, with the light cruisers 20 miles SE of them.³ The raid was to take place on the 19th, and three British submarines were despatched to stations off Heligoland and the Western Ems to be in position during it⁴; they left Yarmouth early on the 18th.

The weather on the 18th was bad. At Harwich there was a storm with heavy snow; but we knew that in the Bight it was clear, with a NNE wind, of force 7, and at 12.50 p.m. the Commodore was ordered to sail, using his discretion as to returning if the weather was too bad for the operation. He sailed at 2.30 p.m., with the *Arethusa*, *Aurora*, *Undaunted*, and 33 destroyers.⁵ The battle cruisers, led by Admiral Beatty in the *Lion*, had left Rosyth at 10 the previous night, with the *Southampton*, *Nottingham*, and *Birmingham*, for their supporting station; by the Commander-in-Chief's directions they steered wide out into the North Sea before coming south, so as to avoid the various mined areas to the westward of 3° E.⁶

Although the operation was carried out exactly as laid down, Commodore Tyrwhitt's force met with no reward for their encounter with the snowstorms and boisterous weather. At 6.30 a.m., January 20, he was on the Borkum-Horn Reefs line and turned to N36E to steam up it. The wind had dropped and patrols might well be out; but though our force followed the supposed patrol line for 70 miles they sighted no enemy destroyers, and were apparently themselves unseen till about 8.30 a.m., when a seaplane came in sight. It made no attempt to attack and was evidently on scouting duty. Nothing having come of the raid, Commodore Tyrwhitt, who had sighted our light cruisers earlier, joined the battle cruisers at 10 a.m., and was directed by Admiral Beatty to return to Harwich.⁷

¹ H.S. 85, p. 685.

² See Appendix K.

³ Comm. (T) to C.O.S., No. 0064, 17.1.15, and reply by C.O.S.

⁴ A 442-444.

⁵ H.S. 86, pp. 453, 487, 494; A 448, 450.

⁶ H.S. 85, pp. 354, 380.

⁷ Report on Plan J, Harwich Force Packs, H.S.A. 287, pp. 762-766.

The three submarines which were stationed in the Bight during the raid were *E.5* (Lieutenant-Commander C. S. Benning), *E.15* (Lieutenant-Commander T. S. Brodie), and *E.10* (Lieutenant-Commander W. St. J. Fraser). *E.5* arrived in position 4 miles north of Heligoland at 5.15 a.m., January 19, and cruised to the north-eastward throughout the 19th and 20th. She saw two destroyers near Heligoland the first morning, and Zeppelins from time to time; but the 20th was thick and snowy. *E.15*, off the Ems, saw a Zeppelin and two submarines on the 19th, but was unable to get near them. Neither saw anything of the destroyer patrols, which had been reported to be active.¹

Of *E.10* nothing more was heard. Her station was NNW of Heligoland, and it is possible she was lost on the minefield laid December 22, whose existence was unsuspected by us.² With her were lost Lieutenant-Commander Fraser, Lieutenant Trevor Whitaker, R.N., Lieutenant P. A. G. Falconer, R.N.R., and 28 petty officers and men.³

Our raiding force had seen little of the enemy, but the Germans were by no means inactive, although there were no regular destroyer patrols, such as we had expected. The cruisers were preparing for the next mining expedition. This was to be in the Forth.⁴ The rest of the fleet was ready to repel the expected blocking expedition; and four submarines were in station on an arc 40 miles from the Jade, *U.8* and *U.33* having the south-westerly stations, close to where Commodore Tyrwhitt was to strike the Borkum-Horn Reefs line. Early on the 19th information came in that the long anticipated blocking expedition had started; and from 7 a.m. onwards an airship from Nordholz, and seaplanes from Borkum, Heligoland and Sylt, reconnoitred the approaches to the Bight. One seaplane at 7.40 a.m. sighted our force about 50 miles from Heligoland. The observer thought he saw at least 100 vessels, and made sure that this was the blocking expedition; he had no wireless apparatus, and being anxious to make his report, he flew back at once without accurately ascertaining the composition of the force he had sighted.

Admiral von Ingenohl received the report at 10 a.m. All ships prepared for action and the fleet lay ready for sea; the light buoys off Heligoland and Norderney were extinguished, the minesweepers recalled, and the Eider Light Vessel towed into Harbour. He even contemplated laying a tactical minefield between the German minefield north of Heligoland and the newly discovered British minefield off Amrum, but the order was not given in view of the risk to the German submarines that were out. In addition to these, five more were sent out to stations on an arc about 60 miles from Heligoland. These last proceeded

¹ Comm. (S) War Records II, pp. 40-44.

² See Section 97.

³ Comm. (S) War Records II, pp. 45-52.

⁴ The remaining paragraphs of this section are based on *Nordsee* III. pp. 175-181.

only after Commodore Tyrwhitt had commenced his return journey. Both his force and the battle cruisers had been sighted by the two submarines, *U.8* and *U.33*, which had been sent out on the 18th; but though these submarines made every effort by wireless to secure the attention of the shore stations, they were unable to get their messages through. Other seaplanes went up from Sylt and Borkum, but though they went as far as 60 miles north of Terschelling, they saw nothing. At 11.25 a.m. one of the first seaplanes reported five battle cruisers steaming west in 54.25 N, 6.15 E. Their course was away from the Bight; and when, at 1 p.m., the airship which had gone to 60 miles north of Heligoland reported nothing in sight, it was concluded that our expedition had withdrawn. The speed of its withdrawal showed clearly that it could not have been composed of merchant ships or the imitation warships which had been reported.

It seemed that the only chance of damaging the returning force lay with the three submarines stationed in the middle of the Hoofden, but *U.22* and *U.19* reported on their return, on January 21 and 22 respectively, that they had not seen a single British warship the whole time they were out, and that they had suffered such discomfort from the weather that submerged attacks would hardly have been possible. *U.19* achieved one small success on January 21, when she sank by bombs a British steamer *Durward*, 28 miles north-west of the Maas Lightship.¹

U.22 (Lieutenant-Commander Hoppe) had an encounter with a submarine north of Ameland. This submarine replied to *U.22*'s recognition signal, but as *U.22* approached, she sheered off and did not reply to flag signals. The seas were so heavy that it was difficult to make a careful examination of the submarine, and Hoppe decided that she was hostile. He gave chase at full speed, and repeated the recognition signal; and as the hostile submarine turned he fired both bow torpedoes. One of them hit, and the submarine went down, leaving only one man afloat. When he was picked up it was found that he was a German seaman, and that Hoppe had torpedoed his colleague, *U.7*, one of the Flanders submarines.

Three submarines had been stationed off Smith's Knoll. Of these, *U.19* and *U.22* had returned; but of the third, *U.31*, nothing more was heard at the time. It was not till August 1915 that the news reached Germany that she had drifted into Yarmouth quite undamaged, but with all her crew dead; and that valuable secret documents, W/T codes, and mine charts in particular, thus fell into the hands of the British. The report was untrue. She had not drifted into Yarmouth, and nothing is known of her fate.

¹ M. 16624/15: Deposition of Master of *Durward*.

116. A Zeppelin Raid Expected.—Commodore Tyrwhitt, on his passage both out to, and back from, the Bight, had all unknowingly crossed the track of a squadron of Zeppelins coming to attack Great Britain. There had been several false alarms of Zeppelins.¹ On December 15, a ship, the S.S. *Ape*, on passage from Hull to Yarmouth, reported that she had seen an airship near the Inner Dowsing. This was certainly a mistake, for no airship had so far been employed for anything but reconnaissance in the Bight. On January 1 there was again a report that Zeppelins were about, and Commodore Tyrwhitt went out with the *Arethusa* and *Fearless* to search for them. It was clear, however, that the weather was too rough for airships and he returned.² Again, on January 3, three Zeppelins were reported 150 miles out on the North Sea from the Humber, in company with three German cruisers, and later, it was stated that they had turned back. Again the Commodore went out, with the *Arethusa*, *Undaunted*, and eight destroyers; but the Admiralty disbelieved the rumour and ordered him back.³ On the same day, Zeppelins were reported over Chelmsford, but the story was soon discovered to be pure invention.³

On January 10 the French reported two Zeppelins approaching; and from Amsterdam, a centre from which agents frequently sent scare reports, came the statement that an aeroplane attack was contemplated for that night. On the 18th there was a further French report that 20 Zeppelins were collected at Namur and Brussels for a night attack on the British Fleet.⁴ All these reports were, doubtless, unfounded, but on the 19th, a report that two Zeppelins were coming in over Bacton, Norfolk, was received at 8.17 p.m., followed at 8.50 by further reports that six bombs had been dropped at Yarmouth by one of the Zeppelins, while at the same time another dropped bombs on Sheringham.⁵ This was definite, and the Admiralty at once passed on the information to our Naval air stations.⁶

117. The Royal Naval Air Service and Anti-Aircraft Defences, January 1915.—Early in the war (3 September 1914), in consequence of the difficulty experienced by the War Office in providing adequate anti-aircraft defences, the Admiralty had assumed responsibility for making the best use of the means of air defence available to protect the United Kingdom against aerial attack.⁷

¹ A 367.

² A 383, 384, 385.

³ H.S. 83, pp. 504, 506, 620.

⁴ H.S. 84, p. 959; 85, p. 173; 86, p. 450.

⁵ H.S. 86, pp. 741, 744, 753, 770.

⁶ 8.40 p.m. "Two Zeppelins reported over Cromer and Happisburgh at 8 p.m., steering SW." Sent to Air Stations at Sheerness, Eastchurch, Grain, Warsash, Great Yarmouth, Felixstowe, South Killingholme, Granton, Dover, Gosport, Dundee, South Farnborough and Hoo.

⁷ Papers titled "Admiralty, 31 May 1915," and "War Office, 4 January 1915."

The Admiralty air policy, as has been shown, was to utilise their resources in aircraft, however scanty they might be, in vigorous attacks on the Zeppelin sheds rather than in patrolling passively and waiting on the defence till the raiders should arrive. For the actual defence of the areas for which they had accepted responsibility a special Naval Corps of Anti-Aircraft Volunteers was raised, particularly for the defences of London, enlistment beginning on 9 October 1914. There was such a shortage of anti-aircraft guns that the "undefended areas" outside London had to go without any protection, except Dover and Sheffield, where a few guns were mounted. For other areas equally vital, such as six out of the eight largest factories producing explosives for the Navy, no guns could be found. In several cases there was no anti-aircraft station in the neighbourhood, either naval or military.¹ However, opinion was divided as to the efficacy of defence by aircraft, since the enemy raiders would probably arrive at night, when aeroplanes would be of little use against them.² A better night defence was thought to consist in darkening areas likely to be attacked, and regulations for reducing lights in the metropolitan district were drawn up in October. The work in dockyards was so urgent that lights were kept burning all night, arrangements being made to extinguish them whenever a raid was actually reported.

The precise limits of responsibility between the Admiralty and War Office were debated at a conference held on October 16. It was then decided that the primary duty of any army aeroplanes in England was to assist the field army in opposing an enemy landing; the Admiralty would be responsible for the protection of London against air attack, manning the guns and searchlights of the defence, the War Office aeroplanes at stations in the neighbourhood assisting until the Naval squadrons were sufficiently developed to undertake the defence alone. In defended ports, the aerial defence, as well as the land defence, was taken over by the Army; the Admiralty providing the aircraft employed. When once any aircraft had crossed the coast line, the duty of destroying it was the Navy's, with the assistance of the Army aircraft available.³ This division of responsibility was re-affirmed on November 25, with the addition that it was expressly agreed that no military aeroplanes should be set aside or detailed to protect any particular locality.

When the German aeroplane visited the Thames estuary on December 25, we had aeroplane stations at Eastchurch, where was the training school, and at Dover, Erith, Felixstowe, Yarmouth, Killingholme (Humber), and Hendon. There were seaplane stations at Westgate, Clacton, and the Isle of Grain,

¹ By arrangement with the War Office, military aeroplanes in the neighbourhood of a raid were expected to co-operate in repelling it.

² Papers titled "War Office, 4 January 1915; Defence of Magazines against Aircraft."

³ C.I.D., Historical Section, Air Branch Paper, A.H., 21.6.93.

as well as at Dover, Felixstowe, Yarmouth and Killingholme. Beyond the East Coast there were air stations at Calshot, in the Portsmouth Command, and at Dundee and Fort George (Inverness-shire); airship stations had been established at Kingsnorth and Farnborough. After the raid, the Admiralty Air Department issued instructions that the East Coast air stations were always to keep at least three machines ready for immediate service; and steps were taken to establish five new aeroplane stations between Maidstone and Chelmsford.¹ By 1 January 1915, there were 40 aeroplanes, 16 seaplanes, 53 search-lights, 8 3-in. and 40 6-pdr. guns, and 20 pom-poms, for the defence of London and the Thames estuary.²

The Central Air Office, from which executive control of the Naval Air Service was exercised, was at Sheerness, and the executive officer was Wing-Commander Francis R. Scarlett, who bore the title of Inspecting Captain of Aircraft. This post had been created in December 1913, at a time when practically all the naval aircraft and air stations were in the Nore Command. But with the extension of the air stations to places so far apart as Inverness-shire and Southampton Water, it was becoming increasingly difficult for an officer at the Central Air Station, Sheerness, to exercise adequate control; and, moreover, there was overlapping, and complications arose through the existence of the Air Department at the Admiralty.³ Such was the condition of the aerial defence of Great Britain when the long expected Zeppelin raid became an actual fact.

118. The Zeppelin Raid of January 19-20.—It appears that the question of airship attacks on England had been discussed by the German Staff as early as September 1914, but until sufficient airships for air offensives would be ready, it was decided to keep those they had for reconnaissance duties with the fleet.

This principle had been re-affirmed by Admiral von Ingenohl on January 7; but as by that date the German Navy had at their disposal 12 airships, all manned by well trained crews, he considered that four of these would be available for attacks on England.⁴ The weather in January and February being calm and the nights long, made favourable conditions for airship attacks, and, moreover, there was a feeling that the airships should be used offensively before another British seaplane attack could succeed in destroying their sheds.

The Admiralstab proposed as objectives London and places on the estuary of the Thames, historical buildings and private property being spared as much as possible. It was considered

¹ D.A.D. to I.C.D., 27.12.14, in H.S. 476.

² D.A.D.'s Report, of 1.1.15, in Papers titled "War Office, 1.6.15."

³ M. 0160/15, titled "Admiralty, 6 January 1915."

⁴ The airships were L.3 to L.8, one "M" ship, and three "P.L." ships. Of these, von Ingenohl considered L.3, 4, 5, and 6 could be used for attacks.

that London was, technically, a defended place, as mines had been laid off the harbour, guns mounted to repel air attacks, it was guarded by forts, and contained the most important military establishments of the country. To this suggestion the Kaiser replied, "London itself not to be bombed at present; attacks are to be confined to dockyards, arsenals, docks (those near London also), and military establishments of a general nature, also Aldershot Camp, if there are no German prisoners there."¹

It was not until January 19 that the weather was favourable. *L.6* (Lieutenant von Buttlar), *L.3* (Lieutenant-Commander Fritz), and *L.4* (Lieutenant-Commander von Platen) started from Nordholz and Fühlsbüttel between 9 and 11 a.m. of the 19th. The motor of *L.6* broke down, and she had to turn back when they were crossing the North Sea; but *L.3* and *L.4* continued through rain, mist and snow, and arrived over the East Coast of England at 8 p.m., January 19. In spite of the Kaiser's permission to bomb the military establishments of London, the objective chosen for this air raid, from which great moral effect was expected, was again Great Yarmouth, a place which seemed to exercise a curious fascination over the minds of those planning raids in Germany. Certainly, it was down in our Army List as having coast defences occupied by the Army, both in peace and war; but the German History offers no explanation of the choice of this town in preference to more valuable objectives.

Lieutenant-Commander Fritz, in *L.3*, recognised Haisborough Lighthouse and, crossing the coast at Winterton, proceeded south toward Yarmouth. When he reached the north side of the town, he believed he was being fired on by an anti-aircraft battery, and he replied by dropping six 110-lb. explosive bombs and seven incendiary bombs from a height of 4,900 ft. Having unloaded his cargo he flew out to sea, crossing the coast at 8.27 p.m. in rain and mist. He successfully reached Fühlsbüttel at 9 a.m., January 20.

Lieutenant-Commander von Platen, in *L.4*, arrived over England a little later than *L.3*. He struck the coast at Bacton and thought himself to be on the south shore of the Humber. Wishing to cross to the north side, he passed out northward, but finding himself over the open sea, he realised he had made a mistake and turned in again, circling over Sheringham about 8.35. He dropped a flare, possibly to enable him to find his position; and then, dropping two bombs on the little town, made off westward. In the German History it is stated that he was fired upon, and it claims that he dropped his bombs in reply. Proceeding westward, he gave a bomb to each of the villages, Thornham, Brancaster, Hunstanton, Heacham, and Snettisham. By that time he was so low that the light shown by the opening of the trap door for the release of the bomb was clearly seen from

¹ See von Ingenohl's Memorandum on Future Employment of the Naval Forces, printed in full as Appendix 4 to *Nordsee* III.

the ground. He says he descended to 820 ft. and found himself over a largish town, from which searchlights were turned upon him and a heavy fire opened. As the town had commenced hostilities, he dropped seven 110-lb. explosive bombs and one incendiary bomb and then turned back for home. The town that received these bombs was King's Lynn.

The firing and the searchlights which the airships reported they had been met with were entirely imaginary. Although the British air stations had been warned at 8.40 p.m., and *L.4* did not get clear of the Norfolk coast until 12.30 a.m., January 20, no anti-aircraft action was taken either by guns or aeroplanes.¹

119. Plans for Another Air Attack on Cuxhaven.—Although the proposed attack on the air sheds at Emden had been only temporarily postponed, the Commodores had prepared plans for a further attack on the Cuxhaven Zeppelin sheds. Commodore Tyrwhitt's plan, marked Z.2, was submitted to the Chief of the Staff on January 16. He proposed to escort the three seaplane carriers to a position $W\frac{1}{2}N$, 18 miles from Heligoland, and, sweeping south-westward, pick up the seaplanes off Norderney Gat; submarines, stationed close in as before, would cover the retirement.² Thus, when the two Zeppelins bombed the defenceless villages of Norfolk, plans for two different attacks on their hangars were ready to be acted upon.

By the 22nd, the weather had sufficiently improved for Commodore Tyrwhitt to ask permission to proceed with the Emden attack, Plan Z.1. It was not, however, till that night that he received orders to carry on when the weather was suitable.³

But before he could start, intercepted German messages indicated that the enemy were about to begin some important movement; Plan Z was again postponed, for the Harwich force would be wanted for our own countermove.⁴

120. Orders for a Reconnaissance of Dogger Bank by German Battle Cruisers.—During January, the German scouting groups had been standing by to carry out a cruiser operation against the Firth of Forth. Bad weather prevented it from being carried out, and on January 21, it was definitely decided to postpone it until the dark nights at the beginning of February. The *Von der Tann* had been waiting to undertake certain defects, and she was now placed in dockyard hands for 12 days.

¹ This section is taken from *Nordsee* III, pp. 182-184, and a document titled "Air Raids, 1915," compiled by War Office, G.H.Q., G.B. (I), June 1918. The "Daily Reports, Home Stations, R.N.A.S.," show that no machines went up. Yarmouth has the entry, "Machines out ready, pursuit, but airship had been lost from view." At the other stations the machines were out on the aerodrome, but did not fly.

² M. 010061/15, and H.S.A. 270.

³ A 461, 464.

⁴ A 466.

On the following day, January 22, the weather suddenly improved, and it was decided to undertake a reconnaissance of the Dogger Bank, which had long been planned, to discover the method of British watch and to surprise light watching craft.¹ The fishing vessels met there were to be sunk after taking off the crews.

It was not expected that any serious opposition would be encountered. The British battleship fleet were thought to be divided between the Firth of Forth and Thames, the battle cruisers in Scapa Flow, ready to counter a German commerce raid; whilst it was thought that the light craft would be coaling after the sweep of the Grand Fleet on January 19. The operation was a short one, and the support of the High Sea Fleet was not considered necessary—indeed, it was thought that any signs of preparation on the part of the battleships might prejudice the success of the raid by coming to the notice of the British. However, in case strong British forces should be on the Dogger Bank, Admiral Hipper arranged to be on the southern side of the bank at dawn, for he feared, above all things, that enemy forces might cut in on his line of retreat.

Every precaution was taken to preserve secrecy. The Operation Orders were made out on January 23, and at 10 a.m. that day, the Commander-in-Chief sent out the following cypher signal to Admiral Hipper:—

From Commander-in-Chief, H.S. Fleet.

To *Seydlitz*, for Senior Officer of the Scouting Vessels. 1st and 2nd Scouting Groups, Senior Officer of T.B.D.s, and two flotillas chosen by Senior Officer of Scouting Vessels are to reconnoitre the Dogger Bank. Proceed to sea this evening after dark, return after dark following evening.

The signal was intercepted. By noon it had been decyphered, and the Admiralty had begun to make their dispositions to deal with the hostile squadron. Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers met the scouting groups on the Dogger Bank. The raiders were driven back; one of their number went down in flames, and numerous prisoners were brought back to Rosyth.²

¹ *Nordsee* III, pp. 191, *et seq.* For the Operation Orders, see Monograph No. 12, "The Action of Dogger Bank, January 24 1915," Appendix K.


² For details of the action on the Dogger Bank, see Monograph 12, C.B. 1585.

PLAN VII

Movements of 5th B.S. 31st December 1914 - 1st January, 1915, and Torpedoing of the FORMIDABLE
Based on Track chart in M.O.169/15. Track of U.24 based on G.O.H.III.

REFERENCE

- 5th B.S. (Track shown 0800 to 1605, 31st Dec^r during exercises, is approximate only)
- U.24, on surface.
- " " submerged.



APPENDIX A.—TELEGRAMS, GENERAL.

1st November 1914.

A 1. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). 7.40 p.m.

122 and 122 bis. We have sent to the Admiral, *Marseillaise*, the following telegram, which we communicate to you that you may let us know your opinion. The only effective means of preventing the action of the enemy's submarines in the Straits of Dover and the eastern part of the Channel, and to destroy them, seems to be to establish both by night and day in that part of the Channel sweeps of torpedo boats and light cruisers. If the Admiralty is of the same way of thinking it would be well for you to consult with them, so that the action of the English and French flotillas may be well arranged and under the same direction.

A 2. Adty. to British Consul, Dunkirk. 8.25 p.m.

Please transmit confidentially to Commander Samson (address railway station, Poperinghe) the following (begins). It is reported that section of submarines are on railway trucks at or near Bruges. You are to reconnoitre over Bruges at daylight to-morrow and ascertain whether there is any large accumulation of trains. If so, you are to drop bombs on the trains and railway station of Bruges. As many machines as possible to be used, and a large number of bombs carried. Passengers need not be taken (ends).

2nd November 1914.

A 3. Adty. to R.A., *Sutlej*. Sent 12.25 a.m.

46 *Pelorus* is required to relieve *Proserpine* for the Gibraltar Straits Patrol. Send her into Queenstown to complete with coal, and report the earliest date she will be ready to leave.

A 4. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. Sent 12.45 p.m.

Send 3rd Battle Squadron, *King Edward VII* class and *Duncan* class, without *Blanche*, to join flag of Admiral Burney at Portland. Proceed as fast as possible having regard to coal. Go west of Hebrides and Ireland and keep 40 miles from the land. Acknowledge.

A 5. R.A.C., Cruiser Force E, *Sutlej*, to Adty. Recd. 3.8 p.m.

69 On withdrawal of *Pelorus* it will not be possible to patrol four lines as heretofore; propose, therefore, to omit Scilly Is. patrol and retain Tory Is., Fastnet Rock, and St. George's Channel patrol. I have to-day posted letter to Admiralty asking Cruiser Force E to be increased to eight ships.

A 6. Adty. to V.A., Longhope. Sent 3.10 p.m.

Four yachts and 48 trawlers from various ports have to-day been ordered to Scapa under your orders.

A 7. Adty. to Comm. (T). Sent 6.50 p.m.

192 Detail six destroyers to attend on minelayers between 5 p.m., Tuesday, 3rd, and daylight 4th. Senior Officer destroyers should arrive at Sheerness by 9 a.m., 3rd, to confer with Captain-in-Charge, minelayers, *Naiad*. Remaining five destroyers to rendezvous lat. 51.48 N, long. 1.34 E, at 5 p.m. on 3rd.

A 8. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (158),
V.A., Longhope (375),
S.N.O., Scotland (373),
A.O.P., *St. George*, Jarrow (188),
R.A., Dover Patrol (145),
V.A., *Lord Nelson*, Portland (178).

Sent 8.10 p.m.

For information. Eighteen submarines are reported as having left Kiel through the Canal for North Sea and coast of Belgium on the 31st October. Another 18 smaller ones are reported having left by train.

A 9. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 10.55 p.m.

148 German pressure on coast flank having temporarily stopped you should rest your flotilla to-morrow and following day, keeping, however, in close touch with military, and being ready to act on any promising opportunity.

3rd November 1914.

A 10. Adty. to 3rd B.S.

Sent 9.57 a.m.

127 Urgent. Cancel previous orders. Join Sir John Jellicoe at Scapa Flow.

A 11. Adty. to S.N.O., Lough Swilly.

Sent 10 a.m.

Urgent. The Grand Fleet is to proceed to Scapa with all despatch, where 3rd Battle Squadron has been ordered to join C.-in-C., Sir John Jellicoe overtaking in the *Iron Duke*.

A 12. Adty. to V.A.C., Channel Fleet.

Sent 10.20 a.m.

180 Proceed with all despatch to Spithead, where *King George V* has been ordered to join your flag.

A 13. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux.

Sent 11.47 a.m.

1016 Reply to your 122. The Admiralty agrees with you entirely as to the utility of sweeps by day and night. But they have no destroyers available for the channel, except those watching the Straits of Dover. The Admiralty asks you if you would organise with the French flotillas a methodical and frequent patrol service between the lines from Boulogne to Dungeness, and from the Havre to St. Catherine's Point. This service will be entirely under the control of the French Admiral.

A 14. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.,
S.O., Cruiser Force A,
S.O., 3rd B.S.,
S.O., Channel Fleet,
Queen,
Irresistible,
Venerable.

Sent 4 p.m.

The enemy's force which approached the coast has retired at speed in a northerly direction. In consequence, the C.-in-C., Grand Fleet, can use his discretion as to his further movements in accordance with his previous orders. All battle cruisers to return to Cromarty. 3rd Battle Squadron should come to Portland as previously ordered. V.A., Channel Fleet, should return to Portland, leaving *King George V* to continue docking. *Irresistible*, *Queen*, and *Venerable* to return to Sheerness. *Jupiter* and *Majestic* remain at Sheerness.

A 15. Adty to T.O., Southampton.

Sent 6.25 p.m.

In future not more than 1,200 troops are to embark in one transport for cross Channel moves. If more than one transport is moving, there should be half an hour's interval between each departure.

A 16. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 6.50 p.m.

161 Following received from Intelligence Officer, St. Johns, Newfoundland (begins). Consul General at New York informed confidentially that German Cruiser Squadron intends to strike somewhere in North Atlantic Ocean within a few days. Admiralty, Halifax, Jamaica, Gibraltar, Ottawa, St. Vincent Is. have been informed.

A 17. Adty. to *Sutlej*.

Sent 8 p.m.

47 There are now six Liverpool tugs working from Milford watching the St. George's Channel. You need therefore not maintain a cruiser there any longer.

A 18. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth

V.A., Channel Fleet, Portland. Sent 8.30 p.m.

Vengeance is to proceed when ready to join V.A., Channel Fleet. She will not be required to go to East Indies.

A 19. Adty. to S.N.O., Harwich,
Comm. (T) (198),
A.O.P. (198).

Sent 9.33 p.m.

Two destroyers and two submarines left Delfzijl this morning, 3rd.

4th November 1914.

A 20. Adty. to *Tiger*.

Sent 12.30 p.m.

Tiger is to proceed with all despatch and join C.-in-C., H.F., at position ordered by C.-in-C.

A 21. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 12.40 p.m.

171 Order *Invincible* and *Inflexible* to fill up with coal at once and proceed to Berehaven with all despatch. They are urgently needed for foreign service. Admiral and Flag Captain, *Invincible*, to transfer to *New Zealand*. Captain, *New Zealand* to *Invincible*. *Tiger* has been ordered to join you with all despatch. Give her necessary orders.

A 22. Adty. (F.N.A.), to Commandant Flotillas,
Boulogne, pour A.C., French 2nd L.S.

Sent 1.45 p.m.

Urgent. Several ships carrying troops will cross the Channel to-night and to-morrow night from Southampton to Havre. The Admiralty begs you to have their route patrolled between the Nab Lightship and the French coast with your destroyers.

A 23. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 8 p.m.

948 Your 171. Is *New Zealand* to remain with 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron or accompany *Inflexible* and *Invincible*? Urgent. (1930.)

Reply.

179 Your 948. *New Zealand* is to remain with 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.

A 24. Adty. to Admiral Hood, Dunkirk.

Sent 8.30 p.m.

43 Keep your ships to the westward of the French mines off Ostend. *Revenge* is being sent to Dover. Don't use her unless it is indispensable, owing to submarine risks. Help Belgians with your small craft.

A 25. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth.

Sent 8.30 p.m.

Revenge is to proceed to Dover, making the passage during the night. If she can't arrive before dawn she is to go to-morrow night.

A 26. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 8.30 p.m.

200 You may send half your present force in to fuel.

A 27. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 8.45 p.m.

947 No mines discovered in vicinity of Loch Swilly. Believe Channel in vicinity between Irish coast and Tory Island, Inistrahul, Rathin Island, all has been well swept. Three sweeps carried out as follows. North and N 22 E 30 miles from Fanad Head, also NW from Tory Island to hundred fathom line. Suggest trawlers for mine sweeping from Larne should be ordered to continue search.

A 28. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 9.26 p.m.

946 When may I expect the 12 additional destroyers sanctioned at meeting on Monday last to arrive Scapa—2nd and 4th Destroyer Flotillas need time for refitting very urgently.

A 29. A.C., French 2nd L.S., to Adty. (F.N.A.)

Received your telegram at 6 p.m. too late to comply to-night with Admiralty's request, for I am afraid that the meeting at sea of transports and torpedo boats would be more dangerous than useful. To-morrow, 5th November, six torpedo boats will rendezvous off the Nab lightship before dark, where they can receive orders from Admiralty.

5th November 1914.

A 30. 1st Lord to C.-in-C., First Fleet.

12.5 a.m.

178 *Secret and Personal*. From all reports received through German sources, we fear Cradock has let himself be caught or has engaged recklessly with only *Monmouth* and *Good Hope* armoured ships against *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. Probably, both British vessels sunk. Position of *Canopus* critical, and fate of *Glasgow* and *Otranto* uncertain. Proximity of concentrated German Squadron of five good ships will threaten gravely Main Trade Route, Rio to London. Essential recover control. First Sea Lord requires *Invincible* and *Inflexible* for this purpose. Sturdee goes C.-in-C., South Atlantic and Pacific. Oliver, Chief of Staff. Bartolomé, Naval Secretary. W.S.C.

A 31. Adty. to British Consul, Dunkirk.

Sent 1.25 a.m.

Following for Admiral Hood (begins). Continue to support Belgian left in close concert with the Military, saving your ships as much as possible.

A 32. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 7.40 a.m.

201 For information. Reported from Bremen that many submarines are about to leave Bremerhaven for Belgium, going by sea along the coast.

A 33. Comm. (T) to Adty.

Recd. 10.18 a.m.

317 Your 201. As submarines must take 24 hours to reach Belgium I am proceeding with Destroyers to complete with oil fuel and will return at daylight to-morrow, Friday, with all destroyers available to meet and, if possible, attack submarines. *Fearless* and *Faulknor* have been warned. (0945.)

A 34. Comm. (T) to Adty.

Recd. 10.25 a.m.

318 Have ordered *Fearless* to proceed to Terschelling, arriving by 5 p.m., then turn South and follow coast line until dawn, then proceed North with destroyers spread at high speed, to intercept submarines. (0955.)

A 35. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 12.24 a.m.

953 2nd and 4th Flotillas showing serious signs of wear. Request one engine-room artificer, one stoker petty officer and four stokers may be sent up at once for each destroyer to keep defects under. (1107.)

A 36. Admiral, Portsmouth, to Adty.

Recd. 1.31 p.m.

8 Following message received from French destroyer *St. Helena*¹ for C.-in-C., Portsmouth (begins). French destroyers required by English Admiral to patrol in front of troopships are to arrive at Nab before night time to-night.

A 37. Naval Base, Lowestoft, to Adty.

Recd. 1.40 p.m.

254 Fishing smack reports seeing steam trawler, black bulwarks, white hull and red bottom, laying mines 8 miles E by N of SE, Newcome Buoy, at 6.30 a.m. to-day. Had B.N. or M. on bows.

(Note.—Already intercepted.)

A 38. S.O., Cruiser Force G, to Adty.

Recd. 2.20 p.m.

39 French S.N.O. informs me French Admiral wishes French ships of the patrol to operate independently in the southern half of English Channel while the British ships undertake the patrol of the northern half. This would give British ships and French ships each depth of 42 miles to watch. French can maintain six ships in their line, I can only maintain three, which number I consider quite inadequate to keep efficient guard on 42 miles. One ship has all she can do to deal with concentrated traffic close to English coast. If their lordships approved this new arrangement I request I may be reinforced by two ships. (1200.)

A 39. R.A., Dover Patrol, to Adty.

Recd. 3.4 p.m.

86 Seaplane reports two submarines off Zeebrugge steering south.

A 40. Adty. to C.-in-C., Grand Fleet.

Sent 4.10 p.m.

184 *Secret.* We are arranging to send you *Minotaur*, *Warrior*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, and *Black Prince*, as soon as possible. Dates of their joining will be telegraphed you to-morrow.

A 41. Adty. to C.-in-C., Grand Fleet.

Sent 5.40 p.m.

186 Norwegian Government have been informed that Minch and Pentland Firth are closed, but that Norwegian vessels already on the way which put voluntarily into Kirkwall, as requested by us some time ago, will be passed on if cargoes are to be landed in Norway, and if contraband not exported. Steamers from Bergen to Newcastle should steer a straight course from Lindesnaes to Farne Islands, also that Admiralty are considering what arrangements can be made for steamers of subsidised Norwegian American liners, *Bergensfjord* and *Christianiafjord*.

A 42. Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet.

Sent 7.10 p.m.

Vengeance is to proceed to Gibraltar at ordinary speed, complete with coal and wait orders.

A 43. Adty. to V.A.C., Channel Fleet.

5.11.14
Sent 7.10 p.m.

185 Battleships under your orders should be provided with net defence as quickly as possible; the nets, when supplied, can be brailled up and lashed to bolts in the ship's side without waiting for fitting the net shelve, which would take a very long time. Nets belonging to *Formidable* class now appropriated to Sheerness defence boom, which is not yet ready for them, are to be used.

6th November 1914.

A 44. Adty. to Admiral Hood, Dunkirk.

Sent 12.45 a.m.

160 Reliable information, that if you are firing off Nieuport to-morrow, a half-flotilla of German submarines are intended to be in that locality.

¹ Should be "at St. Helens." T.S.D.D.

A 45. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F., 1.30 a.m.
 S.O., Channel Fleet,
 S.O., Cruiser Force E,
 Comm. (T),
 Comm. (S),
Inflexible,
Invincible,
 Cs.-in-C., Nore, Portsmouth, Devonport,
 V.A.C., Queenstown,
 S.N.O., Pembroke and Dover,
 Via Cleethorpes 671.

From reliable information, German submarines intend operating off Mounts Bay, Lizard, and southern entrances to Irish Channel, and between Ostend and Boulogne, probably starting westward through Dover Straits, Friday morning, and eventually returning through Channel. Telegram sent to C.-in-C., Home Fleets, C.-in-C., Nore, C.-in-C., Portsmouth, C.-in-C., Devonport, V.A., Channel Fleet, R.A., Cruiser Force E, S.N.Os., Queenstown, Pembroke, Dover, Comm. (S), Comm. (T), *Inflexible*, *Invincible*.

A 46. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth. 1.45 a.m.

Reference to my telegram this morning *re* German submarines, transports should not cross except at night, and should be escorted by destroyers as far as possible.

A 47. Adty. (F.N.A.) to A.C., French 2nd L.S. 4.25 a.m.

From reliable information German submarines intend operating off Mounts Bay, Lizard, and southern entrance to Irish Channel, and between Ostend and Boulogne, probably starting Friday morning, through Straits of Dover, and eventually returning through the Channel. Minister informed.

A 48. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. Sent 1.45 p.m.

1026 Admiralty being desirous of attacking the dirigible sheds of Friederichshaven by means of four aeroplanes and four automobiles, which would be transported by railway from Havre to a base of operations suitable chosen, for example, Dijon, leaving Southampton about 7th November, asks if you would obtain the necessary authorization from the Ministry of War to arrange details of transport across France and give all necessary facilities.

A 49. S.O., Cr. Force G, to Adty.

Sent 1.54 p.m.
 Recd. 2.29 p.m.

41 In consequence of information contained in Admiralty telegram 671¹, I have given instructions that no merchant ships are to be boarded until further orders, and that the patrol is to be considered rather as a precaution against suspicious or enemy armed vessels than as a lookout for contraband in neutral ships. I conclude all ships when going up Channel, if not bound to British or French ports in the Channel, will be stopped in the Downs. (1230.)

A 50. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth. Sent 4.50 p.m.

French destroyers have been asked to carry out sweeps in the Channel. They were only temporarily diverted for this escort duty. Transports from Newhaven should cross at night; not possible to supply escorting destroyers.

A 51. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux. 5.30 p.m.

1027 Admiralty does not wish French trawlers to be placed under English flag, nor manned by English crews. Their proposal is, that you should organise, by means of French trawlers armed with guns and carrying

¹ A 45 above.

French crews, under the authority of an officer of the French Navy, a patrol service distinct from the sweeps by torpedo craft and in addition to the latter.

1027 *bis* The object is to give active pursuit to the submarines day and night over the whole of that part of the Channel between a line to the east from Dungeness to Boulogne, and one to the west from Beachy Head to Dieppe, to prevent them from coming to the surface, and to destroy them if they do so. If this arrangement could be carried out the security of the transports between England and France would be greatly increased.

A 52. Adty. to Naval Centre, Pembroke. Sent 11.15 p.m.

It is reported here that you are causing panic by indiscriminate warning of shipping as to the presence of hostile submarines. Such news should be disseminated only to H.M. Ships and Naval authorities. Your attention is directed to Rule 21, Defence of the Realm Regulations.

7th November 1914.

A 53. A.C., French 2nd L.S., to Adty. Recd. 5.50 a.m.

095 (Decode) Destroyers are resuming sweep, their covering duty being over.

A 54. Adty. to *Diana*. Sent 8.50 a.m.

Diana to part company with transports in the longitude of the Start. Transports to proceed independently. *Diana* to proceed to Plymouth and coal. What is your position, course and speed?

A 55. Adty. to S.N.O., Scotland (401),
A.O.P., Immingham (194),
S.N.O., Cromarty (240),
S.N.O., Dover. Sent 10.5 a.m.

Two submarines left Emden at 3 p.m., 6th November.

A 56. Adty. to S.N.O., Liverpool. Sent 1.55 p.m.

Urgent. S.N.O., Lough Larne, has been ordered to detach two drifters for the defence of the immediate approaches to the Mersey River. They are informed that you will send precise orders to them, and have been told to make the best possible arrangements until such orders are received. All submarines outside the line from Mull of Cantyre through Ailsa Craig to Girvan are enemies. Yacht *Ilex* will be sent from Belfast if available to search from Whitehaven to Liverpool, finally reporting at Altcar Point.

A 57. Adty. to R.A., Cruiser Force E. Sent 4.35 p.m.

51 Send *Doris* to Gibraltar at once to coal and proceed to Alexandria. (1635.)

A 58. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. Sent 5.15 p.m.

198 Weather permitting, can you arrange for four battle cruisers to be ready to leave Cromarty during night of 13th for use in support of light cruisers and destroyers engaged in escorting seaplane carriers. Should battle cruisers be available operation orders will be sent by hand to V.A., *Lion*, and a copy to you.

A 59. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). Recd. 5.35 p.m.

I have received your telegram No. 689. Orders have been given to the *Gustave Zédé*, with material necessary for three months, to proceed to Harwich under the orders of the Admiralty, as soon as the repairs necessitated by a slight injury have been finished. The *Gustave Zédé* will be available in a few days.

A 60. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 6.20 p.m.

168 Following for R.A. Hood. (Begins.) Place the gun vessels under the command of the best and most suitable officer, giving him orders to work in conjunction with Colonel Bridges. Return yourself to Dover and resume your regular duties as Admiral, Dover Patrol. If large operations are required in support of the Army, you can be sent over.

A 61. Adty. to A.O.P.

Sent 7 p.m.

196 Select 12 destroyers from where they can best be spared, and send them without delay to Scapa Flow, where they will come under the orders of C.-in-C., Grand Fleet. Discontinue the present system of patrols and revert to the system laid down in the original war orders, keeping the vessels concentrated in divisions. Acknowledge.

A 62. A.C., Coast of Scotland, to Adty.

Recd. 8.3 p.m.

403 Two submarines will be stationed on a line east from St. Abbs Head during daylight hours to-morrow, Sunday, 8th November, in order to stalk hostile submarines which may be passing that line.

8th November 1914.

A 63. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth.

Sent 1 p.m.

7 The French Admiral has been asked to provide six destroyers to escort the transports from Southampton to Havre to-night.

A 64. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth.

Sent 1.15 p.m.

Transports leaving Southampton to-night are to use the Nab entrance. French Admiral and Transport Officer have been informed.

A 65. Adty. (F.N.A.), to A.C., French 2nd L.S.

Sent 1.20 p.m.

Urgent. Seven transports will cross to-night from Southampton to Havre, another from Newhaven to Boulogne, and one from Newhaven to Havre. A submarine having been seen this morning in the Straits of Dover, the Admiralty ask you to have the transports covered by six destroyers if possible. Their rendezvous will be at the Nab lightship.

A 66. C.-in-C., Portsmouth, to Adty.

Recd. 3.14 p.m.

8 Your 7. Presume French escort refers to that side. British destroyer escort from this side.

Reply (by telephone).

Present arrangements must be adhered to. French torpedo boat destroyers are to be at the Nab.

A 67. Adty. to Comm. (T) (205),
Comm. (S) (110),
A.O.P. (200).

11.30 p.m.

Submarine patrol has been established by the Nore Defence, extending from Kentish Knock L.V. to North Foreland, day and night. In case of bad weather they may shelter in the Downs.

9th November 1914.

A 68. C.-in-C., H.F., to 4th Sea Lord.

Recd. 10.55 a.m.

979 With reference to your enquiry as to division of the *small armed ships* into units, I should like them divided into groups of three, according to speed.

A 69. C-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 11.20 a.m.

982 To First Sea Lord. Have used 18 of the additional trawlers to work in the Minch and between Cape Wrath and Pentland Firth, where patrol is essential. Have also strengthened Shetland Islands patrol by six. Number remaining is insufficient to strengthen Moray Firth patrol. Twelve more are much required to provide for safety of battle cruisers. Can they be sent to Cromarty?

A 70. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. (215),

S.N.O., Harwich, Pass following to
Comm. (T) begins 206,
A.O.P. (201),
S.N.O., Rosyth (413),
S.N.O., Cromarty (247),
S.N.O., Harwich.

Sent 5.5 p.m.

For information. Information has been received that *Ariadne*, *Berlin*, and possibly others, are leaving Wilhelmshaven to-night without lights, except navigation lights.

A 71. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 5.35 p.m.

174 For information. There is a German submarine which is operating between Ostend and Boulogne.

A 72. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol (175),

C-in-C., Nore,
S.N.O., Harwich. Pass following to
Comm. (T) (207),
A.O.P. (202).

Sent 5.55 p.m.

For information. A German torpedo flotilla will probably be patrolling near the Gabbard to-night, as well as to-morrow night.

A 73. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 6.15 p.m.

173 All our gunboats and other craft may be withdrawn from Dunkirk. The operation should be carried out at night. Care is to be taken to bring back all stores and ammunition. The vessels should return to Sheerness, but should remain organised as a flotilla, full up with stores and ammunition ready for further service. *Revenge* is to remain at Dover for the present.

A 74. Adty. to A.O.P. (203).

Sent 6.30 p.m.

Following sent to S.N.O., Harwich, begins. You may send out destroyers of 1st and 3rd Flotillas, which are ready for sea, to intercept German flotilla near the Gabbard. Make arrangements so as not to clash with A.O.P.'s dispositions. Ends.

9th November 1914.

A 75. Adty. (F.N.A.), to A.C., French 2nd L.S.

75 An intercepted telegram gives orders to a German submarine now in the Channel to return up Channel if possible and operate between Ostend and Boulogne.

A 76. C-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 3.28 p.m.

991 Captain Kedroff, Russian Navy, has acquired me a list of documents regarding German Navy he brought for me from Russia. They include their signal books, cyphers, position squares, etc. May I be furnished with originals or copies immediately. The information intercepted would be of extreme value if we can decypher it at once, and will probably lose all value if we have to wait until Admiralty decypher, decode and send it to me. This matter seems of most urgent importance to me.

Further Signal, 9th December.

367 My telegram 991 of 9th November and your letter M of 11th November, No. 930, *re* document brought from Russia for me by Captain Kedroff, Imperial Russian Navy, may I now be furnished with code?

Further Signal, 19th December.

432 Priority. With reference to my telegram, 9th December, 367, and my telegram, 9th November, 991, letter to First Sea Lord, strongly urge that signal books, cyphers brought for me from Russia may be sent to me by special messenger. Time saved by receiving and decyphering on board instead of awaiting news from Admiralty would be of incalculable value—it is of vital importance that delay caused by decyphering at Admiralty, recyphering and transmitting should be avoided. There is always strong probabilities of messages not reaching me in time for complete action.

Reply, 20th December.

562 Your 432. I agree with your view and steps are being taken to meet it, but it was very dangerous to telegraph so explicitly on such a subject. We should have understood by reference to your preceding telegrams.

10th November 1914.

A 77. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 10.40 a.m.

219 In view of your reports of large ships passing out north of Faroes, and serious possibility confirmed by personal reports from trustworthy Danish agent of German intention to send out cruisers into the Atlantic, we consider it imperative to send a battle cruiser, preferably the *Princess Royal*, to New York, as *Suffolk* and *Caronia* are quite insufficient. Give orders accordingly.

A 78. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 11.10 a.m.

208 Your 330. At your discretion you may withdraw flotilla patrolling Broad Fourteens on account of weather. The patrol should be maintained if the weather moderates sufficiently. Report action taken.

A 79. Adty. to all Ships.

Sent 5.45 p.m.

Red Ensign is to be flown by all H.M. Ships at sea, in addition to White Ensign. Previous orders for Union Flag to be flown now cancelled.

11th November 1914.

A 80. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 3.22 a.m.

15 Your 219. My report refers chiefly to ships passing to eastward; only one seen steering west. *Teutonic* reports, so far only trawlers sighted. I submit most earnestly that battle cruiser force for Grand Fleet be not weakened further. *Tiger* is at present totally inefficient; she has not carried out her gunnery practice, and as reported in my telegram 9 to-day, has only one dynamo in action. She cannot possibly be relied on to meet a German battle cruiser in this condition. If one ship is taken away now the force will consist of three effective British to four German, leaving out *Blücher*, a very powerful ship, and if the vessel removed is the *Princess Royal*, the case is far worse. *Queen Mary* very badly needs docking and refit, and as soon as *Tiger* was efficient, I proposed, if possible, sending her to Home port. No battle cruisers have yet been docked, except *New Zealand*. I trust that matter will be reconsidered, as I feel it my duty to emphasise strongly danger of weakening our battle cruisers below German strength. I suggest, if vessels are really needed, that *Duke of Edinburgh* class be sent from Mediterranean Station, but I submit it is in the highest degree improbable Germany will send heavy cruisers into the Atlantic Ocean. I would also point out, Grand Fleet quite recently been reduced by 12 battleships and two battle cruisers. The German policy is concentration, and I most respectfully submit, if policy of British dispersion is adopted it may lead to disaster. Have just received *Teutonic's* report—no oversea traffic in last 24 hours.

A 81. Felixstowe to *Hearly*.

Intercepted 6.21 a.m.

A German submarine has been seen in the Channel; all the look-out stations have been warned and to look out for flashing signals between submarine and shore. (2222.)

A 82. Comm. (T) to Adty.

Recd. 8.6 a.m.

337 Position at 6 a.m., N lat. 52, 43 E, long. 3.45, strong south-westerly gale. I have ordered *Faulknor* and destroyers into harbour. *Aurora* leaves Harwich 7 a.m. with relief destroyers. Propose sending them back and continue patrol with *Aurora* alone. Request approval or otherwise. (0725.)

Reply.

211 Discontinue patrol until weather moderates. (0945.)

A 83. S.O., Cruiser Force G, to Adty.

Recd. 10.38 a.m.

44 Request information as to probable date on which a cruiser will be required from the squadron for convoy. (0955.)

A 84. Adty. (F.N.A.) to A.C., French 2nd L.S.

Sent 1 p.m.

Urgent. Nine transports carrying reinforcements to France will leave Southampton for Havre to-night at intervals of half-an-hour. The Admiralty asks you to have them convoyed, if you can, each by a destroyer, the rendezvous being this evening at the Nab Lightship.

A 85. 1st Sea Lord to C.-in-C., H.F.

1.30 p.m.

Personal. Your private 21. I fear it is quite impossible to make arrangements for you to realise all the requirements which force upon us the steps taken in regard to your 15 in reply to our 219, as we have to consider the possibility of a strong force coming from another direction altogether, which only the *Princess Royal* could cope with. Believe me, we very fully consider your position always in every movement of ships.

A 86. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 2.20 p.m.

21 There are now 22 torpedo boat destroyers at Scapa for local defence; I should use them also for fleet action, if possible. Very desirable to have Captain or Commander (D); propose using *Sapphire* for purpose. Commander Hill has no destroyer experience; submit a Captain or Commander with destroyer experience may relieve him. Suggest Commander Asser or Commander George B. Young.

A 87. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 2.25 p.m.

237 Has *Princess Royal* sailed?

A 88. Adty. to S.O., Cruiser Force G.

Sent 5.45 p.m.

65 Your 44. No convoy will be leaving until 22nd November for Gibraltar.

A 89. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 5.43 p.m.

Recd. 6.18 p.m.

27 *Urgent.* With reference to your telegram No. 237. Not yet. Was awaiting further orders in view of my 15. Is *Princess Royal* to go? If so, submit that orders go direct to Vice-Admiral, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron to save time. Strongly urge *New Zealand* instead.

Reply.

Adty. to C.-in-C.

Sent 8.5 p.m.

244 *Princess Royal* should have proceeded at once on Admiralty orders, which should be conveyed through you to the V.A.C., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, as the matter is serious and urgent.

A 90. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 9.52 p.m.

20 For 1st Sea Lord. My 15. I am quite certain that the Germans, if they send battle cruisers into the Atlantic Ocean, will not send one, but all.

12th November 1914.

A 91. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 12.11 a.m.

246 Your 21. The 12 destroyers sent to you from the Patrol Flotillas were sent with the intention of giving the Fleet additional security at Scapa Flow until the anti-submarine defences are completed. It is quite impossible to spare them altogether from the mobile defence of the East Coast, and their absence throws additional work on the remaining destroyers and their crews and weakens the defence at a critical time. It is regretted that it is not possible to allow you to retain them for a longer period than the date of completion of the anti-submarine defences at Scapa. In southern waters there is a great shortage of destroyers, and with submarines in the Channel the reinforcements to the Expeditionary Force are crossing at considerable risk, only a few French destroyers being available. We have every desire to sustain you by all means in our power in your most anxious and difficult task, but our responsibilities are numerous and grave and our resources are strictly limited.

A 92. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 8.20 a.m.

Recd. 9.42 a.m.

30 For 1st Sea Lord. *Personal.* Your 235, my 15 was sent in view of suggestion contained in your private letter of 7th. It should have been marked *personal*. It appears that my report as to traffic passing north of Faroe Islands had been taken as meaning vessels passing to westward, which was incorrect. Enemy's cruisers can surely only come from North Sea, and if they are battle cruisers more than one would go, in which case *Princess Royal* could not deal with them. If they hear one of ours has gone I shall expect them to immediately send superior force to engage her. I am convinced Germany will never disperse her forces. Such a step is entirely foreign to all their strategical ideas, both on land and sea. We are already suffering dispersal, and I view further steps of this nature with grave misgivings. I must emphasise present inefficiency of *Tiger*. It would be very unwise to send her south on 13th, but if *Princess Royal* goes west I must take the risk. Have no orders yet as to armoured cruisers going with battle cruisers.

A 93. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 9.25 a.m.

Recd. 9.54 a.m.

34 Request to be informed immediately whether operation ordered and mentioned in your 198 will take place. My dispositions depend on early reply. Are armoured cruisers to go?

Reply.

249 Your 34. Operations postponed. In any event your armoured cruisers will not be used. (2250.)

A 94. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 11.5 a.m.

251 It is desired to station a cruiser squadron at Rosyth above the Forth Bridge as soon as the net for the northern span is completed, in about 4 days' time. Please inform Admiralty whether you would prefer 2nd or 3rd Cruiser Squadron, or 1st Light Cruiser Squadron to be detailed.

A 95. British Minister, Christiania, to F.O.

Recd. 3 p.m.

67 (R) Treaty. I would beg early reply to my telegrams Nos. 64 and 66 Treaty. In view of collision reported in English Channel yesterday and loss of two neutral ships on mines off English coast, apparently on route indicated by Admiralty, Norwegian shipowners are afraid of southern

route and show tendency to risk sending their ships North of Scotland. War insurance agencies are charging much higher rates for southern route. It is my duty to warn you that if a Norwegian ship were sunk or fired into for endeavouring to pass north of Scotland, effect in this country would be disastrous. I have done my best to explain Admiralty order and have strongly advised such shipowners as have consulted me to comply with it.

A 96. 1st Sea Lord to C.-in-C.

Sent 1.30 p.m.

252 *Personal*. Your 30 of to-day. I want to make it clear to you what the *Scharnhorst* squadron means as regards our dispositions. We have not heard of them since 4th November. They may adopt the following courses: (a) go through Panama Canal, smash our West Indian Fleet and release all the armed German liners from New York—hence the *Princess Royal*; (b) go to south-east coast of America and stop our vital food supplies—hence the two *Invincibles*; (c) go to the Cape and raid the Army base at Walvisch Bay—hence the *Minotaur* to reinforce *Albion*; (d) go to Duala and relieve the Germans, destroying our ships and military expedition—hence the *Warrior*, *Black Prince*, and three *Edgar Quinets*. I hope to send Bartolomé to you to-morrow with information, which is too secret to be written or telegraphed.

A 97. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 3.14 p.m.

36 The concentration of German High Sea Fleet makes a similar concentration on our part essential. The mines off the East Coast leave only two exits for Channel Fleet. If Germans put to sea they will first either mine these exits or place submarines there, in which case junction of our two fleets is impossible. In any case, absence of cruisers with Channel Fleet renders movements of this fleet difficult. With ships of Grand Fleet refitting in rotation and three battle cruisers away, our superiority is insufficient to ensure the decisive result which the country has been led to expect. I submit most strongly that the whole of the 3rd Battle Squadron rejoin my flag at once. Have discussed question of the general situation with the V.A., who is in full concurrence with the view expressed above. Letter follows.

A 98. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 7.33 p.m.

46 *Priority*. Your 252 Secret and Personal for 1st Sea Lord, from C.-in-C., Home Fleet. Surely, *New Zealand* is sufficient to deal with force mentioned. Not yet too late to change.

A 99. V.A., Channel Fleet, to 1st Lord.

Recd. 7.58 p.m.

Personal. With reference to my conversation, I am of opinion that the Humber would be a better place for Channel Fleet than Walle. The latter, I consider, is a very precarious place. In addition to which, at spring tides, the fleet could not get in or out for four consecutive hours of every 12. I would suggest a submarine protection being placed . . .

A 100. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 8.16 p.m.

44 Your 251. Propose 3rd Cruiser Squadron, but it is a weak squadron. Suggest replacing it by 1st Cruiser Squadron, and *Drake*, when 1st Cruiser Squadron joins my flag. I should point out that withdrawal of 3rd Cruiser Squadron from north will almost stop the work against trade, as the 10th Cruiser Squadron ships all require refitting. Work can be resumed when the light armed merchant ships arrive. They are much required.

A 101. A.C., French 2nd L.S. to Adty. (F.N.A.).

8022 Thank you for information concerning hostile submarines. During the last 10 days we have made four grand sweeps in search of them, but without result. I am proceeding with *Rouen* to Boulogne, to try to

organise defence with herring nets, with patrol by torpedo boats, ready to destroy any submarine obliged to come to the surface. I should be pleased if, on his side, Captain Lowther Crofton¹ could definitely settle the question of which he spoke. Do you know if the Admiralty has given up the special operations for which they asked for six extra French submarines in the Straits of Dover? There is not room for 12 submarines in the French dispositions. They are filling up the harbour uselessly. I should like to send back at least three to Cherbourg. I have satisfied the various demands for torpedo boats to escort convoys as far as possible, in view of the late hour at which such demands have always been made. We will look for and sink the suspected buoy.

13th November 1914.

A 102. Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet.

Sent 11.30 a.m.

203 *Urgent.* Keep eight *King Edwards* under Admiral Bradford ready to sail at very short notice. They should complete with coal and will sail at night.

A 103. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 1.5 p.m.

57 *Priority.* Experience last gale makes it doubtful whether ships of 10th Cruiser Squadron can be made seaworthy. They are not so now. *Crescent*, *Royal Arthur* and *Grafton* being sent to Greenock. Have you arranged with Director of Dockyards for Admiralty Officers to visit and inspect ships. Decision can then be given whether it is worth attempting to patch them up. Without them or efficient sea-going substitutes I can no longer control neutral trade in contraband passing north of Shetland Islands.

A 104. Adty. to Admiral, Queenstown.

Sent 1.40 p.m.

On completion of *Leviathan*, she is to join Cruiser Force E in place of *Doris*. Inform Rear-Admiral Tottenham and *Leviathan*.

A 105. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 4.20 p.m.

267 Since war began you have gained two Dreadnoughts on balance, and will have by 20th, 27 superior units to 20. We intend *Princess Royal* to rejoin you as soon as *Scharnhorst* is dealt with. During the next month you should suspend sending ships away for refit, doing the best you can at Scapa. If, notwithstanding the above, you feel the need of reinforcement, we should propose to meet you by stationing the eight *King Edwards* at Rosyth, where they would be well placed to join you for a general action or to attack an invading force. This would avoid necessity of stationing cruisers there for the present. If you agree, the eight *King Edwards* will be ordered to sail to-night.

A 106. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (268), V.A.,
Channel Fleet (204).

Sent 5.10 p.m.

Following for V.A., 3rd Battle Squadron: Proceed with *King Edward* class only to Rosyth by the west coast route, sailing after dark this evening. Communicate with C.-in-C., Grand Fleet, when passing Scapa Flow, in view of any modification being made in your orders later.

A 107. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 5.50 p.m.

217 The "M" class destroyers, as they become available, are to come under your orders at Harwich and not go north. Give the necessary orders to *Minos* and *Mastiff*, which are now at Portland.

¹ Assistant to Admiral of Patrols.

A 108. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 4.15 p.m.

Recd. 6.3 p.m.

62 My 36. Have enquired of V.A., Channel Fleet, route by which he proposes to join me, if required. His reply is (begins): "Propose to pass between the British-German minefields. Have no destroyers and have only two repeating cruisers—*Topaze* and *Diamond*. Twenty-two to twenty-four hours would elapse between time order was given until clear of the minefields, supposing the fleet to be at 2 hours' notice. Would require destroyers to accompany me and minesweeping vessels to meet at the entrance to minefields" (ends). It is evident that a junction could not be effected in northern area without great delay, even if minesweeping vessels are available and weather suitable for their work. V.A. could not move without cruisers or destroyers. Consider these facts very strongly; emphasise necessity for steps asked for in my 36.

A 109. Adty. (F.N.A.) to A.C., French 2nd L.S. Sent 6.40 p.m.

A new scheme for the patrolling of the Dover Straits is under consideration, in order to make it more effective against enemy's submarines. In the meanwhile, the Admiralty would wish the six extra submarines sent to the Dover Straits to be kept there.

A 110. A.O.P., Immingham, to Adty.

Recd. 10.38 p.m.

O.C., Humber Defences, informs me that he has been specially warned by G.O.C., Northern Command, to expect attack to-night, to-morrow night, or Sunday. Submit I may be informed whether this is probable, in order that the eight destroyers, with fires drawn for cleaning boilers, may raise steam.

Reply.

217 Attack may be expected any time this month, not advisable to defer cleaning boilers, as the destroyers must be kept efficient.

14th November 1914.

A 111. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.

Sent 1.15 a.m.

Report how many of the small vessels lately operating off Belgian coast are ready for sea now. Report how many are in dockyard hands and give dates of completion. It is desired to station them at East Coast ports for coast defence.

A 112. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 5.20 a.m.

66 Your 267. Respectfully submit that the 27 units quoted include three ships, two of which have never fired a gun, and the third is only partially trained. A battle squadron stationed at Rosyth, without cruisers or sea-going destroyers to cover it, runs grave risk from mines and submarines, which may easily operate outside the limit of port defence. Suggest that it is preferable to keep a concentrated force of battleships and attendant craft at closely adjacent base and submit that the *King Edward VII* class be ordered to Cromarty, where they are covered in by the cruisers operating from Scapa Flow and by the 4th Destroyer Flotilla, now stationed at Cromarty.

A 113. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 1 p.m.

276 The 3rd Cruiser Squadron should be relieved from patrolling duties and held in readiness to proceed to Rosyth.

A 114. 1st Lord to V.A., Channel Fleet.

Sent 1.30 p.m.

207 *Personal.* Your personal telegram of 12th. Your objection to the Wallet on the score of depth will be met by buoying a channel which is navigable at all times of tide and of which the survey is now in progress. The Wallet is much better protected by shoals from submarine attack than most other anchorages, and patrols and minesweepers will be provided. The submarine protection you propose for Humber would take 3 to 4 months to carry out, and the proposed anchorage is an indifferent one.

A 115. Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet (208),
C.-in-C., Nore,
C.-in-C., H.F. (277),
R.A., Dover Patrol (197).

Sent 1.55 p.m.

Exmouth and *Duncan* are to proceed to Dover, where they will be joined by *Russell* and *Albemarle* when out of dockyard hands. V.A., Channel Fleet, should make arrangements for *Exmouth* and *Duncan* to proceed to Dover as soon as possible, communicating with R.A., Dover Patrol, and arranging for the passage to be made at such time as to be most secure from submarine attack. R.A., Dover, to provide four destroyers as escort. This telegram has been sent to C.-in-C., Nore, C.-in-C., Home Fleet, V.A., Channel Fleet, and R.A., Dover Patrol.

A 116. Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet (209),
C.-in-C., H.F. (278),
C.-in-C., Nore,
R.A., Dover Patrol (198),
Comm. (T) (220).

Sent 3.0 p.m.

The *Formidable* class and *Lord Nelson* class, with *Diamond* and *Topaze*, are to proceed to Sheerness as soon as possible, having regard to arranging the passage at the most suitable time to avoid submarine attack. The Commodore (T) is to supply 12 destroyers as escort, and V.A.C. should make the necessary arrangements with C.-in-C., Nore, R.A., Dover, and Comm. (T) direct. Report time of sailing and expected time of arrival at Sheerness. *Majestic* has been ordered to the Humber and *Jupiter* is to proceed there when ready. This telegram has been sent to C.-in-C., Home Fleets, C.-in-C., Nore, V.A., Channel Fleet, R.A., Dover Patrol, and Commodore (T).

A 117. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.

Sent 6.30 p.m.

The gunboat *Excellent* is to be stationed at Brightlingsea for use in the event of a landing raid in the neighbourhood of Clacton. She should be berthed where she can communicate easily by signal with the coastguard, and a good local pilot should be engaged for her. Her duty will be to resist a landing keeping to shallow water where she cannot be torpedoed. She should keep fires banked and be ready to move at once shortly before daylight every morning. Arrange for orders to be transmitted to her rapidly in the event of emergency through Naval Centre or otherwise. Acknowledge.

A 118. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.

Sent 6.40 p.m.

The three monitors, with *Wildfire* and *Vestal*, are required for coast protection, and should be completed for service as soon as possible. Acknowledge.

A 119. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore,
S.N.O., Harwich,
A.O.P., (221).

Sent 7.0 p.m.

Sirius is to proceed forthwith to Harwich, and also *Brilliant*, as soon as defect to steampipe is completed, precautions being taken against submarine attack en route, and escort of T.B.D.s or T.B.s should be provided for the passage. They are to remain at Harwich, under banked fires, ready to proceed at short notice to engage enemy transports, or their escort, in the event of a landing operation being attempted. Steam is to be on the engines, and the ships are to be in all respects ready to move at once, from half-an-hour before daylight until 9 a.m. daily. This telegram has been sent to C.-in-C., Nore, S.N.O., Harwich, and A.O.P. Acknowledge.

A 120. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore, A.O.P. (220).

Sent 7.15 p.m.

Send *Rinaldo* to Hartlepool to act under orders of A.O.P. for protection against invasion. Acknowledge.

A 121. R.A., Dover Patrol, to Adty.

Recd. 7.20 p.m.

109 Am taking steps to obey your 197, but I wish to state that Dover is open to submarine attack through western entrance, and is, in my opinion, unsuitable for battleships. Shall I send *Revenge* to Portsmouth to-morrow, Sunday night, to clear harbour?

Reply.

Sent 11.10 p.m.

202 Your 109. It is necessary to have the battleships at Dover, and temporary measures must be taken to protect any ships exposed to torpedo fire through western entrance, either by nets or by putting colliers alongside them, or by mooring a vessel in such a manner as to shield them. *Revenge* should remain for the present; it is understood there are five battleship berths. *Russell, Duncan, Exmouth*, have sailed for Dover.

A 122. Adty. to Squadron Comdr. Samson, Dunkirk.

When weather permits, you are to carry out a reconnaissance over Ostend and Zeebrugge, and report whether there are any activities in harbour or adjacent canals. Ascertain if any submarines or supply ships are in harbour or work going on in putting sections of submarines together.

15th November 1914.

A 123. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 11.55 a.m.

204 German submarines are using Zeebrugge and have been ordered to go in the direction of the Channel to-day, weather permitting.

A 124. Adty. to *Bacchante*.

Sent 1.25 p.m.

The transports are to proceed independently to Southampton. They are to take a mid-channel course and separate several miles. Everything is to be done to prevent their appearance being that of transports. The numbers should be painted out, and during daylight the troops are to be kept out of sight. Blue ensign should not be hoisted. Acknowledge.

A 125. Adty. (F.N.A.), to A.C., French 2nd L.S. Sent 1.35 p.m.

Bacchante, with seven transports, will go to Southampton instead of Plymouth. Admiralty would be obliged if you would, if possible, have their route patrolled in the Channel by torpedo boats. Position, Saturday noon was, 47 2 N, 9 27 W, Greenwich.

A 126. Adty. to *Bacchante*.

Sent 7.35 p.m.

Cancel orders for transports to proceed to Southampton and proceed to Devonport, as previously arranged. Acknowledge.

A 127. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.

Sent 9.30 p.m.

Send *Severn* to Boston Deep to operate in the Wash and on adjacent coast in the event of invasion or raid. She should engage a good local pilot. Send *Humber* to Middlesbrough for the same purpose. Both ships will be under the Admiral of Patrols while on this service. Inform Admiral-Superintendent that the ships must be ready to leave on 18th. Inform A.O.P.

16th November 1914.

A 128. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.

Sent 1.55 p.m.

Humber is to proceed to Boston Deep, in the Wash, instead of Middlesbrough, and will come under the orders of Admiral of Patrols.

A 129. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

1st Part 3.30 p.m.

2nd Part 4.15 p.m.

293 *Most Secret.* We have very carefully considered your letter brought by de Bartholomé. The importance of preventing the enemy from making a serious attack on our coast and getting away without being engaged makes it imperative to have a force nearer the probable points of attack

than either Scapa Flow or Cromarty, which are practically the same distance off. The coast has been so denuded of destroyers for the sake of strengthening the force with you (amounting now to 71 destroyers), that there is only a skeleton force of patrol vessels available on the East Coast amounting to three scouts, 23 destroyers, 12 T.B.s, between the Naze and St. Abb's Head, a distance of 300 miles. In these circumstances, we are reluctantly compelled to decide on the *King Edwards* and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron going to Rosyth, and you should detach half a flotilla of the 71 destroyers at Scapa Flow, to act with them. We are sending you a carefully compiled table of comparative strength of your fleet and the German High Sea Fleet, which makes it clear that, without the 3rd Battle Squadron, you have such a preponderance of gun power that, with equal gunnery efficiency, a successful result is ensured. If the 3rd Battle Squadron falls in with the enemy before effecting a junction with you, it will be open to him either to make a running fight towards your fleet or towards Rosyth, in which case you would be almost certainly in a position to intercept the German Fleet after it had received whatever damage the 3rd Battle Squadron had been able to inflict upon it. If the enemy meets your fleet alone, the 3rd Battle Squadron will be in a favourable position to head off the defeated German Fleet from its base, or to destroy escaping cripples. In case of raid north of Flamborough Head, the *King Edwards* should proceed at once to attack it. With respect to *Emperor of India* and *Benbow*, it is left to your discretion to arrange their gunnery practice when and where you think best, and you should give orders to them direct accordingly. They are ready to sail 14th November and 18th November. The Admiralty have in mind the importance of getting back the *Princess Royal* as soon as the situation admits. Your proposals as to mining have been carefully considered, but the work done by our submarines in the Bight have been of such importance that it is undesirable to add to their dangers by laying mines, whose positions must be very uncertain. The Germans have no difficulty in sweeping any channel they wish when they want to bring any of their ships out, and do so daily. It would be very difficult for us to lay fresh mines in any channels they sweep on account of the dangers to the minelayers from our own mines. We agree with you as regards refits.

A 130. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 7.24 p.m.

Recd. 7.51 p.m.

104 Your 267 and 268, my telegram 66. Should 3rd Battle Squadron proceed to Scapa, Cromarty or Rosyth, submit Cromarty preferred. Necessary to give definite orders to-morrow forenoon.

A 131. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 11.50 p.m.

296 The following has been received from a very trustworthy source in Denmark (begins). It transpires from Hamburg, that there are indications of a sortie of German Fleet, or part of it, primarily with object of enabling a fleet of fast cruisers to get into and spread in the Atlantic (ends).

17th November 1914.

A 132. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 2.55 a.m.

Recd. 4.48 a.m.

109 With reference to your telegram 293, the 71 destroyers mentioned include 41 of 2nd and 4th Destroyer Flotillas, of which 10 are absent refitting. I would point out that the 40 destroyers of the 1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotilla at Harwich, have been omitted from the total between Naze and Abbs Head. The total allotted for defence of the two principal fleet bases, Scapa Flow and Cromarty, is 30, whereas Rosyth, which is not used as yet, has 19 T.B.s and T.B.D.s. I regret to appear importunate, but must beg for reconsideration of order detaching a half-flotilla with the 3rd Battle Squadron. As pointed out by me, the submarine obstructions here are barely commenced, and although additional trawlers have been

sent up, many have not yet arrived, and they require time to be organised and stationed. Without the additional 12 T.B.D.s the safety of the Dreadnought Battle Fleet is seriously endangered. A submarine attack here is quite feasible, and as I am directed to use this base, I trust that I shall not be held responsible for any disaster that may occur. The question of relative strength of the High Sea Fleet and the fleet now with me cannot, of course, be decided without reference to the cruiser and destroyer strength of the two fleets. It is my comparative weakness in these essentials that counterbalances any battleship superiority I possess, and which makes me so anxious to be concentrated. I am, of course, obeying their Lordships' instructions, but hope, at least, a portion of the orders which directs me to detach a half-flotilla will be rescinded.

Sent 12 noon.

A 133. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 1.10 p.m.

110 With reference to your telegram No. 296, it seems improbable Battle Fleet will come out for this purpose, because enemy must realise, as I do, that cruisers can easily get into Atlantic Ocean owing to long hours of darkness. With 3rd Cruiser Squadron away and 10th Cruiser Squadron out of action, I have 12 fewer cruisers than at commencement, and there are now 15 hours of darkness, instead of 5 hours. It is therefore impossible to do more than partially watch one area with advantage. Cruisers attempt to select one that may possibly be passed in daylight. Request to be informed whether 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron remain under my orders, and if so, under what limitations as to area of their operations or whether they are stopping at Rosyth.

A 134. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 1.15 p.m.

298 Your 109. We have carefully reviewed the position and given fullest consideration to your wishes. We are confident that your fleet, with its cruisers and flotillas, is strong enough for the definite task entrusted to it. In view of the grave needs we have to meet elsewhere, we cannot reinforce you at present nor alter the dispositions communicated in telegram 293. The 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron, and eight destroyers should proceed to Rosyth as ordered. You have, of course, full discretion to move your fleet in any way necessary to provide for its safety and enable you to meet the enemy, and are not tied to Scapa. Every effort is being made to accelerate the completion of the submarine defences.

A 135. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (299),
Comm. (T) (227).

Sent 2.0 p.m.

Following has been made to Comm. (T): Information has been received that one-and-a-half flotillas of destroyers have been ordered to be off Heligoland at daybreak to-morrow. The orders are given by the Admiral of 1st Scouting Squadron, which consists of four battle cruisers, three armoured cruisers, and two light cruisers, and may be an indication that the 1st Scouting Squadron are coming out. Arrange for two fast cruisers to reconnoitre and report if squadron comes out. They should take every precaution to avoid getting engaged, especially if there is such a heavy sea that battle cruisers can overhaul you.

A 136. Adty. to A.S., Malta.

Sent 4.45 p.m.

652 For V.A., *Indefatigable* (begins): More destroyers are urgently required in Home waters as soon as possible. Recall the destroyers from the Egyptian waters to join your flag. Send four destroyers home at once, and a second four as soon as four have rejoined you from Egypt. Acknowledge. S.N.O., Egypt, informed.

A 137. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 7.30 p.m.

305 C.-in-C., High Sea Fleet, is at Wilhelmshaven.

A 138. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 8.30 p.m.
 307 For information. Following from British Minister, Christiania. German auxiliary cruiser *Berlin* will be interned at Trondhjem. She is now being disarmed.

A 139. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore. Sent 8.45 p.m.
 Both *Humber* and *Severn* should go to the Wash and Mersey as soon as ready.

A 140. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 10.55 p.m.
 309 *Warrior*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Black Prince*, and *Donegal* will join your flag as soon as they can be spared from other duties, and these will form a squadron for Admiral Moore. He had better remain as he is for the present.

18th November 1914.

A 141. Adty. to V.A.C., Channel Fleet (216),
 Comm. (T) (230),
 A.O.P. (231). Sent 1.20 a.m.
 Keep steam ready to move your vessels at once until noon to-day. Submarines are also to be ready to move at once until noon.

A 142. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 1.25 a.m.
 313 Your 110. 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron remain under your orders, subject to their being based on Rosyth and not being ordered away by you without Admiralty consent, unless you require them to operate against the enemy's fleet.

A 143. Adty. to S.N.O., Scotland (473),
 A.O.P., Immingham (232),
 S.N.O., Cromarty (268). Sent 1.55 a.m.
 Submarines have been reported outside Lofoten. Two submarines passed Skaw 3 p.m., Monday, direction NW.

A 144. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. Recd. 3.33 a.m.
 123 With reference to Admiralty telegram, 22nd September, to all ships *re* close of East coast ports to neutral fishing boats, I strongly urge prohibition should be extended to all Scottish coast, north and west, including Hebrides and islands and also coast of Ireland. Enemy submarines now in northern waters are undoubtedly receiving supplies from alien craft. Tracing is being forwarded.

A 145. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. Sent 2.5 p.m.
 Recd. 3.10 p.m.
 130 Search of Western Hebrides by two destroyers leaves no doubt as to use by enemy's submarines. Submarines actually came up alongside unarmed trawler off Barra Island and dived to avoid ramming. They are reported daily off Cape Wrath and vicinity. Urgently necessary establish complete patrol Hebrides, Skye, Mull, the Minch, and coast from Cape Wrath to Dunbeath, both by armed trawlers and shore parties. Energetic retired naval officer required to take charge several districts.

A 146. Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet (217),
 C.-in-C., Portsmouth,
 R.A., Dover Patrol (216). Sent 5 p.m.
Implacable is to discontinue fitting mine catcher and join flag of V.A., Channel Fleet. Dover Patrol is to supply four destroyers to escort her from Dover to Sheerness. This has been sent to V.A., Channel Fleet, C.-in-C., Portsmouth, and R.A., Dover.

A 147. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 5.25 p.m.
Recd. 5.58 p.m.

132 Referring to my 123 in anticipation of approval I have given instructions to Grand Fleet that neutral fishing craft found in prohibited area on the east coast or inside 100 fathoms line on the west coast of Scotland, including Hebrides and the north coast, Ireland, from Belfast to Blacksod Bay, are to be treated as under suspicion and sent into port for examination.

Reply.

324 Your 132. Your action approved.

A 148. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 7.15 p.m.

320 Your 123. A new and more stringent set of orders has been drawn up for the restriction of fishing by all craft in the vicinity of north coast of Ireland, west coast of Scotland as far as St. Kilda, and all the Orkneys and Shetlands. Also the English Channel to eastward of Portland Bill. Further steps will not be taken until receipt of your tracing.

A 149. Adty. to S.N.O., Harwich.

Sent 8.10 p.m.

Aurora is to sail to-night and scout as far east as longitude $7^{\circ} 20' E$, returning at once by a different route. She should keep out of sight of land and be careful not to attack British submarines on passage towards Heligoland. These orders are not to be signalled to her, but are to be sent by hand. Acknowledge.

A 150. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 8.35 p.m.

321 The following arrangements are in hand and will be completed with the utmost despatch in order to put the Northern Patrol on a more satisfactory footing. The patrol will consist of 24 armed liners, constituted as follows: Three already on patrol. Four now commissioning, with full crew and armament. Seventeen further vessels, which are now being taken up. Their speed will be 14 to 17 knots. Tonnage 4,000 to 6,000 tons. A somewhat reduced armament. These vessels will be manned by the crews of the *Edgars*, supplemented, where possible, by R.N.R. firemen. The *Edgars* will be paid off as the liners become available. These 24 vessels will be under the command of Rear-Admiral de Chair, and will be employed exclusively for patrol duty.

19th November 1914.

A 151. Adty. (F.N.A.), to Marine, Bordeaux.

Sent 1.20 a.m.

1069 In order to make it more difficult for enemy submarines to enter the Channel, the Admiralty has elaborated a scheme for modifying the lighting and buoying of the English coast from Yarmouth to the Isle of Wight. The new lighting and buoying will be frequently modified at dates kept secret. Pilotage will be compulsory between these two points. The new scheme will come into operation seven days after warning has been given to navigators, probably about 1st December. The Admiralty propose that you also institute a reduction and modification in the lighting of the coast from Barfleur to the Belgian frontiers. For the warships of the two nations operating in the Channel and for transports, secret information on the scheme of lighting will be exchanged.

A 152. Adty. (F.N.A.), to A.C., French 2nd L.S.

Sent 2.25 p.m.

91 We believe that German submarines will be posted before Portland or Portsmouth to-morrow, Friday. A sweep might prove effective.

A 153. Comm. (T), to Adty.

Recd. 2.30 p.m.

361 With reference to *Aurora*, should *Fearless* carry out Terschelling patrol to-morrow, Friday? (1415.)

Reply.

234 (sent 7.15 p.m.) Your 361. Keep ships in port until *Aurora* returns and wait further orders.

A 154. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 5 p.m.

333 . . . We are trying to get you some more light cruisers at earliest possible.

A 155. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 5.25 p.m.

334 Your 130. Every effort is being made to obtain more trawlers for patrolling, but there is considerable difficulty in getting vessels and crews, and it takes some time to increase the numbers materially. Steps are being taken as rapidly as possible to organise shore patrols. Rear-Admiral Tupper will be appointed in charge of district. We would be glad if you would send evidence of master of trawler and have him and any men who saw the trawler cross-examined. Remember you have authority to arrest and send into port all vessels in the military area, and you should use this authority in every case where the vessel is not known to you. You can, if you think fit, prohibit fishing in particular areas.

A 156. Adty. (F.N.A.), to A.C., French 2nd L.S.

Sent 7.20 p.m.

93 An enemy submarine will certainly be operating to-morrow, Friday, and the following night with the assistance of a trawler, between Havre and Southampton. Admiralty relies on you to capture the one and sink the other.

A 157. Adty. to Comdr. Samson and Lieut. Seddon.

Very necessary to know what is going on at Zeebrugge and Ostend Harbours. Send machine over as soon as possible. Urgent.

20th November 1914.

A 158. Adty. to C.-in-C., Devonport.

Sent 12.30 a.m.

9 *Cæsar* is to proceed to Gibraltar with gunlayers to carry out their firing there. She is to be ready to sail and take the place of the *Talbot* in conveying the transports out to Gibraltar on the 23rd. Give necessary orders. Details as to ratings, etc., will be sent later.

A 159. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.,
R.A., 10th C.S.

337 Seven *Edgars* of 10th Cruiser Squadron are to return to their Home Ports forthwith and pay off. . .

A 160. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 9.35 a.m.

338 There is reliable information that five enemy vessels, indicated by numbers which may mean any type of craft, are to proceed at once to the following five areas: East coast Shetlands, north half. East coast of Shetlands, south half. West coast Shetlands, north half. West coast Shetlands, south half. Area around Fair Island. It is also stated that we have ships lying on the west coast of the Shetlands in the Bay "The Deep."

A 161. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 12.55 p.m.

238 Prepare to carry out plan number X on Monday morning. There will be no *Duncans*, but a supporting force from Grand Fleet instead.

A 162. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 1 p.m.

224 For *Revenge*. Prepare to leave for Dunkirk to-night after dark to resume operations on Belgian coast.

A 163. Adty. to C-in-C., Nore.

Sent 1.10 p.m.

17 Send *Bustard* in tow to Dover and place her and tug under orders of Admiral, Dover Patrol. She is required again for Belgian coast, and should be filled up with ammunition.

A 164. Adty. (F.N.A.), to A.C., French 2nd L.S.

Sent 1.20 p.m.

121 Four transports will go to-night from Southampton to Havre. Admiralty will procure escort, but would like you to watch landings on the French coast. As transports cross almost every night, Admiralty will undertake to ensure their escort, but asks you to keep a strict look out in the approaches to Havre.

A 165. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F.

Sent 2.10 p.m.

340 Our reliable German information and also our 338 to you shows firstly, concentration of German cruisers, battle cruisers and battleships in Weser and Elbe, and secondly, dispersal of their submarines to hunt in the Shetlands and English Channel. In these favourable circumstances the aerial attack on Cuxhaven Zeppelin sheds, which we had previously planned and consider desirable in itself, might easily bring on a considerable action in which your battle cruisers and the Grand Fleet might take part without undue risk from the German submarines. We suggest for your consideration Tyrwhitt and aeroplanes attacking on Monday at daybreak, with you supporting him from the northward with whatever force is necessary if the enemy respond to the challenge. Further, if it should be true, as some reliable information indicates, that the enemy is preparing an offensive raid or sortie himself, our movement would bring on a collision at the outset unexpected and disconcerting to him. Tell us your views. Meanwhile, we think you should coal your squadrons.

A 166. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 5.45 p.m.

242 Eight destroyers are to be sent to Dover to arrive to-morrow evening. On arrival they are to be placed under the orders of Rear-Admiral Nicholson, H.M.S. *Russell*. As large a proportion of them as possible should have modified sweeps or explosive sweeps of some kind. Acknowledge.

A 167. Adty. to Comm. (S).

Sent 10.50 p.m.

116 Plan Number X. Submarines will not take part, and Comm. (T) was only told to prepare to carry it out and await for a definite order to carry on.

A 168. Adty. to C-in-C., Nore.

Sent 11 p.m.

28 *Engadine* and *Riviera* are to hoist in seaplanes and proceed in execution of previous orders to-morrow afternoon, Saturday, 21st November. Machines are to be covered up as much as possible.

A 169. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.).

158 We have received from General Joffre the following telegram:—General Foch reports that for some little time the French or English ships have no longer been participating in the action of our forces in the neighbourhood of Nieuport; on account of very violent bombardment by the enemy in this region it would be advantageous if the ships could attack the numerous German batteries established to the east of the mouth of the Yser. I should be glad if you would notify the Ministère de la Marine and the Admiralty of this situation, in order to obtain a more active co-operation on the part of the squadron between Nieuport and Ostend (ends). Please ask Admiralty's opinion on course to be followed in view of this request.

21st November 1914.

A 170. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 12.22 a.m.

Recd. 1.28 a.m.

160 Your telegram No. 340. Submarines ordered to operate Shetland Islands are almost certainly those already in vicinity. Two seen there yesterday. I do not think it judicious to base movements Grand Fleet on so uncertain a factor as operations of seaplanes, nor do I consider aerial attack likely to bring out fleet. If decided to carry out movements should much prefer Tuesday (24th November), daybreak, as repairing works now in hand could be completed. I should propose taking battle-fleet to about 55.40 N, 5.30 E. Battle cruisers about 40 miles nearer, with 2nd Cruiser Squadron and light cruisers further in. I propose to order 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron to join me if movement takes place.

A 171. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 2.30 p.m.

350 Your 160. We consider present a good occasion for a sweep southward by Grand Fleet. The seaplane attack is incidental and subsidiary though very desirable in itself. It may bring on an action now that the German Fleet is concentrated near Wilhelmshaven, and their cruisers and battle cruisers are active. It will frustrate any offensive movement they may intend as reported. We therefore desire operations to proceed. Tuesday, the 24th, at 5.30 a.m., will be the time. The positions you proposed are generally concurred in, and you should use the 3rd Battle and Cruiser Squadrons. The orders for the seaplane portion of the operation will be sent you by hand. The nearest substantial support to Commodore (T.s) vessels should be in lat. 54.50 N, long. 7.6 E, at 5.30 a.m., on Tuesday. It is desired to avoid the use of W/T as much as possible in connection with this operation and preliminary orders should go by land line or messenger.

A 172. R.A., Dover Patrol, to Adty.

Recd. 4.15 p.m.

139 Owing to the destroyers employed operations Belgian coast, proposed patrol cannot be put into force yet. Present scheme is therefore being continued with a much reduced patrol.

A 173. Comm. (T), to Adty.

Recd. 5.18 p.m.

373 Repairs of *Arethusa* have taken longer than expected and will be completed by midnight. Request information respecting plan X. I have ordered carriers to proceed to the Wallet to be in readiness.

A 174. Adty. to Marine, Bordeaux.

Sent 7.35 p.m.

1078 A new plan of defence for the Straits of Dover drawn up so as to render access to it by the enemy's submarines more difficult, is ready to be put into force. It takes in an area bounded to the SW by the line Dungeness-Grisnez; to the N by the parallel 51.15 N; to the E by the Ruytingen Shoal and the eastern half of a line joining the South Goodwins buoy to the Pointe de Grave lines. This region is divided into eight areas, each one of which will be continually patrolled by a British destroyer. A flotilla with a cruiser will be held in reserve at Dover. French submarines will be held in the harbours ready to occupy, on the "alert" being given, the line Grisnez-Varne, another line Calais to a buoy situated lat. 51.4 N, long. 1.36 E, Greenwich. Details will follow by post. As this plan does not cause, as far as it concerns us, any modification other than the creation of a cordon of submarines in front of Calais by means of the submarines now stationed there and the appearance of English destroyers near our coasts, it may be put in force before you have received other details. It will be put into force as soon as you have kindly acknowledged the receipt of this telegram.

1079 (Sent 8 p.m.). In telegram 1078 instead of "Dungeness-Grisnez" read "Dungeness-Boulogne."

A 175. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 8.20 p.m.

245 Your 373. Plan postponed until one day later. I will send plan to-morrow. Please tell Commodore (S) of postponement.

A 176. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 10.45 p.m.

Recd. 11.44 p.m.

173 Your 350. Request that 1st and 3rd Destroyer Flotillas, except one half flotilla, be directed to join me after seaplane carriers have got well away on return journey. The half flotilla escort them home. If they steer about WNW after picking up machines my cruisers would steer towards their course till dark dusk, when I should alter course to northward for the night. Commodore (T) should inform me when he will leave scene of action. Seaplane carriers and half flotilla to make their bases after dark, when over 100 miles from Heligoland.

22nd November 1914 (Sunday).

A 177. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

12.30 a.m.

356 The following positions for rendezvous refer to a telegram which will follow : No. 2, 55.0 N, 7.30 E ; No. 3, 54.27 N, 8.0 E ; No. 4, 54.50 N, 7.6 E. No. 4 is the position where your supports should be at 5.30 a.m., and towards which southern forces will retire at 8.30 a.m.

A 178. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

357 Your 172. Messenger cannot reach you by 5 p.m., Sunday. Following are the particulars of plan ; positions of rendezvous have been sent in telegram 356. *Arethusa*, *Aurora*, *Undaunted*, *Engadine*, *Riviera*, and eight destroyers will be at R.V. 2 at 2.30 a.m., and at R.V. 3 at 5.15 a.m. Seaplanes will be started from R.V. 3 as soon as ready. When seaplanes have started the ships will cruise about at high speed in such a manner that they leave the vicinity of R.V. 3 about 2 hours after seaplanes have started. They will then spread one mile apart on either beam of *Arethusa*, course N 39 E, speed 15 knots, looking out for seaplanes, and proceeding towards R.V. 4, where your supports will be met with. In the event of attack by enemy light cruisers, British light cruisers will engage and lead enemy away, and destroyers will pick up pilots and sink seaplanes. In the event of attack by heavy cruisers, the whole force retire towards your supports, an endeavour being made by some vessels to return and pick up pilots later. When 3 hours have elapsed since seaplanes started, the whole force will retire at speed towards your supports at R.V. 4. Three submarines will be spread 5 miles apart on a WSW bearing, the line being situated 10 miles to the northward of Heligoland. The submarines will intercept pursuing vessels and pick up air pilots in case destroyers are unable to do so.

A 179. Adty. to Comm. (S).

Sent 1.15 a.m.

117 My 116. Approved for three submarines to operate under Comm. (T), as laid down in last paragraph of his secret letter, No. 0049, dated 20th November 1914. Plan will take effect on Tuesday morning.

A 180. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 1.30 a.m.

246 Your secret letter, No. 0049, dated 20th November, received. Plan approved as therein stated ; it will take effect on Tuesday morning. Submarines co-operating, as laid down in last paragraph. *Duncans* not available, being otherwise employed. But C.-in-C. has been asked to have supports at rendezvous No. 4, at 5.30 a.m., and a very strong fleet will be further back.

A 181. Comm. (S) to Adty.

Sent 9.9. a.m.
Recd. 9.34 a.m.

45 Three submarines have left (for) taking part in Plan No. X. They will remain in enemy waters three days, unless they receive contrary orders passing Gorleston. Submarines off Ems leave Monday evening, 23rd November. Submit that it is desirable to have one or two off there during Plan X. Can I cruise off Ems Monday night with four destroyers?

A 182. Adty. to Comm. (S).

Sent 1.20 p.m.

118 Following is a report from Kingsnorth midday, 22nd. NE wind, strong to high, in Dover Strait and southern portion North Sea. Anti-cyclonic weather, light airs and calms, in remainder North Sea. It is forecasted that the mild anti-cyclonic conditions will shortly extend all over the North Sea. Send the three submarines required for the Plan 0049 and give them orders to return should they find the weather too bad for them to remain in the position required for Tuesday morning.

A 183. Adty. to Comm. (S).

Sent 1.25 p.m.

119 Your 45. Send two submarines to operate off Ems, arriving there by daybreak on Tuesday. They should return after 24 hours. Destroyers cannot be spared owing to other requirements. Acknowledge by telegram.

A 184. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 1.50 p.m.

363 Your 176. Eight of 1st Flotilla on Belgian coast. Four of 1st Flotilla escorting ships on East Coast. Nine of 1st and 3rd Flotillas under repair. Eight will go to Comm. (T). Eleven remain for disposal, and in case of German activity, will be required with Channel Fleet. If no German activity, some will be required to escort Channel transports.

A 185. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 4.0 p.m.
Recd. 4.28 p.m.

184 Request to be informed at once if operations are postponed for any reason. Request also Comm. (T) be directed to inform R.A.C., 3rd C.S., V.A.C., 1st B.C.S., and myself, if on arrival at rendezvous three operations are found impracticable.

A 186. C.-in-C., Nore, to Adty.

Recd. 5.6 p.m.

52 Your 42. It has not been possible to send message to Galloper Light, owing to very heavy sea. Patrol unable to remain out.

A 187. Comm. (T) to Adty.

Recd. 5.19 p.m.

379 *Arethusa* ready for sea. Unless ordered to the contrary, am proceeding at 5.0 a.m. to carry out Plan X. Strong east wind, but not sufficient to prevent operations.

A 188. Adty. (F.N.A.) to A.C., French 2nd L.S.

Sent 6.15 p.m.

103. Six transports will cross over from Southampton to Havre during the night of Monday-Tuesday, leaving at intervals of half an hour. The Admiralty asks you to have them guarded by torpedo boats, which ought to be at the Nab Lightship to-morrow evening before dark.

A 189. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 7.37 p.m.

368 Your 184. Weather unsuitable at present, but forecast promises improvement later. You will be informed if operation is postponed. Commodore (T) will be directed as you request.

A 190. R.A., *Russell*, to Adty.

Sent 8.50 p.m.
Recd. 9.35 p.m.

Weather permitting, operations ordered will be carried out to-morrow, 23rd November. (1615.)

A 191. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 11.45 p.m.

248 Following for Comm. (T) is not to be sent by wireless, but is to be sent by boat or destroyer—begins—

248 Your 379 received. Your support at No. 4 rendezvous will be Light Cruiser Squadron and 2nd Cruiser Squadron, with battle cruisers and battleships 33 miles and 73 miles further back respectively, on the line N 39 W from No. 4 rendezvous. You have a perfectly free hand to carry out the operations or not, having regard to the weather and any other conditions at the time. Should you decide operation is not practicable, proceed to a safe distance and then inform R.A., 3rd Cruiser Squadron, V.A., 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and C.-in-C., Home Fleet, by wireless. If operation takes place as arranged, inform the above Admirals when you have picked up pilots and are proceeding to join supports. Admiralty wish you every success. Acknowledge.

23rd November 1914.

A 192. Comm. (S) to Comm. (T).

Intercepted 1.25 p.m.

Regret three submarines unable to arrive station in time to take part in Plan X. Two are proceeding Ems; should be there daylight to-morrow, Tuesday. (1235.)

A 194. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.

Sent 5.10 p.m.

55 *Urgent*. Immediate. Arrange that one of your flotilla gives orders to Galloper and Tongue Light ships to remain lit to-night.

A 195. C.-in-C., Nore, to Adty.

Recd. 5.45 p.m.

Your 55. Orders issued for message to be taken out, but is doubtful if Galloper can be reached. The northern patrols have had to return to Harwich on account of the weather. The light will be extinguished before the boat reaches the Galloper, and it is doubtful if she will be able to find it.

A 196. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Bordeaux.

Sent 7.50 p.m.

1085 Admiralty proposes to leave *Indefatigable*, *Dublin*, and three British submarines to watch the Dardanelles, and asks you to replace *Indomitable* by two old battleships, for instance, those used for convoying transports. Admiralty is extremely anxious to withdraw the destroyers from the Dardanelles in order to use them in the North Sea, if you can replace them.

A 197. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 8.45 p.m.

249 Superior enemy force of 11 destroyers, 1 armoured cruiser, 2 light cruisers and torpedo boats is scouting to NW of Heligoland. Send back *Engadine* and *Riviera* with a destroyer escort and make for a position nearer your supports.

A 198. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 9.35 p.m.

374 One enemy armoured, or possibly battle, cruiser, 11 destroyers, 2 light cruisers, besides torpedo boats, are scouting NW of Heligoland to-night. Have ordered Commodore, *Arethusa*, to send back *Engadine* and *Riviera*, and make for a position nearer his supports. It seems a good opportunity to bring on a cruiser action. Use your discretion as to ordering Comm. (T) to make a reconnaissance in the morning and give him adequate support.

24th November 1914.

A 199. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol (240),
S.O., Cruiser Force G (73),
S.N.O., Portland,
C.-in-C., Portsmouth (71),
C.-in-C., Devonport (62).

Sent 12.55 a.m.

Urgent. An enemy vessel, description not known, stopped steamer *Malachite* off Cape La Hève yesterday, at 4.0 p.m. Crew escaped in boats and landed, and enemy vessel fired on *Malachite*. Warn your vessels to be vigilant. (0055.)

A 200. Adty. to S.N.O., Harwich. (75.)

Sent 10.40 a.m.

S.N.O., Harwich, has been ordered to send six destroyers to Portsmouth at once to convoy transports to Havre to-night.

Note.—C.-in-C., Portsmouth, informed. (75.)

A 201. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 10.55 a.m.

241 If straits are fairly clear of drifting mines, *Revenge* should return to Dover after dark. The enemy vessel off Cape La Hève last night was a submarine.

A 202. Adty. to Comm. (S).

Sent 12.55 p.m.

120 A German submarine is using Zeebrugge, and you should send a "C" class submarine there to try and stalk her. There is also considerable movement of German ships about Heligoland, and two or three submarines should be sent over there as soon as possible.

A 203. Adty. (F.N.A.) to A.C., French 2nd L.S. Sent 1.40 p.m.

105 The five transports which did not cross last night will do so to-night. The Admiralty asks you to have them escorted by torpedo boats, which should be at the Nab Lightship before dark. Six British destroyers have been sent from Harwich to reinforce the convoy. If you have any more torpedo boats available, the Admiralty will be much obliged if you would employ them in sweeping ahead of the transports.

A 204. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 2.5 p.m.

375 All German destroyer flotillas have been ordered to be ready for night operations to-night. (1355.)

25th November 1914.

A 205. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth.

Sent 12.5 p.m.

85 *Urgent.* *Hornet* and five destroyers are to sweep along the coast from Portsmouth to the Downs for the purpose of locating and attacking any enemy submarines or their tenders. They are then to proceed to Harwich.

A 206. R.A., Dover Patrol, to Adty.

Recd. 1.7 p.m.

161 Three steamers are delayed in Downs for convoy to East Coast ports. My convoy is ready, but it is no good starting unless I can ensure relief convoy at Orfordness. Present arrangements very unsatisfactory. I have telegraphed to 7th Flotilla and they say no destroyers available. Whole matter requires looking into.

A 207. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 2.6 p.m.

191 With regard to Admiralty orders for fishing boats in North Sea, dated 14th August, this allows fishing by British trawlers between the Orkneys and the line joining Hook of Holland and Sumburgh Head. Fishing fleet have been working in this area lately and it makes it possible for a disguised alien trawler working among them to act as a submarine tender or minelayer. Already two British trawlers have been sent in for examination, owing to their close proximity to an enemy's submarine. It is very desirable that the area N lat. 58 and east and west should be prohibited to all fishing boats.

A 208. Adty. to C-in-C., Portsmouth.

Sent 2.49 p.m.

87 With reference to *Hornet's* division of destroyers. You can retain or recall two for escort transports to-night if nothing else available.

A 209. Adty. to C-in-C., Portsmouth.

Sent 8.30 p.m.

Three leaders and 12 armed trawlers are the numbers allowed to the Portsmouth area in the complete scheme of coast patrols, which is about to be promulgated. These have been ordered to Portsmouth at once, and are to be used as you think fit to patrol the route of the transports to Havre, varying the actual positions from day to day. They are for protection against submarines and to sink drifting mines, and also to board any suspicious small craft which may supply or assist submarines.

26th November 1914.

A 210. C-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 9.0 a.m.

197 Recent events clearly indicate insecurity of my base. No Cromarty type obstruction yet arrived. Urgently request further hastening steps be taken. Material for temporary obstructions not even arrived yet. (0740.)

A 211. C-in-C., H.F., to 1st S.L.

Recd. 9.11 a.m.

199 Strongly urge late 1st Cruiser Squadron ships be attached to H.M.S. *Drake*, not H.M.S. *New Zealand*. They would greatly reduce latter ship's speed, her best asset. (0730.)

A 212. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 10.20 a.m.

252 Your 385. As soon as ready, *Faulknor* should proceed to Scapa, informing V.A., Longhope, of expected time of arrival, which should be during daylight hours.

A 213. Adty. to S.N.O., Harwich.

Sent 12.35 p.m.

Send the eight destroyers which are standing by to-day to Dover to wait orders. Commodore (T) has been informed. Acknowledge.

A 214. Adty. (F.N.A.), to Marine, Bordeaux.

Sent 1 p.m.

1101 Admiralty asks if plan of defence of the Straits of Dover, set forth in telegram 1078, can be put in force to-morrow at noon, the question of the submarine barrier off Calais being reserved.

A 215. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 1.45 p.m.

249 Eight destroyers are being sent to the Channel to hunt submarines, board small craft, and sink drifting mines. They will work to the westward of Dover Patrol, but may sometimes require accommodation at Dover.

A 216. Adty. (F.N.A.), to A.C., French 2nd L.S.

Sent 6.35 p.m.

112 Eight British destroyers will make a sweep to-morrow, Friday, between the English coast and a line starting from Dover, passing by the Varne buoy, next reaching a point situated 50.30 N, and 1.20 W, of Paris, then a point 50 N, 3.20 W; from there to the Needles. The aim is to destroy floating mines, as well as to chase enemy submarines. A parallel sweep made by French destroyers at the same time south of this line might be effective.

A 217. Adty. (F.N.A.), to Marine, Bordeaux.

Sent 7.50 p.m.

1103 Admiralty accepts Admiral Favereau's proposal that eight submarines only be kept in the Straits of Dover to form two lines in case of alarm, the one between Grisnez and Varne, the other between Calais and Buoy B. The other submarine can return to Cherbourg. Admiral Favereau informed.

A 218. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.). Recd. 8 p.m.

181 Plan of defence of the Straits of Dover can be put into force as soon as Admiralty think fit, provided that Officer commanding 2nd Light Squadron be informed.

A 219. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol. Sent 8.15 p.m.

251 The eight destroyers from Harwich are to sweep the English half of the Channel from Dover to the Needles. The area to be swept is that contained between the coast and the following line—Dover—NE Varne Buoy, 50.30 N, long. 1 E, 50 N, 1 W—the Needles. Sweep is to start to-morrow, and is to operate against submarines and suspicious vessels, as well as sinking mines. The French are similarly going to sweep the French half of the Channel at the same time.

A 220. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 8.25 p.m.

386 Your 199. We think the following will be the most suitable arrangement. *New Zealand* to become a private ship in 1st B.C.S. Rear-Admiral Moore to transfer to H.M.S. *Leviathan* and command 1st Cruiser Squadron, consisting of *Leviathan*, *Warrior*, *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh* (stop). *Donegal*, *Cumberland*, and *Hampshire* to join 6th Cruiser Squadron.

A 221. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth. Sent 10.25 p.m.

105 It is desired to trap the German submarine which sinks vessels by gunfire off Havre. A small, or moderate sized steamer should be taken up and fitted very secretly with two 12-pdr. guns in such a way that they can be concealed with deck cargo or in some way which will not be suspected. She should be sent when ready to run from Havre to England, and should have an intelligent officer and a few seamen and two picked gunlayers, who should all be disguised. If the submarine stops her, she should endeavour to sink her by gunfire. The greatest secrecy is necessary to prevent spies becoming acquainted with the arrangement.

27th November 1914.

A 222. Adty. to A.C., Coast of Scotland (537),
A.O.P. (256),
R.A., Cromarty (292). Sent 1.40 a.m.

It is reported that two submarines passed Skaw lightship at 9.30 a.m., 26th, passing north.

Repeated as 388 to C.-in-C., H.F., at 8.45 a.m., with "from a reliable source" after the word "reported."

A 223. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. Recd. 10.10 a.m.

205 In the event of the three absent battle cruisers taking part in any action, submit their names and class may be suppressed in any public notification that may be made. Most undesirable that enemy should be aware of reduction in number of battle cruiser squadron in the North Sea.

A 224. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. Recd. 11.4 a.m.

207 I propose remaining at Scapa for the present, completing temporary obstruction, refit ship, and carry out practice inside the Flow.

A 225. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. Recd. 3.43 p.m.

214 Your 386. Propose the transfer should take place at once. If approved will order *Leviathan* to Cromarty. Submit R.A. Moore may be informed.

A 226. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 10.10 p.m.

390 It is desired to use Kirkwall in preference to Lerwick for examination port for steamers, as it much facilitates negotiations with neutral powers, and if Kirkwall is decided on adequate measures can be put in force at once instead of re-opening matters already agreed on, which will entail

considerable delay. Please report if you consider there is any danger of those on board neutral ships at Kirkwall acquiring information if adequate precautions are taken. Precautions would consist of (1) Establishment of a proper examination service with boarding officers, pilots, tugs and guard boats; (2) No communication permitted with the shore; (3) Ships to be anchored as far from Kirkwall as possible in a position from which Scapa Flow would be behind hills and not be allowed to remain for a longer time than is required for examination.

A 227. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth.

Sent 11.30 p.m.

119 Please instruct *Miranda* that she is to sweep up Channel to-morrow with the eight destroyers, reaching Dover to-morrow evening. The vessels are then to complete with fuel and be ready to leave Dover at noon on Sunday.

28th November 1914.

A 228. *Maidstone* to Adty. (by telephone).

11.25 a.m.

From Commodore (T) to Chief of War Staff. There is a strong German W/T going on about 100 or 150 miles from Harwich. The *Arethusa* and *Fearless* are ready to sail at a moment's notice. It is probably too rough for destroyers.

Reply. Duty Capt., 11.35 a.m.

Proceed with *Arethusa* and *Fearless* and scout reporting result. Do not get engaged with superior forces.

A 229. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.

Sent 3.50 p.m.

134 *Vestal* is to return to Portsmouth as soon as convenient.

A 230.

Press Notice and Notice to Mariners.

ALTERATION OF LIGHTS AND BUOYS IN ENGLISH CHANNEL.

On and after 10th December 1914, the lights, buoys and fog signals in the English Channel and the Downs, eastward of a line joining Selsea Bill and Cape Barfleur, and south of the parallel of lat. $51^{\circ} 20' N$, will be liable to extinction or alteration without further notice. Trinity House Pilot Stations will be established by the 10th December 1914 at the places mentioned herein, and merchant vessels are very strongly advised to take pilots, as navigation in the area in question will be exceedingly dangerous without their aid. (1) St. Helens, Isle of Wight, where ships proceeding up Channel can obtain pilots capable of piloting as far as Great Yarmouth. (2) Great Yarmouth where ships from the North Sea bound for the English Channel can obtain pilots capable of piloting as far as the Isle of Wight. (3) Dover, where ships from French Channel ports, but NO OTHERS, can obtain pilots for the North Sea. (4) The Sunk Light Vessel, where ships crossing the North Sea between the parallels of $51^{\circ} 40' N$ and $51^{\circ} 54' N$, but NO OTHERS, can obtain pilots for the English Channel. (5) Pilots can also be obtained at London for the Channel or North Sea.

29th November 1914.

A 231. Adty. (F.N.A.), to A.C., French 2nd L.S.

Sent 1.20 p.m.

121 Four transports will go to-night from Southampton to Havre. Admiralty will procure escort, but would like you to watch landings on the French coast. As transports cross almost every night, Admiralty will undertake to ensure their escort, but asks you to keep a strict look out in the approaches to Havre.

30th November 1914.

A 232. C.-in-C., Portsmouth, to Adty.

Recd. 4 p.m.

151 Referring to report of arrival of *Beagle*, *Bulldog*, *Pincher*, and *Rattlesnake*, it is submitted that these vessels would be valuable augmentation of local flotilla in view of frequent escort duty with transports.

Reply.

The four destroyers *Beagle*, *Bulldog*, *Pincher*, *Rattlesnake* to be made tenders to the *Victory*, and are to be used for escorting transports to Havre, and for patrolling the Channel for enemy submarines. They should not be considered as part of the Extended Defence.

A 233. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 7.45 p.m.

412 *Yarmouth* and *Gloucester* are being sent to join you. It is thought desirable that 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron should have two light cruisers attached to it, and when these ships join you it will be possible for you to detail two vessels for this purpose if you concur.

A 234. Adty. to S.N.O., Dover.

Sent 10.40 p.m.

262 Inform *Miranda* that she should remain at Dover with her six destroyers until further orders.

1st December 1914.

A 235. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 5.13 p.m.

260 Admiralty confidential weekly order No. 193. Submit that it is necessary in view of this report to prohibit British trawlers from fishing in the North Sea or anywhere within the limits east of the line Hebrides-Faroe Islands, and that owners may be informed accordingly. Also that neutral trawlers may be similarly warned against fishing in the North Sea. On the 23rd ultimo, when in southern waters, a considerable number of trawlers flying Dutch colours were passed by the battlefleet. It is not possible to avoid them all, and if the reported ruse is carried out, there is no safeguard short of sinking every trawler met with, unless a sufficient number of torpedo boat destroyers is in company to examine them all. This has never yet been the case.

A 236. Adty. to R.A., Cruiser Force G.

Sent 12.30 p.m.

80 A ship is to be detailed to proceed to Halifax, N.S., for convoy duty. She should coal at Devonport and take any stores requiring passage. Instructions as to the convoy will be sent to her at Halifax.

A 237. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.

Sent 7.17 p.m.

173 The proposals for protection of Walle Anchorage have been dropped. An alternative proposal for berthing a fleet in West Swin has been adopted. Admiral Napier proposes to proceed to Chatham to-morrow to explain the new proposals to you.

2nd December 1914.

A 238. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 2.50 a.m.

427 Your 260. Admiralty have now issued orders very considerably restricting British fishing vessels in North Sea, and prohibiting it in all waters round Orkneys, Shetlands, West of Scotland, North of Ireland, and English Channel to E of line Portland Bill-Cape La Hague. No neutral subjects will, in future, be allowed in British trawlers. Neutral trawlers are denied all U.K. Ports and their fishing limits are as submitted by you, St. George's Channel and English Channel also being forbidden. Copies of new Fishery Regulations are on their way to you now.

A 239. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F.

Sent 12.35 p.m.

431 Boarding steamers were sent you to act in conjunction with 10th Cruiser Squadron to avoid the cruisers stopping and being liable to submarine attack. Now that the 10th Cruiser Squadron is being paid off and replaced by 24 armed liners, there does not appear to be the same necessity for the boarding steamers. If you can spare them we should be glad to use them for boarding work in other places where they are urgently required.

A 240. Adty. (F.N.A.), to Marine, Bordeaux.

1126 The Admiralty has just issued fresh regulations for the restriction of fishing. I will forward them to you by the first opportunity. In the North Sea the limits allowed are the same as before up to the parallel of 52.50, south of which fishing is forbidden. It is forbidden also in the Straits of Dover and in the Channel to the east of a line joining Portland Bill and La Hague, and in the Irish Sea to the north of a line running from St. Bees Head to Ballywater. The Admiralty hope that you will promulgate similar prohibitions in order to prevent suspected trawlers from helping enemy's submarines or mining our coasts.

3rd December 1914.

A 241. R.A., Cruiser Force G, to Adty.

Recd. 12.7 p.m.

54 With reference to telegram 53—owing to ships being in dockyard hands no cruisers will be available for convoying to Gibraltar until Tuesday, 8th December. I am obliged to go into harbour to-morrow, Friday, until Sunday, 6th December, and propose visiting Admiralty Saturday morning to discuss reorganisation Western Patrol. (1012.)

A 242. Marine, Bordeaux, to Adty. (F.N.A.).

192 We intend to establish aeroplane stations at several points on our Channel coasts, in order to carry out search for enemy's submarines. Please let us know if the hangar which had been placed at the disposal of Admiralty with a view to the ultimate installation of a station at Boulogne is necessary to them. If it is not, we will make use of it.

Reply.

1129 Admiralty asked permission to make use of hangar at Boulogne at a period when situation of Dunkirk seemed to be precarious. They did not and do not now expect to make use of it.

A 243. Adty. to Admiral, Dunfermline (598),

R.A., Cromarty (332),

A.O.P. (272).

Sent 10.50 p.m.

One submarine reported left Emden Tuesday evening last.

4th December 1914.

A 244. C-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 7.31 a.m.

289 The situation in regard to fleet minesweeping vessels is at present very often serious. There are four at base, and of these only three are fit for work in fine weather. Should Germans contemplate any movement they will certainly lay mines off my base first, and my sweeping resources are totally inadequate. Trawlers' sweeping speed is so low that they cannot work far from base, and probable position of minefield is some distance out. The inevitable result must be delay in getting fleet away or taking considerable risk. Submit *Halcyon* and *Spanker*, understood to be already fitted for minesweeping, be sent to join me, and that at least eight merchant ships of at least 16 knots speed, capable of keeping the sea for six days, be at once taken up and fitted as mine-sweeping vessels. (0620.)

5th December 1914.

A 245. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 12.45 a.m.

451 Four minesweeping gunboats are required for operations on Belgian coast, and should be sent to Sheerness as soon as weather permits. They will return to you as soon as operations are concluded.

A 246. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 1.10 a.m.

452 It is desired to utilise *Hannibal* and *Magnificent* for more active service if they can be replaced at Scapa Flow by providing guns for mounting on shore and a force of marines to man them. Report number of guns and marines required, and what huts or accommodation on shore will be required.

A 247. R.A., Dover Patrol, to Adty.

Recd. 5.55 p.m.

197 Following from First Lord of the Admiralty: Dover Boom Defence cannot be repaired for a fortnight. Meanwhile, battleships very exposed without nets. Surely it would be better to send all except *Revenge*, which is fairly snug, away at once until entrances are closed.

Reply. To S.N.O., Dover. Sent 7.55 p.m.

Send battleships to Portland, except *Revenge*.

A 248. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 10.55 p.m.

281 Your 199. Captain (D) should return to his ship and destroyers of 3rd Flotilla to Harwich as convenient to-morrow.

6th December 1914 (Sunday).

A 249 V.A., Channel Fleet, to Adty.

Recd. 11.55 a.m.

325 I hear from the Rear-Admiral that 6th Battle Squadron has left Dover for Portland. Respectfully submit I have not been informed of this intended movement, and request I may be informed if this is a permanent change of base.

A 250. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 1.52 p.m.

310 I propose to send 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and Light Cruiser Squadron to sea to-morrow, Monday evening, to arrive about 56 N 1° East by 8 a.m., Tuesday, sweeping to the south till noon, then eastward, being again off coast daylight, Wednesday, and returning to base daylight, Thursday. 1st Battle Squadron and 1st Cruiser Squadron supporting to the northward.

A 251. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 7.40 p.m.

461 Your 310. Unless you have any special object it is not desirable to come south, as after the recent westerly gales it is probable there will be mines adrift to the southward of lat. 56°. At present there is no movement of German High Sea Fleet.

Reply.

Recd. 12.7 a.m., 7th.

317 Have cancelled order.

8th December 1914.

A 252. Comm. (T), to Adty.

Recd. 9.18 a.m.

409 For Chief of Staff. Shall I continue to send out a cruiser daily, this will not interfere with Plan Y?

Reply (sent 10.45 a.m.).

Your 409. Yes.

A 253. Adty. to S.N.O., Milford Haven. Sent 11.55 a.m.
Have your yacht and trawler patrols been able to go out and have you searched the vicinity of the Tuskor?

A 254. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth. Sent 12.25 p.m.
243 It is desirable to continue the arrangement of the transports sailing singly, each being escorted by a destroyer. French Admiral has been communicated with, and in the event of your being short of destroyers, he will send some over. He requests that you will telegraph to Chef de Division de Flotille, Cherbourg, direct, and to do so sufficiently early for the French torpedo boats to arrive at Nab by daylight. He is also patrolling the Havre vicinity.

9th December 1914.

A 255. Adty. to Comm. (S). Sent 4.50 p.m.
130 If weather is suitable send a C class boat to Zeebrugge to look out for German submarine and to scout. She should return if weather turns bad, and should not remain in any case longer than two days.

A 256. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 12.20 a.m.
482 German steamships *Alma* and *Marie* arrived at Thamshaven, 9 a.m., 8th December, and are expected to remain two days. Believed to be loading copper ore for Hamburg.

10th December 1914.

A 257. Adty. to Comm. (T). Sent 12.50 a.m.
266 Send four destroyers to Boston Deep forthwith to escort monitors to Dover.

A 258. Comm. (S), to Adty. Recd. 9.45 a.m.
56 Plan Y postponed owing to weather.

A 259. Adty. to Comm. (S). Sent 8 p.m.
131 Owing to other operations now contemplated Plan Y must be postponed. Inform Commodore (T). Acknowledge.

A 260. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. Recd. 9.4 p.m.
368 *Personal to First Sea Lord.* Reference to O. X. O., No. 1, received to-day. The urgent necessity for the presence of four flotillas during fleet action is apparent, and this emphasises extreme importance at least another half flotilla being sent to join me now.

A 261. Adty. to Admiral, Rosyth (649),
C.-in-C., Nore (276),
V.A., Channel, Sheerness (235),
R.A., 6th B.S., Portland (5). Sent 9.20 p.m.
3rd B.S., 3rd C.S., Channel Squadron, should have steam ready for 12 knots daily from daybreak to 9 a.m., and steam for 3/5 power at two hours' notice throughout the 24 hours, except when tidal conditions do not admit of ships going out of harbour. One ship in turn in each squadron may have fires out at the Admiral's discretion for cleaning boilers.

A 262. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. Recd. 9.26 p.m.
366 Your 486. Information was received 24 hours after explanation was asked for and too late for action to be taken. Thamshaven does not appear in sailing directions, gazetteer, or any chart supplied. Submit in future latitude and longitude of place may be given as asked in my telegram No. 352.

Reply.

500 Your 366. This will be done.

A 263. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 10.50 p.m.
493 Urgent. My 482. One of German steamers reported to be leaving
Thamshaven to-day, 10th.

A 264. Adty. to Comm. (S). Sent 11.10 p.m.
133 Board ordered operation to be postponed in view of Harwich sub-
marines and destroyers all being required for another purpose. Send one
C class boat to Zeebrugge with orders to be back by noon on Sunday.

A 265. Adty. to Comm. (T). Sent 11.15 p.m.
267 Send four destroyers to Humber to escort one battleship to Dover.

A 266. Adty. to A.O.P. Sent 11.30 p.m.
292 Send one battleship of *Majestic* class to Dover to arrive by Sunday
morning. Four destroyers will be sent from Harwich as escort. Select
a vessel which has fired full calibre ammunition since commissioning,
if possible.

11th December 1914.

A 267. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 12.20 a.m.
494 Although names of battle cruisers detached are being kept secret,
Germans must know that destruction of *Scharnhorst-Gneisenau* Squadron
means a great reinforcement at home operative about three weeks hence.
They can never again have such a good opportunity for successful offensive
operations as at present, and you will no doubt consider how best to conserve
and prepare your forces in the interval, so as to have the maximum number
possible always ready and fresh. For the present the patrols to prevent
contraband passing are of small importance. *Princess Royal* has been
ordered to rejoin you with all convenient despatch.

A 268. Adty. to Comm. (T). Sent 11 a.m.
268 My 267. A second battleship is going from Humber to Dover.
Send four destroyers to escort her. Acknowledge.

A 269. Adty. to A.O.P., Immingham Dock. Sent 11.5 a.m.
294 My 292. Report name of battleship being sent to Dover. A second
battleship will be required to be at Dover by Monday morning. Escort
will be provided from Harwich.

A 270. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 8.20 p.m.
503 Reported from British Minister, Christiania, that two German ships
at Thamshaven, 63.19 N, 9.55 E, will probably leave one on 13th December,
the other 14th or 15th December.

A 271. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol. Sent 9.5 p.m.
300 Operations postponed. Ships at Dover and Dunkirk should remain
at respective ports. Everything is to be ready to begin operations if
required. *Majestic* is proceeding to Dover and should be sent on to Port-
land by night. Another *Majestic* class battleship is coming to Dover
and should remain there under your orders. She is to use her net defence
while in Dover.

12th December 1914.

A 272. Comm. (T) to Adty. Recd. 9.13 a.m.
420 For Chief of Staff. *Aurora* reports very heavy weather off
Terschelling. She has been recalled. Request instructions for *Fearless*
and *Galatea*, both at Harwich. (0852.)

Reply. Sent 1.50 p.m.
269 *Fearless* and *Galatea* should remain for the present at Harwich.

A 273. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 3.45 p.m.

304 Be ready to commence operations on Tuesday at daylight. Take the first *Majestic* class battleship which arrives at Dover under your orders and send the second one to Portland. A number of drifters are being armed with 3-pdr. guns and maxims, and protected with plating against machine gun fire. Those which are ready will be sent to Dunkirk to assist you and also to try them and give them some exercise. They may be useful to hunt submarines. Captain Dick will be in charge of them and will be sent to Dunkirk on Monday to report to you.

13th December 1914.

A 274. Adty. to Comm. (S).

Sent 1.20 a.m.

134 Operations which were contemplated have been postponed. Plan Y should now be carried out as soon as the weather conditions are suitable. Inform Commodore (T). Acknowledge.

A 275. First Sea Lord to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 11.55 a.m.

510 *From First Sea Lord.* Your 371. It is necessary to keep the Coastal Squadron out of the public notice until the opportunity occurs of using them in the manner we desire, and there is no place so convenient for the purpose as Scapa Flow. It is proposed therefore to send all these vessels to Scapa Flow. There is no necessity for you to use them.

14th December 1914.

A 276. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 2.15 a.m.

516 My 493 and 503. German S.S. *Alma* did not sail from Thamshaven, 63.19 N, 9.55 E, 13th, but is said to be leaving 14th, and *Marie* day after.

A 277. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 5.40 a.m.

517 My 516. According to later information German ship *Alma* sailed 2 p.m., 13th. German trawler *Preussen* sailed from Kristiansund, 63.8 N, 7.50 E, yesterday.

A 278. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 9.30 p.m.

523 Good information just received shows that German 1st Cruiser Squadron with destroyers leave Jade River on Tuesday morning early, and return on Wednesday night. It is apparent from information that the battleships are very unlikely to come out. The enemy force will have time to reach our coast. Send at once leaving to-night the Battle Cruiser Squadron and Light Cruiser Squadron supported by a Battle Squadron, preferably the 2nd. At daylight on Wednesday morning they should be at some point where they can make sure of intercepting the enemy on his return. Tyrwhitt, with his light cruisers and destroyers, will try to get into touch with the enemy off the British coast and shadow him, keeping Admiral informed. From our information the German 1st Cruiser Squadron consists of four battle cruisers and five light cruisers, and there will probably be three flotillas of destroyers. Acknowledge.

A 279. Adty. to C.-in-C., Grand Fleet.

Sent 11.40 p.m.

524 My 523. While the ships are at sea the use of wireless telegraphy should be restricted to messages of urgent necessity.

15th December 1914.

A 280. Adty. to Comm. (S).

Sent 12.10 a.m.

135. Plan Y is to be postponed until further orders. Inform Comm. (T).

A 281. Adty. to Comm. (S).

Sent 1.55 a.m.

136 As a preparative measure all oversea submarines which are available are to be sent to Gorleston to arrive by 1 p.m. to-day, Tuesday. Should they be told to carry out the plan ordered, they are to proceed to a line extending in a SSE direction from a position in lat. 53.50 N, long. 4.30 E, to the 10-fathom line off the Dutch coast. They are to be spread on this line by daybreak Wednesday, and remain on it until nightfall, when they are to return to Harwich. German vessels may be crossing this line at any time on Wednesday.

A 282. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 2.17 a.m.

406 Your telegram 523. Am sending 3rd Cruiser Squadron as well. Some of Light Cruiser Squadron not available. (0150.)

A 283. C.-in-C., H.F., to Comm. (T), *via* Adty.

Sent 4.6 a.m.

Recd. 5.4 a.m.

Following telegram sent to Admiralty begins:—

407 2nd Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron, Light Cruiser Squadron will be in position lat. 54.10 N, long. 3.00 E, at 7.30 a.m., 16th. Please inform Comm. (T) of composition of force and 7.30 a.m. position. Very desirable his T.B.D.s should be with V.A. should engagement ensue. Probable that two divisions of T.B.D.s being sent by me may not reach rendezvous owing to heavy weather. Ends. Acknowledge.

A 284. Comm. Keyes to C.O.S. (by telephone).

Recd. 5.25 a.m.

Your 136. Submit very inadvisable to attempt passage through Haisborough swept channel with a number of submarines after dark. If undesirable to proceed round Hinder Light Vessel propose to proceed direct and wait orders eastward of Smith's Knoll. Would prefer N. Hinder Light Vessel route. Telephone, because must go away very soon if going former route. I am going myself with T.B.D.s.

Reply.

Sent 6.20 a.m.

Remain at Harwich ready for sea.

A 285. Adty. to Comm. (S).

Sent 11.15 a.m.

137 Your 63. Eight submarines will be sufficient. Leave by the most suitable route in time to be spread on patrol line by daybreak to-morrow, Wednesday. Patrol line extends SSE to the 10 fathom line from a position in lat. 53.50 N, long. 4.30 E. Submarines to remain on lookout from daybreak to nightfall on Wednesday, and then to return to Harwich. They are also to be ordered to return if weather gets too bad. Warn them that British ships will also be at sea. Report whether orders are understood, also time of sailing and route proposed.

A 286. C.-in-C., H.F., to Admiralty.

Sent 11.35 a.m.

Recd. 12.19 p.m.

408 With reference to your telegram 523, *Boadicea* and *Blanche* returned. *Boadicea* considerably damaged by heavy seas. Now only four light cruisers with force. Probably destroyers will be forced to return. Very important Commodore (T) should effect junction in event of engagement.

A 287. S.O., 2nd B.S., to Adty.

Sent 1.17 p.m.

Recd. 1.20 p.m.

Having few torpedo boat destroyers with me Commodore (T) should join me at 7.30 a.m.

A 288. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 2.5 p.m.

273 There is good probability of German battle cruisers, cruisers, and destroyers being off our coast to-morrow about daybreak. One "M" class destroyer is to patrol vicinity of North Hinder Lightship from midnight until 9 a.m. A second destroyer is to patrol a line extending 15 miles

South magnetic from a position lat. 53.0 N, long. 3.5 E, from midnight until 9 a.m. The duty of these destroyers is to look out for and report the enemy, and trust to their speed to escape. If the weather is too bad they are to return to Harwich. Report their names. The 1st and 3rd Flotillas with all available light cruisers are to be under way off Yarmouth before daylight to-morrow ready to move to any place where the enemy may be reported from, whether it is to the northward or southward. Their duty is to get touch with the enemy, follow him, and report his position to the V.A., 2nd B.S., and V.A., 1st B.C.S. The 2nd B.S., 1st B.C.S., 3rd C.S., and Light Cruisers Squadron will be in a position in lat. 54.10 N, long. 3.0 E, at 7.30 a.m., ready to cut off retreat of enemy. Should an engagement result your flotillas and light cruisers must endeavour to join our fleet and deal with enemy destroyers. If the weather is too bad for destroyers, use light cruisers only, and send destroyers back. Acknowledge.

A 289. Comm. (T), to Adty.

Sent 3.5 p.m.
Recd. 3.28 p.m.

427 For Chief of Staff. With reference to order to Commodore (S) *re* submarines, I have not sent a cruiser to Terschelling to-day. Propose sending one at daylight to-morrow, arriving there at dark when submarines are returned.

A 290. Adty. to A.O.P.

Sent 4.5 p.m.

305 All patrol flotillas should be specially alert to-morrow, Wednesday morning. Weather permitting, they are to be under way off their harbours before daylight, in such positions that they can be communicated with quickly. Acknowledge.

A 291. Adty. to R.A., Dover.

Sent 5.35 p.m.

Weather permitting all available destroyers and submarines are to be under way to-morrow, Wednesday morning, before daylight. The submarines should be spread between the S. Goodwin and west end of Outer Ruytingen. It is believed some German ships will be sent out to-night. The French should be asked to have their patrols out also. S.N.O., Dover, has been informed. Acknowledge.

A 292. Adty. to S.N.O., Dover.

Sent 5.40 p.m.

Following for Admiral Hood begins. *Majestic* should return to Dover to-night. Ends. Acknowledge.

A 293. Comm. (T) to Adty.

Sent 7.13 p.m.
Recd. 7.19 p.m.

430 For Chief of Staff. I do not consider *Galatea* fit for service and have not included her in my orders for to-morrow.

Reply.

275 Your 430 noted.

A 294. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 7.20 p.m.

274 Your 427. Take all your cruisers with you to-morrow in accordance with telegram 273.

A 295. S.N.O., Dover, to Adty.

Recd. 7.37 p.m.

235 Your telegram to-day orders for submarines to be spread in one line across Straits of Dover conflict with arrangements now in force with French, by which I have two lines this side and they have two the other side. It appears to be desirable to adhere to existing arrangements to prevent confusion with French. Instructions are requested by telegraph.

Reply.

320 Your 235. Adhere to existing arrangements.

A 296. Adty. to Admiral, Rosyth. Sent 11.45 p.m.
 678 It is believed several enemy vessels are at sea to-night. Your local defence flotilla should be under way and alert at daybreak to-morrow. Inform V.A., 3rd Battle Squadron.

16th December 1914.

A 297. Adty. to S.N.O., Dover. Sent 2.0 a.m.
 321 Following for Admiral Hood begins: Continue support of military operations, Wednesday. Acknowledge.

A 298. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 9.40 a.m.
 529 Enemy shelling Scarborough and Hartlepool; in case their vessels are chased north you should bring your fleet out.

A 299. Adty. to S.O., 2nd B.S.
 165 Twenty destroyers of 1st and 3rd Flotilla are waiting orders off Gorleston. If you think it advisable you may direct Commodore (T) to take them to vicinity of Heligoland to attack enemy, ships returning in dark hours. (1520.)

A 300. R.A., Dover Patrol, to Adty. Recd. 8.8 p.m.
 244 C.O.S. I am arranging to have my submarines out to-morrow morning before dawn, and am informing the French to that effect.

A 301. Adty. to Comm. (S). Sent 8.12 p.m.
 We think Heligoland Amrum lights will be lit when ships are going in. Your destroyers might get a chance to attack about 2.0 a.m., or later, on the line given you.

A 302. Comm. (S) to Adty. Sent 8.30 p.m.
 Recd. 9.45 p.m.
 Four submarines from Terschelling Patrol will be in the Heligoland Bight dawn to-morrow, one of which will be off the entrance Weser River. Endeavouring to collect others; when done, will keep them in company pending further instructions.

A 303. R.A., Dover Patrol, to French Admiral.
 Request submarine patrol may be placed at daylight to-morrow, the same as to-day. British submarines will be placed according to arranged plan.

17th December 1914.

A 304. Comm. (T) to *Fearless*. Sent 7.14 a.m.
 Recd. 7.16 a.m.
 Take all available destroyers with you to Great Yarmouth and await orders. (0650.)

A 305. Felixstowe W/T (76) to Adty. Sent 8.2 a.m.
 Recd. 8.19 a.m.
 76 17th, 7.50 a.m. From Commodore (S)—begins—Instructions are requested for four submarines, which it is hoped to collect by 10 a.m. Please reply through *Maidstone*—ends. (0735.)

Reply. Through *Maidstone*. Sent 10.40 a.m.
 138 They should return to Harwich.

A 306. A.O.P. to Adty. Recd. 9.0 a.m.
 Steamer reports large vessel blown up 9 p.m., 16th December, 4 miles east by south from Filey. Enemy appears to have laid mines in this neighbourhood, which is where one of their ships was moving about yesterday. (0730.)

A 307. Adty. to all Ships.

Sent 11.20 a.m.

Mines appear to have been laid yesterday off Scarborough, about 7 miles from land. It is probable mines have also been laid off Whitby and Hartlepool. (1045.)

A 308. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 11.45 a.m.

537 Everything is quiet and the German ships have returned to the Elbe and Jade. Send 1st and 3rd Flotillas back to Harwich.

A 309. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 12.12 p.m.

328 No occasion to keep submarines out to-day.

A 310. Adty. to A.O.P. (310),

C.-in-C., Nore (361),

S.N.O., Harwich,

S.N.O., Jarrow,

A.C., Rosyth (689).

Sent 1.30 p.m.

Several ships have been blown up off the Yorkshire coast by mines laid by Germans yesterday. Traffic between Flamborough and Newcastle must be warned and stopped until a channel is swept. Minesweeping has been ordered.

A 311. Adty. to all Ships.

Sent 4 p.m.

All Naval Centres (excluding

Cromarty to Sheerness).

Sent 3.50 p.m.

Trawlers report witnessing German T.B.D. laying E.C. mines in lat. 55.15 N, long. 1.20 E.

A 312. Adty. to S.O., Cruiser Force G.

Sent 6.20 p.m.

89 A ship is required to convoy two transports to Gibraltar, due to leave on the 23rd. Please detail one. *Talbot* should be home shortly. It is hoped your boarding steamers are arriving and are satisfactory.

18th December 1914.

A 313. Adty. to Comm. (T) (280).

Comm. (S) (141).

Sent 11.55 a.m.

Plan Y should be carried out at the first favourable opportunity.

A 314. Adty. to all Ships.

Sent 3.20 p.m.

A pilot cutter reports that she saw a steamer laying mines to the north of the Fairway Buoy, of River Tay, at sunrise this morning. On seeing the pilot cutter she steamed full speed to the northward. Description of steamer, two masts, fitted with wireless, red funnel, with white band, white band round hull, and a large platform aft. (1520.)

A 315. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore (374),

A.O.P. (315),

S.N.O., Harwich,

S.N.O., Tyne,

S.N.O., Rosyth (703),

S.N.O., Dover (331).

Sent 6.50 p.m.

With reference to the traffic being stopped between Flamborough Head and Newcastle. It may be re-opened during daylight, but all vessels should keep within 2 miles of the shore between those points.

19th December 1914.

A 316. Adty. (F.N.A.) to A.C., French 2nd L.S. Sent 1.40 p.m.

145 To-night, and the two following nights, important transports of troops will take place between Southampton and Havre. The Admiralty begs you to have all available torpedo boats before Havre, especially as to-morrow the state of the tide will not allow the transports to enter the harbour until a long while after daybreak.

A 317. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 7.40 p.m.

282 Send a cruiser to patrol off Terschelling and return as usual. Acknowledge.

20th December 1914.

A 318. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 5.20 p.m.

509 In view of another possible raid at an early date, which may probably be to the southward, it is essential that the Battle Cruiser Squadron should be sent to Rosyth, and they should be accompanied by four of the fastest light cruisers. It is intended that, in the event of our getting information of another raid, your whole fleet should be sent to sea, in which case you would assume complete charge of the whole operations; with the following proviso: That the Battle Cruiser Squadron proceed without a moment's delay to an intercepting position, which will be communicated by the Admiralty to the Vice-Admiral, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and repeated to you, to avoid the delay in passing it through you. All information received subsequently by the Admiralty as to the enemy's position will be communicated to you and to the Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Squadron, simultaneously. The force of destroyers under Comm. (T) must continue to act under the orders of the Admiralty until the main fleet or the Battle Cruiser Squadron are sufficiently near to enable him to join one or the other. The oversea submarines under Comm. (S) will also act under the orders of the Admiralty. The possibility must be kept in mind of the enemy breaking through the Straits of Dover and making a raid on Ireland, and on the French and British Western Patrol Squadrons, which are slow and weak, afterwards returning by the west coast of Ireland and north coast of Scotland. The Southern Force, under Admiral Bayly, will be brought out of harbour and concentrated under Admiralty orders, with a view to barring the Dover Straits if information is received in time.

21st December 1914.

A 319. Adty. to Naval Centre, Buncrana (69),
S.N.O., Liverpool (70),
V.A.C., Queenstown,
R.A., Cruiser Force E,
C.-in-C., H.F. (564),
S.N.O., Halifax (137).

Sent 12.20 a.m.

No Atlantic commercial shipping is to pass round north of Ireland until further orders, owing to mines in that vicinity. H.M. Ships should be instructed to divert shipping accordingly.

A 320. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 11.30 a.m.

284 Your telephone message. Cruiser not required. Noted as regards Plan Y. It is not advisable to use the telephone for these matters.

A 321. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 2.25 p.m.

286 Plan Y must be deferred for the present as we are expecting something else soon.

A 322. Adty. to S.N.O., Queenstown.

Sent 2.50 p.m.

Indomitable is to join 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth with all convenient despatch, proceeding west of Ireland and the Hebrides, and giving north-west coast of Ireland a very wide berth. She should leave Queenstown during dark hours and should communicate with C.-in-C. as to time of passing Scapa Flow and of entering the Forth.

A 323. Comm. (S) to Adty.

Recd. 4.32 p.m.

72 Plan Y, Wednesday, 23rd December, unless contrary orders received before 9 p.m.

Reply.

Sent 6.15 p.m.

144 Your 72. Postpone Plan Y and keep all your vessels in readiness for further German activities.

A 324. Adty. to C-in-C., Devonport.

Sent 6.25 p.m.

427 As soon as *Prince George* is ready, she is to proceed off the Tagus and temporarily relieve *Carmania*, who is going to coal at Gibraltar. *Prince George* can carry out gunnery practices whilst there outside territorial waters.

A 325. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. (568),
3rd B.S. (160),
1st B.C.S. (137).

Sent 7.15 p.m.

There are indications that may require you to go to sea to-morrow night.

A 326. Adty. to Comm. (T) (287),
Comm. (S) (145).

Sent 9.40 p.m.

One fast cruiser and eight destroyers are to sail to-morrow morning and proceed to a rendezvous in 54° 10' N, 4° 50' E, arriving by 7.0 p.m., 22nd, and waiting there for orders. If orders are given to proceed in execution of previous orders, the Senior Officer is to send the destroyers to watch the line NNW from Heligoland, about 10 to 15 miles from the island, to intercept any German vessels coming out. They should arrive at this station shortly after midnight, 22nd, after the moon has set, and should leave it 2 hours before sunrise and return to Harwich. The cruiser should remain in wireless touch with the destroyers about 50 to 100 miles from Heligoland until the destroyers leave their station off Heligoland in order to support them or pass any information they obtain to the Admiralty. Two submarines should be sent to the same rendezvous, sailing to-night to arrive there before 7 p.m. on the 22nd. They should proceed to Heligoland if the signal "Proceed in execution of previous orders" is made, arriving at daylight on the 23rd, and should watch for the enemy coming out after the destroyers have left. If the enemy do not come out on the 23rd, the submarines should remain until the evening of 24th and then return to England. They should use great caution, as the ground is sure to be well searched before the enemy come out. The submarines should return at any time if the weather is too bad. If weather conditions are such that destroyers could not escape from a cruiser, they should return to Harwich. *Lurcher* or *Firedrake* should accompany the submarines to the rendezvous, returning to Harwich if the submarines are ordered to proceed to Heligoland. Signals for *Lurcher* or *Firedrake* will be passed through the cruiser. Acknowledge and report names of vessels detailed.

22nd December 1914.

A 327. Adty. to Comm. (S) (by telephone
in cypher).

Sent 1.0 a.m.

146 Two boats can go direct to the position NNW of Heligoland and remain there until evening of 24th, returning at any time if weather is unsuitable.

A 328. Comm. (S) to Chief of War Staff.

Recd. 11.31 a.m.

74 If cruiser remains within 50 miles of submarines stationed off Heligoland in accordance with your 145, they could give her early information as to enemy's movements by wireless. If the enemy gets past them to seaward, submit they proceed to the entrance of rivers to await enemy's return. If approved, I can give them instructions through *Arethusa* and *Firedrake* by pre-arranged code until 7 p.m. to-night, Tuesday.

A 329. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 11.55 a.m.

Priority.

460 In view of great probability that Germans will attempt to lay mines in vicinity of fleet's base whilst general action was in progress or intended with a view to destroy ships returning after the action, submit that when the probable action is known all the available local defence vessels of every description should be ordered to patrol areas of approaches to base to attack minelayers. These vessels to include battleships in Tyne and Humber rivers, etc. I am arranging for armed merchant ships to do this for Scapa Flow and Cromarty approaches. Submit that orders be given now to officers commanding at other bases, so that they may have plans ready. The area up to at least 60 miles from base should be patrolled.

A 330. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 3.50 p.m.

578 It is known that German signal for "Close to Torpedo Range" is a single white flag. This would probably be used in latter part of action, when it might be mistaken for sign of surrender. Warn Flag Officers, Grand Fleet, that care must be taken not to be deceived by this.

Reply.

473 Your 578. This was done in Grand Fleet Battle Orders No. 20, page 10, forwarded to Admiralty, 7th inst. Orders will now be made more explicit.

A 331. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 11.30 a.m.

462 If movement (in view of (?)) latter part of your telegram 559 is probable, it would seem desirable to press French Admiralty to stiffen Western Patrol by battleship from Mediterranean.

A 332. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (579),
3rd B.S. (161),
1st B.C.S. (139),
1st L.C.S. (42).

Sent 4.15 p.m.

Your 468. Present circumstances do not point to necessity for ships going out to-night.

A 333. Adty. to *Arethusa*.

Sent 5.15 p.m.

Arethusa and destroyers are to return to Harwich. Acknowledge. (1715.)

A 334. Comm. (T) to Adty.

Recd. 6.26 p.m.

444 Your 1715 received. Request orders for *Firedrake* and submarines. (1800.)

Reply.

Your 444. *Firedrake* and submarines are to return. (2015.)

23rd December 1914.

A 335. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 11.15 a.m.

474 Propose leaving this evening with 2nd Battle Squadron, 4th Battle Squadron, and carry out target practice west of Orkneys to-morrow, Thursday. Shall pass into North Sea to-morrow evening and reach position in about 57 N by 8 a.m., 25th December, with 1st Battle Squadron, 2nd Battle Squadron, 4th Battle Squadron. I propose to send 3rd Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, Light Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron to sea evening 24th December, to meet me, remaining out until 28th December.

Reply.

585 Your 474 approved. (1355.)

A 336. Adty. to Comm. (S) (155),
Comm. (T) (289).

Sent 12.40 p.m.

Plan Y can be proceeded with as soon as the weather is favourable.
Acknowledge.

A 337. Adty. to Marine, Paris.

Sent 1.10 p.m.

1210 (Repeated substance of 578 to C.-in-C., H.F., 22nd December.)

A 338. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris.

Sent 6.35 p.m.

1211 Admiralty, having urgent need of big, fast ships, for a special purpose, would much like to take temporarily such of our mail steamers as are not in use. Admiralty would be glad if you would let it know as soon as possible whether *France, Gallia, Lutetia, Massilia*, or others, could be placed at its disposal.

A 339. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris.

Sent 2.15 p.m.

1215 Admiralty asks that the mail steamers should be sent empty. The officers and crews bringing them to England would be sent back to France. They would be armed by the Admiralty with some light guns. Four ships are desired.

Secret. These ships are to act as minelayers.

A 340. Adty. to all Ships, via Cleethorpes (721).
Naval Centres, Sheerness, to
Cromarty.

Sent 6.25 p.m.

Reports received from trawlers make it evident that German mines have been laid between lat. 54.15 N and 55.20 N, long. 1.0 E and 2.0 E. The northern part of the published Flamborough foul area between lat. 54.0 N and 54.15 N is now considered safe. (1745.)

26th December 1914.

A 341. Adty. to Admiral, Dunfermline.

Sent 3.50 p.m.

752 Following from British Minister, Christiania: A report has just reached me that German raid on Aberdeen or Dundee is being planned for Monday or Tuesday next. Source said to be fairly reliable. I am endeavouring to check the information.

A 342. Adty. (F.N.A.) to Marine, Paris.

Sent 6.45 p.m.

1227 Information from an absolutely reliable source indicates an immediate attack by Zeppelins on French fortified places. The date of the attack will depend on suitable weather.

A 343. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 8.45 p.m.

606 It is noticed in the daily reports of the position of ships of the Grand Fleet that a large cruiser is usually shown as patrolling to the eastward of the Pentland Firth. Their lordships consider that such an arrangement as a regular procedure tends to invite submarine attack and should be discontinued.

27th December 1914.

A 344. Comm. (T) to Adty.

Sent 9.52 a.m.

Recd. 10.3 a.m.

451 For Chief of Staff. Do you wish cruiser to patrol off Terschelling? *Arethusa* and *Undaunted* are available.

Reply.

Sent 6.50 p.m.

294 Your 451. Not if the weather is very bad.

A 345. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Recd. 9.59 p.m.

494 With reference to your telegram No. 606. In order to prevent mine laying to eastward, to give warning of any approaching force, and to back up trawlers patrolling, one large cruiser and two light cruisers were considered necessary to eastward. Their area by day is between bearings 75 and 135 from Pentland Skerries, and they cruise at not less than 15 knots, zigzagging. Since withdrawal of light cruisers to Rosyth more heavy ships have been necessarily employed on this service. I submit an outpost of a sort is essential. Armed boarding steamers, backed up by one cruiser eastward of them, is my present routine. Am withdrawing cruiser, in accordance with your No. 606, but submit the orders be reconsidered for reasons given above.

28th December 1914.

A 346. Adty. to A.O.P., Immingham.

Sent 12.20 p.m.

349 It is very desirable that each end of the Filey-Scarborough mine-field should be patrolled by destroyers, if possible, until the new channel is swept and buoyed. This is in order to prevent commercial traffic passing through at night or by unauthorised routes, and to prevent further improper minelaying. Report action you propose to take. Also, with reference to my 314, was this area investigated, and with what results?

A 347. V.A., Channel Fleet, to Adty.

Recd. 1.53 p.m.

343 With reference to para. 12 (of) Admiralty letter M. 0088, of 26th December, I am directing 6th Battle Squadron to leave Portland so as to arrive at Sheerness 1 p.m., Wednesday, 30th December. 5th Battle Squadron to leave Sheerness 10 a.m., Wednesday, 30th December, for Portland. All ships' speed through the water 15 knots. Requested all patrols may be warned accordingly. 5th Battle Squadron will carry out tactical exercises in mid-Channel, and will probably arrive at Portland daylight Saturday.

29th December 1914.

A 348. V.A., Channel Fleet, to Adty.

Sent 12.5 a.m.

256 Following sent to Commodore (T) begins: Arrange for six destroyers to be at the Nore at 10 a.m. on Wednesday, 30th December, to escort 5th Battle Squadron as far as Folkestone. Destroyers then to return to Harwich (ends).

A 349. Adty. to R.A., Dover (367),
R.A., 6th Battle Squadron (16),
C.-in-C., Channel (255).

Sent 12.20 a.m.

Arrange for four destroyers to escort 6th Battle Squadron from Folkestone to the Nore on Wednesday, 30th December. Arrange rendezvous off Folkestone with R.A., 6th Battle Squadron, Portland.

A 350. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 11.10 a.m.

619 Your 494. Armed boarding steamers with trawlers adequately supervised by responsible officers would seem sufficient, as the employment in the North Sea of heavy ships in routine patrols must inevitably result in disaster from submarines, as in the case of the *Hawke*, and we have the narrow escape of *Antrim* and other ships.

30th December 1914.

A 351. Comm. (T) to Adty.

Recd. 3.24 p.m.

460 For Chief of Staff. Propose sailing at 4 p.m., Thursday, 31st December, with *Fearless*, for Zeppelin search Friday, returning Saturday. I do not propose taking destroyers.

Reply.

Sent 8.40 p.m.

300 Your 460 approved.

A 352. Adty. (D.I.D.) to R.A., Dover Patrol. Sent 3.40 p.m.

374 Consul, Amsterdam, reports 29th inst. (begins). I am informed that two German submarines, namely *U.28* and *U.29*, now ready at Zeebrugge, have orders to attack Dover on 1st January or 2nd January, if weather is foggy. Two other submarines already at Zeebrugge, namely, *U.30* and *U.31*, will be ready for action in about 8 days (ends).

A 353. C.-in-C., H.F. to Adty. Recd. 8.39 p.m.

529 Your telegram 619. Armed boarding vessels are as yet quite untrained and cannot be relied on to give effective protection against mine-laying, or to give adequate warning of the approach of hostile T.B.D.s or hostile vessels. Submit the employment of cruisers at night may be sanctioned. They can return at early dawn. I feel that without some adequate force outside there is no real safeguard against minelaying or against the harbour being entered by destroyers and light cruisers, and a torpedo attack made on the fleet at anchor. They would suffer heavy loss, but may achieve some considerable success in torpedoing battleships.

31st December 1914.

A 354. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. Recd. 1.17 a.m.

532 *Personal for 1st Sea Lord.* Your private letter, 28th December, re value of British fishing craft in North Sea. If these vessels were fitted with wireless and manned by reserves, as are the German trawlers, I should agree that they would be most useful. Under present conditions their information is so belated and unreliable that it in no way compensates for the many great objections to their presence; the principal one being that any hostile ship may fly British colours, under cover of which she can lay mines or torpedo a battleship. It is not safe for a ship to close to examine her, and therefore the greater the number of trawlers out the greater are the facilities for hostile trawlers to operate.

A 355. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 1.20 p.m.

638. Your 529. Employment of cruisers at night, returning at dawn, is sanctioned until some armed boarding vessels can be trained for this service. Immediate steps should be taken to train the officers in armed merchant cruisers, and a few officers from your large fleet should be detailed for this work from time to time. We have secured the services of practically all the suitable officers and men of British nationality in the Mercantile Marine, and for the future conduct of the war we must rely rather on increasing the efficiency of those we have got than on increasing the numbers. The same thing applies largely to the trawlers and other small vessels, and every opportunity should be taken when they are in harbour to give them training in gunnery, signalling, working modified sweeps, etc.

A 356. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. Sent 3.50 p.m.
Recd. 7.45 p.m.

539 Great difficulty has recently occurred with steering gear of destroyers of 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, and there have been numerous instances of the helm jamming, with great risk of collision, and it has now been ascertained that the defect is apparently due to serious wear in the upper bush of rudder. The vessels of this flotilla are old, and the weather experienced up north has severely tried them. They are no longer fit for working so far from repairing facilities. I submit that one of two alternatives be adopted immediately, viz., either exchange the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla with one from Harwich, or to send 2nd Destroyer Flotilla to Rosyth, instead of 1st Destroyer Flotilla, the latter coming to Scapa Flow, thus carrying out arrangements indicated in A.L.M. 04356/1914 of the 15th inst. In

either case, it is most desirable to get 2nd Destroyer Flotilla further south, where they are nearer a dockyard or private firm, at the earliest possible date. The delay involved in sending them from Scapa Flow for repairs results in the strength of the flotilla being constantly and seriously reduced. Submit that a very early decision be given on the point. The C.O.s are losing confidence in their boats from these constant failures of steering gear.

1st January 1915.

A 357. S.O., Channel Fleet, to Adty. Recd. 5.20 a.m.
Formidable believed to be sunk in position lat. 15.1, 50.9 N, long. 3.6 W.
 Can you send assistance? (0400.)

A 358. S.O., Channel Fleet, to C.-in-C., Intercepted 5.50 a.m.
 Devonport.
 Please send destroyers, if available, to attack submarine sighted lat. 51.11 N, long. 3.6 W. (0543.)

A 359. Adty. to Admirals, Devonport (532), Sent 6.15 a.m.
 Portsmouth (488).
Formidable badly damaged in lat. 50.11 N, long. 3.6 W. Send tugs or any assistance possible.

A 360. Adty. to Admiral, Portsmouth (490), Sent 6.40 a.m.
 Devonport (534).
 Submarine reported in lat. 50.11 N, long. 3.6 W, by *Topaze*.

A 361. Adty. to *Majestic*. Sent 7 a.m.
 Proceed into Portsmouth until this evening, unless Portland is nearer.

A 362. Adty. to Cruiser Force G. Sent 7.20 a.m.
 96 Submarines in lat. 50.11 N, long. 3.6 W, at 4 a.m.

A 363. Adty. to A.C., French 2nd L.S. Sent 7.35 a.m.
 British Channel Fleet has been attacked by hostile submarines this morning at 3 a.m.—Position, 50.11 N, 5.26 W, Paris (3.6 W, Greenwich).

A 364. Adty. to *Monarch*. Sent 11.15 a.m.
 Proceed to Queenstown.

A 365. Adty. to S.N.O., Harwich. Sent 11.17 a.m.
 Send 12 destroyers of 1st or 3rd Flotilla to sweep the Channel from Dover to Plymouth for submarines, keeping to the English side and suiting speed to the weather. Report name of leader.

A 366. S.O., Channel Fleet, to C.-in-C., Intercepted 12.23 p.m.
 Portsmouth.
 Thank you. Weather is so bad that destroyers can do nothing. I have ordered them back. (1150.)

A 367. Comm. (T) to Adty. Sent 2.22 p.m.
 Recd. 2.26 p.m.
 1 My position noon, N lat. 53.42 N, long. 5.40 E, course west, speed, 15 knots. Nothing seen. Too rough for Zeppelins. (1355.)

A 368. S.N.O., Harwich, to Adty. Recd. 6.29 p.m.
Hornet, *Tigress*, *Sandfly*, *Jackal*, *Goshawk*, *Acheron*, *Phoenix*, *Lizard*, *Lapwing*, regret returned to harbour owing to stress of weather. They will be sent out if the weather moderates.

A 369. Adty. to *Minotaur*.

Sent 7.50 p.m.

Submarines are active in the Channel by night and day. Passage from Ushant to home ports is to be made at high speed during dark hours, and every precaution is to be taken to defeat submarine attack. Acknowledge.

A 370. Adty. to S.N.O., Harwich.

Sent 8.50 p.m.

Destroyers should be sent out if weather moderates. French destroyers are also searching Channel, but will not come north of parallel of 50° N lat.

A 371. Adty. to *Cornwallis*, Killary Bay.

Sent 11.15 p.m.

Owing to activity of submarines you are to remain in harbour for the present and take every precaution against submarine attack. Establish lookout at harbour mouth, and use steamboat to patrol with torpedoes. Acknowledge.

A 372. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 11.30 p.m.

Following received from Christiania, 31st December 1914. I hear, on good authority, that discharge of German s.s. *Brandenburg's* cargo of coal, which has been bought by Norwegian Government, will be completed next week. It is believed that she will then take a full cargo of copper pyrites from Thamshaven, and leave for Germany, like *Alma* and *Marie*.

A 373. Foreign Office to Mr. Chilton (The Hague),
Mr. Howard (Stockholm),
Mr. Findlay (Christiania),
Sir H. Lowther (Copenhagen).

1 My circular telegram of 28th September. His Majesty's Government have now reluctantly decided that they must, during the war, exclude neutral fishing vessels from using any ports in the United Kingdom. Please notify Government to which you are accredited, and inform them that exclusion is to take effect forthwith.

1st January 1915.

A 374. War Office to Sir John French.

9.45 p.m.

2632 Following from 1st Lord: "The battleship *Formidable* was sunk this morning by a submarine in the Channel. Information from all quarters shows that the Germans are steadily developing an important submarine base at Zeebrugge. Unless operation can be undertaken to clear the coast, and particularly to capture this place, it must be recognised that the whole transportation of troops across the Channel will be seriously and increasingly compromised. The Admiralty are of opinion that it would be possible, under cover of warships, to land a large force at Zeebrugge, in conjunction with any genuine forward movement along the seashore to Ostend. They wish these views, which they have so frequently put forward, to be placed once again before the French Commander, and hope they may receive the consideration which their urgency and importance require.

2nd January 1915.

A 375. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 5.35 p.m.

5 Submarines C.31 and C.34 are to be placed under Commodore (S) orders temporarily.

A 376. Adty. to R.A., Cruiser Force G.

Sent 8 p.m.

1 Destroyers will be sweeping Channel to-night and to-morrow north of lat. 50 N. (2000.)

A 377. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 6.55 p.m.

Recd. 8.3 p.m.

26 For D.I.D. Daily return of movements of foreign ships constantly mentions five dreadnoughts at Kiel. Is it surmised that these are dummies? If so, suggest it be so stated.

Sent 8.55 p.m.
Recd. 10.57 p.m.

A 378. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

28 Find routine work of such a large fleet is very great tax on my time, preventing my devoting myself to far more important strategical and other questions. Have been considering how best to reduce this, and will forward suggestions by letter, but as a first step, it would be some relief if matters of disciplinary nature, including ordering of courts martial, could be dealt with by officer (? afloat) next senior to myself, without reference to me. Could this be arranged?

3rd January 1915.

A 379. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (24),
Admiral, Dunfermline (16),
3rd B.S. (1),
1st B.C.S. (1),
Commodore (T) (5).

Sent 10.40 a.m.

For information. *Secret. Rostock and Graudenz*, with one flotilla, apparently sailed from the Jade this morning, steering N by W at 20 knots.

A 380. Adty. to Comm. (S).

Sent 11.30 a.m.

2 Send one destroyer and two submarines to $54^{\circ} 0' N$, $4^{\circ} 40' E$, to wait orders. If the signal is made to proceed in execution of previous orders, one submarine is to proceed to vicinity of Weser Lightship and the other to vicinity of Heligoland, to intercept German ships returning to port. The destroyer is to return when signal has been passed to submarines. Submarines to return after two days in Heligoland Bight, at any time in case of bad weather. A light cruiser will be sent out later to pass signals.

A 381. Adty. to Comm. (S).

Sent 1.40 p.m.

3 Cancel my No. 2. Recall vessels. Acknowledge.

A 382. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 3.0 p.m.

26 Your 26. The five Dreadnoughts reported at Kiel are probably the five ships of the *Kaiser* type, which are based at that port. No reason to suppose they are dummies.

A 383. Patrol to *Doon* (Intercepted).

Recd. 4.27 p.m.

37 Admiral of Patrols. Three German cruisers and three Zeppelins are reported to be in North Sea, about 150 miles out. Another report states that Zeppelin, supported by four or five cruisers. (1545.)

A 384. Comm. (T) to Adty.

Recd. 6.24 p.m.

7 *Arethusa*, *Undaunted*, and eight destroyers are proceeding to investigate reported German cruisers in North Sea.

A 385. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 6.50 p.m.

7 Reports untrue, return to harbour.

A 386. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (28),
A.C., Rosyth (17),
3rd B.S. (2),
Commodore (T) (8).

Sent 7.0 p.m.

German cruisers and flotilla are believed to have returned to harbour.

A 387. Adty. to Naval Centre, Portland.

Sent 7.30 p.m.

Majestic is to remain in Portland Harbour until further orders.

A 388. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 7.23 p.m.
Recd. 7.39 p.m.

35 Priority. Is there any information I can give V.A., Commanding, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.

Reply.

Sent 12.45 a.m.

33 Your 35. No indications, everything quiet.

4th January.

4th January 1915.

A 389. Adty. to all Flag Officers and S.N.O.s
in Home Waters.

Sent 2.30 a.m.

Several cases have occurred of large ships being sent to sea without the Admiralty having been informed in time to prevent them sailing or to make adequate arrangements to protect them from submarine attack. In future, Admiralty permission is to be obtained before large ships are sent to sea. This order is not to interfere with the discretion of the C.-in-C., H.F., in moving the ships under his orders, nor is to prevent ships being ordered to sea to attack the enemy in case of emergency.

A 390. Adty. to P.N.T.O., Havre.

Sent 8.50 a.m.

Urgent. Admiralty are considering possibility of providing some small steamers, 2,500 to 3,500 tons gross, protected against torpedoes by appliances which would project approximately 15 ft. each side, giving total beam 75 to 80 ft. These would be used for troops only, and horses, wagons, guns, etc., would be sent in separate ships. Special disembarkation appliances would be constructed. As these ships could not pass through locks or into basins with narrow entrances, report how many could be berthed at one time at Havre, Rouen and Boulogne, and whether navigation of the Seine would be practicable.

A 391. Dockyard, Portland, to Adty.

Recd. 1.25 p.m.

Hornet reports as follows: *Hornet* attacked by two submarines 2 miles SE of Berry Head. Teignmouth reports two submarines astern of *Tigress* as she passed there this morning. (1250.)

A 392. S.O., Cruiser Force G, to Adty.

Recd. 2.59 p.m.

2 French Admiral notifies me that he has been informed that Italian ships are working in the interests of Germany, trying to create difficulties by causing men-of-war to open fire on them. He added that he has received orders to avoid doing so. Request instructions if there are any special measures to be taken with regard to Italian ships met with. One Italian ship passed through French Patrol, 2nd January, bound to Salcombe. (1250.)

A 393. Adty. to *Hornet*.

Sent 3.25 p.m.

Continue to hunt submarines and retain *Ferret's* division also if required.

A 394. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth.

Sent 5.25 p.m.

525 All destroyers for escort duty are to be employed to escort transports with troops crossing to France to-night.

A 395. F.N.A. to A.C., French 2nd L.S.

Sent 5.45 p.m.

3 Six transports, carrying more than 5,000 men, will cross to-night to Havre; they will be convoyed by Portsmouth destroyers. The Admiralty ask that the approaches to Havre may be watched by our torpedo boats. I am telegraphing to the Officer Commanding the Cherbourg flotillas.

A 396. R.A., Dover Patrol, to Adty.

Recd. 6.10 p.m.

16 I request permission at once to paint yellow the funnels of the four armed boarding vessels, *Duchess of Devonshire*, *Louvain*, *Peel Castle*, and *City of Belfast*, and when convenient, to paint their hulls black. They anchor in the Downs and they look like cruisers at present.

Reply.

5 Your 16. Approved.

A 397. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 9.15 p.m.

13 Send *Revenge* to Sheerness as soon as you can make suitable arrangements for her safe passage, providing escort to the Tongue and arranging with C.-in-C., Nore, to escort her from there to Sheerness.

A 398. Commodore, Portland, to Adty. Recd. 9.23 p.m.
Following message received from *Hornet*. In view of submarines having been located in the vicinity of Berry Head, are 4th and 5th Divisions to remain or return to Harwich? Shall continue to-night until further orders. (The answer to the message was sent through Portland Bill.) (2055.)

Reply.

Your 2355. Continue search for the present. (0845.)

5th January 1915.

A 399. Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet. Sent 5.50 p.m.
16 Your 11. *Venerable* is to leave Portland after nightfall on the 6th and proceed to Portsmouth. She is to leave Portsmouth the following evening and arrive at Sheerness before daylight.

A 400. Adty. to *Hornet*. Sent 10.57 p.m.
Leave one division at Portland ready for service, in case further intelligence is obtained of submarines. Remaining divisions to return to Harwich, sailing to-morrow, 6th.

6th January 1915.

A 401. Adty. to C.-in-C., Channel Fleet. Sent 12.20 p.m.
18 Remain in Portland Harbour pending further orders.

A 402. R.A., Dover Patrol, to Adty. Recd. 9.29 p.m.
31 *Urgent*. I have had two authentic reports of submarine just outside Dover. I propose to keep *Revenge* here to-night. Please telegraph if approved.

Reply.

Sent 9.50 p.m.
22 *Urgent*. Your 31. Approved to keep *Revenge* at Dover.

7th January 1915.

A 403. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 11.20 a.m.
66 From C.O.S. Your 68. We know that battle cruisers came out on 14th December at low water and suspect that there is a dredged channel.

A 404. Adty. to *Ferret*, Dartmouth. Sent 1.35 p.m.
Return to Harwich.

A 405. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth. Sent 3.15 p.m.
Urgent. Retain *Venerable* until to-morrow night, as there is a submarine off West Oaze Buoy.

A 406. Adty. to Comm. (T). Sent 4.25 p.m.
17 Minelayers are anchored in a fog. Plan OQ is to be carried out one day later. Inform *Aurora*.

A 407. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 5.5 p.m.
70 Your 43. German steamship *Brandenburg* expected to leave Thams-haven, fully loaded with copper ore, about 19th January. Full details follow by post.

A 408. Adty. to R.A., Dover. Sent 8.12 p.m.
23 *Urgent*. Keep the *Revenge* for the present on account of submarine in the Thames.

Sent 8.38 a.m.
A 409. Comm. (T) to Adty. Recd. 8.43 p.m.
20 Your 17. Minelayers are in company with *Aurora* and plan is being carried out.

Reply.

19 Your 20. Let plan continue.

8th January 1915.

A 410. C.-in-C., Nore, to Adty.

Recd. 2.16 p.m.

704 Submit, in view of continued reported presence of a submarine in the Thames estuary, whether *Venerable* should proceed to Chatham for the present.

Reply.

Sent 4.55 p.m.

573 Direct *Venerable* to sail to-night and make passage at high speed. Inform Dover when she will pass. Escort will be provided from Dover to Thames.

A 411. C.-in-C., Nore, to Adty.

Recd. 8.39 p.m.

710 Submit, in view of report (of) presence of enemy's submarines in Thames and Harwich estuaries, that Edinburgh and Tongue Light Vessels should not be lighted at 6 a.m., which is the order at present in force. These lights might be of the greatest assistance to enemy's craft making the estuaries in the dark hours between 6 a.m. and daylight, and enable them to take up position in the channel unperceived by the patrols.

9th January 1915.

A 412. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.

Sent 10.40 a.m.

556 It is suggested that a hunt on a large scale should be organised for the submarines in Thames estuary; it will add to their difficulties if it does not result in a capture. Officers might be told off to organise it and all local craft in Thames ports encouraged to assist. Drift nets should be used to block passages between shoals and tugs, small steam vessels and steamboats should sweep with chains or wires. The nets might be watched by picket boats with 14-in. torpedoes. A liberal reward should be promised to vessels directly contributing to destruction of a submarine.

A 413. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 12.10 p.m.

30 Arrange for the monitors now at Dunkirk to return to Sheerness, with due precaution against submarine attack.

A 414. F.N.A. to Marine, Paris.

Sent 3.40 p.m.

1043 The Germans, having raised submarine *E.3*, it is very probable that they have got possession of our code B.G. It is very necessary then to make important modifications in it, touching on the telegraphic codes and recognition signals. It appears absolutely necessary to reprint the book. I am commencing, in collaboration with the Admiralty, a new edition, of which the proofs will be submitted to you.

A 415. Adty. to Comm. (T) (23),

Sent 10.50 p.m.

Captain, Minelayers.

In view of submarines in Thames, arrange to escort minelayers to Sheerness with destroyers. This telegram addressed to Commodore (T) has been repeated to Captain of Minelayers. (1046.)

10th January 1915.

A 416. F.N.A. to Marine, Paris.

Sent 6.25 p.m.

1049 From a different source to that of my telegram 11 and considered as being well informed, we receive the following: At the beginning of the war Germany had ready 29 submarines. Since then she has completed 3 big and 17 small ones, capable of being transported by military, making a total of 49. Of this number it is known that 7 have been lost at sea, and 2 small ones during transport.

1049 II. Seven of the transportable submarines, although ready, are at Kiel. The other 33 in commission are distributed as follows: Kiel, 9; between Dantzig and Stettin, 3; Zeebrugge, 8; North Sea, 13. Moreover, there are 8 submarines under construction at Kiel.

A 417. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol.

Sent 11.0 p.m.

38 Following received (begins): With regard to Zeebrugge, the damaged submarines are still out of use. Several submarines are in the outer harbour and go out regularly. Belgium was aware of the destruction of the *Formidable* before Germany, and although the official information from Berlin indicated that a submarine engaged with the *Formidable* had gone back to Cuxhaven, it really returned to Zeebrugge, and is still in the harbour there.

11th January 1915.

A 418. Adty. to C-in-C., Portsmouth.

Sent 1.20 p.m.

599 In view of submarine activity give the four ships with reinforcements crossing to-night as strong a destroyer escort as possible.

A 419. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F. (104),
Admiral, Rosyth (53),
R.A., Cromarty (43),
A.O.P., Immingham (32),
Comm. (S) (14),
Comm. (T) (24),
S.N.O., Harwich,
V.A.C., Channel Fleet (21),
R.A., 6th B.S. (4),
R.A., Dover (39),
C-in-C., Nore (562),
C-in-C., Portsmouth (601).
C-in-C., Devonport (665).

Sent 5.0 p.m.

For information of Fleet. Ships should not approach within 7 miles of a position in 54° 33' N, 7° 48' E, as the locality is known to be mined. It is undesirable to transmit this information by W/T.

A 420. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 7.23 p.m.

25 Have 16 fast destroyers and 2 light cruisers ready to sail to-morrow at noon. Orders will follow. Acknowledge.

12th January 1915.

A 421. Adty. to R.A., Dover (41).

C-in-C., Nore (588).

Sent 1.5 a.m.

41 Twelve armed drifters are to be sent to Sheerness and placed under orders of *Actaeon* temporarily, for hunting submarines in Thames estuary.

A 422. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 10.55 a.m.

28 In view of weather, cancel Plan OR.

A 423. A.C., French 2nd L.S. to Adty. (F.N.A.). Recd. 11.55 a.m.

82 In view of the reported presence of three enemy submarines in the Channel, I have ordered the watch kept on the approaches to Havre to be increased.

13th January 1915.

A 424. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 12.55 a.m.

30 Four destroyers should be sent to Portsmouth, to arrive on 14th, to assist in convoy of troops. Acknowledge.

A 425. Adty. to C-in-C., Portsmouth.

Sent 1.15 a.m.

623 Four destroyers from Harwich have been ordered to arrive at Portsmouth on 14th, to assist in convoy of troops temporarily. They should be retained for convoy of *Queen Elizabeth* when she leaves Portsmouth, and also for escorting her in and out of Portland. When she sails for Gibraltar they should return to Harwich.

A 426. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (121),
R.A., Cromarty (51),
Admiral, Rosyth (66). Sent 11.58 a.m.

There are signs of German activity. Ships should be prepared to go to sea after dark to-night, but should not sail without further orders.

A 427. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (122),
R.A., Cromarty (53),
Admiral, Rosyth (69). Sent 4.15 p.m.

Urgent. Cancel my 121.

14th January 1915.

A 428. Adty. to Comm. (S) (18),
Comm. (T) (34). Sent 5.35 p.m.

Postpone Z. First Lord wishes to consider something else. Can you both come here to-morrow (stop). Sent to Commodore (S) and (T).

15th January 1915.

A 429. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (139). Sent 10.50 a.m.
V.A., *Lion* (8).

Battle cruisers and light cruisers should be ready to proceed to sea after dark to-night.

A 430. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 11.5 a.m.

140 We have good reason to believe that *Seydlitz* and *Derfflinger* sailed from the Jade shortly after daylight this morning. In case they cross North Sea the battle cruisers and light cruisers should be at sea to-night, and should go out after dark and after the ebb tide has ceased.

A 431. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (143). Sent 4.10 p.m.
V.A., *Lion* (9).

Urgent. No necessity to proceed to sea to-night.

A 432. Adty. to A.C., Rosyth. Sent 4.20 p.m.

82 Arrange for two submarines to be under way off the Tay and two off Aberdeen before daylight to-morrow morning.

A 433. Adty. to R.A., Dover Patrol. Sent 4.35 p.m.

53 Owing to considerable number of troops crossing to-night and two following nights, warn Dover Patrol to be particularly vigilant.

16th January 1915.

A 434. Adty. to V.A., the Hon. Sir A. E. Bethell,
R.N. College, Greenwich. Sent 6.15 a.m.

You are appointed V.A.C., Channel Fleet. Proceed with all convenient despatch to Portland, and hoist your flag in a ship of the Channel Fleet on Sunday, transferring it the following day to *Lord Nelson*. Details can be settled later.

A 435. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 11.30 a.m.

150 Your 127. For reasons connected with certain activities, it is not desirable now for battle cruiser squadrons to leave base. Acknowledge.

A 436. F.N.A. to Marine, Paris. Sent 6.30 p.m.

1091 Admiralty have information, which they consider serious, that German submarines are using the sheltered waters of the Channel Islands for replenishment and re-charging their batteries. Not having at present any armed trawlers available for chasing them, the Admiralty would be obliged if you would have search made by torpedo boats.

A 437. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. Sent 8.32 p.m.
 Recd. 9.32 p.m.
 144 *Re* A/L M. 0194 No. 13, 7th January, is any further information available of *Brandenburg's* movements?

Reply. Sent 3.5 p.m.
 162 Your 144. No further news. 17.1.15.

A 438. Adty. to S.N.O., Scotland (98),
 A.O.P. (44),
 S.N.O., Cromarty (67),
 C.-in-C., H.F. (157). Sent 10.0 p.m.
 Two submarines and one cruiser are reported to have left Königsberg noon, Friday, for Emden. Route believed to be via Belts.

A 439. Adty. to V.A., Channel Fleet. Sent 10.55 p.m.
 28 *Urgent.* *Cornwallis* is to remain at Portland until further orders.

17th January 1915.

A 440. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 3.40 a.m.
 160 *Urgent.* Following intercepted, 2.30 a.m., from *Columbella* to Rear-Admiral, 10th Cruiser Squadron (begins). Look out for German cruisers somewhere close (ends).

A 441. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. Sent 8.43 a.m.
 Recd. 9.53 a.m.
 148 With reference to A.L.M. 04356/21869. Submit I may be informed whether eight "E" class destroyers are to be sent to Portsmouth as therein directed, and if so, whether the 1st Destroyer Flotilla will then be immediately detached to Rosyth or to Scapa Flow to relieve the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla. The need of more destroyers for the Grand Fleet is most urgent, as constantly pointed out by me during the last 4 months, and I beg that this matter may be settled at very early date. The battle cruisers now proceed to sea entirely unattended by destroyers, and this is most objectionable and leads to these valuable and irreplaceable ships incurring the gravest risk from submarine attack.

A 442. Adty. to *Alecto*, Yarmouth. Sent 12.25 p.m.
 Sent. *E.5*, *E.10*, and *E.15* are to proceed to positions NNE and NNW of Heligoland and off Western Ems respectively. They should remain, weather permitting, until the evening of the 20th, when they are to return to Yarmouth. Our battle cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers, will probably be in western part of Heligoland Bight on morning of 19th. Submarines are to withdraw if severe weather threatens. It is known that during the last few days German large ships have several times come out in daylight. A further telegram follows. Acknowledge.

A 443. Adty. to Comm. (T) (40), Sent 1.30 p.m.
 And *Alecto* (adding, "Inform submarines that . . .").
 German submarines occupy the two following positions whenever weather admits: (1) 54° 27' N, 7° 42' E; (2) 53° 51' N, 6° 42' E. German submarines will probably also occupy the following positions, weather permitting, until 20th: (1) 54° 39' N, 7° 22' E; (2) 54° 27' N, 7° 2' E; (3) 54° 15' N, 6° 52' E.

A 444. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (161). Sent 2.20 p.m.
 V.A., *Lion*, Rosyth (10).
Secret. On the morning of the 19th January, three light cruisers and 32 destroyers, under Commodore (T), will attempt to cut off two German flotillas, which patrol between the Ems and Horn Reefs. The battle

cruisers and light cruisers will support the Commodore (T). The battle cruisers should be in lat. 55.0 N, long. 5.30 E, at 6.30 a.m., on the 19th, and the light cruiser squadrons should be 20 miles to the south-east of the battle cruisers at 6.30 a.m. Three British submarines will watch Heligoland and the Ems river, but none will be operating more than 15 miles from land. The battle cruisers should not use wireless unless called up.

A 445. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.

Sent 10.43 p.m.

Recd. 11.20 p.m.

158 As it is quite possible westbound ships may be carrying mines and weather usually prevents their being boarded for examination, also ships do not call at Kirkwall when desired to do so, submit for consideration that all westbound ships may be sent to Stornoway instead of being sent back to Kirkwall and in order to enable search to be carried out. This will also relieve congestion at Kirkwall. If this is approved it will be necessary to strengthen the customary examination staff at Stornoway.

A 446. Adty. (F.N.A.), to Marine, Paris.

1096 Admiralty only received yesterday evening at 7, through Dover, news that a submarine had been sighted at 9 a.m. near Vergoyer. Admiralty would be much obliged if you would, in future, transmit similar information as soon as received, unless French naval authorities should already have transmitted them to English naval authorities.

18th January 1915.

A 447. Adty. to *Prince George*.

Sent 1 a.m.

Take every precaution against submarines in the English Channel. Avoid being in it in daylight. Arrange to arrive at Portland during dark hours. Acknowledge.

A 448. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 10.30 a.m.

43 Urgent. Do not sail yet but wait till weather improves. Telegraph weather at noon. At 5 a.m. in the Bight the wind was NNE, force 7, weather clear and wind veering.

A 449. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.

Sent 12.45 p.m.

638 From First Sea Lord. Your 810. All three monitors are now urgently required to be at Sheerness ready for service on 31st January. Do what work you can upon them in the time available.

A 450. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 12.50 p.m.

44 Proceed in execution of previous orders subject to your own judgment as regards weather. If you find conditions too bad to-night for destroyers you can return.

A 451. Adty. (F.N.A.), to Marine, Paris.

Sent 1.50 p.m.

1098. Will you please inform the Governor of Havre that six transports carrying troops will cross to-night, and as they will not be able to enter before 8.30 a.m. on account of the tide, it will be necessary to protect them with every torpedo boat available.

A 452. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent 5.35 p.m.

45 To-night one flotilla patrols from the Ems river between NW and WNW as far as 5° 20' W (should be E). They enter the river after it becomes daylight.

A 453. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 8.10 p.m.

174 We have good information that submarine *U.21* is leaving Germany to attack armed merchantmen as well as auxiliary cruisers. Auxiliary cruisers may mean patrol yachts.

21st January 1915.

A 454. Adty., First Lord, to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 4 a.m.

192 *Private and Personal.* I understand that *Magnificent* and *Hannibal* are required by you to deal with barrier-breaking ships and enemy destroyers. For this purpose they could only use their 6-in. guns, why then cannot *Crescent* and *Royal Arthur* do what is necessary? If you think their complement should be improved, or if you would like the Captains of *Magnificent* and *Hannibal* to remain for them, you have only to say so. But it would be wrong to detain *Hannibal* and *Magnificent*, who are required for urgent service elsewhere. I could not help being distressed by the tone of your letter to the First Sea Lord. It is wonderful how by tireless vigilance you have managed to safeguard the fleet during all these months. This has secured us the command of the sea and ultimate success in the war. Nothing in the future will be so hard again. Rest while the good information lasts. We are getting stronger every day and you will be continually reinforced.

A 455. Adty. to A.O.P. (53),
S.N.O., Harwich.

Sent 4 p.m.

Two German steamers loaded with sand are believed to have sailed to-day. Patrol vessels should be vigilant off Harwich and Yarmouth in case of an attempt being made to block entrances.

A 456. Adty. to R.A., Cruiser Force T.

Sent 8.25 p.m.

12 It is proposed in view of the risk of ships being attacked by submarines to alter the patrol arrangements in the English Channel as follows: The eastern limit of the area patrolled to be a line joining the Longships Rock to Isle Vierge. The western limit to be a line joining the west point of Ushant Island and the west point of St. Mary's Island, Scilly Islands. The division between the French and British to be a line drawn S 62 W true, from a position in lat. 49.20 N, long. 5.8 W. The ships to patrol on such lines as may be arranged by the respective Admirals and the positions of these lines to be varied from time to time. Do you concur. (2025.)

A 457. Adty. (F.N.A.), to Marine, Paris, and

A.C., French 2nd L.S. Sent 11.15 p.m.

1115 On account of risk of danger from hostile submarines run by our ships patrolling in the Western Channel, Admiralty proposes to modify our arrangements as follows: The area patrolled by the cruisers to be bounded on the east by a line joining Longships Rock and The Vierge, on the west by a line joining the west extremes of St. Mary (Scilly Is.) and Ushant. The dividing line between the English and French patrols to be a line drawn S 62 W (true) from a point in lat. 49.20 N, long. 5.8 W. Ships on patrol to keep on lines arranged by their respective admirals, such lines to be changed from time to time. Admiralty makes this proposal for your approval. (Admiral Favereau has been informed.)

1118 Continuation of my 1115. Admiral Wemyss thinks that the objection to the Admiralty's plan is that security against submarines will be no greater because the zone fixed is too narrow and does not permit sufficient flexibility of the line. He is coming to discuss the question with the Admiralty. Will you please send me your instructions in view of this discussion.

22nd January 1915.

A 458. S.O., Cruiser Force G, to Adty.

Recd. 2.46 a.m.

14 With reference to Admiralty message No. 12 I consider plan proposed would not render ships of the patrol any safer from submarine attacks than at present. The limit of the proposed area is much too small, and is, therefore, not so satisfactory as the present scheme, which allows greater flexibility, and, therefore, greater safety. I request that before any alterations be ordered I may confer with Admiralty. (0050.)

A 459. R.A., *Russell* to Adty.

Recd. 2.34 p.m.

18 In view of withdrawal of *Duncan* submit that *Cornwallis* may be ordered to join my flag. (1315.)

A 461. Comm. (T), to Adty.

Sent 4.15 p.m.

Recd. 4.45 p.m.

65 For Chief of Staff. No reply having been received to my number 64, have postponed leaving for Z 1 until to-morrow.

Reply.

Sent 7.10 p.m.

52 Your 65. I have nothing from Commodore (S) yet.

A 462. S.O., Cruiser Force G, to Adty.

Recd. 6.58 p.m.

Your 15. Present E limit of the patrol is the line joining Berry Head and Barnouie. W limit is a line south 17 E from Bishop Light, Scilly Is. This area gives sufficient lateral distance to vary position of patrol considered at any hour from day to day, and is thus preferable to Admiralty proposal. I consider scheme embodied in my letter 15 of 12th November carried out either by trawlers or small boarding steamers in conjunction with auxiliary patrol vessels in area 14 to be best solution. I propose to attend Admiralty Monday morning 25th. (1535.)

A 463. Adty. to R.A., 6th B.S.

Sent 7.20 p.m.

12 *Irresistible* is to leave to-morrow after dark and join Channel Fleet 20 miles west of Belle Isle at daylight on Monday, 25th January. Four destroyers from Harwich will escort her from Sheerness to Beachy Head. Precautions must be taken against submarines for the whole passage. Speed must be high, course should be zigzagged during daylight or moonlight and headlands must be avoided. Acknowledge.

A 464. Adty. to Comm. (T)

Sent 11.25 p.m.

54 From C.O.S. Commodore (S) has sent his orders. Send a copy of your orders and carry on with execution of plan when weather is suitable. Inform Commodore (S).

23rd January 1915.

A 465. Adty. to Comm. (S) (29).

Comm. (T) (56).

Sent 3.50 a.m.

With reference to the sinking of British steamer *Durward* 22 miles NW of Maas Light Vessel, now reported that four submarines are in same neighbourhood.

Note.—Naval Centre, Sheerness and Hull, were informed at 4.10 a.m.

A 466. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Sent noon.

58 Negative Plan Z. All your destroyers and light cruisers will be wanted to-night. Negative sending destroyers to Sheerness for escort. Acknowledge.

A 467. Adty. to V.A., *Lion*.

Sent 12.25 p.m.

13 Get ready to sail at once with all battle cruisers and light cruisers and sea-going destroyers. Further orders follow.

A 468. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.

Sent 1.5 p.m.

209 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, cruisers, and light cruisers, should be ready to sail after dark this evening. Acknowledge.

A 469. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore (687),

R.A., 6th B.S., Sheerness 13.

Sent 2.25 p.m.

Negative *Irresistible* sailing. Acknowledge.

A 470. Adty. to C.-in-C., Channel. Sent 2.30 p.m.
39 *Irresistible* will not be able to sail to-night as no escort is available.

A 471. C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty. Sent 2.30 p.m.
Recd. 3.14 p.m.
206 *Secret and Personal*. For First Sea Lord. Your private letter, 21st, indicates possible transfer of Channel Fleet to the north. I am writing to you on subject. *Lord Nelsons* will be invaluable attached to 3rd Battle Squadron; pending decision had I not better retain 1st Cruiser Squadron up north? I had intended they should *leave to-morrow*, Sunday night.

A 472. C.-in-C., to Adty. Sent 4.50 p.m.
Recd. 5.16 p.m.
209 Your 212 recd. What orders have been given to V.A., *Lion*?
Reply. Sent 6.35 p.m. to C.-in-C., H.F.
215 Your 209. Orders are as given in my 210.
Note.—For telegrams 209, 210, 212, and others referring to the Dogger Bank action and dispositions, see C.B. 1573, Appendix A.

A 473. F.N.A. to Marine, Paris. Sent 7.10 p.m.
1123 *et bis*. In order to try to close the Channel to hostile submarines the Admiralty wishes to lay a large number of mines to eastward of Straits of Dover and to south-westward of minefield already in existence. They desire me to ask if you have any objection to the laying of mines between the Braek Bank and Ruytingen, leaving free the passage by Dunkirk anchorage. A number of luminous buoys will permit of navigation through the minefield, plan of which will be communicated. Laying of mines will be effected by Admiralty. Earliest possible reply is requested.

A 474. Adty. to R.A., *Russell*. Sent 8.55 p.m.
15 Your 18. *Cornwallis* will proceed with V.A.C., Channel Fleet. *Irresistible* will remain with you.

24th January 1915.

A 475. Adty. to R.A., 6th B.S. (16),
R.A., Dover Patrol (90). Sent 12.10 a.m.
It is reported on good authority that many mines are strewn in the sea off Zeebrugge at the spot where Belgian light vessel *Wandelaar* was previously moored.

A 476. Adty. to Comm. (S) (32). Sent 10.55 a.m.
Send submarines to Heligoland Bight. High Sea Fleet are coming out. Your battle cruisers are chasing German battle cruisers towards Heligoland. Position of German battle cruisers at 9.23 a.m., lat. 54.39 N, long. 4.16 E.

A 477. Adty. to 1st B.C.S.,
2nd B.C.S.,
1st L.C.S.,
2nd L.C.S.,
via Cleethorpes (29). Sent 1.10 p.m.
Enemy submarines are in following positions, lat. 54.9 N, long. 5.16 E, and lat. 54.17 N, long. 5.35 E.

A 478. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (222),
via Cleethorpes (30). Sent 3.45 p.m.
Germans are preparing a night attack by destroyers, but the two flotillas which were out with their battle cruisers last night have not enough fuel to take part. Our destroyers should protect damaged ships. (1540.)

- A 479.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.,
1st B.C.S.,
Comm. (T)
via Cleethorpes (31). Sent 4 p.m.
German battlefleet is returning to harbour.
- A 480.** Adty. to Comm. (S) (33). Sent 4.15 p.m.
33 German battle cruisers and High Sea Fleet are returning to harbour.
- A 481.** C.-in-C., H.F., to 1st B.C.S.
Comm. (T) Sent 5.2 p.m.
via Stockton (138). Recd. 5.8 p.m.
1st Flotilla, 3rd Flotilla, 4th Flotilla to remain to protect *Lion*—enemy are preparing for night destroyer attack.
- A 482.** C.-in-C., H.F., to Comm. (T) Recd. 5.34 p.m.
Stockton (145) Intercepted.
Enemy's flotilla are preparing to attack to-night. (1708.)
- A 483.** Adty. to 1st B.C.S. (19)
via Cleethorpes (34). Sent 6.5 p.m.
19 Look out for enemy's submarines, we have none near you, so any showing can be sunk. An enemy submarine is chasing to NW.
- A 484.** L., British Minister, Copenhagen, to Sent 6.32 p.m.
Adty. Recd. 8.14 p.m.
Secret. My telegram, 21st January. I now learn, from reliable source, that side turrets of *König Albert* and *Friedrich der Grosse* have been altered so as to take one 38-cm. gun each. Similar guns are to be mounted on *Kaiser*, *Kaiserin*, and *Prinz Luitpold*. Guns have been sent to Hamburg, where they will be mounted on ships, two of which have already arrived. Twenty seaplane pilots left Fredrichs Ort for Ostend, 23rd January.
- A 485.** C.-in-C., H.F., to S.O., 10th C.S. Intercepted.
Referring to order about Tory Island Light—route is unsafe, due to floating mines, and not to be used by ships until further orders; ships are not to enter ports on the north of Ireland. (1134.)
- A 486.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 10.25 p.m.
224 Wireless should not be used except in case of urgent necessity.
- A 487.** Marine, Paris, to F.N.A.
49 Reply to your 1123. We have no objection to the project for laying mines. It would, however, be necessary that the Commandant of the Dunkirk Flotilla should be made acquainted with the plan of the minefield before the minelaying is carried out, so that he may, if necessary, ask for any modification that might seem to him desirable.
- A 488.** Comm. (S) to Adty. Recd. 11.6 p.m.
Your 33. 1615. Submarines detached 4 p.m. *Lurcher* and *Firedrake* proceeding in company to Heligoland. (1720.)

25th January 1915.

- A. 489.** C.-in-C., H.F., to Adty.
217 When may wireless be used? (0641.)
- A 490.** Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F. (227). Sent 5.45 p.m.
1st Cruiser Squadron is to be retained by you until a new light cruiser squadron is formed.

APPENDIX B.

TELEGRAMS AND SIGNALS CONNECTED WITH THE
RAID ON YARMOUTH OF 3RD NOVEMBER 1914.

1st November.

B 1. Comm. (S) to C.O.S.

35 Propose to send one submarine to the Kattegat to endeavour to attack enemy's submarines interfering with trade. Before returning, think she should make certain of her presence being reported near the Belts. C.-in-C., Home Fleets, fully concurs. Request early decision, as I should like to send submarine selected to Yarmouth to-day.

B 2. Comm. (T) to C.O.S.

Propose to send two cruisers and eight torpedo boat destroyers on patrol to-morrow, 2nd November, one cruiser and four T.B. destroyers standing by at 1 hour's notice. (1300.)

B 3. Adty. to Comm. (S).

107 Your 35 to C.O.S. approved. Keep the remaining oversea submarines that are not absolutely required in good condition, ready for any emergency. (1410.)

B 4. Comm. (S) to Adty.

37 Your 107. Submarine *E.10* goes to Kattegat. *D.3* and *D.5* to Terschelling and Western Ems respectively, from Gorleston when weather moderates. Nine in readiness at Harwich.

B. 5. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Your proposals to C.O.S. approved. Arrange, when conditions are suitable, for the proposed attack on sweeping flotilla off Western Ems. (2000.)

2nd November.

B 6. Adty. to C.-in-C. and V.A.C., 3rd B.S.

Send 3rd Battle Squadron, *King Edward VII* class and *Duncan* class, without *Blanche*, to join flag of Admiral Burney at Portland. Proceed as fast as possible, having regard to coal; go west of Hebrides and Ireland and keep 40 miles from the land. Acknowledge. (1245.)

B 7. *Aurora* to *Lark*.

I gather you have orders from *Undaunted*. The division will be 20' S (true) from Haaks at 4 a.m. If I make M.F. to you then, will that be sufficient? *Aurora* will proceed towards Rendezvous Y at 4 a.m. (1235.) (24738.)¹

B 8. *Lark* to *Aurora*.

I saw Capt. (D) yesterday, and he did not know if you were coming out; if you were I was to act under your orders. I suggest destroyers may be detached about 5 from a position 20 miles S (true) from Haaks, so that at 15 knots we arrive there at dawn. . . . (Made 1 p.m.) (24738.)

¹ The five-figure number in brackets is that given to a signal or wireless log by the Record Office at Deptford.

B 9. Aurora to Lark.

Destroyers will be detached by *Aurora* at 5 a.m., in a position roughly 20' S (true) from Haaks Light Vessel. Destroyers to form single line abreast to port visibility distance apart, 15 knots, increasing to 20 knots at 6 a.m. A good lookout to be kept for submarines believed to be in that vicinity, and every endeavour made to ram or sink them with gunfire. Rendezvous at 8 a.m. at Y. (1600.) (24738.)

B 10. Laurel to Undaunted.

Submitted may I have your D.R. position at 5 p.m. (1620.)

Reply.

N 71 E, 47 miles from Y. (14617.)

Note.—*Laurel* logged 45 for 47. (17958.)

3rd November.**B 11. 6 a.m. Ships in Company.**

Undaunted, Laurel, Legion, Lennox, Lysander. (17958.)

B 12. Leopard to Violet.

Two battle cruisers and two armoured cruisers open fire on *Lively* and myself. (0720.) (16474.)

B 13. Halcyon to all Ships.

Am engaged by superior force, four, require reinforcements.

Note.—Intercepted at Adty., 7.21 a.m.

B 14. Comm. (T) to Undaunted and Aurora.

Proceed towards Smith's Knoll with all despatch. *Halcyon* reports she is engaged with superior force. (0730.)

Note.—Logged by *Undaunted*, 7.40. (14622.) Not logged by *Aurora*. Intercepted at Admiralty.

B 15. Lark to Undaunted.

Seen nothing. Position at 7.30, S 68 E, 30 miles from Y, course N 68 W, 24 knots. *Landrail* and *Laverock* 5 miles on either beam. (0730.)

Note.—Received by *Undaunted*, 8.5. (14617.)

B 16. Halcyon to all Ships.

Am engaged by a superior force. Four armoured. Position, 53.4 N, 1.20 E.

Note.—Logged by *Undaunted*, 7.35. (14622 and 14617.) *Aurora*, 7.35.

B 17. Comm. (T) to Arethusa, Meteor, Louis, Laforey.

Raise steam with all despatch. (Made 7.30 a.m.).

B 18. Comm. (T) to Fearless.

Fearless and two divisions, raise steam with all despatch and report when ready to proceed. (0740.)

B 19. Capt. (D) to General.

Course, N 76 W. Proceed at utmost speed. (Made at 7.40.) (14617.)

B 20. Halcyon to Naval Base, Lowestoft.

Enemy have cleared off; am now coming into roads. (0745.)

Note.—Intercepted by Admiralty.

B 21. Capt. (D) to Laurel.

Form single line with your division, proceed full speed towards Smith's Knoll. Order *Lark* to join you with his division, also *Lysander*. (0800.) (14617.)

B 22. *Leopard to Violet.*

Halcyon and *Lively* inform me they sighted 4 cruisers, 4 dreadnought battleships, last seen steering to southward, estimated speed about 20 knots. (0810.) (16474.)

B 23. *Laurel to Lark.*

Join me with division at Smith's Knoll. Am proceeding there at full speed. (0818.) (17939.)

B 24. *Laurel to Undaunted.*

Please give me your 8 o'clock position.

Reply.

In Position Y.

B 25. *Undaunted to Aurora.*

Am proceeding full speed to Smith's Knoll. Join me. (0820.)

Note.—Logged by *Aurora* at 8.40.

B 26. Comm. (T) to *Undaunted* and *Aurora*.

Halcyon reports enemy clearing off. Proceed towards Terschelling to cut them off. I am proceeding with *Fearless* and two divisions. (0752.)

Note.—Received by *Undaunted* 8.21 (14617 and 14622); *Aurora*, 8.25, last words reading, "and *Christopher* divisions, 0752." (16454.) Intercepted by Admiralty.

B 27. Capt. (D) to General.

Turn 16 points to starboard together. (Made 8.22.) (14617.)

B 28. Comm. (T) to *Fearless*.

I have ordered *Undaunted* and *Aurora* to proceed to Terschelling to cut off enemy. I shall follow and wish you to do the same. I will inform you how things go on, but so far we have not been given position or strength of enemy. (0838.)

B 29. Comm. (T) to *Halcyon*.

Indicate position, composition, and course of enemy. (0800.)

B 30. *Halcyon* to Comm. (T).

Four battleships, Dreadnought class, four four-funnelled cruisers, 52.31 N, 2.3 E, steering ESE. (0838.)

Note.—Intercepted by Admiralty.

B 31. *Laurel to Lark.*

Undaunted to *Lark*. You are to join *Aurora* off Terschelling. (0858.) (17939.)

B 32. *Aurora* to *Lark*.

Proceed to join me at Smith's Knoll full speed. (0900. (17939.)

B 33. Adty. to Admiral, Dover.

Enemy's cruisers and battle cruisers off Gorleston steering south. (0900.)

B 34. Adty. to V.A., *Lion*.

653 Four enemy cruisers and at least one battle cruiser off Gorleston steering south. (0907.)

B 35. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.

Enemy cruisers and battle cruisers off Gorleston steering south. (0910.)

B 36. Adty. to Comm. (S).

Send all available submarines to attack enemy's cruisers reported off Gorleston. (0913.)

B 37. Adty. to V.A., Channel, Portland.

179 Six enemy's cruisers and at least one battle cruiser reported off Gorleston, steering south. (0914.)

B 38. *Lark* to *Laurel*.

Proceeding to Smith's Knoll at full speed, arriving there about 10.30, course S 85 W. (0910.) (17952.)

B 39. Adty. to C.-in-C., Portsmouth.

Six enemy cruisers and at least one battle cruiser reported off Gorleston, steering south. *King George V* to be ready to proceed to sea at a moment's notice. (0924.)

B 40. Comm. (T) to Admiralty.

306 I have ordered *Undaunted* and *Aurora* to watch off Terschelling. Am proceeding with six destroyers to Smith's Knoll. *Fearless* will follow shortly. *Halcyon's* report is extremely vague—mentioned four Dreadnoughts and four armoured cruisers. Request instructions. *Urgent*. (0931.)

Note.—No time of receipt in Admiralty.

B 41. Adty. to S.N.O., Dover.

All submarines to be ready outside the harbour, and some spread ready for emergency. Inform the French submarines. (0935.)

B 42. Adty. to Admiral, Dover.

150 *Irresistible* to weigh and proceed through the Downs, escorted by two destroyers, and join *Queen* off Tongue Lightship. (0937.)

B 43. Adty. to C.-in-C., Nore.

Queen to proceed off the Tongue Lightship, where she will be joined by *Irresistible*. (0940.)

B 44. Adty. to V.A., *Lion*.

114 Exercising your discretion, proceed to the vicinity of the north of Heligoland with all despatch, to intercept enemy's squadron on their return. Now reported definitely as four Dreadnoughts and four cruisers. Repeat this to Senior Officer at Lough Swilly and Lamlash. (0955.)

B 45. Adty. to 3rd B.S.

127 *Urgent*. Cancel previous orders. Join Sir John Jellicoe at Scapa Flow. (0957.)

B 46. Adty. to S.N.O., Lough Swilly.

Urgent. The Grand Fleet is to proceed to Scapa with all despatch, where 3rd Battle Squadron has been ordered to join C.-in-C., Sir John Jellicoe overtaking in the *Iron Duke*. (1000.)

B 47. Adty. to V.A.C., Channel, Portland.

180 Proceed with all despatch to Spithead, where *King George V* has been ordered to join your flag. (1020.)

B 48. Capt. (D) to all Ships.

Four four-funnelled cruisers in sight ESE 10 miles from Y, steering N. (0955.)

Note.—Logged by *Aurora* 10.21 (instead of ESE, she has "What are waiting for.") (16454.) Intercepted at Admiralty, 10.44 a.m.

B 49. *Undaunted* to *Aurora*.

Four cruisers steering towards Terschelling. Where are you? (1030.) (16454.)

B 50. *Aurora* to Capt. (D).

Aurora at Smith's Knoll. What is your position? (1037.)

B 51. Comm. (T) to *Undaunted*.

My position, 10.30 a.m., is S 64 W, 73 from Y, course N 30 E, 23 knots, and increasing. Do not get cut off by superior force. Try to lead them south. Is *Aurora* with you? (1055.)

Note.—Logged in *Undaunted* as received 11.17. Intercepted at Admiralty, 11.19 a.m.

B 52. Capt. (D) to *Aurora*.

NE by N, 12 miles from Y. (1100.)

B 53. *Lark* to Capt. (D).

Just joining *Aurora* NE 6 miles from Smith's Knoll. (1100.) (17952.)

B 54. Capt. (D) to Comm. (T).

Four cruisers, looked like two *Roons*, and two others, chased me north. They have given up chase. Am going back towards Terschelling. (1040.)

Note.—Intercepted at Admiralty, 11.4 a.m.

B 55. *Aurora* to *Undaunted*.

Am at Smith's Knoll waiting orders, with *Lark's* division. (1112.)

B 56. Capt. (D) to *Aurora*.

Join me. (1200.)

B 57. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Negative Terschelling patrol for the time. *Undaunted* to watch enemy movements, keeping out of range and avoid being cut off. Concentration of light cruisers desirable. (Sent 11.15 a.m.)

B 58. Adty. to Comm. (T), via Ipswich W/T.

Urgent. Enemy have laid a line of mines in the vicinity of Smith's Knoll, probably SE. Keep well clear. (Sent 11.20 a.m.)

Note.—Not logged by *Arethusa*. Logged by *Undaunted* at 11.35.

B 59.

11.30 a.m. positions. *Laverock*, 52.52, 2.30; *Landrail*, 52.46, 2.28. (*Aurora* Signal Log 12348.)

B 60. Lowestoft Naval Base to all Ships.

Many mines laid in vicinity of Smith's Knoll this morning.

Note.—Logged by *Arethusa* at 11.40. (18132.)

B 61. Comm. (T) to *Aurora* and *Fearless*.

Rendezvous at Y. My position is S 72 W, 45 miles from Y, and course is N 72 E, 20 knots. *Aurora* report position, 11.55.

Note.—*Aurora's* W/T Log 16454 has remark: "Apparently the position table is being confused with compass table by senders." The course given, N 72 E, does not agree with the entries in *Arethusa's* Signal Log 18132, which was used in drawing the plan.

B 62. Comm. (T) to *Undaunted*.

Are you in sight of enemy? If not, join me at Y. (1200.)

Reply.

Enemy not in sight. Am joining. (1240.)

B 63. *Undaunted* to Comm. (T).

My position, 11.35, 10 miles NE of Y, steaming ENE, lost sight of enemy 10.45, last seen steaming ENE. *Aurora* reports herself at Smith's Knoll. (1200.) (16455.)

B 64. Comm. (T) to *Fearless*.

Mines have been laid in vicinity of Smith's Knoll. Channel is unsafe. Turn and proceed south of German minefields. Have seen mine explode 14 miles S 31 W from Smith's Knoll. Rendezvous Y. (1210.)

B 65. *Aurora* to Comm. (T).

Aurora, Lark, Landrail, Laverock, noon position, 10° E Smith's Knoll, steaming N 68 E, 20 knots. Request orders. (1220.)

B 66. Comm. (T) to General.

Noon position, 13 miles S 82 E from Corton Light Vessel. (1255.)

B 67.

2.10 p.m., *Aurora* joined *Undaunted*. (12348.)

B 68. Comm. (T) to *Fearless*.

Return to Harwich. (1409.)

B 69.

2.33. *Arethusa* sighted *Undaunted, Aurora*, and destroyers north. (18132.)

B 70. Comm. (T) to Adty.

309 Doubtful whether enemy is returning to port. *Undaunted* lost sight of them steering ENE, from 53° N, 3° 13' E. Am concentrating. Have you any instructions? (1420.)

Note.—Received at Admiralty, 2.52 p.m. *Arethusa's* Log 18132 has only "309. Cypher."

B 71. Comm. (T) to Capt. (D).

I suppose there is no doubt the enemy have gone home after mining Smith's Knoll. (1445.)

Reply.

I think not the slightest doubt. . . . (1450.) (14617.)

B 72. Comm. (T) to Adty.

Have concentrated in N lat. 53, E long. 3° 13', *Arethusa, Undaunted, Aurora*, and 13 destroyers. Am sweeping towards Terschelling Bay; intend turning to SSW at 5 p.m., unless contrary orders are received. (1530.) (Recd. 3.52 p.m.)

B 73. Adty. to C.-in-C., H.F.,
S.O., Cruiser Force A,
S.O., 3rd B.S.,
S.O., Channel Fleet,
Queen,
Irresistible,
Venerable.

The enemy's force which approached the coast has retired at speed in a northerly direction. In consequence, the C.-in-C., Grand Fleet, can use his discretion as to his further movements in accordance with his previous orders. All battle cruisers to return to Cromarty. 3rd Battle Squadron should come to Portland, as previously ordered. V.A., Channel Fleet, should return to Portland, leaving *King George V* to continue docking. *Irresistible, Queen*, and *Venerable* to return to Sheerness. *Jupiter* and *Majestic* remain at Sheerness. (1600.)

B 74. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Remain at sea and endeavour to ascertain the position of the enemy and attack with destroyers after dark, using your own discretion. (1600.)

APPENDIX C.

OPERATIONAL SIGNALS, 23-24 NOVEMBER 1914.

23rd November.

- C1. C-in-C. to S.O., 1st L.C.S.,
S.O., 1st B.C.S.,
S.O., 2nd C.S.

Proceed in execution of Operation Order No. 17. (1330.)

24th November.

- C2. C-in-C., H.F., to A.C., 1st B.C.S.,
A.C., 2nd C.S.,
S.O., 1st L.C.S.,
Comm. (T).

Reported that enemy force of 1 armoured, or possibly battle, cruiser, 2 light cruisers, 11 T.B.D.s are scouting NW of Heligoland. Commodore (T) to meet R.A., 2nd C.S., 15 miles west of R.V. 4 at daylight. Commodore (T), with 3 *Arethusas* and T.B.D.s, to reconnoitre towards Heligoland, not closer than 15 miles, and draw enemy towards 2nd C.S., which is to be in close support. V.A., 1st B.C.S., to support 2nd C.S. Avoid being drawn over mines laid by retreating enemy. Seaplanes have returned to base. Acknowledge. (0125.)

C3. Comm. (T) to S.O., 2nd C.S. Recd. 7.4 a.m.
Am chasing enemy's destroyers N75E. (0700.)

C4. S.O., 2nd C.S., to L.C.S. Sent 7.18 a.m.
Chase E by N. Reinforce *Arethusa*.

C5. Comm. (T) to S.O., 2nd C.S. Recd. 7.18 a.m.
Reported enemy's destroyers were our own Light Cruiser Squadron. (0715.)

C6. S.O., 2nd C.S., to Comm. (T). Sent 7.48 a.m.
My P.C. and S., 54° 46' N, 6° 53' E; course, NNE; speed, 15 knots. Looking for you. (0730.)

C7. S.O., 2nd C.S., to *Southampton*. Sent 7.50 a.m.
Where is *Arethusa* or Commodore (T)? (0748.)

Reply.
Four miles north of me. (0755.)

C8. S.O., 2nd C.S., to *Arethusa*. Sent 8.10 a.m.
Are you going to reconnoitre now? If so, I will support you. I will detach *Falmouth* and *Liverpool* and four destroyers to join you. State if you require them. (0805.)

Reply.
Many thanks, do not require them. I am proceeding. (0810.)

24th November.

C 9. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to C-in-C.

Commodore (T) apparently had no knowledge of our disposal and chased *Southampton* 70 miles from Heligoland. Have sent him to join 2nd C.S. to carry out your 0125. Nothing sighted. (0800.)

C 10. S.O., 2nd C.S., to Comm. (T).

Sent 9.20 a.m.

Have you definite orders as to how far to go and how long to stay? I have orders to be in close support of you. (0918.)

Reply.

My orders not to go within 15 miles of Heligoland. No time mentioned. (0925.)

C 11. S.O., 2nd C.S., to Comm. (T).

What is your course? (0945.)

Reply.

SE Heligoland in sight bearing S 38 E. I propose to reconnoitre the Bight from the north. (0950.)

C 12. S.O., 2nd C.S., to *Arethusa*.

Sent 10.20 a.m.

Submarine has been sighted by *Natal*. (1023.)

C 13. Comm. (T) to S.O., 1st B.C.S.Intercepted *Shannon*, 10.24 a.m.

There is considerable smoke bearing south and one ship ESE, one submarine on surface SE Heligoland bearing 15 miles ESE. I am returning. (1015.)

Note.—Repeated by S.O., 1st B.C.S., to C-in-C., G.F. 10.35 a.m.

Reply from R.A., 2nd C.S., 10.35 a.m.

Reconnoitre smoke bearing S by E, keep out of gun range.

Further reply from Comm. (T).

11.0 a.m.

Smoke bearing ESE are destroyers. Submarine S by W.

C 14. Comm. (T) to C-in-C., and

S.O., 1st B.C.S.

Intercepted *Shannon*, 10.50 a.m.

Have reconnoitred Heligoland, several ships appear to be steaming WSW, and there is a great deal of smoke behind island. A submarine has been seen. (1040.)

C 15. S.O., 2nd C.S., to Comm. (T).

Sent 10.58 a.m.

Propose to retire now. I do not think we can draw them out. Do you concur?

Reply.

Yes, concur, I am sure they will not come out far enough for us to get at them. (1115.)

C 16. S.O., 2nd C.S., to C-in-C. and S.O.,
1st B.C.S.

Sent 11.21 a.m.

Cannot draw enemy. Only their destroyers sighted. Am returning to rendezvous with Commodore (T). (1100.)

APPENDIX D.

TELEGRAMS AND SIGNALS, DECEMBER 15-16,
CONNECTED WITH THE SCARBOROUGH RAID.*Reference to Logs.**King George V.* Signal 16195-6. W/T 17837.*Lion.* Signal 14281-2.*Southampton.* Signal 12732. W/T 16379.*Arethusa.* Signal 18134.

W/T signals made by destroyers were passed to flagships by destroyer wave guards as follows: 2nd B.S., *Monarch*; 1st B.C.S., *New Zealand*; 1st L.C.S., *Birmingham*, from 7.33 a.m. W/T logs of *Arethusa* and *Lion* are not forthcoming. Most of the signals received by W/T were entered in *Lion's* signal log, which apparently was largely written up after the operation. (W) Wireless log. (S) Signal log.

15th December.**D 1.** From V.A., 2nd B.S. to V.A., 1st B.C.S. By visual, 1240.

German Squadron, four battle cruisers, five light cruisers, and three flotillas leave Jade River daylight to-day, return Wednesday night. Am proceeding to R.V., 54° 10' N, 3° E, 7.30 a.m. Hope to get news from Commodore (T) and join him. If nothing heard at 7.30 a.m., shall steer 90° till 10.30, 270° till 1.30, speed 14 knots, and then return north. Considering your strength, do not get more than 5 miles from me. Steering 90° I want you astern, otherwise ahead with 3rd C.S. and 1st L.C.S. under your command. I think raid probable Harwich or Humber. If you get engaged draw enemy towards battle squadron. If Commodore (T) does not join up I fear enemy destroyers only. On joining 3rd C.S., take station 1 mile on your port beam. First L.C.S., 1 mile on starboard beam, opening to 5 miles for night, closing at daylight. They are then under your command to engage light cruisers and keep off destroyers as you may direct. Battle stations by 7.30 a.m., and steam for full speed at midnight. Warn cruisers to beware of mines floating or dropped astern. (Have you any suggestions? As soon as you understand, take station 5 miles ahead. If this weather continues, if possible, engage to windward and steering to north to hinder destroyers.¹) (1140.)

D 2. V.A., *Lion*, to V.A., 2nd B.S.

Submit that 14 knots is too slow for menace from submarines after daylight. Assume, when you steer 90°, you want B.C.S. and cruiser squadrons to westward of you. Where and when will Commodore (T) be expected to join you? (1320.)

D 3. S.O., 2nd B.S., to Admiralty.

Recd. 1320.

Having few T.B.D.s with me, Commodore (T) should join me at 7.30 a.m.

D 4. V.A., 2nd B.S., to V.A., *Lion*.

I will steam at 18 knots to the eastward and probably zigzag. I want cruisers astern to west of me, as I anticipate enemy coming from English coast. Commodore (T) is to shadow enemy and inform me. I have asked for him to join me at 7.30 a.m. at rendezvous; 96° means east (true), 270° means west (true). (1335.)

¹ This signal was repeated to all ships by visual with the exception of portion in brackets.

D 5. V.A., *Lion*, to V.A., 2nd B.S.

Have you any recent information *re* approaching English coast, south of 53°? Special swept Channel Chart was not obtained before sailing. (1350.)

D 6. V.A., 2nd B.S., to V.A., *Lion*.

Do not go inside a line drawn 149° from a position 56° N, 0°. Mines have been reported just outside this line, especially one on 1st December, lat. 54° 09' N, 2° 30' E. (1359.)

D 7. V.A., 2nd B.S., to V.A., *Lion*.

Warn your ships to look out for destroyers at 7.30 a.m.,¹ and that the destroyers' distinguishing sign is a V shape. (1355.)

D 8. V.A., *Lion*, to *Southampton*, *Antrim*.

Sent 1455.

If no further orders are received by 7.30 a.m., I shall alter course to the northward, to arrive at rendezvous 54° 10' N, 3° 0' E, at 7.50 a.m., when course will be altered 90° to follow 2nd B.S. You are to close at 7.30 a.m. and get in visual touch with me. Report if all instructions are clear. That is all I have received. (1430.)

D 9. V.A., 2nd B.S., to V.A., *Lion*.

Sent 1550.

Course and speed will be altered without further signal to 14½ knots at 4 p.m., and S 17° E, and will be maintained during night. (1539.) (Passed to cruiser squadron.)

D 10. V.A., 2nd B.S., to *Shark*.

Sent 1555.

Destroyers take station 10 miles on port beam, closing in at daylight. Squadron may be altering to east (true) at 7.30 a.m. My present course and speed is S 15° E, 16 knots.

D 11. *Lynx* to S.O., 1st B.C.S.

Recd. 0540.

King George V, 0614.

Am chasing enemy's destroyers in NW direction. (0530.)

D 12. *Ambuscade* to *Lynx*.

Sent 0555.

We are damaged; on fire, lower mess deck. Require assistance.

D 13. *Victor* to *Lynx*.²Recd. *Lion*, 0609.

Big cruiser astern. (0559.)

D 14. *Unity* to *Lynx*.Recd. *Lion*, 0647.

Ambuscade needs assistance. (0600.)

Note.—*Lion's* log has *Alligator*, *King George V* evidently received this, but does not log it.

Recd. 0622.

Intercepted, *King George V*, 0616.**D 15.** *Lynx* to S.O., 1st B.C.S.*Shark*, 0610.

Am being chased by enemy's cruiser; am steering SSW. (0601.)

Note.—*Shark* (W) has code time 0608.

Lion, 0645.*King George V*, 0654.**D 16.** *Lynx* to *Unity*.Intercepted *New Zealand*, 0612.

Unity to assist *Ambuscade*. (0605.)

Note.—This reading in *New Zealand* and *King George V*. *Lion's* log has "*Unity* to *Lynx*. *Unity* assisting *Ambuscade*."

¹ Logged in *Lion* and repeated to cruisers as 5.30 a.m.

² Evidently *Unity* is meant.

- D 17.** *Lynx* to *Ambuscade*. Recd. *Lion*, 0653.
At what speed are you able to go? (0612.)
Reply.
Ten knots. (0618.) Received *Lion*, 0714.
Recd. *King George V*, 0656.
Lion, 0658.
- D 18.** *Unity* to *Lynx*.
Am cut off from *Ambuscade* by cruiser. (0615.)
- D 19.** *Ambuscade* to *Lynx*. Recd. *Lion*, 0647.
Lower (mess) is full up, require someone to stand by (me). (0615.)¹
- D 20.** *Shark* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. *Lion*, 0642.
Hardy W/T and steering gear disabled; steering from engines. (0620.)
Intercepted *New Zealand*, 0624.
- D 21.** *Lynx* to *Ambuscade* and *Rother*.² Recd. *Lion*, 0657.
Retire to NNW. (0623.)
Intercepted *New Zealand*, 0630.
- D 22.** *Unity* to *Lynx*. Recd. *Lion*, 0715.
Am following you; have lost *Ambuscade*. (0625.)
- D 23.** *Lynx* to A.C., 1st B.C.S., and C.-in-C. Recd. *King George V*, 0710.
Lion, 0717.
Have reason to believe one destroyer (sunk). *Ambuscade* damaged, *Unity* standing by her. (0635.)
Note.—Words in brackets missed by *King George V* and *Lion*.
- D 24.** *Lynx* to *Ambuscade*. Recd. *Lion*, 0736.
How are you getting on? (0650.)
- D 25.** *Unity* to *Ambuscade*. Recd. *Lion*, 0718.
What is the matter? (0652.)
- D 26.** *Southampton* to Flag, *Lion*. Recd. by S.L., 0710.
Battle fleet bearing NNW.
- D 27.** *Shark* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. 0805. (See note below.)
Intercepted Adty., 0748.
[My position is lat. 54° 22' N, long. 3° 20'; am keeping in touch with large cruiser.] *Roon* and five destroyers steering east. (0705.)
Note.—*New Zealand* (destroyer wave guard) (S) gives time of receipt, 0730, but her (W) (auxiliary cabinet) log says 0723. *Monarch* (W), 0722; *Orion*, 0730. *King George V* says: Received by auxiliary W/T at 0734, passed to *Lion* at 0758. *Tiger* (W), 0751. *Falmouth* (W), 0758. Entered in *Lion* (S), as received by searchlight at 0805, note in same: "Repeated on main W/T, *King George V*, and on auxiliary W/T by *New Zealand*." *Antrim* (W), 0801. Words in brackets were not intercepted by the Adty.
- D 28.** From *Ambuscade* to *Lynx* and *Unity*. Recd. *King George V*, 0736.
Intercepted *Tiger*, 0739.
Two shells exploded fore lower mess deck; think oil tanks are pierced; am keeping water under at present and maintaining 10 knots. (0715.)

¹ Words in brackets were missed by *Lion*.² Evidently *Unity* is meant.

D 29. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to 1st L.C.S. Sent by Aux. W/T, 0730.
 Recd. *Southampton*, 0726.
 Take station N (true), 5 miles from *Lion* and spread N (true) for lookout duties. Put one of your ships on "D" wave. (0725.)

Note.—A similar signal stationed the 3rd C.S. S (true). The last part of the signal was received by *Southampton* as a separate signal at 0730. Comm. (S) put the *Birmingham* on "D" wave at 0733.

D 30. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General. By flags, 0730.
 Alter course 16 points to port in succession; speed, 18 knots.

D 31. *Shark* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. 0809.
 My position, lat. 54° 28' N, long. 3° 40' E, steering east, 22 knots. (0730.)

Note.—*Lion* logs this: "*King George V* to *Lion*," with note, "repeated on Auxiliary W/T by *New Zealand* at 8.10."

D 32. S.O., 2nd B.S., to General. Recd. *Orion*, 0740.
 Turn together 8 points to port. (0735.)

D 33. V.A., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S. By W/T, 0736.
 Have you received messages 0530, 0600, 0615, 0705, from *Lynx*?

Note.—Not logged by *Lion*.

D 34. *Lynx* to *Ambuscade*. (?) receipt.
 You are to proceed to nearest port and dock. (0742.)

D 35. S.O., 2nd B.S., to General. *Orion* (S), 0748.
 Turn together 4 points to starboard; speed, 18 knots. (0742.)

D 36. S.O., 2nd B.S., to 2nd B.S. Sent 0750.
 Intercepted *Tiger* (W), 0754.
 Turn together 4 points to starboard.

D 37. *Lion* to Cruisers. By flags, 0752.
 Course N 76 W.

D 38. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. by S.L., 0755.
 Are you going after *Roon*?

Reply.

Have heard nothing of *Roon*; what course are you steering?

D 39. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S. 0755.
 Shall not go south of this line unless enemy are sighted; keep me informed of your movements. (0750.)

D 40. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to Cruisers. By flags, 0800.
Queen Mary, 0804.
Tiger, 0801.
Southampton, 0755.
 Alter course in succession 16 points to starboard.

D 41. Flag, *Lion*, to Cruisers. By flags, 0804.
 Speed, 22 knots.

Note.—*Southampton's* log adds course ENE.

D 42. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *Antrim*. Sent 0810.
 Preserve your station on the battleships and look out to the southward. (0805.)

D 43. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General. By S.L., recd. *Southampton*, 0806.

Spread north and look out for *Roon*.

Note.—Not logged by *Lion*.

D 44. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to Cruisers. By flags, 0810.
Course, E½N; speed, 24 knots.

D 45. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., 2nd B.S. 0820.
Am leaving 3rd Cruiser Squadron with you. Am proceeding east with light cruiser squadron to try and cut off *Roon*. (0815.)

D 46. *Test* to Capt. (D), 9th Flotilla. Intercepted Adty., 0828.
Decode. Action with two battleships, Dreadnought class. (0815.)

D 47. *Lynx* to *New Zealand*.
Have been attacked by four enemy cruisers; believed one of our flotilla has been sunk. *Ambuscade* fore mess deck flooded. *Scourge*¹ badly holed forward, fore magazine and shell-rooms flooded; No. 2 oil tank no use. Am proceeding Newcastle for repairs, *Unity* escorting. One man badly hurt. (0815.)

Recd. Aux. W/T, 0835.
D 48. *Shark* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Intercepted *King George V*, 0835.
Urgent. I am being chased to westward by light cruisers; my position, lat. 54° 34' N, long. 3° 48' E. (0815.)

Note.—*Tiger* has: "Are we to chase *Leonidas W* by two-funnel cruiser?"

By flags, 0816.
D 49. Flag to *Southampton*. Recd. 0815.
Course east.

D 50. *Waveney* to Captain (D), 9th Flotilla. Intercepted Adty. 0818.
Enemy in sight. (0820.)

Intercepted Adty. 0828.
D 51. Scarborough to Adty. *Lion*, 0845.
Urgent. Scarborough being shelled. (0820.)
Note.—*Lion* has code time, 0830.

D 52. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Shall follow you and retire north at 1430. Do not go too far east; inform me your movements occasionally. (0820.)

D 53. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to 1st L.C.S.
Preserve your compass bearing. (0825.)

By S.L., 0825.
D 54. Flag, *Lion*, to *New Zealand*.
What time was 0705 from *Shark* received in *New Zealand*? (0825.)
Reply. Intercepted Adty., 0828.
0730.

¹ Evidently *Lynx*; *Scourge* was in Mediterranean. *Lion's* log says *Fire Queen*, a yacht, at Portsmouth. Signal was apparently repeated to C.-in-C., H.F., and intercepted by *Lion*, 0906.

D 55. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *New Zealand*.
How fast can you go for a prolonged chase? (0830.)

By S.L., 0830.
Recd. 0836.

Reply.
25½ knots.

D 56. *Test* to Capt. (D), 9th Flotilla. Intercepted Adty., 0835.
Fired on by three battleships of Dreadnought class. (0830.)

D 57. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., 2nd B.S. By visual, 0832.
Have you any knowledge whether our submarines are likely to be met with. (0830.)

Note.—No answer to this signal has been traced.

D 58. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *Shark*. 0847.
Report every half-hour enemy's position, course and speed. (0830.)

D 59. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., 2nd B.S. 0840.
Have you any news of Commodore (T)? (0830.)

D 60. S.O., 2nd B.S., to Commodore (T). Intercepted Adty., 0911.
My position, S 82° E, 23 miles from rendezvous, steering S 77° E, 16 knots.
Shall retire N at 1430. (0830.)

Note.—Not logged by *Arethusa*.

Recd. *King George V*, 0855.
Lion, 0856.

D 61. Adty. (703) to S.O., 2nd B.S. Intercepted *Antrim*, 0855.
Urgent. At 1820,¹ Scarborough was being shelled. (0835.)
In 703, for 6.20 p.m., read 8.20 a.m. (0945). See (Signal No. 96). This signal was taken to be 6.20 a.m., and led to the idea that the enemy had proceeded from Scarborough to Hartlepool. See No. 100.

D 62. From S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *New Zealand*. 0816.
Signals from destroyers are being delayed in passing in. Why is this? (0816.)

Reply. Recd. by S.L., 0832.
Your 0816. Auxiliary Office interfered with Main Office readings. Has to wait when signals are faint. (0836.)

D 63. Hartlepool W.S.S. to Adty. Recd. 0838.
Three three-funnelled cruisers south-east, firing north-east.

D 64. Capt. (D), 9th Flotilla, to *Test*. Intercepted Adty., 0840.
Attack with torpedo. (0840.)

D 65. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S., Sent 0859.
S.O., 1st L.C.S. Recd. *Lion*, 0906.
Rejoin me. (0844.) *Southampton*, 0859.

Note.—*King George V* prefixes this "Urgent."

¹ *Orion* has 6.20 p.m.(?); *Antrim*, 6.20 p.m.; *King George V.*, 1820; *Tiger*, 1820; *Lion's* 8.30 a.m. probably inserted later. Corrected at 0945.
From Admiralty to S.O., 2nd B.S.

D 66. *Southampton to Lion.*

Reply from *Patrol* to *Jupiter*. Enemy engaged with two battle cruisers. (0845.)

Reply.

Do not pass wireless signals. (0906.)

D 67. *Shark to New Zealand.*

Recd. *Lion*, 0905.

What is position of battle cruisers and battle fleet? Urgent. (0845.)

Note.—*New Zealand* was told by S.O., 1st B.C.S., to reply to this. (0913.)

Intercepted *King George V*, 0847.

Lion, 0840.

D 68. *Patrol to Jupiter.*

Ship badly injured. (0850.)

Note.—*Lion* also logs this (intercepted) on main W/T. (0847.)

Sent 0855.

Intercepted *King George V*, and

Lion, 0920.

D 69. Adty. to 3rd B.S.

151 Three enemy Dreadnoughts reported firing on Scarborough 8.30 a.m. and enemy light cruisers off Hartlepool. (0850.)

By flags, 0852.

Recd. *New Zealand*, 0855.

Queen Mary, 0859.

Tiger, 0856.

Southampton, 0850.

D 70. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General.

Course north.

Sent 0907.

Recd. *Lion*, 0907.

Southampton, 0905.

Intercepted Adty., 0909.

D 71. From S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O.,
1st B.C.S., S.O., 1st L.C.S.

I am steering for Humber. (0854.)

Recd. 0903.

D 72. *Ambuscade* to S.O., 2nd B.S.

Intercepted *Antrim*, 0905.

Estimated position, lat. $55^{\circ} 44' N$, long. $2^{\circ} 54' E$. Course, $N 70^{\circ} W$. $12\frac{1}{2}$ knots. (0855.)

Sent 0855.

D 73. Adty. to Comm. (T).

Intercepted *King George V*, 0925.

276 Three enemy Dreadnoughts off Scarborough, get in touch. Enemy light cruisers off Hartlepool.

Note.—Not logged by *Arethusa*, but apparently received.

D 74. Flag, *Lion*, to General.

By flags, 0900.

Course WNW.

Note.—*Lion* has NW by W. The course steered was WNW. From the evidence of *Southampton's* signal log, the signal NW by W may have been hoisted and corrected immediately afterwards.

D 75. Adty. to S.O., 2nd B.S., and S.O.,
1st B.C.S.

Sent 0900.

Recd. *King George V* and *Lion*, 0911.

Urgent. Three Dreadnoughts reported off Scarborough.

Note.—*King George V* and *Lion* have "Dreadnought battle ships."

By W/T, 0917.

Recd. *Lion*, 0918

Southampton, 0900.

D 76. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S.,
S.O., 1st L.C.S.

Intercepted Adty. (no time noted).

My course is NNW. (0904.)

D 77. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., 2nd B.S. By main W/T, 0908.
Evidently¹ screen of enemy light cruisers ; should like to keep light cruisers.
(0905.)

D 78. *Southampton* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. by S.L., 0910.
Three columns of smoke N $\frac{1}{2}$ W our destroyers.

D 79. *Lynx* to *Shark* and S.O., 1st B.C.S., Recd. *Shark*, 0950.
via *New Zealand*. Intercepted *Antrim*, 1000.
Position at 0900, lat. 54° 53' N, long. 1° 40' E. Course, N 39° W. 23
knots. Proceeding Newcastle for repairs, *Unity* in company. (0910.)
Note.—*Shark* has code time, 0900. Not logged by *Lion*.

D 80. *Southampton* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. by S.L., 0912.
Birmingham reports three columns of smoke bearing north. Four of our
destroyers steaming at high speed.

D 81. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., 2nd B.S. By main W/T, 0920.
In view of Admiralty 0900, I am steering WNW. (0915.)

Intercepted *King George V*, 0921.
D 82. Commodore (T) to *Undaunted* Recd. *Undaunted*, 0920.
and *Fearless*. *Fearless*, 0925.
Urgent. Proceed at full speed with your flotilla by swept channel to
Haisborough Light Vessel, and from there to position of battle fleet.
(0915.)
Not logged by *Arethusa*.

D 83. *Lion* to *King George V*. Sent 0928.
Am steering WNW for Scarborough. Destroyers N $\frac{1}{2}$ W from Southampton,
being chased by enemy's light cruisers. (0918.)

D 84. *Shark* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. 0932.
Am being chased by light cruisers. (0918.)

D 85. *New Zealand* to *Shark*. Recd. 0930.
Battle cruisers at 0930, lat. 54° 20' N, long. 3° 28' E, steering WNW,
24 knots. Battle fleet, 8 miles S 30° W from battle cruisers, steering
270°. (0920.)

Note.—Bearing should probably be S 30° E.

D 86. Scarborough to Adty. Recd. 0925.
War Signal Station demolished. Low power W/T station intact. (0920.)

D 87. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *New Zealand*. By S.L., 0921.
Proceed at 24 knots.

Intercepted *King George V*, 0924.
Lion, 0923.

D 88. C.-in-C., H.F., to S.O., 3rd B.S. *Antrim*, 0935.
Raise steam for full speed with all despatch and report when ready to
proceed. Have destroyers ready. (0921.)

D 89. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *Southampton*. By S.L., recd. 0925.
Light cruisers coming towards us are probably enemy ; if so, engage them.
(0923.)

D 90. *Lynx* to C.-in-C., H.F. 0925(?).
What orders for *Unity* ? I no longer need her. (0925.)

¹ *King George V* has "evidence of."

- D 91.** S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *New Zealand*. Sent 0933.
Has *Shark* received our position, course and speed? (0925.)
Reply.
Position passed 9.36. (0940.)
By main W/T, 0939.
Repeated by visual, 1005.
Recd. *Lion*, 0939.
Recd. *Southampton*, 0938.
Falmouth, 0938.
D 92. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st Intercepted *Antrim*, 0939.
B.C.S., S.O., 1st L.C.S. Adty., 0946.
Urgent. Light cruisers must go in through minefield to locate enemy.
(0929.)
Intercepted *King George V*, 0936.
Lion, 0937.
D 93. C.-in-C., H.F., to S.O., 3rd B.S. Adty., 0947.
Proceed to sea as soon as you are ready. Take destroyers as submarine
screen. Further to follow. (0930.)
D 94. V.A., 2nd B.S., to Admiralty. Recd. 1011.
My position, 54° 17' N, 3° 35' E. I am steering towards Scarborough.
(0930.)
D 95. Sheerness to *Aurora* or Intercepted *Lion*, 0933.
Lord Nelson. *King George V*, 0933.
Tynemouth intercepted. Three battleships of Dreadnought class attack-
ing, enemy off Hartlepool. Hartlepool reports three three-funnelled
cruisers SE. *Urgent.*
D 96. *Lion* to *Southampton*. Sent 0940.
Your duty is to clear enemy light cruisers from our front, as they will
obtain information as to our position. Do not close me any more. (0934.)
D 97. Admiralty to C.-in-C., H.F. Sent 0940.
529 Enemy shelling Scarborough and Hartlepool. In case their vessels
are chased north you should bring your fleet out.
D 98. *Southampton* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. 0941.
Add to *Shark's* signal. I have been chased by three light cruisers until
0815. They are probably steering east in company with *Roan*.
Sent 0954.
Recd. Adty., 1016.
D 99. S.O., 2nd B.S., to Adty. Intercepted *Lion*, 1030.
Is it safe to go straight across minefields? (0941.)
Intercepted *Lion*, 0943.
D 100. *Falmouth* to *King George V*. *Southampton*, 0935.
Position of *Shark* when chased at 0830 was lat. 54° 37' N, long. 3° 37' E.
Intercepted *King George V*, 0952.
D 101. C.-in-C., H.F., to S.O., 3rd B.S. Adty., 1004.
Third Battle Squadron proceed to lat. 55° 50' N, long. 1° 10' W, to inter-
cept enemy, if coming north. Take all available cruisers and destroyers.
(0945.)

Note.—Admiralty logs code time, 1045, which is obviously a mistake.

- D 102.** Adty. to S.O., 2nd B.S., Recd. *King George V*, 1006.
S.O., 1st B.C.S.
In 703, for 6.20 p.m., read 8.20 a.m. (0945.)
Note.—See Signal 58. Not logged by *Lion*. *King George V* (W) has :
“Passed to S.O., 1st B.C.S., at 10.16 a.m.”
- Intercepted *Lion*, 0942.
Southampton, 0930.
- D 103.** *Shark* to *Lynx*.
Present position, lat. 54° 18' N, long. 3° 51' E. *Acasta*, *Hardy*, *Spitfire*,
in company, steering gear and W/T put out of action. (0945.)
Note.—*Southampton* (S) has long. 3° 41' E.
- D 104.** Adty. to V.A., 3rd B.S. Sent 0945.
152 Second Battle Squadron and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron were in
54° 10' N, 30' E, at 7.30 a.m., and are steering towards Humber ; endeavour
to join them.
- D 105.** *Lynx* to *Shark*. Recd. *Lion*, 1026.
Proceeding Newcastle for repairs, report casualties. (0948.)
- D 106.** S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., 2nd B.S. By S.L., 1003.
Shall have to haul to N 40° W to clear SW Dogger Bank Patch. Enemy
appear to be working up coast. (0950.)
- D 107.** Capt. (D), 9th Flotilla, to *Hebe*. Intercepted Adty., 1006.
Yes, remain in vicinity outside ; enemy appears to have retired. (0952.)
- D 108.** Naval Centre, Sheerness, to Adty. Recd. 0954.
Topaze, *Diamond*, *Lord Nelson*, *Queen*, *Venerable*, *Implacable*, *Agamemnon*,
Formidable, *Prince of Wales*, *London*, out of harbour.
- D 109.** *Shark* to *Lynx*. Intercepted *Tiger* (W), 1025.
What destroyers have you in company ? (0955.)
Reply.
Unity in company.
- D 110.** S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd by S.L., 1017.
Dreadnoughts reported off Heligoland, also three-funnelled cruisers.
(0956.)
Note.—*Lion* has “cruiser” and no code time.
- D 111.** S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General. Sent 1000.
Course, N 40° W.
- Recd. 1005.
- D 112.** Comm. (T) to S.O., 2nd B.S. Intercepted Adty., 1005.
My position at 9.45 a.m. is by Would Light Vessel, steering N 26° W,
25 knots. Request instructions. (1000.)
Sent 1040.
Reply. Intercepted *Lion*, 1040.
Proceed with all despatch to lat. 54° 20' N, long. 1° 30' E. (1028.)
Note.—Not logged by *Arethusa*, but apparently received.
- D 113.** S.O., 2nd B.S., to S O, 1st B.C.S. By visual, 1016.
[Reply to 0950. We must catch him. Keep me informed.] I think
you might probably cut him off about 55° N, 1° 21' E. (1000.)
Note.—Words in brackets not logged by *Lion*.

- D 114.** C-in-C., H.F., to S.O., 2nd B.S., S.O.,
1st B.C.S. Recd. *King George V*, 1011.
Gap in minefield between parallel lat. $54^{\circ} 40'$ and $54^{\circ} 20'$, and (W) as far
as 20° E long. Enemy will in all probability come out there. (1004.)
- D 115.** Hartlepool to Group Service A. Recd. 1007.
Fire opened by three cruisers, 8.20 a.m., at 4 miles range. Fire extremely
heavy and lasted about 30 minutes. All telegraphic and telephonic
communications with Hartlepool at present stopped.
By S.I., 1024.
- D 116.** S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *Shark*. Intercepted *Southampton*, 1030.
What course were light cruisers which chased you steering when last
seen? (1015.)
Recd. by S.L., via *Birmingham*, 1055.
Intercepted *Southampton*, 1051.
Reply.
When last seen steering WSW, but they probably turned away to
eastward.
- D 117.** S.O., 2nd B.S., to Comm. (T). Intercepted Adty., 1039.
Your 1000. Battleships, Dreadnought class, at Scarborough. Light
cruisers, Hartlepool. (1024.)
By main W/T, 1035.
Intercepted *Tiger*, 1037.
Falmouth, 1035.
Antrim, 1035.
Adty., 1048.
- D 118.** S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Adty., 1048.
Urgent. Keep to south of Dogger, through gap between $54^{\circ} 40' N$ and
 $54^{\circ} N$ up to $20' E$. (1025.)
Note.—Not logged in *Lion*. Admiralty logs code time 1026.
- D 119.** A.O.P. to V.A., 2nd B.S. Intercepted Adty., 1052.
Am making for Flamborough Head in *Skirmisher*. Please give me your
position and course. (1025.)
Recd. 1039.
- D 120.** S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *Southampton*. Recd. *Southampton*, 1037.
Light cruisers, take station WNW from *Lion* and spread for lookout duties
NNE and SSW. Shall steer WNW at 1100. (1030.)
By S.L., 1040.
Note.—*Southampton* (S) has code time 1035. The words, "at 1100,"
were apparently sent "till 1100," and were corrected 7 minutes later.
- D 121.** S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., 2nd B.S. By S.L., 1030.
Hope you can collect *Commodore* (T) from south.
Recd. 1039.
- D 122.** Adty. to S.O., 2nd B.S. Intercepted *Tiger*, 1047.
Intercepted *Antrim*, 1045.
164 *Urgent.* Enemy is probably returning towards Heligoland. You
should keep outside minefield and steer so as to cut him off. (1030.)
Note.—Not logged by *Lion*.
- D 123.** S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., 2nd B.S. By S.L., 1050.
Recd. 1042.
Propose to steer WNW at 1100, with light cruisers spread ahead of me to
fill gap through minefield. (1035.)
- D 124.** Whitby War Signal Station to Adty. Recd. 1044.
69 message. Two hostile battleships, class unknown, bombarded signal
station 9 a.m. Signal station completely wrecked. All communication
cut off. Houses partially wrecked. Casualties, if any, not yet ascertained.
All confidential books under debris, am endeavouring to recover same.
9.15 a.m., firing ceased, and vessels proceeded east at high speed.

D 125. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *Southampton*. By S.L., 1053.
Shall steer WNW at 1100. Shall steer west at noon. Idea is to block gap between minefields. Act accordingly. (1050.)

D 126. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., 2nd B.S. Recd. 1106.
Think we should block gap between minefields. Light cruisers to the northward, 3rd Cruiser Squadron to the southward; 3rd Battle Squadron guard by Farne Islands. Commodore (T) off Flamborough Head. (1050.)
Note.—Not logged by *Lion*.

D 127. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Sent 1107.
Obey the purport of Admiralty signal 1030. (1053.) Recd. 1108.

D 128. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General. By flags, 1100.
Course, WNW. *Southampton*, 1051.
Tiger, 1100.

D 129. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., 2nd B.S. Recd. 1109.
My position, course and speed, lat. $54^{\circ} 41' N$, long. $1^{\circ} 43' E$. West, 24 knots. Light cruisers spread ahead. [Indicate your position, course and speed.] (1100.)
Note.—Position and course given are incorrect. Compare No. 145 and footnote. Words in brackets not logged by *King George V*.

D 130. C-in-C., H.F., to Adty., via Aberdeen. Recd. 1157.
417 Fleet leaving between noon and 1 p.m. (1100.)

D 131. S.O., 2nd B.S., to A.O.P. Intercepted *Lion*, 1143.
My position, $54^{\circ} 24' N$, $2^{\circ} 50' E$. N 75 W, 20 knots. (1100.) Adty., 1201.

D 132. Comm. (T), S.O., 2nd B.S. Recd. 1104.
I have ordered destroyers to Yarmouth. (1103.)

D 133. *Lynx* to *Ambuscade*. 1105.
Have given directions for *Unity* to escort *Ambuscade* to Newcastle. (1105.)

D 134. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General. 1105.
Speed, 22 knots.

D 135. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General. 1109.
Speed, 18 knots.

D 136. Comm. (T) to S.O., 2nd B.S. Recd. 1115.
My position, 10 a.m.,¹ lat. $53^{\circ} 14' N$, long. $1^{\circ} 47' E$. 25 knots. (1115.) Intercepted *Lion*, 1115.

D 137. *Nottingham* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Intercepted *King George V*, 1119.
Urgent. Vessel SW, steering NW.
Note.—Not logged by *Lion*.

D 138. *Queen Mary* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Intercepted *Tiger*, 1121.
Vessels south-westerly, steering N.W. (1115.)
Not logged by *Lion*. This is probably a repetition of No. 124.

¹ *King George V*. has 11 a.m., which appears to be correct, and inserts Course N 5 E.

- Sent 1138.
- D 139.** S.O., 1st L.C.S., to S.O., Intercepted *King George V*, 1139.
1st B.C.S. Adty., 1158.
- Am engaging a cruiser and destroyers. (1130.)
Note.—Not logged by *Lion*.
- Sent 1155.
Recd. 1155.
- Intercepted *Falmouth*, 1153.
Antrim, 1154.
- D 140.** S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Adty., 1211.
- My position, 12.30 p.m., lat. $54^{\circ} 24' N$, long. $2^{\circ} 0' E$; shall then steer S $15^{\circ} E$; speed, 20 knots, altering 16 points every half-hour. Commodore (T's) position, 60 miles south. (1140.)
Note.—Position not in *Lion*'s log. Longitude and code time missed by Adty.
- Intercepted *King George V*, 1146.
Sent 1154.
- D 141.** S.O., 1st L.C.S., to *Nottingham* and *Falmouth*. Recd. *Falmouth*, 1154.
- My present course, SE by S. (1142.)
Note.—*Falmouth* has code time 1153.
- Sent 1210.
Intercepted *Lion*, 1210.
- D 142.** S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 3rd C.S. Adty., 1224.
- At 12.30 I shall alter course to S $15^{\circ} E$. Speed, 18 knots. Third C.S. is to spread N $15^{\circ} W$ from me, 3 miles apart by 1230. I shall alter course 16 points every quarter of an hour. (1143.)
- D 143.** Aberdeen to C.-in-C., G.F. Intercepted *Lion*, 1143.
- Following received from Naval Centre, Newcastle. Scarborough bombarded from 0807 till 0830. Hartlepool bombarded from 0820 till 0850. Enemy last seen proceeding north.
- By W/T, 1148.
Recd. 1146.
- Intercepted *King George V*, 1146.
Antrim, 1147.
- D 144.** S.O., 1st L.C.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Adty., noon.
- Chasing light cruiser and some destroyers steering south. (1144.)
Note.—*King George V* (W) and Admiralty say "enemy's light cruiser."
- By visual, 1150.
Recd. 1140.
- D 145.** S.O., 1st B.C.S., to L.C.S.
- Resume your position for lookout duties. Take station ahead 5 miles.
Note.—*Southampton* (S) has "V.A., *Lion*, to *Southampton* and light cruisers. Resume your station in line," corrected to "Resume your previous lookout station." *Falmouth* (S) has "*Lion* to General," corrected to "*Lion* to L.C.S. Resume your previous lookout station."
- D 146.** S.O., 1st B.C.S., to Destroyers. 1155.
- Close. Investigate trawlers.
See Nos. 142, 150.
- D 147.** S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General. 1156.
- Course, SSE.
- By S.L., 1158.
Recd. 1210.
- D 148.** *Southampton* to S.O., 1st B.C.S.
- Enemy's cruisers bearing S by E.
Note.—*Lion* read the bearing S $60^{\circ} W$.

D 149. *Nottingham* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. 1205.
Several smokes SSW.

D 150. *Southampton* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. 1206.
What speed?

Reply.
18 knots.

D 151. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 3rd C.S. By main W/T, 1215.
Follow. (1209.) Intercepted *Lion*, 1219.

D 152. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *Southampton*. By S.L., 1212.
Recd. 1155.
What have you done with enemy light cruisers? (1210.)

Reply.
They disappeared steering south when I received your signal to resume station.

D 153. A.O.P. to S.O., 2nd B.S., and S.O., Recd. *King George V*, 1215.
1st B.C.S. *Lion*, 1210.
Intercepted Admiral, 1232.
I am off Flamborough Head in *Skirmisher*. There is no sign of enemy between Flamborough Head and Humber. (1210.)

D 154. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *Southampton*. By S.L., 1215.
Engage the enemy. (1213.) Recd. 1200.

Reply.
There is no enemy in sight now.

Further Reply. By visual, 1225.
When and where was enemy last seen? When you sight enemy engage him. Signal to resume previous station was made to *Nottingham*.¹ (1220.)

Further signal.
My signal to resume previous station was made to *Nottingham*.¹ I cannot understand why, under any circumstances, you did not pursue enemy. (1250.)

D 155. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to Destroyers. By visual, 1218.
Close me on completion of present duty. (1215.) See (No. 135.)

Sent (W) 1216, (S) 1225.
Intercepted *Tiger*, 1228.
Falmouth, 1226.
Antrim, 1225.
Adty., 1230.

D 156. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S.
Urgent. Enemy's cruisers and destroyers in sight. (1216.)
Note.—*Tiger* has C-in-C., H.F., to S.O., 2nd B.S. Not logged in *Lion*, but apparently received.

D 157. S.O., 2nd B.S., to 1st B.C.S. Sent 1226.
My course is NE by E. (1218.) Recd. by Main W/T, 1225.
Intercepted Adty., 1234.

¹ cf. No. 132.

D 158. *Falmouth* to *Lion*. Recd. 1220.
Will you please give me your noon position?

Reply.
54° 38' N, 1° 54' E.

D 159. C.-in-C., H.F., to S.O., 2nd B.S. Recd. 1220.
3rd B.S. left 1000 for 55° 50' N, 1° 10' W. (1220.)

D 160. S.O., 2nd B.S., to 3rd C.S. By Main W/T, 1231.
Take station ahead. (1224.) Intercepted Adty., 1243.

D 161. *Shark* to C.-in-C., H.F. Intercepted *Tiger*, 1225.
(All destroyers (?)) Have reported themselves safe. *Acasta*, *Spitfire*, *Hardy*, are with *Shark*. *Unity* has been detailed to escort *Ambuscade* to Newcastle. *Lynx* proceeding to Leith. *Hardy* steering gear and W/T disabled. *Ambuscade* as before reported. Casualties: *Hardy*, one man killed. *Lynx*, one man wounded. *Hardy*, one officer and three men wounded.

D 162. *Southampton* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. by S.L., 1225.
At 1155, bearing south 5 miles, steering about SSE. (1225.)

D 163. *Shark* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. 1250.
Trawlers are all from Hull, transferring fish. They report they have not seen any strange vessels. *Hardy* has defective steering gear; propose sending her into Humber, escorted by *Spitfire*. She has one man killed, one officer and three men wounded. (1225.)

Reply.
Approved.

D 164. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General. Sent 1230.
Alter course in succession 16 points to port.

D 165. *Lion* to General. By flags, 1235.
Course, ESE.

Note.—From *Southampton's* signal log. Not logged by *Lion*.

D 166. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. by Main W/T, 1241.
Intercepted Adty., 1250.
Enemy's course, east—no battle cruisers seen yet. (1238.)

D 167. S.O., 2nd B.S., to 3rd C.S. By Main W/T, 1245.
Intercepted Adty., 1254.
Close me. (1241.)

D 168. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *Hardy* and *Spitfire*. Sent 1245.
Proceed to Humber.

D 169. Comm. (T) to S.O., 2nd B.S. Sent 1250.
Intercepted Adty., 1303.
My speed reduced to 18 knots. Request instructions. (1247.)

Note.—*King George V* has: "My speed is 16 knots have no request your position." Admiralty has: S.O., 2nd B.S., to Comm. (T). My speed is reduced to 16 knots. Request your position. (1207.)

D 170. Flag, *Lion*, to General. By flags, 1250.
Speed, 20 knots.

- D 171.** S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O.,
1st B.C.S. By Main W/T, 1257.
Intercepted Adty., 1303.
2nd Battle Squadron have resumed original position.¹ (1250.)
- D 172.** A.O.P. to S.O., 2nd B.S. Recd. 1318.
Intercepted *Lion*, 1318.
All German vessels steered east from neighbourhood of Whitby and Filey Bay about 0900 and have not since re-appeared. (1250.)
- D 173.** *Shark* to *Lion*. Recd. 1300.
Please give me your position.
Reply.
54° 35' N, 1° 52' E.
- D 174.** R.A., *Orion*, to S.O., 2nd B.S. 1310.
I think two of the enemy's ships were battle cruisers. I distinctly saw one isolated funnel on each. (1300.)
- D 175.** Flag, *Lion*, to General. By visual, 1315.
Course, north.
- D 176.** S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O.,
2nd B.S. By Main W/T, 1332.
Intercepted Adty., 1323.
Am patrolling to northward of you. Light cruisers spread to westward (a). *Spitfire* is escorting *Hardy*, injured, to Humber. (1315.)
Note.—Admiralty interpolates at (a): "Enemy must be to the westward," and misses the code time.
- D 177.** *Shark* to S.O., 2nd B.S. Recd. 1331.
Am in company with *Lion*, position 1315, 56° 6' N, 2° 10' E. Course, north. (1315.)
- D 178.** Comm. (T), to S.O., 2nd B.S. Recd. 1328.
Expect to arrive rendezvous, 1500. (1320.)
Sent 1346.
Recd. 1346.
Intercepted *Lion*, 1347.
Antrim, 1346.
Adty., 1359.
- D 179.** S.O., 2nd B.S., to Comm. (T).
My position, lat. 54° 23' N, long. 2° 17' E, steering round and round. (1324.)
Note.—Admiralty missed call sign of sender.
- D 180.** Flag, *Lion*, to General. By visual, 1325.
Speed, 16 knots.
Recd. *King George V* (not known).
Recd. *Lion*, 1343.
Southampton, 1400.
Antrim, via *Centurion*, 1440.
- D 181.** Adty. to all Ships.
707 At 12.15 p.m. (G.M.T.), enemy battle cruisers were in lat. 54° 33' N, 1° 7' E, steering E by S, 23 knots. *Urgent*. (1325.)
Note.—Passed by *King George V* to 1st B.C.S., 1st L.C.S., and 3rd B.S., at 1340.
- D 182.** S.O., 1st B.C.S., to *Southampton*. By S.L., 1330.
Recd. 1340.
I am going to steer north until clear of Bank and then turn west again. Enemy must be to westward. I want you to extend your distance from me further west.

¹ *King George V* (S) has "station," (W) has "position." Not logged by *Lion*.

Recd. 1424.
Intercepted *Lion*, 1425.
Adty., 1428.

D 183. S.O., 3rd B.S., to S.O., 2nd B.S.
My position, lat. $56^{\circ} 7' N$, long. $2^{\circ} 6' W$. Course, SE by S, 16 knots.
(1345.)

Note.—*Lion* logs position, $56^{\circ} N$, $20' W$.

Recd. *King George V*, 1425.
Lion, 1422.
Southampton, 1458.
Antrim, 1400.

D 184. Adty. to C-in-C., H.F., S.O.,
2nd B.S., S.O., 1st B.C.S.,
and Comm. (T).
708 High Sea Fleet is out and was in lat. $54^{\circ} 38' N$, $5^{\circ} 55' E$, at 1230
to-day, so do not go too far east. Acknowledge [through a medium power
station]. *Urgent.* (1350.)

Note.—Words in brackets not logged by *King George V*.

Sent 1425.
Recd. 1430.
Intercepted *Falmouth*, 1426.
Admiral, 1426.
Tiger, 1428.

D 185. S.O., 2nd B.S., to Comm. (T).
Return to your base. (1354.)

Sent 1355.
Recd. *Queen Mary*, 1355.
Tiger, 1354.
Southampton, 1355.
Nottingham, 1358.

D 186. Flag (*Lion*) to General.
Turn together to east by south. Speed, 22 knots. (1355.)

By Main W/T, 1359.
Recd. 1358.
Intercepted *King George V*, 1359.
Adty., 1419.

D 187. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., 1st L.C.S.
Course, E by S, 22 knots. (1355.)

Sent 1402.
Recd. *Southampton*, 1400.

D 188. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General.
Speed, 24 knots.

Sent 1406.

D 189. V.A., 2nd B.S., to *Spitfire*.
Are destroyers safe?

Reply.
Yes, as far as I know. *Lynx* and *Ambuscade* badly damaged and proceeding
to Newcastle. *Shark* and *Acasta* with battle cruisers.

By visual, 1408.

D 190. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General.
Alter course to ESE, speed, 25 knots.

By Main W/T, 1408.
Recd. *Southampton*, 1410.
Intercepted *King George V*, 1410.
Adty., 1414.

D 191. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to L.C.S.
Chase ESE.

Note.—Admiralty adds code time, 1405.

Recd. 1535.
Intercepted *King George V*, 1510.

D 192. Adty. to Comm. (S), and
Adamant, via Ipswich.
High Sea Fleet is at sea, and at 12.30 p.m. was in lat. $54^{\circ} 38' N$, long.
 $5^{\circ} 55' E$. They may return after dawn to-morrow, so proceed to Heligo-
land and intercept them. They probably pass 5 miles west of Heligoland,
steering south for Weser Light. (1410.)

D 193. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S. By Main W/T, 1434.
What is your position? I fear battle cruisers were, with remainder,
seen by me at 1215. (1414.)

Reply.

Recd. 1435.

My position, course and speed: Lat. $54^{\circ} 42' N$, long. $2^{\circ} 23' ESE$,
25 knots. (1430.)

D 194. Flag (*Lion*) to General.
Alter course to SE.

By visual, 1442.

By Main W/T, 1427.

Recd. *Southampton*, 1430.

D 195. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., Intercepted *King George V*, 1426.
1st L.C.S. Adty., 1438.

Course, SE. (1425.)

D 196. C-in-C., H.F., to Intercepted *King George V* and *Lion*, 1452.
S.O., 3rd B.S. Adty., 1504.

Re Admiralty telegram 1325. Steer¹ to intercept enemy if they move
north. (1430.)

D 197. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., 2nd B.S. By Main W/T, 1447.
What is your position [course and speed?] (1445.)

Note.—Words in brackets not logged by *King George V*.

Recd. *King George V*

(via *Centurion*), 1507.

D 198. Adty. to S.O., 2nd B.S.,
S.O., 1st B.C.S., S.O.,
3rd B.S., S.O., 1st
L.C.S.

Lion, 1522.

Southampton, 1523.

Antrim, 1504.

Enemy's battle cruisers' position at 12.45 p.m. was lat. $54^{\circ} 26' N$, long.
 $1^{\circ} 25' E$, steering N by E, 21 knots. *Urgent.* Acknowledge. (1450.)

D 199. C-in-C., H.F. (via Aberdeen, No. 788),
to Adty.

Recd. 1536.

May I adv. Comm. (T) to meet me daylight to-morrow? (1458.) *Urgent.*

Sent 1547.

Recd. *Lion*, 1545.

D 200. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st
B.C.S., S.O., 1st L.C.S.

Southampton, 1543.

Intercepted Adty., 1551.

Relinquish chase—rejoin me to-morrow. My present position is lat.
 $54^{\circ} 43' N$, long. $1^{\circ} 55' E$. N $15^{\circ} W$, 18 knots. (1500.)

D 201. S.O., 2nd B.S., to C-in-C., H.F. Intercepted Adty., 1541.

Enemy's cruisers and destroyers seen by 2nd Battle Squadron in mist
and rain, about 12.15 p.m., recognisable distance about 5 miles, steering
E by S, full speed, altered to northwards when chased, and disappeared.

Lat. $54.25 NE$, long. 2.18, they evidently passed battle cruisers in
mist.

My present position, N lat. $54.43 E$, long. 1.55, course N $15 W$, 18 knots.
Third Cruiser Squadron in company. Have ordered battle cruisers and
light cruisers to rejoin.

Am proceeding to base.

Lynx, *Ambuscade*, and *Hardy* damaged; two former proceeding to
Tyne, latter to Humber. (1500.)

D 202. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 3rd B.S. Intercepted Adty., 1542.
My position, $54^{\circ} N$, $1^{\circ} 55' E$. Course, N $15 W$. Speed, 18 knots. (1502.)

¹ Adty. read this "steering."

D 203. *Shark* to S.O., 1st B.C.S. Recd. by visual, 1510.
Shark has only 100 tons of oil left and is burning 8 tons an hour at this speed.

Reply.

1525.

Proceed to harbour and re-fuel. (1505.)

D 204. Adty. to S.O., 2nd B.S. Recd. 1549.
 165 Twenty destroyers of 1st and 3rd Flotillas are waiting orders off Gorleston. If you think it advisable, you may direct Commodore (T) to take them to vicinity of Heligoland to attack enemy ships returning in dark hours. (1520.)

Reply.

Your 165. Certainly not advisable, as there is a strong NW wind and nasty sea. (1639.)

Further signal.

C-in-C., H.F., to S.O., 2nd B.S.

Recd. 1724.

Intercepted Adty., 1730.

Admiralty message, 1520. It is too late now. (1717.)

D 205. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General. Recd. *Southampton*, 1530.
 Speed, 20 knots. By flags, 1538.

D 206. S.O., 1st L.C.S., to Sent by W/T, 1548.
 1st L.C.S. Intercepted *King George V*, 1548.
 Close *Southampton*. Course, north. (1540.)

D 207. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General. Recd. *Southampton*, 1540.
 Course, north. By flags, 1544.

D 208. *Unity* to S.O., 2nd B.S. Recd., via *Monarch*, 1644.
 My position, 1530, lat. $55^{\circ} 12' N$ long. $0^{\circ} 51' E$, steering $N 56^{\circ} W$, 10(?) knots. (1550.)

D 209. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to S.O., Recd. 1554.
 1st L.C.S. Intercepted *King George V*, 1559.
 Take station 5 miles west. Course, $N15W$. Speed, 18 knots. (1550.)

D 210. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General. By visual, 1558.
 Speed, 18 knots.

D 211. S.O., 1st B.C.S., to General. By visual, 1600.
 Course, $N 15^{\circ} W$.

D 212. S.O., 2nd B.S., to S.O., 1st B.C.S., Recd. *Lion*, 1648.
 S.O., 3rd C.S., S.O., 1st L.C.S. *Southampton*, 1639.
 Course for the night, north. (1616.)

D 213. C-in-C., H.F., to S.O., 2nd B.S. Recd. 1707.
 What news? Give your position, course, and speed. Am steering for lat. $57^{\circ} 10' N$, long. $2^{\circ} 10' E$. (1703.)

D 214. C-in-C., H.F., to 2nd B.S. Intercepted Adty., 1807.
 Your 1638. Keep everything out.

D 215. R.A., Dover Patrol, to Adty. Recd. 2008.
 244 C.O.S. I am arranging to have my submarines out to-morrow morning before dawn, and am informing the French to that effect.

D 216. Adty. to Comm. (S). Sent, via Ipswich, 2012.
Recd. 0120, 17th Dec.
We think Heligoland and (?) lights will be lit when ships are going in.
Your destroyers might get a chance to attack about 2.0 a.m., or later,
on the line given you.

D 217. Comm. (S) to Adty. Sent 2030.
Recd. 2145.
Four submarines from Terschelling Patrol will be in the Heligoland Bight
dawn to-morrow, one of which will be off the entrance Weser River.
Endeavouring to collect others; when done, will keep them in company
pending further instructions.

D 218. R.A., Dover Patrol, to French Admiral.
Request submarine patrol may be placed at daylight to-morrow the
same as to-day. British submarines will be placed according to arranged
plan.

APPENDIX E.

GERMAN SIGNALS, 16 DECEMBER, CONNECTED WITH THE SCARBOROUGH RAID.

The German 24-hour day began at noon, Berlin time, *i.e.*, 11 a.m. (G.M.T.); thus, code time, 2040 = our 0740, 0215 = 1315 (G.M.T.). Times have been converted to G.M.T. (except code times). In this appendix, signals addressed to *Friedrich der Grosse* are logged "to C-in-C., H.S. Fleet." Positions given by German squared chart are converted to geographical.

- E 1.** *Moltke* to *Seydlitz*. Recd. 3.34 a.m.
My position, 55° 5' N, 5° 40' E. (1600.)
- E 2.** *S.33* to *Strassburg*. Recd. 4.21 a.m.
Four destroyers, 54° 55' N, 2° 15' E.
- E 3.** *V.155* to *Rostock*. Recd. 5.25 a.m.
For leader of T.B. Flotillas; 10 enemy destroyers in sight. (1825.)
- E 4.** *V.155* to *Rostock*. Recd. 5.30 a.m.
Enemy destroyers chasing me, 55° 10' N, 2° 45' E.
- E 5.** C-in-C., H.S. Fleet, to General. Recd. 5.30 a.m.
H.S. Fleet, 3rd and 4th Scouting Groups, turn by squadrons at 5.30 a.m.
to port; course, SE, high speed. (1815.)
- E 6.** *V.155* to *Rostock*. Recd. 5.35 a.m.
My course is NE.
- E 7.** *V.155* to General. Recd. 5.35 a.m.
Enemy destroyers are chasing me. Course, E. (1825.)
- E 8.** *Hamburg* to C-in-C., H.S. Fleet. Recd. 5.37 a.m.
Ships in sight ahead in 54° 50' N, 3° 5' E. (1820.)
- E 9.** *V.155* to *Rostock*. Recd. 5.38 a.m.
My course is E.

- E 10.** *V.155 to Rostock.* Recd. 5.48 a.m.
Destroyers are chasing me, 55° 10' N, 2° 45' E.
- E 11.** *Rostock to 3rd and 4th Scouting Groups and all Flotillas.* Recd. 5.58 a.m.
To H.S. Fleet, 2nd (? 3rd) and 4th Scouting Groups. Turn to port by squadrons at 5.30 a.m.; course, SE, high speed. C-in-C., H.S. Fleet. (1815.)
- E 12.** *Rostock to all Flotilla Leaders.* Recd. 6.0 a.m.
H.S. Fleet, all Half-Flotilla Leaders, 4th Scouting Group. Turn to port by squadrons at 5.40 a.m. Course, SE. Enemy in sight astern. C-in-C., H.S. Fleet. (1915.)
- E 13.** *Hamburg to C-in-C., H.S. Fleet.* Recd. 6.5 a.m.
Hamburg has destroyed the enemy destroyers. (1850.)
- E 14.** *Strassburg to Seydlitz.* Recd. 6.8 a.m.
Several vessels with lights in sight. Have not sighted coast and lights. Misty on the coast, heavy sea. Cannot keep my course. (1900.)
- E 15.** *V.155 to Rostock.* Recd. 6.10 a.m.
For Leader of T.B. flotillas. Am returning alone. Position, 54° 45' N, 3° 35' E, steering for Heligoland. (1900.)
- E 16.** *Seydlitz to Graudenz and Strassburg.* Recd. 6.32 a.m.
Stralsund, *Strassburg*, *Graudenz* and flotillas, steer for the 6 a.m. position of the main body, *Stralsund* leading. (1940.)
- E 17.** *C-in-C., H.S. Fleet, to General.* Recd. 6.33 a.m.
Turn by squadrons at 6.20 a.m. to ESE½E, take station on 2nd Squadron. (1850.)
- E 18.** *C-in-C., H.S. Fleet, to Preussen (Flagship of 2nd Squadron).* Recd. 7.5 a.m.
2nd Squadron report position. (2000.)
- E 19.** *Leader of T.B. Flotillas to V.155 and all T.B.s.* (?)
Position of main body, 7.15 a.m., 54° 33' N, 3° 55' E. (0817.)
- E 20.** *Preussen to C-in-C., H.S. Fleet.* Recd. 7.20 a.m.
My position, 0700, 54° 33' N, 3° 55' E. Course, ESE½E, slow speed.
- E 21.** *Stuttgart to C-in-C., H.S. Fleet.* Recd. 8.2 a.m.
54° 43' N, 0° 20' W, six enemy destroyers in sight. (2100.)
- E 22.** *Stralsund to C-in-C., H.S. Fleet.* Recd. 8.7 a.m.
My position, 0800, 54° 33' N, 0° 6' E; course, E by S; speed, 20 knots
What is your position?
- E 23.** *Rostock to C-in-C., H.S. Fleet.* Recd. 8.11 a.m.
Enemy submarine in sight on surface, 54° 33' N, 4° 15' E. (2104.)
- E 24.** *Stuttgart to C-in-C., H.S. Fleet.* Recd. 8.11 a.m.
Enemy submarines in sight, 55° 9' N, 1° 50' E. (2104.)
- E 25.** *Seydlitz to C-in-C., H.S. Fleet.* Recd. 8.32 a.m.
Stralsund, *Strassburg*, *Graudenz*, and flotillas detached 6.30 a.m., 54° 38' N, 0° 30' W, steering for the H.S. Fleet. Battle cruisers follow after carrying out the bombardment. (1800.)

E 26. C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet, to *Stuttgart*. Recd. 8.51 a.m.
Main body of H.S. Fleet steering ESE $\frac{1}{2}$ E, full speed.

E 27. *Seydlitz* to *Stralsund*, *Strassburg*, *Graudenz*. Recd. 9.17 a.m.
What is your position? (2200.)

Replies.

Stralsund, 54° 35' N, 0° 55' E; course, SE $\frac{3}{4}$ E; 19 knots.

Graudenz, 0° 49', 54° 31' N (*sic*), 9.30 a.m.

Strassburg, 54° 47' N, 1° 0' E.

E 28. *Seydlitz* to *Von der Tann* and *Derfflinger*. Recd. 9.20 a.m.
Von der Tann, *Derfflinger*, rendezvous in accordance with plan. *Seydlitz* position, 8.45 a.m., 51° 42' N, 1° 0' W; course, ESE; 23 knots. (2145.)

E 29. *Kölberg* to *Seydlitz*. Recd. 9.25 a.m.
Minelaying in 0705 (off Scarborough) completed. (2144.)

E 30. *Seydlitz* to C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet. Recd. 9.44 a.m.
Operation completed. Battle cruisers and *Kölberg*, 9.45 a.m., 54° 42' N, 0° 30' W; course, ESE; 23 knots. (2225.)

E 31. *Seydlitz* to C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet. Recd. 10.21 a.m.
Request your position and course. (2300.)

Reply.

Recd. 10.43 a.m.

Position of H.S. Fleet, 10.0 a.m., 54° 40' N, 5° 0' E; course, ESE $\frac{1}{2}$ E; full speed. Enemy destroyers reported this morning in 54° 43' N, 3° 35' E, and 54° 45' N, 2° 45' E. (2327.)

E 32. C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet, to *Seydlitz*. Recd. 10.48 a.m.
Leader of 18th Half-Flotilla reports area about 54° 56' N, 4° 25' E, dangerous from mines. (2330.)

E 33. *Seydlitz* to *Stralsund*, *Strassburg*, *Graudenz*. Recd. 10.50 a.m.
Are all light cruisers and flotillas in company? What is your 11.0 a.m. position and course? (2340.)

Reply.

Recd. 11.15 a.m.

Stralsund, *Strassburg*, 11.0 a.m., 54° 38' N, 1° 45' E; course, E by S. *Graudenz* bears 8 miles WSW from *Strassburg*.

E 34. *Stralsund* to *Seydlitz*. Recd. 11.39 a.m.
Main body of enemy's fleet 54° 38' N, 2° 6' E. Am being chased SW by S.

Note.—Repeated by *Seydlitz* to C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet, 11.46 a.m.

E 35. *Stralsund* to *Seydlitz*. Recd. 11.58 a.m.
My position, 54° 30' N, 2° 6' E; course, SE. Two hostile light cruisers in sight, enemy's main body in 54° 39' N, 2° 15' E, steering SE.

E 36. *Graudenz* to *Seydlitz*. Recd. 12.7 p.m.
Enemy's forces are reported in 54° 30' N, 2° 6' E, steering west.

E 37. *Stralsund* to C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet. Recd. 12.8 p.m.
The enemy's forces reported are in 54° 38' N, 2° 6' E, steering west.

E 38. *Seydlitz* to C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet. Recd. 12.10 p.m.
My position at noon, 54° 32' N, 0° 57' E; course, SE by S; 23 knots.

E 39. *Stralsund* to C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet. Recd. 12.13 p.m.
Five enemy battleships in $54^{\circ} 15' N$, $2^{\circ} 7' E$.

Note.—Repeated by *Seydlitz* to C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet, 12.18 p.m.

E 40. *Seydlitz* to C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet. Recd. 12.19 p.m.
My position, 12.15 p.m., $54^{\circ} 33' N$, $1^{\circ} 7' E$; course, E by S; 23 knots.

E 41. *Stralsund* to *Seydlitz*. Recd. 12.23 p.m.
My position, $54^{\circ} 27' N$, $2^{\circ} 16' E$; what is the position of our main body?
Enemy battleships SE.

Reply from C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet.

Position of the main body, 12.30 p.m., $54^{\circ} 39' N$, $5^{\circ} 55' E$.

E 42. *Stralsund* to *Rostock*. Recd. 12.35 p.m.
Six enemy armoured cruisers in sight, $54^{\circ} 39' N$, $2^{\circ} 28' E$, steering west.

E 43. *Seydlitz* to *Graudenz*, *Stralsund*. Recd. 12.36 p.m.
Report number and type of enemy's ships. (0125.)

Replies.

Stralsund, 12.44 p.m. Two light cruisers, *Chatham* class, six battleships of 2nd B.S.

Graudenz, 12.50 p.m. One cruiser, "Town" class, one *Essex* to northward, and five battleships to southward of the course line. (Repeated 12.59 p.m. by *Seydlitz* to C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet.)

E 44. *Stralsund* to *Seydlitz* and C.-in-C.,
H.S. Fleet. Recd. 12.41 p.m.
The reported enemy armoured cruisers are enemy battleships.

E 45. *Stralsund* to *Seydlitz*. Recd. 12.44 p.m.
Enemy is out of sight.

E 46. *Seydlitz* to *Strassburg*, *Stralsund*, *Graudenz*. Recd. 12.56 p.m.
Are you in danger? (0150.)

Reply.

Your 0150. No. *Stralsund*. Recd. 1.5 p.m.

Note.—*Graudenz* made a similar reply, but addressed it to *Friedrich der Grosse*, and was asked by C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet, whether *Seydlitz* W/T was out of action, or whether *Graudenz* was in visual communication with *Seydlitz*.

E 47. *Seydlitz* to C.-in-C., H.S., *Stralsund*. Recd. 12.58 p.m.
My position, 12.45 p.m., $54^{\circ} 33' N$, $1^{\circ} 26' E$; course, N by E; 21 knots;
(0145.)

E 48. *Seydlitz* to Battle Cruisers. Recd. 12.59 p.m.
Course, N by E; 21 knots.

E 49. *T.98* to C.-in-C., H.S. Fleet. Recd. 3 p.m.
Enemy submarine in sight, $53^{\circ} 56' N$, $6^{\circ} 35' E$ (?) $54^{\circ} 15' N$, $6^{\circ} 22' E$.
(0400.)

E 50. *Stralsund* to *Seydlitz*. Recd. 5.13 p.m.
My position, 5.0 p.m., with 9th Flotilla, $54^{\circ} 39' N$, $4^{\circ} 46' E$; course,
E by S; 20 knots. (0600.)

E 51. *Seydlitz* to C-in-C., H.S. Fleet, *Kölberg*,
Von der Tann.¹ Recd. 9.12 p.m.
 My position, 9 p.m., 55° 27' N, 5° 6' E; course, ESE½E; 20 knots. (1005.)

E 52. *Derfflinger* to *Seydlitz*. Recd. 10.15 p.m.
 Request permission, with my superior speed, to return to Jade independently, in case suggestion to return via Little Belt is not approved. (1110.)

Note.
 No reply given.

APPENDIX G.

SECRET.

GRAND FLEET—OPERATIONS, NOVEMBER 1914.

Copies to Vice-Admirals Commanding, 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron; Rear-Admirals, *Drake* and *New Zealand*; Rear-Admiral Commanding, 2nd Cruiser Squadron; Rear-Admirals, 1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons; Commodore Commanding, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron; Captains of *Blonde*, *Bellona*, and *Boadicea*, Captain (D), 2nd Flotilla, and the Admiralty.

OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 17—22ND NOVEMBER 1914.

The fleet will leave Scapa at dusk to-day, Sunday, and proceed into the North Sea. The battle squadrons and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron will pass to the northward of Pentland Skerries, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, *Drake* and *Sapphire* to the southward of Pentland Skerries.

Battlefleet in Organisation No. 2.

Destroyers.—*Active* and 2nd Flotilla to leave at 2 p.m. to-day, and search the Pentlands, from the line Dunnet Head—Tor Ness up to 10 miles to eastward of the Pentland Skerries in the direction of rendezvous (A), passing through it at 6.15 p.m., then steering for rendezvous (B) at 15 knots in the order shown in the diagram.

The Cruiser and Battle Squadrons will leave harbour at 15 knots, under their respective flag officers, weighing so as to pass the Pentland Skerries in the order and at the times given below; the distance between the nearest ships of the respective battle squadrons on leaving harbour is to be one and a half miles.

Iron Duke will take station ahead of the *Dreadnought*, when convenient outside the harbour, the *Dreadnought* remaining next astern of the *Iron Duke* until daylight, when she will be directed to take her proper station in Organisation No. 2.

¹ *Von der Tann* had lost touch at 8.30 p.m. and was steering for Horn Reefs independently.

Order of leaving.	Time of passing Pentland Skerries.
1st Light Cruiser Squadron	5.0 p.m.
2nd Cruiser Squadron	1 mile astern of 1st Light Cruiser Squadron.
<i>Drake</i> and <i>Sapphire</i> (under Rear-Admiral <i>Drake</i>).	Close astern of 2nd Cruiser Squadron.
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron	5.30 p.m.
2nd Battle Squadron	6.0 p.m.
1st Battle Squadron	} To follow at intervals of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles between squadrons.
4th Battle Squadron	
<i>Iron Duke</i>	
Attached cruisers <i>Blonde</i> , <i>Bellona</i> , and <i>Boadicea</i>	Astern of their respective squadrons.

Second Battle Squadron to weigh before dark and stand out clear of the anchorage, ready to move out of the harbour at correct time.

2. On clearing the Pentland Skerries, senior officers of squadrons are to steer for rendezvous (A) at 15 knots, and the battlefleet will, without signal, form divisions in line ahead, disposed abeam to port, divisions 5 miles apart, leading ships to bear N 38° E, speed, 15 knots, the 2nd Division steering for rendezvous (A).

Blonde to take station 1 mile astern of 4th Battle Squadron, *Bellona* 1 mile astern of 1st Battle Squadron, and *Boadicea* 1 mile astern of the 2nd Battle Squadron for the night.

3. On passing through rendezvous (A), course is to be altered for rendezvous (B), S 52° E, and at 9.30 p.m., destroyers, cruisers, light cruisers and battle cruisers will reduce speed to 10 knots without signal, whilst at 10 p.m., battleships and attached cruisers will similarly reduce speed to 10 knots without signal.

4. The following rendezvous will be used :—

(A)	Lat. 58° 46' N, long. 2° 0' W.
(B) 58° 0' N, .. 2° 0' E.
(C) 57° 40' N, .. 2° 30' E.
(D) 55° 40' N, .. 5° 20' E.
(E) 55° 10' N, .. 6° 20' E.
(F) 54° 50' N, .. 7° 6' E.

5. *Swift*, and the destroyers of 4th Flotilla have been ordered to be at rendezvous (B) at 7.30 a.m., Monday, 23rd. At 8 a.m., *Swift*, and two divisions will join the Vice-Admiral Commanding, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and at the same time the 2nd Flotilla and remainder of the 4th Flotilla are to take station ahead of the battlefleet as a submarine screen.

The 3rd Cruiser Squadron and 3rd Battle Squadron will join the flag of Commander-in-Chief, at rendezvous (C), at 10 a.m.

Blanche has been ordered to leave Cromarty at midnight, 22nd–23rd, and join *Drake* at rendezvous (C), at 3 p.m., Monday, 23rd.

6. After 4 p.m., on Monday, 23rd, only urgent wireless signals are to be made and those reporting movements of the enemy.

No visual signals, except by shaded lamp, are to be made after early dusk, and searchlights for night defence are to be tested before 3 p.m.

(Signed) J. R. JELlicoe.

Admiral.

Grand Fleet Operations Order, No. 17—22nd November 1914.

ORDER OF FLEET FOR THE NIGHT.

2nd Flotilla.

" " O Active.
 " " " "
 " " " "
2'2'2'
 " " " "

o D.2.

↑
Ten miles.

1st Light Cruiser Squadron (in pairs).

o3'3'
 o
 o

↑
Seven miles.

1st B.C.S.

2nd C.S.

Drake. o

Sapphire. o

.....7'7'
 o
 o
 o
 o

↑
Seven miles.

2nd B.S.

4th B.S.

1st B.S.

X
 X
 X
 X5'5'
 X
 X
 X
 X
 X
 ↑ One mile.
 o
 Boadicea.

X
 X
 X
 X5'5'
 X
 X
 X
 X
 X
 ↑ One mile.
 o
 Blonde.

X
 X
 X
 X5'5'
 X
 X
 X
 X
 X
 ↑ One mile.
 o
 Bellona.

7. The Grand Fleet will carry out a sweep of the North Sea, leaving Scapa, as stated in paragraph 1, and will incidentally afford support to a seaplane attack on the airship sheds at Cuxhaven, which will be made during the early hours of 24th.

The following rendezvous have been fixed by the Admiralty :—

No. 2	Lat. 55° 0' N, long. 7° 30' E.
No. 3	„ 54° 27' N, „ 8° 0' E.
No. 4	„ 54° 50' N, „ 7° 6' E.

The general scheme is as follows :—

Arethusa, *Aurora*, *Undaunted*, with *Engadine*, *Riviera* (seaplane carriers), and eight destroyers, will be at rendezvous No. 2 (lat. 55° N, long. 7° 30' E), at 2 a.m., 24th, and at rendezvous No. 3 (lat. 54° 27' N, long. 8° E), at 5.15 a.m. Seaplanes will start from rendezvous No. 3, after which ships will cruise at high speed, turning towards rendezvous No. 4 (lat. 54° 50' N, long. 7° 6' E), two hours after the seaplanes have started, looking out for their return. If attacked by enemy light cruisers, British light cruisers will engage and lead them away, and destroyers will pick up pilots and sink seaplanes.

If attacked by heavy cruisers, the force will retire towards the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, two light cruisers and one division of destroyers, whose position at 5.30 a.m. is to be rendezvous No. 4 (lat. 54° 50' N, long. 7° 6' E), an endeavour being made by some vessels to return and pick up pilots later.

8. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and Light Cruiser Squadron (except *Falmouth* and *Liverpool*), with one division of destroyers, will be in position in rendezvous (G) (lat. 55° 10' N, long. 6° 20' E), by 5.30 a.m., and will cruise in the vicinity at high speed, to afford support to the inshore force if necessary.

When 3 hours have elapsed since seaplanes started, the whole force will retire at speed towards rendezvous No. 4, on reaching which they are to retire to rendezvous (G).

9. Three submarines will be spread 5 miles apart on a west-south-west line of bearing, the line being 10 miles to the northward of Heligoland. The submarines will intercept and attack enemy vessels and pick up pilots if the destroyers cannot do so.

10. The battlefleet, 3rd Cruiser Squadron, attached cruisers, 2nd Flotilla, and remainder of 4th Flotilla, will be in position about lat. 55° 40' N, long. 5° 45' E, by 8 a.m., 24th, and will cruise in the vicinity until expedition is concluded.

The 3rd Cruiser Squadron will be looking out 10 to 15 miles north-east of the battlefleet, according to visibility.

Destroyers will form a submarine screen.

Grand Fleet Operations Order, No. 18—6th December 1914.

The moon and times of high water being favourable on the 8th–9th December for raiding the Northumberland coast, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, *Drake*, *Warrior*, *Black Prince*, and the 1st Battle Squadron, will be moved into the North Sea, under the orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding, 1st Battle Squadron.

The above force will leave their bases at dusk on Monday, 7th inst.

1st Light Cruiser Squadron are to weigh at 3.30 p.m. and pass through lat. 58° 10' N, long. 1° 20' W, at 8.30 p.m., on Monday, 7th, so as to be clear of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.

The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron are to be at a position lat. 56° N, long. 1° E, at 8 a.m., on Tuesday, 8th inst.,

thence to steer to pass through a position in lat. 55.30 N, long. 1.50 E, and stand towards the Little Fisher Bank, returning to lat. 55° 30' N, long. 1° 50' E, by 8 a.m., on Wednesday, 9th.

From this position the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron are to steer towards Sumburgh Head, returning in company to Cromarty before daylight on Thursday, 10th inst.

At 8 a.m., on Tuesday, 8th, the 1st Battle Squadron and cruisers will be in lat. 57° 0' N, long. 1° 50' E, and will conform generally to the movements ordered for the battle cruisers, so as to be within supporting distance of them.

During the stay of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Cromarty, two light cruisers will frequently be detailed to watch the approaches to the Orkneys, in company with a cruiser from Scapa. Copies of the orders under which these vessels work are attached for your information.

(Signed) J. R. JELlicoe,
Admiral.

APPENDIX H.

ORDERS FOR PLAN Y.¹

(SEAPLANE ATTACK ON CUXHAVEN.)

LIST OF RENDEZVOUS.

(Numbers for Surface craft, letters for Submarines.)

I	Lat. 54.53 N, long. 7.34 E.
II	„ 54.27 N, „ 8.0 E.
III	„ 54.28 N, „ 7.22 E.
IV	„ 54.15 N, „ 6.54 E.
V	„ 54.2 N, „ 6.3 E.
A	„ 54.23, „ 8.2 E.
B	„ 54.13½, „ 7.35 E.
C	„ 54.7, „ 7.15 E.
D	„ 54.0, „ 7.0 E.

FORCE AVAILABLE.

<i>Riviera</i> , with 3 seaplanes.	<i>Fearless</i> .
<i>Engadine</i> , „ 3 „	8 Destroyers.
<i>Empress</i> , „ 3 „	
<i>Arethusa</i> , Comm. (T).	<i>Firedrake</i> , Comm. (S).
	<i>Lurcher</i> .
<i>Aurora</i> .	10 "D" and "E" class sub-
<i>Undaunted</i> (if she is available).	marines.
8 Destroyers.	4 "C" class submarines.

The force will be collected at Harwich, and the day for the operation to take place will be selected by the Commodores (S) and (T), taking the weather into consideration.

Having settled on a day, the Commodore (S) will telegraph to the Chief of Staff by land line in cypher, "Your Y, Tuesday, 2nd inst." (or whatever the day is).

¹ These orders are taken from a draft marked "original" and initialled by the Naval Secretary to the 1st Lord. No other copy has been seen.

The Commodore (S), with *Lurcher* and *Firedrake* and the submarines, will sail in time to be in the following positions at 5.30 a.m. on the selected day, taking care to have time in hand in case of bad weather or having to dive on the passage :—

- 2 " D " or " E " boats to R.V. A.
- 2 " " " " B.
- 2 " " " " C.
- 4 " D " " E " or " C " boats to a position off Norderney Gat.
- 2 " C " class submarines to a position outside the Western Ems (four boats may be sent if available).

Lurcher and *Firedrake* should not proceed beyond the line joining Norderney Gat and R.V. IV, and must not be sighted from the land.

The *Fearless* and eight destroyers will proceed to R.V. V, arriving there by 5.30 a.m.; they may cruise in towards the Western Ems, but must not be sighted from the shore.

Commodore (T), with *Arethusa*, *Aurora*, *Undaunted* (if available), and eight destroyers, will convoy *Engadine*, *Riviera*, and *Empress* to R.V. No. I, arriving at 3.30 a.m. They will then proceed to R.V. No. II, arriving at 5.30 a.m.

The seaplanes will be started as soon as possible after arrival at R.V. II.

The seaplanes will proceed to drop their bombs on the Cuxhaven air-ship sheds, noting what men-of-war are lying in the Elbe and off its mouth en route there.

On their return they should note what men-of-war are at Wilhelmshaven and in the Jade River.

Except when attacking the air sheds, the seaplanes should endeavour to keep out of gunfire.

On leaving the Jade River they should fly along above the coast or islands until Norderney Gat is reached and then steer out to sea due north magnetic from Norderney Gat to meet the flotilla, which will be steaming south in line abreast, covering a front of about 6 miles.

After the seaplanes have started, the Commodore (T), with the seaplane carriers, cruisers and destroyers accompanying him, will proceed at 22 knots to rendezvous Nos. III and IV. On reaching R.V. No. IV, he will alter course to south (magnetic), and steer for Norderney Gat to meet the seaplanes in line abreast, covering a front of about 6 miles.

If undisturbed by the enemy, the seaplanes will be picked up by the seaplane carriers.

Should the enemy attack the surface vessels, the destroyers must rescue the pilots, the seaplanes being abandoned and sunk by the destroyers if possible, the cruisers engaging the enemy or, should they be in superior force, endeavouring to lead them away from the seaplanes.

The *Fearless*, with her eight destroyers, should, at 7.30 a.m., steer at high speed for R.V. D, in order to be at hand to support the Commodore (T) in the event of an attack while picking up the seaplanes, but she should not cross the line due south from R.V. IV and must look out for our own submarines.

The two submarines at R.V. A should spread 2 miles east and west of R.V. A to cover the Commodore (T) from attack while the seaplanes are starting.

When the seaplanes have started, or at 6.30 a.m., the eastern submarine of this pair should remain until nightfall in the vicinity of R.V. A.

The western boat of this pair should proceed to R.V.s B, C, and D, looking out to attack any enemy vessels coming out from the direction of Heligoland.

The pair of submarines at R.V. B should spread E and W of R.V. B, and stand by to attack any enemy vessels. At 7.0 a.m., they should proceed towards R.V.s C and D.

The pair of submarines at R.V. C should be similarly spread until 7.30 a.m., when the western one should steer for a point 10' S (magnetic) from R.V. D, and the eastern one for a point 5' S from R.V. D.

The Commodore (T's) ships will be leaving R.V. IV about 8.30 a.m., steering south (magnetic), and the submarines must not cross their path but remain to the eastward of it to cover them from attack.

The four submarines detailed for a position off Norderney Gat should be stationed in pairs to watch the swept channel, the eastern pair to the northward of Norderney Lighthouse, and the western pair 5 miles to the westward of them. The object of this is that one pair should double bank the other pair.

At 9.0 a.m., these four submarines should steer north (magnetic) and form line abreast, and keep a sharp lookout for any seaplanes which may have descended in order to rescue the pilots.

When the surface vessels have picked up the pilots and begin retiring to the westward, the submarines in sight of them should cover their rear and proceed after them, spreading out into line abreast.

All submarines (except the one which remains near R.V. A) which do not sight our surface vessels should remain in the vicinity of the line Norderney Gat-R.V. IV and keep a sharp lookout for seaplane pilots until noon, when they should return to England.

Should there be a fight, the surface vessels may be prevented from picking up the pilots, and the submarines must use every endeavour to rescue the pilots.

In the event of the operation being brought to a conclusion without interference by the enemy, all surface vessels are to retire to the westward out of sight of land, and are not to commence any further aggressive operations unless attacked while retiring.

(Signed) H. F. O.

2nd December, 1914.

APPENDIX J.

ORDERS FOR OPERATION "O Q."

FORCE TO BE USED.

Aurora (S.N.O.).

1 light cruiser (to be detailed by Commodore (T) and name reported to Admiralty).

4 minelayers (to be detailed by Captain Cobbe, who will be in charge of the minelayers).

1. The four minelayers will leave Sheerness in time to arrive off Harwich by noon on the 7th January, and follow the orders of the S.N.O., *Aurora*.

2. The minelayers are to be escorted from Sheerness to Harwich by a division of destroyers, to be detailed by the Commodore (T). These destroyers should arrive at Sheerness at a time to be arranged with S.N.O., Minelayers.

3. The light cruisers, having joined the minelayers off Harwich, the whole force is to proceed by way of the gap between the minefields (south of lat. 51°54' N), and steer to pass through Position I.

4. The division of destroyers may be used as a submarine screen until nightfall on the 7th, and should then return to Harwich.

5. After passing through Position I, the course and speed should be arranged so as to arrive at Position II at 7 p.m. on the 8th.

6. The cruisers and minelayers will then separate, after carefully fixing their position by the shore lights.

7. The cruisers will proceed to Position III, where they will remain until 1 a.m. on the 9th. Their duty here is to support the minelayers in case they are attacked, the minelayers reporting the attack by wireless

telegraphy, and retiring on the cruisers, and the latter closing to support them.

8. Should they not be required to support the minelayers, they are to proceed to Position V, where the minelayers will join them at daylight on the 9th January.

9. The minelayers will proceed from Position II towards Position IV at 15 knots.

The leading pair of minelayers will lay lines of mines C and D (shown on Charts F.059 enclosed), and the second pair of minelayers will lay lines A and B.

10. The navigation from Position II will have to be by dead reckoning, and it will be necessary for the vessels to proceed in company until it is time for the second pair to turn off and lay lines A and B.

11. The light vessel shown on Chart F.059, near Position IV, is believed to have been removed, and it is believed a war light vessel is sometimes placed in this locality. Should the war light vessel be lit, it will be necessary to avoid it, and in this event, if undiscovered, the ships should retire and lay their mines across a line of bearing N 40 E (magnetic) from Position IV, at such a distance to the northward as to avoid discovery from the light vessel.

12. The mines are to be adjusted so that they will be 12 ft. below the surface at L.W., and are to be spaced apart so that the lines, which are 2 miles long, are covered.

13. As each vessel finishes laying her mines she should proceed independently to join the cruisers at Position V at daylight.

14. The greatest care must be taken to avoid the use of W/T during the passage and during the operation, unless attacked, when it should be used to inform the cruisers and the other minelayers.

15. If attacked by superior forces at any time the cruisers should endeavour to mislead and delay them while the minelayers scatter and escape.

16. A very efficient system of aerial scouting is in operation, and during daylight, Heligoland should not be approached within 100 miles.

17. If the operation is carried out undisturbed, the squadron can return to Harwich by the same route as on the outward passage, but should it appear that the enemy have knowledge of the operation, the return should be by the northern route.

18. The receipt of these orders is to be acknowledged by telegram to C.O.S.—

“ Paper ‘ OQ ’ received.”

In arranging details with Commodore (T), or between S.N.O., Minelayers and S.N.O., Light Cruisers, W/T is not to be used.

19. These orders are not to be communicated to any others than the Commanding Officers of the ships concerned until the squadron has sailed from the R.V. off Harwich, when the C.O.s may communicate them to their officers.

(Signed) C.O.S.

5th January, 1915.

TABLE OF POSITIONS.

Position I	Lat. 55. 0 N, long. 4. 0 E.
Position II	Lat. 55.33 N, long. 7.10 E.
Position III	Lat. 54.45 N, long. 7.10 E.
Position IV (white striped barrel buoy)	Lat. 54.32 N, long. 7.45 E.
Position V	Lat. 55. 0 N, long. 5. 5 E.

APPENDIX K.

"Arethusa."

17th January, 1915.

PLAN "J."

No. 0064. *Memorandum.*

The enemy are supposed to be patrolling the line between Borkum and Horn Reef. It is therefore impossible to strike the whole line at the same time.

I therefore propose to turn my attention to the Borkum end, where there is only one bolt-hole, and from the direction of my approach it is the easiest to stop.

2. Flotilla cruisers and all available destroyers will cross the line joining Borkum and Horn Reef at about 5.30 a.m., at 15 knots, in lat. 54° N, and at 6.30 a.m. turn to N 36 E, and as follows:—

The 3rd Flotilla, with "M" Division on the right, will spread by divisions 1 mile apart on a line of bearing E by N from *Arethusa*, the *Undaunted* being in the centre.

The 1st Flotilla will be spread by divisions 1 mile apart on the port beam of *Arethusa*, whose speed will be 20 knots.

3. If the enemy's T.B.D.s are sighted, divisions will be detached to chase, but they are not to chase for more than half-an-hour. That is, if they are not up to their quarry in half an hour, they are to rejoin, and are to keep me informed of any movements.

4. If the enemy's cruisers are sighted, destroyers are to form on their flotilla cruisers and await orders.

5. I shall proceed for about 2 hours on N 36 E, and if nothing has been sighted I shall turn towards the battle cruisers, who will be in lat. 55° N, long. 5° 30' E.

The light cruiser squadron will be 20 miles SE of the battle cruisers.

6. Commanders of divisions are to use their discretion as regards chasing enemy's T.B.D.s.

Many may be met with, or *vice versa*. In any case, not more than two of ours should chase a single enemy's T.B.D.

Commanders of divisions are to clearly explain this to their sub-divisional leaders, so that the whole division does not chase one T.B.D.

(Signed) R. Y. TYRWHITT.

Commodore (T).

To the Captains (D), *Aurora* and *Undaunted*,
and Divisional Commanders concerned.

ADDENDA.

Add to Paragraph 6:—

Destroyers are not to chase to the eastward of the 7th Meridian, and if, on return, they fail to find their flotilla, they are to proceed to the position of the battle cruisers.

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- DANE, Lieutenant-Commander C. R. Commanding *Lennox*; In action with destroyers, 17th October, II 70.
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- FRENCH, Field-Marshal Sir John, Commander-in-Chief, B.E.F. ; *Re* defence of Havre, II 2 ; Urges establishment of alternative base, 29th August, II 7 ; His plans for capture of Ostend and Zeebrugge, III 108.
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- GRANT, Rear-Admiral William L., C.B. Hoists flag as Rear-Admiral, 6th Cruiser Squadron, 12th July, I 14 ; Searches Faroes for German craft, 12th August, I 44.
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- HANSEN, Lieutenant-Commander. Commanding *U.16*; Grounds off Lerwick, 23rd November, III 50; Trying experiences on return journey, III 54.
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- HORTON, Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Commanding *E.9* ; sinks *Hela*, 13th September, II 28 ; Sinks *S.116* off Western Ems, 6th October, II 48.
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- JAMESON, Lieutenant-Commander. Commanding *D.2*; drowned, November, III 45.
- JELlicoe, Vice-Admiral Sir John R., K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Second in Command of Grand Fleet, I 15; Arrives at Scapa, 2nd August; Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet; Hoists flag in *Iron Duke*, with acting rank of Admiral, 4th August, I 21; Requests that Harwich Striking Force be separated from his command, I 51; Suggests extension of Dover minefield, 14th October, II 87; Presents memorandum of Grand Fleet requirements at conference, 2nd November, III 18; His objections to despatch of *Princess Royal* to Atlantic, November; His principles of strategy, III 36; His opinion on changed conditions of strategy, due to submarines; His suggestions for precautions against invasion, November; His objection to attachment of 3rd Battle Squadron to Channel Fleet, III 37; Dissatisfied with conditions of possible fleet action, November, III 63; Suggestions for dealing with minelayers, December, III 94; Wish to use mines tactically in fleet action, III 111. *See also under* Grand Fleet and cross-references there given.
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- JOHNSON, Captain C. D., M.V.O. Captain (D), Dover Patrol; Commanding *Attentive*, II 40-41.
- JOHNSON, Captain R. W. Commanding *Cressy*; *Re* sinking of three *Cressys*, 22nd September, II 34.
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- KIEL. Capacities as German naval base; as headquarters of Baltic station, I 12; Practicability of British submarine operations off, II 23.
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- KILNER, Flight-Commander. Movements and reports of, in Cuxhaven air raid, 25th December, III 99.
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- KOLBE, Lieutenant-Commander. Commanding *U.19*; Rammed by *Badger*, 24th October, II 87.
- KOSGICK, Vice-Admiral Gunther von. Commander-in-Chief, Wilhelms-haven, I 16.
- LAMBE, Acting Wing-Commander Charles L. Commanding seaplanes at air raid, 25th October, II 86.
- LANS, Vice-Admiral Wilhelm von. Commanding 1st Battle Squadron, I 16.
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- LAW, Commander W. J. B. Commanding *Topaze*; stands by *Formidable*, 1st January, III 106.
- LAYARD, Lieutenant-Commander B. V. Commanding *C.32*; off Ostend, II 87.
- LEAKE, Captain Francis Martin. Commanding *Pathfinder*; wounded when sunk, 5th September, II 26.
- LEARMONTH, Captain Frederick C. Chairman of Committee on Submarine Defences, December, III 69.
- LE CANNELLIER, Rear-Admiral. Under Admiral Rouyer in French 2nd Light Squadron; Patrolling with Admiral Wemyss, I 35; Patrolling Ushant to Finisterre, 31st August, II 11.
- LE HAVRE. See under Havre.
- LEIR, Lieutenant-Commander Ernest W. Commanding *E.4*; in Bight, 10th September, II 22.
- LEITH. Guns mounted at, November, III 39.
- LE MANS. Advanced base in France, 30th August, II 8.
- LEMMER, Kapitän-Leutnant. Commanding *U.5*; lost off Flanders, December, III 104.
- LEVESON, Rear-Admiral Arthur C., C.B., Director of Operations Division, Admiralty, August, III 114; Relieves Admiral Arbuthnot, Commanding 2nd Battle Squadron, January, III 114.
- LIGHTS, Channel. Extinguished, due to German submarines, 27th September, II 42, 87.
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- LISTER TIEF. Minefield laid off, at mobilisation, I 24; R.V. for merchant shipping entering Germany from 10th September, II 73.
- LITTLE BELT. Westernmost Channel controlled by Germany; Available up to 27 ft. draught, I 11.
- LITTLEJOHNS, Lieutenant-Commander A. Scott. Commanding Antwerp battery, II 44; Commanding Naval armoured train, Antwerp withdrawal, II 52.
- LOCH EWE. Secondary coaling base at, I 49; Defence of, I 50, II 25; Supersedes Scapa as coaling base, 11th August, I 52; *Dreadnought* battlefleet arrives at, I 64; Four units of Auxiliary Patrol to, September, II 14; Abandoned for Scapa, 6th October, II 64; Auxiliary Patrol at, November, III 51; Anti-submarine defences unsatisfactory, December; Steps to hasten work on; Base for armed boarding vessels, December, III 65.
- LOCH NA KEAL. Temporary overflow base for Grand Fleet, 16th October, II 64; Submarine defences improvised, October, II 65.
- LOFOTEN ISLANDS. Supposed R.V. for German merchantmen, I 29.

LONDON. Protection of, against airship attack, II 6; Anti-aircraft defence, August 1914–January 1915; Air stations at Erith and Hendon, January; Airship attack on, forbidden, January, III 117.

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(a) *By Mine.*

1. *On Southwold Minefield.*—*Amphion*, 6th August, I 32.
2. *On Tyne Minefield.*—H.M. Trawler No. 61, 27th August, I 67; H.M. Trawler No. 106, 27th August, I 67; *Barley Rig*, 27th August, I 67.
3. *On Humber Minefields.*—Fleet Sweeper *Speedy*, and number of trawlers, II 15; Trawler *Windsor*, 22nd January, III 113.
4. *On Tory Island Minefield.*—S.S. *Manchester Commerce*, 26th October, II 79; *Audacious*, 27th October, II 80; s.s. *Tritonia*, 19th December, II 82; III 95, 113.
5. *On Smith's Knoll Minefield.*—Submarine *D.5*, 3rd November, III 7; Fishing vessels *Fraternal*, *Copious*, *Will and Maggie*, 3rd November, III 7; Trawler *Mary*, 5th November, III 13.
6. *On Scarborough Minefield.*—Collier *Elterwater*, 16th December; s.s. *Princess Olga*, 16th December; Trawler *Orianda*, 19th December; Trawler *Garmo*, 20th December; Trawler *Night Hawk*, 25th December; s.s. *Gem*, 25th December; s.s. *Linaria*, 26th December; two more trawlers, III 92.
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(b) *Sunk by Submarine.*—*Pathfinder*, by *U.21*, 5th September, II 26; *Aboukir*, by *U.9*, 22nd September, II 34; *Hogue*, by *U.9*, 22nd September, II 34; *Cressy*, by *U.9*, 22nd September, II 34; *Hawke*, by *U.9*, 15th October, II 63; s.s. *Glitra*, by *U.17*, 20th October, II 67; Submarine *E.3*, by *U.27*, 18th October, II 73; *Hermes*, by *U.27*, 31st October, II 89; *Niger*, by *U.12*, 11th November, III 31; s.s. *Malachite*, by *U.21*, 23rd November, III 59; s.s. *Primo*, by *U.21*, 26th November, III 60; *Formidable*, by *U.24*, 1st January, III 106; s.s. *Durward*, by *U.19*, 21st January, III 115.

(c) *Sunk by Surface Craft.*—Trawlers *Marnay*, *Capricornus*, *Skirbeck*, *Wigtoft*, *Walrus*, *Flavian*, *Julian*, *Indian*, 22nd August, I 62; Fishing vessels *Rhine*, *Harrier*, *Lobelia*, *Valiant*, *Mersey*, *Sati*, 25th–26th August, I 65; Trawler *Manx Queen*, by *V.28*, 16th December, III 88; *Good Hope*, *Monmouth*, by von Spee's Squadron, 1st November, III 33; Fishing vessels *Wayside Flower*, *Constance*, at Hartlepool raid, 16th December, III 84.

(d) *Cause Unknown, but Probably Mine.*—Submarine *D.2*, November, III 61; Submarine *C.31*, January, III 107; Submarine *E.10*, January, III 115.

(e) *Through other Causes.*—Repair Ship *Fisgard II*, in gale, 17th September, II 25; Armed Merchant Cruiser *Oceanic*, wrecked, 8th September, II 74; *Bulwark*, internal explosion, 28th November, III 63.

LOSSES (French). S.S. *Amiral Ganteaume*, sunk by *U.24*, 26th October, II 88.

LOSSES (German). *Königin Luise*, sunk by gunfire, 5th August, I 31; *U.15*, rammed by *Birmingham*, 9th August, I 42; *U.13*, lost in North Sea, I 42; *Hela*, sunk by *E.9*, 13th September, II 28; *S.116*, sunk by *E.9*, 6th October, II 48; *S.119*, *S.115*, *S.117*, and *S.118*, sunk by gunfire, in Broad Fourteens, 17th October, II 70; *Yorck*, sunk on German defensive minefield, 3rd–4th November, III 15; *U.8*, sunk off Pentland Skerries, 23rd November, III 52; *U.11*, lost off Flanders, about 9th December, III 69; *U.5*, lost off Flanders, December, III 104; *U.7*, sunk by *U.22*, January; *U.31*, lost in North Sea, January, III 115; *Blücher*, sunk in Dogger Bank action, 24th January, III 120.

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On Tyne Minefield.—Danish s.s. *Skuli Fogeti*, Norwegian s.s. *Hesvik*, Swedish s.s. *Gottfrid*, 27th August; Norwegian s.s. *Gaea*, 27th August; Norwegian s.s. *Tromo*, 3rd October; Swedish s.s. *Kamma*, 2nd September; s.s. *St. Paul*, 2nd September, I 67.

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